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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Thomas Johnsen 
University of Bath School of Management
Research on the management of collaborative innovation has, to date, largely 
concentrated on analysing relationships between two companies or, more recently, 
within coalitions of companies. There has been a paucity of research on how innovating 
companies deploy the resources and technologies available within their wider industrial 
networks whilst at the same time coping with the problem of loss of control of 
knowledge through the very same networks. This is the subject of the present thesis.
A conceptual framework is developed, which is structured around a set of activities that 
companies apply during product innovation to manage collaborative innovation. These 
activities are: - uniting, mobilising, synchronising, communicating, problem solving, 
exchanging human resources and timing. The conceptual framework provides an 
analytical structure for examining the positive, enabling, effects of networks on the 
management of collaboration activities, and the negative, constraining, effects. The 
framework differentiates a variety of ways in which these network effect may manifest 
themselves during product innovation projects.
The empirical data collection comprises an exploratory mini-survey involving five 
interviews with companies in the automotive and pharmaceutical sectors, and four in- 
depth case studies involving 46 interviews with a range of companies in the automotive 
and telecommunications sectors.1 The findings from the thesis provide indications that 
more than any other activities, uniting and communicating appear to be affected by the 
surrounding network in which they take place, both enabling and constraining the 
management of these two activities. Hence, this study contributes to the debate on the 
different forms of network effect on the innovation management process, and explores 
how companies can cope with and exploit these paradoxical effects.
1 The number 46 includes three interviews from an abandoned case.
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Part One:
The Case for Collaborative Innovation in Networks: 
Existing Research and Conceptualisation
Overview of Part One
The purpose of Chapter One is to provide an overview of the context of 
the thesis. The chapter will introduce the relevance and contribution of 
the study, define the subject of inquiry - collaborative innovation in 
industrial networks - and the research problem, and explain the research 
aim and objectives. An overview of the research approach and 
methodology is provided and the structure of the thesis is outlined.
Chapters Two and Three explain the academic context of the inquiry 
through a critical review of the existing research on innovation and 
customer-supplier relationships in industrial networks. Based on this 
literature review, Chapter Four presents the conceptual framework, 
which has been developed from the literature review and undergone 
iterations following exploratory empirical findings. Thus, what is 
presented in Chapter Four represents the final version of the framework.
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Chapter One
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS
1.0. Introduction
This thesis is concerned with some of the critical issues facing companies when they are 
involved in collaboration with others in developing and implementing innovations. 
These issues centre on the simultaneous opportunities and problems in collaborative 
innovation in industrial networks. On the one hand, inter-company collaboration can 
provide the opportunity for companies to capitalise on the technologies and skills of 
other companies in the surrounding network. However, on the other hand, such 
collaboration can lead to problems in retaining control over the company’s own 
resources and technologies. This paradox is the subject of inquiry of the thesis.
Chapter One sets out the context of the thesis, thus introducing the relevance and 
contribution of the study. The chapter defines the basic problem, which drives the study, 
and explains the research aim and objectives. A brief note is made to provide an 
overview of the research approach and methodology. The chapter concludes by 
outlining the structure of the thesis.
1.1. The Subject and Context of Inquiry
A substantial body of research has reported a ‘strong upsurge’ of various forms of inter- 
organisational collaborative ventures for innovation (e.g. Freeman, 1991; Hagedoom, 
1995; Hagedoom and Schakenraad, 1990). The concept of collaborative innovation also 
seems to be receiving increasing attention amongst academic scholars. Researchers have 
examined vertical collaboration with customers (e.g. Von Hippel, 1988; Lundvall, 1986; 
Voss, 1985), suppliers (e.g. Clark, 1989; Lamming, 1993; Takeuchi andNonaka, 1986; 
Womack et al, 1990; Wynstra, 1998; Bideault and Butler, 1995), and horizontal 
collaboration with universities, research associations, or even competitors (e.g. Hamel et 
al, 1989; Hagedoom, 1993, 1995; Kotabe and Swan, 1995).2 The concepts o f ‘networks 
of innovators’ or ‘innovation networks’ have also emerged (e.g. Freeman, 1991;
2 Collaboration may be vertical i.e. part o f an on-going relationship within the value or supply chain, or 
horizontal i.e. across value/supply chains: competitive or complementary (see also Hakansson, 1987; 
Easton and Araujo, 1992).
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DeBresson and Amesse, 1991; Imai and Baba, 1989). The reasons for the apparent 
recognition of many companies across industries to engage in different modes of 
collaboration with a myriad of external parties are multiple. The increasing intensity of 
global competition means that time and speed are now regarded as key competitive 
factors (Stalk and Hout, 1990). Consequently, there is a need to reduce product 
development time and cost whilst improving the value of the offering that results from 
the development process. Furthermore, in their quest to keep up with an increasing rate 
of innovation, many companies are reportedly focusing on their core competencies and 
technologies, hence out-sourcing many of the activities and competencies they 
previously nurtured in-house (Quinn, 1999). The rate of technological change in most 
industries is so high that most companies do not have a choice whether or not to 
collaborate; they are often forced down this route of action in order to gain access to 
knowledge-intensive resources, capabilities, and technologies, which they cannot 
contain inside the boundaries of their own company if they are to remain flexible and 
agile (e.g. Granstrand et al, 1997; Ford and Saren, 2001).
Whereas there are many apparent advantages of collaboration for innovation and 
technological development the road to collaboration is often paved with obstacles. The 
management of collaborative relationships is often entirely different from the 
management of traditional adversarial relationships and requires different capabilities 
(Moller and Svahn, 2002) and different mindsets. Therefore, although companies may 
realise the need to collaborate many have reported mixed successes in such ventures. In 
specific contexts, such as the Japanese automotive industry, collaboration with suppliers 
for product development has been reported in a major study to have reduced time to 
market by four to five months and saved vehicle manufacturers around 800.000 
engineering hours per car development project (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, Clark, 1989). 
However, in other contexts the benefits that have been reported are less clear and 
outcomes may even be negative. In a cross-industry survey, Hartley (1994) found that 
there were hardly any or no effects of closer supplier involvement in product 
development on product costs, quality or development lead-time. The results by Birou 
(1994) were even more disappointing: she found that the results of supplier involvement 
in product development across several industries were in fact negative, both in terms of 
development time and product performance. Even though there may be specific 
methodological problems in the surveys concerned, it would appear that the benefits of
13
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collaboration often fail to come to fruition. There is therefore a real need to advance the 
current understanding of the management of collaborative innovation.
The premise of this thesis is that both the benefits and problems of inter-organisational 
collaboration can be better understood by adopting a network perspective. Most 
research to date that has examined the management of collaborative innovation has 
focused on dyadic (one-to-one) relationships, ignoring the fact these operate within and 
are influenced by a complex surrounding network. Even in the cases of the so-called 
‘networks of innovators’ or ‘innovation networks’ (e.g. Freeman, 1991; Oliver and 
Blakeborough, 1998) little attention is paid to the existence of other relationships of the 
parties, including other similar networks or alliances in which the parties are likely to be 
involved. An understanding and conceptualisation of these network influences has been 
provided by a group of researchers within industrial marketing and purchasing (IMP 
Group: see for example Hakansson, 1982, 1987, 1989; Ford, 1990; Easton, 1992; 
Lundgren, 1993; Johanson, 1989; Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). These researchers 
have effectively contributed to the trend of ‘networking’ as a means to innovate, but 
unlike much other research into collaboration, they have also argued the difficulties 
related to operating within a network of relationships. This implies that any 
collaboration may be constrained, for example, by the partner having conflicting 
relationships with other parties in the network (ibid.).
One problem that companies face when seeking to collaborate with other parties for 
innovation is that each of the parties involved is enmeshed in a network of relationship 
(e.g. Burt, 1983; Ford and Hakansson, 2002; Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Nohria,
1992). This network is an asset to the companies as it can provide access to a wider set 
of resources. However, at the same time it limits the control that any one company can 
exercise over a relationship (e.g. Hakansson, 1987; Ford and Hakansson, 2002; 
Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Nohria, 1992). The reason why networks limit 
individual company control is that the actions and priorities of each of the parties will 
be influenced by what happens in their other relationships and elsewhere in the network. 
Some of the companies in these other relationships may act in a way that supports the 
focal company. Conversely, the actions of others may conflict with those of the focal 
company. Such conflicting actions may thus constrain attempts at developing and 
managing innovation by any one actor in the network. Therefore, it is critical for
14
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managers to understand the actions and re-actions not only of their immediate partners, 
but also those of companies positioned further away in the network.
The IMP researchers tend to have a background in industrial marketing and purchasing 
and their perspective is focused on inter-firm interaction. They have arguably 
contributed to a more realistic understanding of the complexity of inter-organisational 
collaboration and management. Nevertheless, the majority of the IMP work on 
technological innovation in networks has focused primarily on describing, explaining, 
and conceptualising the nature of dyadic relationships and their embeddedness in 
networks. Their work has emphasised the constraints of collaborating in networks, but 
provided little insight into how networks can contribute positively to innovation (see for 
example Wensley, 1995).
From the 1990s complementary theories of industrial networks have been posed to the 
IMP perspective by scholars with a background in strategic supply (chain) management, 
and strategy. This emerging body of research has reported on how powerful 
manufacturers (often automotive vehicle assemblers) appear to be able to exercise 
effective control over their networks e.g. Benetton (Jarillo and Stevenson, 1991), 
Toyota (Womack et al, 1990), and Nissan (Nishiguchi, 1994). Like the IMP research, 
the strategic supply chain research has highlighted the benefits that can be derived from 
inter-organisational relationships. However, unlike the IMP-orientated research, supply 
chain and strategic networks research has suggested that individual powerful network 
actors are in a position to exert power and control over networks and may thereby 
achieve competitive advantage at the level of the whole supply chain and hence through 
network deployment.
To date much strategic supply chain research has been observational and anecdotal, 
describing case examples of firms that appear to have managed their networks and 
achieved some form of competitive advantage (Johnsen et al, 2000). Benetton (Jarillo 
and Stevenson, 1991), Nike (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995), Toyota (Womack et 
al, 1990), and Nissan (Nishiguchi, 1994) are examples of such descriptive accounts,
3 The term ‘strategic’ supply chain management is not used here to suggest one coherent body of research 
but rather to differentiate between research, which has focused on how inter-organisational relationships 
can contribute to competitive advantage (such as Womack et al, 1990; Lamming, 1996), and more 
operational logistics-focused research (such as Bowersox et al, 1986).
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which have been seminal in recent developments in supply chain management (Johnsen 
et al, 2000). Although much supply chain management-based research focuses on 
operations and supply processes, recent research has also adopted innovation as the unit 
of analysis. Examples of such research include the concept of supplier involvement in 
product development (e.g. Clark, 1989; Lamming, 1993; Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986; 
Womack et al, 1990; Wynstra, 1998). Therefore, whereas some scholars have argued 
that IMP research has tended to focus on the negative implications of networks (e.g. 
Galaskiewicz, 1996; Harland and Wensley, 1996), it would appear that researchers in 
supply chain management and strategic networks have tended to focus on positive 
exploitation of networks.
This thesis primarily adopts an IMP perspective, however, it incorporates some 
complementary perspectives, notably that of supply (chain) management. It builds upon 
concepts and theories that have been developed from within the IMP approach, but 
extracts some ideas and concepts from supply management, thereby incorporating the 
best of both theories whilst avoiding their inherent limitations.
1.2. Problem Definition
A central premise of recent research is that individual companies and even supply 
chains are but part of a large complex network of inter-connected relationships. 
However, there has been a paucity of research on how companies can manage the 
innovation process within wider industrial networks; concepts such as ‘early supplier 
involvement in product development’ arguably have a predominantly dyadic focus, 
which tends to underestimate the significance of networks (e.g. Bonaccorsi and 
Lipparini, 1994; Wynstra, 1998). Companies face a strategic challenge of how they can 
explore the opportunities existing within the network in which they are enmeshed. 
Paradoxically, they may need at the same time to cope with the problems and 
constraints, which networks may exert on the innovation management process. 
However, the knowledge of different activities that companies may apply to manage the 
process of innovation and how networks affect these activities, is still to emerge. Thus, 
the aim of the thesis is to:
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• examine how companies deploy the resources and technologies available within their 
network whilst at the same time coping with the problem of loss of control of 
knowledge and technologies, during technological innovation
The overall aim sets the direction for the thesis as a whole. Within the overall aim a set 
of objectives has been developed to:
1. Identify a set of activities that companies apply during technological innovation to 
draw upon individual dyadic relationships and gain access to resources and 
technologies available in the wider network
2. Examine how companies draw on networks when managing the identified set of 
activities
3. Examine the extent to which networks pose a constraint on the management of the 
identified set of activities
The first objective was formulated to lead to the construction of a set of activities 
through which network actors may draw upon resources and technologies existing 
within networks. The objective framed the inquiry within a process perspective, 
although recognising that innovation processes cannot be fully understood without 
appreciation of the structural context that is networks. Prior attempts by some 
researchers to construct similar sets of activities have arguably been partial in scope. For 
example, Hakansson and Eriksson (1993) and Wynstra (1998) construct sets of 
activities related to managing supplier involvement in product development. From a 
network perspective their constructions therefore focus on upstream supplier 
relationship and network problematics, but pay littler attention to downstream customer 
relationships. Here the author draws upon experience from a previous (and at some 
points simultaneous) research project on Inter-Organisational Networking (Project ION: 
1996-1999), which constructed a similar set of activities, but in a more generic context 
of ‘managing’ in different types of network situations (Lamming et al, 2000a; Harland 
et al, 2001; Johnsen et al, 2000).
The second objective concerns the positive implications of networks. It involves 
generating insights into how the set of activities identified might be managed beyond 
the dyadic relationship level, helping focal actors to draw upon the resources and
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technologies that can be mobilised through the network. The IMP research has provided 
important conceptualisations and language for understanding how network actors can 
deploy and co-ordinate resources and technologies available through networks (e.g. 
Hakansson, 1989; Ford et al, 2003). However, IMP researchers have tended to adopt a 
rather conservative stance on the question of ‘management’ in networks (Harland et al, 
2003) so the complementary perspective of supply chain management and lean supply 
is used to provide conceptualisations of ways of enabling activities within a network 
context. The experience and conceptualisation from Project ION provided important 
insights into this somewhat controversial aspect of network research. In addition, 
participation in a research project, which was initially known as ‘IMPlb’ but later as 
‘Project MaGNet’, helped to develop and refine the author’s understanding of the 
problem of ‘management’ in networks.
The third objective was developed to provide an understanding of the negative 
implications of networks on the process of managing collaborative innovation. It 
concerns the consequences of operating in networks, which according to IMP theory 
(e.g. Hakansson and Snehota, 1995) imply that focal actors have to cope with the 
actions and re-actions of other network actors. Whereas Project ION provided 
inspiration for the positive side of networks it arguably had less to say about this 
negative aspect of networks. Hence the existing IMP research has been the primary 
source of knowledge for this objective.
The combination of the overall objective to identity a set of activities and examining the 
-  positive and negative - network implications on the conduct of the identified set of 
activities is core to the contribution of this thesis. Arguably, existing research has 
examined both the positive and negative effects of networks. However, little research to 
date has examined specifically how individual activities, which are concerned with the 
management of innovation, may be positively and/or negatively affected by the network 
in which actors are embedded. The dual consideration of those two conflicting effects is 
therefore seen as a core contribution of this inquiry.
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1.3. Overview of Research Methodology and Approach
The process of collaborative innovation in networks is complex, dynamic and often 
characterised by a high level of confidentiality. Moreover, the concept of networks is 
not well understood and often confused with e.g. information or communications 
systems networks (such as Local Area Networks or LANs). Hence, it is problematic to 
formulate well-defined hypotheses that allow large-scale surveys to obtain reliable data 
from respondents. Such practical reasons have often caused IMP researchers to rely on 
case research methodologies.
As Easton argues (1998, 2002) there are not only practical but also epistemological 
arguments for adopting case research as the methodology for the study of customer- 
supplier relationships and network phenomena. In seeking to generate valid explanatory 
knowledge, positivist researchers rely on analysis of event regularities (correlation) 
within systems to uncover reality (Ramsay, 1998). Within a phenomenological (or 
constructivist) paradigm, reality is regarded as socially constructed rather than an 
objective phenomenon. Human interpretation of meanings perceived in phenomena and 
events, constitutes reality. Phenomenology differs from positivism in its focus on in- 
depth understanding of phenomena rather than large-scale empirical hypothesis testing 
and deductive reasoning. Furthermore, positivist research relies on the study of closed 
or ‘close-able’ systems (through isolation and control of variables). As phenomenology 
is not concerned with uncovering reality through analysis of event regularity 
(correlation of controllable variables), it requires no such system isolation.
As this research project is concerned with complex and dynamic processes in structures 
that are by definition open systems, namely networks (Cova et al, 1998), it rejects a 
positivist philosophy. However, it seeks to avoid the inherent trap associated with 
phenomenological research, that the researcher equates his/hers constructed reality with 
the reality underlying the constructed reality (Easton, 1998). To avoid this problem, this 
research project adopted a so-called ‘critical realist orientation’ (Easton, 1998; Kwan 
and Tsang, 2001). This implies that although both respondents and the researcher may 
attach different meanings to phenomena (and thus construct their own reality) what 
matters is the search for the reality that is not purely subjective.
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The choice of a critical realist research philosophy affected the way in which the present 
research study has been conducted. The project commenced with a review of the 
literature, which presented the state of knowledge and research related to the field of 
study i.e. the management of collaborative innovation in networks. The aim of the 
literature review was not to derive a set of defined hypotheses but rather to develop an 
understanding of the field of knowledge and to allow for a set of research questions to 
emerge. During the early stages of the literature review an exploratory mini-survey 
involving five interviews across five companies was carried out. Following analysis of 
early empirical findings and further literature investigation, research questions 
formulated around a conceptual structure were evolved. This guided four in-depth case 
studies that were conducted, involving 39 interviews with focal companies and key 
suppliers and customers in addition to three case study facilitation meetings and four 
follow-up meetings with the main focal company contacts for validation of case 
findings. Hence, the combination of the study of literature and the exploration of an 
emerging research agenda served to continuously refine ideas and concepts. It was an 
iterative learning process, which was abductive rather than systematically deductive or 
inductive (Ayer, 1968). It has been a process of systematic combining of theory and 
empirical data (Dubois and Gadde, 2002).
1.4. Structure of the Thesis
The report is divided into three parts. Part One sets the scene for the research (Chapter 
One) and contains a critical review of existing research, key definitions and 
conceptualisations. Part Two is the empirical part of the thesis. It explains and justifies 
the research process and methodology and presents the findings from first the 
exploratory mini-survey and next four in-depth case studies. Part Three contains the 
discussions and conclusions of the empirical results, comparing these with the findings 
from the literature review and the conceptual structure. The three parts are divided into 
nine chapters as follows:
Chapter Two sets out to define and classify the key concepts and terms related to 
technological innovation. It presents some prominent models depicting the product 
development process and explains the significance of integrating process development
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into the product development process. Chapter Two concludes by advancing the 
argument that innovation by definition entails interaction amongst different actors.
Chapter Three examines the theme of interaction in business markets. It identifies some 
of the main characteristics of relationships and examines the existing theory and 
knowledge concerning the role of individual relationships within wider networks. As 
the meaning of ‘networks’ is often ambiguous the concept of network is defined and a 
generic model of networks is introduced. Different types of inter-organisational network 
are identified and the question of how different levels of analysis and different 
perspectives on networks affect the way we describe and perceive networks, is 
discussed.
Chapter Four presents the conceptual framework, which underpinned the empirical 
investigations conducted as part of the thesis. The framework has been developed from 
the literature review and undergone iterations following the exploratory mini-survey and 
the pilot case study. What is presented here represents the final version of the 
framework. The conceptual structure is examined, including a set of collaborative 
innovation activities. The chapter concludes by outlining the emerging research 
questions.
Chapter Five provides an overview of the research philosophy and methodology 
adopted in the thesis. The chapter begins by discussing the philosophical and 
epistemological approach adopted, including a brief critical evaluation of three potential 
philosophies i.e. positivism, phenomenology and critical realism. The chapter discusses 
the research approach and the research design, relating to the two empirical stages that 
have been conducted as part of this research: an exploratory mini-survey and four in- 
depth case studies. The research design section further discusses issues of the unit of 
analysis, case selection, and analytical methods employed.
Chapter Six reports on the findings from the mini-survey i.e. a small set of exploratory 
interviews and discusses some possible explanations for apparent cross-case differences 




Chapter Seven reports on the findings from the four in-depth case studies that form the 
core of the empirical study. Each case is discussed in sequence, identifying the specific 
context of the case and discussing different network effects on each collaboration 
activity. An assessment of the performance of each collaboration activity, including the 
perceived extent of collaboration shown in each activity, is presented.
Chapter Eight presents the cross-case comparisons. This serves to provide an overview 
of the main findings from the case studies. Thereafter, the research questions, which 
were set out at the end of Chapter Four, are addressed through analysis of the case study 
findings and by revisiting the literature. Hence, the contributions of the cases are 
identified and the implications of the findings are discussed.
Chapter Nine presents the managerial implications and conclusions from the research, 
addressing the overall aim and project objectives. The contributions and limitations of 
the study are discussed. The chapter concludes with an outline of avenues for further 
research. Figure 1 provides an overview of the structure of the thesis, illustrating the 
principal connections between chapters:
Figure 1. Thesis Structure
Chapter 6: Findings from 
exploratory mini-survey
Chapter 3: Existing research 
on networks
Chapter 8: Cross-case 
comparisons and theoretical 
implications
Chapter 7: Findings from 
in-depth case studies
Chapter 4: Conceptual 
framework and research 
questions
Chapter 2: Existing research 
on innovation
Chapter 5: Research 
Philosophy and 
methodology
Chapter 9: Conclusions: 
Collaborative innovation in 
networks
Chapter 1: Problem 





The motivation for doing this thesis was sparked by an academic concern about an 
apparent lack of understanding of the dual -  enabling and constraining - implications of 
networks on the management of technological innovation. Existing schools of thought 
seem to place a somewhat imbalanced representation of this duality and appear to 
consider network implications at a general rather than specific level. Knowledge of 
different activities that companies apply to manage the process of innovation and how 
networks affect these activities appears to be lacking. Thus, the aim of the thesis is to 
examine how innovating companies deploy the resources and technologies available 
within their network whilst at the same time coping with the problem o f loss o f control 
o f knowledge and technologies.
The thesis (the premise) is that both the benefits and problems of inter-organisational 
collaboration can be better understood by adopting a network perspective. This 
argument is grounded in prior research and empirical investigation. The first of these 
two elements is the subject of the following three chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION
2.0 Introduction
This chapter commences by defining and classifying core concepts and terms related to 
technological innovation. Having established a platform of innovation terminology, a 
range of models depicting the product development process is presented. Early models 
focus predominantly on the development of the product per se, whereas later models 
incorporate required process developments in parallel with the product development 
process. The final section of Chapter Two shifts the focus towards the interactive nature 
of innovation, advancing the argument that innovation by definition entails interaction 
amongst different network actors. This understanding of innovation provides the basis 
for an in-depth examination of networks in Chapter Three.
2.1 Core Concepts of Innovation
Although the territory of technological innovation is well developed, a number of 
different definitions of innovation can be identified. The following section seeks to 
discuss these definitions and classify relevant terms.
2.1.1. Innovation
The Latin word innovare means ‘to make something new’. Innovation can be regarded 
as the process of turning opportunity into new ideas and of putting these into widely 
used practice. This is consistent with the UK DTI Innovation Unit definition (1994) as: 
“successful exploitation of new ideas”. ‘Exploitation’ is important here, as it 
differentiates innovation from invention: “innovation is the process by which an 
invention is first transformed into a new commercial product, process, or service” 
(Saren, 1984, pp. 11-12). This view is echoed by e.g. Martin (1984) and Roberts (1988).
According to the Frascati Manual, adopted by the OECD (1994), innovation involves 
the transformation of an idea into a marketable product or service, a new or improved 
manufacturing or distribution process. The Frascati Manual definition indicates that two 
types of innovation exist: product and process innovation. Nevertheless, other forms of
24
Chapter Two
innovation may be considered equally important: organisational-structure innovations, 
market innovations and people innovations (e.g. Knight, 1967; Schumpeter, 1935).
Searching through the literature, one realises that it is very difficult to find any agreed 
definition of innovation. Trying to synthesise the wide variety of definitions, Zaltman et 
al (1973) posit that definitions can be classified into three dimensions each reflecting 
different perspectives.
The first perspective looks at the process of developing the new item. This perspective 
is embraced by, for example, Holt who defines innovation as “a process which covers 
the use of knowledge or relevant information for creation and introduction of something 
that is new and useful” (1983, p. 13). The second perspective focuses on the process of 
adopting the new item. Examples of the adopter perspective include Knight (1967) who 
defines innovation as “the adoption of a change which is new to an organisation and to 
the relevant environment” (p. 478). To put it differently, this perspective is concerned 
with the diffusion of innovation into different categories of customer and how they 
receive and use the innovation (Rogers, 1983). Finally, the third perspective focuses on 
the new item itself (e.g. Gobeli and Brown, 1987). This perspective analyses the extent 
to which new ideas, practices, or objects are perceived as new by an individual or other 
unit of adoption. It often leads to examinations of the degree of newness brought about 
by the innovation. Each of the perspectives is relevant to this inquiry, although given 
the objectives of the thesis perhaps mostly so the development process perspective. 
Whereas it is seen as important to establish the degrees of innovation of projects being 
studied that is not a primary objective of the thesis. Similarly, the focus on interaction 
will stress the role of customers in innovation, but the focus will not be on the process 
of adoption per se.4 The question of degree of change is examined in the following.
Following the perspective of the item being developed, innovations can be classified 
according to the nature and degree of change, or outcome. Martin has made an early 
contribution by differentiating between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ innovations 
(1984). Inspired by Kuhn (1962), Martin’s term suggests that a fundamental
4 The adoption process perspective is often studied in consumer marketing and is concerned with the 
identification of different categories o f adopter, such as ‘early adopters’ and ‘laggards’ (Rogers, 1983). In 
some respects this is equivalent in industrial markets to the research by Von Hippel on ‘lead users’ (e.g. 
1988). This is discussed in more depth in Chapter Four.
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transformation of existing belief systems and paradigms is required to bring about a 
revolutionary innovation.
Gobeli and Brown later proposed a more detailed distinction between ‘incremental’, 
‘technical’, ‘application’, and ‘radical’ innovations (1987). Distinguishing the two 
dimensions of technological change (the producer’s view) and customer benefit 
(customer’s or market view), they define those innovations that involve a low customer 
benefit and low degree of technological change as incremental. Technical innovations 
involve a high degree of technological change but low customer benefit, and application 
innovation involves high degree of customer benefit but low degree of technological 
change. Radical innovations involve high degrees of both customer benefit and 
technological change. This classification is comparable with Crawford (1994), Ford and 
Saren (2001), and Booz, Allen and Hamilton (1982). Such a classification is useful, as it 
emphasises the equal importance of the technological upstream-driven side and the 
customer downstream-driven side of innovation. Hence, the model is based on the 
seminal differentiation and discussion of whether innovation is demand-led 
(Schmookler, 1966) or technology-pushed (Schumpeter, 1934).5
Based on an impressive synthesis of innovation theory, Freeman (1994) has suggested a 
ranking of innovation on a five-point scale: systemic, major, minor, incremental, and 
unrecorded. He acknowledges, however, that the most common distinction is simply 
between radical and incremental innovations. He characterises radical innovations as 
those needing a new factory and/or market for their exploitation and incremental 
innovations as the scaling-up of plant and equipment and quality improvements to 
products and services for a variety of specific application (see also Freeman and Perez, 
1988). The term ‘novel’ also frequently appears in the literature, and would appear to 
refer to innovations that entail a radical change (see e.g. Von Hippel, 1986; and Tidd et 
al, 1997). ‘Novel’ is a useful term as it emphasises that innovation is not only about 
change, it is about evolving on something new.
5 In more recent years the debate on the innovation process seems to have reached consensus with the 
introduction of Rothwell’s interactive model (1983), which depicts that neither a linear research/science- 
to-marketing nor a demand-to-innovation-to-market is sufficient to understanding the innovation process, 
but an interactive combination of the two.
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Scholars focusing on innovations that involve a very high degree of change have 
developed the concept of ‘discontinuous innovation*. In discussing radical versus 
evolutionary innovation, Abernathy and Utterback (1988) suggest that discontinuous 
innovations are those that create entirely new market offerings that may be opaque to 
customers (see also Veryzer, 1998; DeTienne and Koberg, 2002). Kassiecieh et al 
(2002) relate discontinuous innovations to radical, architectural, generational and 
revolutionary innovations. However, the terms discontinuous and revolutionary may be 
appealing as they hint at a required shift in technological (and product and market) 
paradigm (Dosi, 1982). DeTienne and Koberg argue that “discontinuous innovations are 
not necessarily a matter of magnitude but can comprise altered variations in technology 
that over time shift the direction of the industry ... discontinuous innovation or 
variations in technology will augment, shift and change the firm’s technological 
processes and products/services/programs.” (p. 352). DeTienne and Koberg thus adopt a 
more dynamic focus.
Linton (2002) has pointed out that discontinuous innovation involves shifting from one 
technological learning curve to a more attractive one, thereby obtaining a substantial 
gain in one or more performance metrics. Hence, discontinuous innovation is about 
moving from one technological path or trajectory to another (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and 
Winter, 1977,1982).6
Innovations that involve a supposedly even higher degree of change have been termed 
disruptive. Kassicieh et al (2002) describe disruptive innovations as “scientific 
discoveries that break through the usual product/technological capabilities and provide a 
basis for a new competitive paradigm” (p. 375) (see also Linton, 2002).
The view of innovation as revolutionary (Martin, 1984), discontinuous or disruptive 
(e.g. Kassicieh, 2002) change can be traced to the seminal work on innovation by the 
Austrian economist Schumpeter who specified that all innovation requires some degree 
of ‘creative destruction’ (1942). The fundamental idea is that in order for (particularly
6 Trajectories describe the direction in which a technology is seen to advance, driven by technology 
pushes (R&D-led) and demand-pulls (gradual adoption in the market place). Firms may decide to jump 
on the bandwagon to pursue the ‘technological corridor’ (Georghiou et al, 1986) offered by the trajectory. 
Dosi describes a technological paradigm as an outlook, a set of procedures, a definition of the relevant 
problems and of the specific knowledge related to their solution (1982). Hence, a technological paradigm 
might be seen as a cross-sectoral set o f new trajectories (see also, Lamming, 1992).
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revolutionary or disruptive) innovation to come about, old assumptions have to be 
questioned, and ‘old’ technologies and competencies may need to be ‘creatively 
destructed’. This concurs with Leonard-Barton’s findings that core capabilities may 
both enable and impede product innovation, in the latter case becoming core rigidities 
(1992) or core incompetences (Dougherty, 1995). As Itami and Roehl have stated: The 
time to search out and develop a new core resource is when the old is working well 
(1987, p. 54). Thus, both continuous and discontinuous innovation matter (Lamming,
1993) and it requires an element of creative destruction and dynamic capabilities (Teece 
and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al, 1997).7
Teece and Chesbrough (1996) mainly distinguish between ‘autonomous’ and ‘systemic’ 
innovation. Autonomous innovations are those that are pursued independently from 
other innovations. Systemic innovations in contrast are those that are dependent on 
other, complementary, innovations. The authors refer to Polaroid’s efforts to profit from 
instant photography, which necessitated both new film technology and new camera 
technology, as an example of systemic innovation. Tidd et al (1997) have offered a 
variation on the distinction between autonomous and systemic innovation. Autonomous 
innovations concern stand-alone elements whereas systemic innovations concern 
components in broader systems or architectures. For example, a new type of disc drive 
represents a product innovation at the component level, but it also makes a contribution 
to the larger computer system of which it is part.
Whereas most classifications concern purely the degree of change, the scope of 
innovation, there is also an issue of the extent to which innovations are systemic i.e. 
scale. In trying to capture this issue, Lundgren (1995) has developed a taxonomy of 
innovation incorporating both the scope and the scale of the innovation. Lundgren’s 
taxonomy distinguishes between ‘minor’ and ‘major’ innovations on the innovation 
scope dimension, and ‘changes to the technological systems’ and ‘technological 
revolutions’ on the innovation scale dimension. Technological revolutions are not only 
radical innovations, but also interrelated (Schumpeterian) clusters of innovation 
amongst several firms (or a whole industry) as a result of a technological breakthrough. 
Such technological revolutions may enable an industry to leap ahead from its previous
7 The ever shortening product life cycles across industries over the last few decades is a sign that firms 
have started to realise the importance of becoming ever more innovative, continuously questioning
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technological position. Examples of such technological revolutions include 
breakthrough fields such as biotechnology and image processing. It is important to 
recognise that Lundgren’s view of technological revolutions is different from that of 
e.g. Martin, as it adopts an industry rather than a firm perspective.
Some authors view the scale of innovation as reflecting the scope. Earlier work by 
Freeman (1994) suggested that ‘systemic* was at the highest end of the (scope) 
spectrum, reflecting an even higher degree of change than ‘radical*. This view reflects 
that when product innovations become increasingly radical, associated changes in, for 
instance, production and marketing systems (but not necessarily the firm) may be 
needed (Pavitt, 1984). This is also consistent with the definitions of radical innovation 
adopted by Mensch (1975) and Utterback (1979). Whether it is necessarily the novelty 
of an innovation, which determines whether it is systemic (if for example a series of 
inter-dependent yet incremental innovations together formed a significant, but not 
necessarily radical innovation), is unclear.
Figure 2 synthesises the plethora of definitions discussed here, using Lundgren’s 
taxonomy as a template.
existing accepted or dominant designs of products, processes, technologies, and systems.
8 Lundgren’s discussions of leaping clusters of innovation owe much to the early research on innovation 
by economists, notably Schumpeter and his followers, whose work on periods of clustered innovations or 
‘clusters of explosions’ followed by periods without such clusters, has inspired, or in some cases directly 
resulted in, the concept o f long term innovation cycles (such as those conceptualised by Kondratiev and 
Mensch (Mensch, 1979). Those clusters of innovations are formed by the ‘swarming’ activity as 
competitors copy and react to the initial innovation i.e. band-wagon effect (Freeman, 1982).
29
Chapter Two
Figure 2. Synthesis of Innovation Classifications
Interrelated Cluster of 
Innovation
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system (Lundgren, 1995)
Minor Change
Minor Innovation (Freeman, 1994)
Incremental Innovation:
(Freeman, 1994; Gobeli and Brown, 1987; 
Martinich, 2002)




Systemic Innovation: (Freeman, 1994; 
Teece and Chesbrough, 1996) 
Technological Revolutions (Lundgren,
1995)
Disruptive Innovation (Veryzer, 1998; 
DeTienne and Koberg, 2002; Kassiecieh et 
al (2002)
Discontinuous Innovation (Linton, 2002; 
Kassiecieh et a/, ^ 2002)
Revolutionary Innovation (Martin, 1984)
Major Change
Novel Innovation (Von Hippel, 1986; 
Tidd, 1995)
Radical Innovation (Lundgren, 1995; 




However, the degree of change brought about by an innovation is not objective. What 
matters is the perceived degree of change or novelty; novelty is in the eye of the 
beholder (Tidd et al, 1997). For example, the implementation of a technologically 
advanced information system may be a small innovation to a large computer company, 
but a radical innovation to a small low-tech company where even the use of a simple PC 
may represent a major challenge. This point is thus consistent with Gobeli and Brown’s 
model (1987) and it emphasises the importance of the two dimensions of newness: new 
to the world/market versus new to the company.
Innovations involving major change have traditionally been seen as more important than 
those involving minor change. However, the majority of firms do not generate radical 
innovations, but develop and adopt incremental innovations first made by others 
(Freeman, 1994). Indeed lessons from Japan have shown that ‘continuous improvement’ 
or kaizen may be more important as a competitive success factor (see Womack et al,
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1990).9 Moreover, innovation may often come about as a result of the creative 
combination of old and new technologies; in fact innovations rarely embody only new 
technology. Hence, the definition of innovation centred on ‘first application’, while 
useful as a starting point for analysis, has its limitations. It can be interpreted as lending 
support to the view of innovations as representing well-defined, homogeneous things 
that enter the economy at a precise point in time. In reality, most important innovations 
go through drastic changes over their lifetimes. Subsequent improvements can be 
significantly more important, economically, than the original invention (OECD, 1994).
2.1.2. Product Innovation and New Product Development
The terms ‘product innovation’ and ‘(new) product development’ often seem to be used 
interchangeably in the literature and few scholars attempt to explain the significance of 
using one term or the other. One scholar who has attempted to define these two terms is 
Trygg (1991). He views product innovation as including the whole process from market 
needs to sales, and product development being the phases of product planning, 
engineering design, and process planning. Figure 3 illustrates the difference:










Based on Trygg, L. (1991) Engineering Design: Some Aspects o f Product Development Efficiency, 
Gothenburg, Chalmers University of Technology.
According to Trygg (1991), the number of stages of development determines whether 
the process should be regarded as product development or product innovation: 
innovation includes the whole process from initial market recognition to initial sales, 
whereas product development only includes product planning, engineering design, and
9 Kaizen emphasises the dominance of continuous, or incremental, improvements, particularly related to
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(production) process planning. Trygg’s model refers to the development process rather 
than the outcome of the process. His model is also useful for depicting product 
development against research and development, portraying the latter involving research, 
product planning, and engineering, but not process planning. The models of the new 
product development process discussed later, however, are not all consistent with 
Trygg’s model.
According to Hart (1996) it is the large number of traditionally different disciplines, 
such as engineering, design, marketing, industrial economics, production management, 
and technology management, which results in seemingly different terms being used to 
describe practically the same phenomenon. Hart perceives innovation as a concept 
describing a higher degree of ‘newness’ than, for instance, the term ‘development’. 
Hence, she argues that product innovation describes “a new (to the world) product, not 
necessarily using new (to the world) technology, while a product development would 
describe further development of a product already in existence” (p. xi). She does, 
however, recognise the difficulties of adopting such a classification; firstly that it 
becomes difficult to distinguish between technological development and product 
innovation and secondly the fact that it ignores the market perspective. In other words, 
an innovation may be new to a specific market (or industry) but not to the world as a 
whole. Wynstra suggests (1998) that the term innovation always seems to be related to 
the discussion of degree of change or newness, and thus favours the term product 
development, although this suggestion is debatable given Zaltman et aVs analysis 
(1973) distinguishing three perspectives, only one of which focuses distinctly on the 
discussion of degree of newness.
One concept that is rarely discussed in the literature but is nevertheless frequently used 
in industry is ‘new product introduction’. It can be equated to the launch phase of a new 
product development project but may also refer to slight variants on existing products or 
already developed products launched or introduced in new markets (Hines et al, 2000). 
Thus, one new product development project may result in several new product 
introductions, for example, in different geographical markets. The concept of new 
product introduction is thus very close to Hart’s (1996), arguably problematic, 
definition of product development.




Process innovation tends to refer to innovation in production or manufacturing 
processes (e.g. Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Process 
innovation is often regarded as a separate form of innovation from product innovation. 
However, in reality it is difficult to distinguish between product and process innovation 
as e.g. the user or adopter of a new CAD system may think of it as a process innovation 
whereas the manufacturer may regard it as a product innovation. It depends on the 
perspective, as also argued by Biemans (1989).
Together product and process innovations have been categorised as ‘technical 
innovation’ (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975) or ‘technological innovation’ (Johne, 
1985, Tidd et al, 1997). Utterback and Abernathy (ibid.) viewed process innovation as 
stimulated either by improvements in technology or a wish to minimise cost at the later 
stage of product development. Their perception was based on the traditional marketing 
assumption that innovation is need-triggered. As discussed by many authors this may 
not always be the case as innovations may be technology-driven (e.g. Freeman, 1979). 
Furthermore, the model can be criticised for viewing process innovation, including cost 
improvements, as something which primarily takes place towards the end of the product 
life cycle. Even if this may have been the case in the past, there is a large emphasis in 
contemporary literature on early, and indeed product life-cycle independent, process 
innovation e.g. kaizen, based on the logic that processes have to be right from the start 
of product launch. This will be discussed later in this chapter (see also Clark and 
Wheelwright, 1994; Pisano, 1997).
Pisano (ibid.) argues that to understand the strategic role of the process development 
capability, it is important to explore and establish its context. Pisano’s ‘Alpha gene’ and 
‘Beta gene’ cases highlight three untenable assumptions of Utterback and Abernathy’s 
model:
1. The model focuses on cost reduction as the primary benefit of process innovation; 
the role of time to market and production ramp-up are ignored.
2. The model assumes that organisational competencies required for product innovation 




3. The model assumes that specialised process innovation is not needed to enable 
product innovation. Pisano’s Alpha and Beta gene cases show how breakthroughs in 
process technologies actually enabled the product innovation.
Pisano presents the following matrix for contexts with different roles of product and 
process innovation:






Pisano, G. (1997) The Development Factory-Unlocking the Potential o f Process Innovation, Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts.
As Table 1 shows the relative importance of process innovation versus product 
innovation differs widely across industrial contexts. In industries such as 
pharmaceuticals or biotechnology it is innovations in new process technology that often 
allow new products to be developed. The implication of this view is significant, as it 
dismisses the prior depiction of the role of process innovation as something that occurs 
later on in the product innovation process (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). Hence, in 













High precision, miniature electronic
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Work station computers 
Assembled products
Either little process development or 
a focus on designs for 
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As discussed in the previous section, technological innovation has been described as an 
umbrella term for product and/or process innovation. However, technological 
innovation often refers not only to innovation in finished or assembled products and 
processes but also to innovation in underlying product and process component 
technology. A more precise definition, therefore, may be obtained by defining what 
exactly is meant by ‘technology’.
The perceptions of the meaning of ‘technology’ have undergone important historical 
development. Historically, the focus on technology has been on the physical aspects. 
Skinner (1982, p. 464) has defined technology as “the set of physical processes, 
methods, techniques, tools and equipment by which products are made or services 
rendered.” Nystrom (1990) has defined technology as “knowledge that is potentially 
useful for product and company development, even though the immediate implications 
may not be clear” (p. 43). Thus, Nystrom reflects the recent trend, which is to turn the 
focus towards knowledge, and in his case specifically related to product and company 
development. This definition concurs with Ford and Saren’s definition of technology, 
which differentiates between three types of technology: (2001, p. 50-51)
1. Product technology is knowledge of the physical properties and characteristics of 
materials and the ability to incorporate these into the design of products or services 
which could be of value to another company or individual
2. Process technology is knowledge of ways of producing products or services and the 
ability to produce these so that they have value to others
3. Marketing technology is knowledge of ways of bringing these products and process 
technologies to a particular application and the ability to carry this out. This involves 
the skills of market analysis, branding, packaging, pricing, communications and 
logistics.
Ford and Saren (2001) not only see process and product knowledge as the basic 
components of technology, but they also conceptualise what they call ‘marketing 
technology’ as knowledge of ways of bringing these products and process technologies 
to a particular application and the ability to carry this out. Their argument is that 
developing a product as well as the means to produce it is insufficient to achieve
35
Chapter Two
success in the market place if it does not reach customers in a meaningful manner. Their 
definition is comparable with the one formulated by Lambe and Spekman (1997), who 
divide technological innovation into three similar parts: ‘product technology* being the 
set of ideas embedded in the product itself, ‘process technology* being the set of ideas 
involved in the manufacture of the product and ‘management technology’ being the 
knowledge required to market the product.
Defining technology in terms of knowledge and ability to act on knowledge puts 
technological innovation in a very different light, akin to modem definitions of 
capabilities or competencies. Prahalad (1993) conceptualises core competency as the 
harmonisation of multiple technologies: “[Sony’s core competency of miniaturisation] 
requires core technologies, such as microprocessors, miniature power sources, power 
management, packaging, and manufacturing. It certainly also requires knowledge and 
understanding of user-friendly design and a knowledge of ergonomics. In addition, 
miniaturization is a result of deep sensitivity to emerging life styles. A core competency 
does not represent just technical capabilities in microprocessors, or packaging, or 
passive components; it also means understanding how to exploit life styles knowledge 
using electronics.... What matters is the creative bundling of multiple technologies and 
customer knowledge and intuition, and managing them as a harmonious whole” (p. 45).
Prahalad (ibid.) conceives competence as being a more aggregate and transcending 
ability than technology, an ability embedded in the whole organisation. Competencies 
are also different from ‘capabilities’ in that these do not necessarily confer any specific 
differential advantage over competitors. In other words, capabilities may be pre­
requisites to ‘get into the game’ in the first place, but nothing more, according to 
Prahalad. Competencies are ‘distinctive’, as originally termed by Selznick to describe 
‘the character’ of the organisation (1957). Therefore, capabilities may be seen as 
operational whereas competencies are strategic. Elsewhere, however, Prahalad and 
Hamel (1992) argue that it is not so much a question of whether they are called 
capabilities or competencies, but rather whether they are core or non-core.
Others have a different perception of capabilities. Teece and Pisano (1994) differentiate 
capabilities from technologies stating that “the management capability to effectively co­
ordinate and re-deploy internal and external competencies;...companies can accumulate
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a large stock of valuable technology assets and still not have many useful capabilities” 
(p. 538). Their distinct concept is one of ‘dynamic capabilities’ where the term 
‘dynamic’ refers to the changing character of the environment and ‘capabilities’ to the 
salient role of strategic management in adapting, integrating, and re-configuring internal 
and external organisational skills, resources and functional competencies toward the 
changing environment (p. 538). Teece et al (1997) perceive a competence as a set of 
differentiated skills, complementary assets, and routines that provide the basis for a 
firm’s competitive capacities and sustainable advantage in a particular business. 
Capabilities have also been defined as firm specific ‘invisible assets’ created and 
accumulated over time through complex interactions among the firm’s resources (see 
for example Teece et al, 1997; Itami and Roehl, 1987).
In her examination of the interaction between activities pursued in the course of 
developing new products and processes, and the organisation’s core technological 
capabilities (p. 5), Leonard-Barton (1995) has distinguished three types of capability: 
supplemental, enabling, and core capabilities. Supplemental capabilities are “nice to 
have - but unessential”, enabling capabilities are “the minimum basis for competition in 
the industry but that, by themselves, convey no particular competitive advantage” while 
core capabilities are those that “at least potentially provide a competitive edge” (p. 18), 
hence consistent with the notion of core competencies as developed by Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990). Her definition of capabilities includes the skills and knowledge base, 
technical systems, managerial systems (of education and rewards), and (organisational) 
values and norms (1992):










Source: Leonard-Barton, D. (1992) Core capabilities and core rigidities: a paradox in managing new 
product development. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13, p. 114.
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As Tsekouras argues “whatever definition of capabilities/competencies is adopted it is 
clear that a capability/competence consists of several dimensions some of which are 
technological and some of which are clearly organisational” (1998, p. 64).
In summary, apart from bringing the concept of technology very close to that of 
competence, Ford and Saren’s definition of three types of technology (2001) is more 
operational compared with the very wide definition of core competence. By essentially 
disaggregating the concept of core competence, they attempt to cope with the problem 
of the core competency approach to strategy10, being that it tends to constitute ex post 
observations rather than ex ante guidelines as to how to develop such competencies, a 
criticism also echoed by e.g. Iansiti and Clark (1994).11
The following section resumes the inquiry into product development to examine how 
the process of developing new products can be described.
2.2 The Product Development Process
A large number of models depicting the product development process exists. The nature 
and complexity of the plethora of models that have emerged during the last 30-40 years 
have changed radically. Most models are so-called ‘stages models’, assuming that the 
process of generating new products undergoes a sequential process from early idea 
generation to product launch. The stages models vary significantly according to their 
unit of analysis: some are concerned with how the process moves across different 
departments, others focus on different forms of activity. However, a range of non-stage 
models also exist, for example so-called conversion models that remove the assumption 
of an orderly sequential process and instead look at how the process uses different types 
of input and transforms these into outputs (Quinn, 1985).
It is beyond the purpose of this thesis to seek to develop any new typology of the 
product development process. In order to provide a brief overview of some of the 
existing different models the taxonomy proposed by Saren (1984) will be used:
10 Discussed by for example Porter (1991) in his excellent criticism of the core competence view of 
strategy.
11 The problem of building core capabilities/competencies is also the aim of Leonard-Barton (1995) and 






- Conversion process models
- Response models
Taking each of these in turn, departmental-stage models focus on the development as it 
moves from one department to another e.g. R&D, design, engineering, production, and 
marketing (Saren, 1984). Although departmental-stage models are useful for showing 
the departmental involvement and responsibility, they say little about the process of 
product development. Perhaps more importantly, they assume a sequential movement 
through departments, thus ignoring the importance of departmental overlap and 
feedback.
Activity-stage models focus on the sequence of distinct activities, which make up the 
development process (e.g. Utterback, 1974; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Perhaps the 
best-known activity-stage model is the classic model by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton 
(1971):









Derived from Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (1971) Management o f New Products, New York: Booz, Allen 
and Hamilton Inc.
The Booz, Allen, and Hamilton model assumes interdependent stages. This was an 
important message at the time of publication because it emphasised that individual
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1 9stages needed to overlap to reduce product development time. The Booz, Allen and 
Hamilton model is often used in traditional Marketing textbooks (see for example 
Kotler, 1994). Nevertheless the activity-stage models have been criticised for their 
inability to illustrate the interactions between the various stages of the new product 
development process and the assumption that each stage is completed before the next 
one starts (Moore, 1984).
Decision-stage models adopt a more flexible approach than activity-based models, as 
they generally do not assume that one step has to be carried out before the next can 
commence (e.g. Cooper, 1983). The models often specify go/no-go decisions and 
evaluation points, thereby allowing for decision theory, probability analysis, and 
computer simulation to assist in decisions. Each decision point is viewed as a small 
process with information as input and decision(s) as output. Cooper’s model assumes a 
multidisciplinary process, incorporates both market and technological activities, and 
exhibits incremental commitment and is market-oriented. In recent years the so-called 
Stage-Gate model (e.g. Cooper, 1993) has been widely applied, for example by Danish 
Bang & Olufsen (Hansen et al, 2002).13 However, it is arguably a formalised, rational 
and to some extent bureaucratic model, which may hinder creativity and hence 
innovation (Hamel, 2000).
Conversion process models adopt an operations management depiction of input, 
conversion/transformation process and output (Cooper, 1982). Such models remove the 
assumption that the process is an orderly and logical sequence (Quinn, 1985). Using the 
ICAM (ICAM, 1981; Godwin et al, 1989) development of the input-process-output 
model to include consideration of ‘mechanisms’ or ‘enablers’, and ‘constraints’ or 
‘blockers’ (IDEF0), the product development process can be illustrated as below:14
12 Later the authors included “new product strategy development” at the beginning of the process (Booz, 
Allen and Hamilton, 1982).
13 Although at B&O the initial idea development stage is separated sharply from the rest of the process, 
managed by the so-called ‘Idea Land’ unit.
14 Historically, the concept of IDEF0 began in the early 1970s when the US Airforce recognised the need 
to cut costs of aerospace products by increasing its industries’ productivity. This led to the introduction of 
a program for Integrated Computer-Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) being developed as a means of 
producing efficient manufacturing control and developing automated manufacturing systems. This model 
has now also been used to analyse design and development processes, including concurrent engineering 
(e.g. Colquhoun et al, 1989).
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Figure 6. A Conversion Model of the Product Development Process
Enablers
input i y ConversionProcess: y> Output
XT
Constraints
Finally, response models are based on behavioural stimulus-response models, focusing 
on innovation as a response to a change/stimulus. They concentrate on the early stage of 
inception and include stages such as stimulus, conception, proposal, and 
adoption/rejection (Biemans, 1989).
The conversion model in the form of a basic interpretation of the so-called IDEFO 
(Input-Definition-Output) modelling of the product development process is adopted in 
this thesis. This is adopted because it offers a simple way to capture and conceptualise 
network enabling and constraining effects on specific innovation activities. 
Furthermore, an activity stage model is relied on for collecting data on issues of the 
timing of supplier and customer involvement in the product development process. The 
specific activity-stage model adopted is discussed in Section 2.3 (and further discussed 
in Chapter Five).
2.3. Integration of Process Development into the Product Development 
Process
As a result of the limitations of early activity-stage models attempts have been made to 
produce models which include cyclical processes and feedback loops (e.g. Miaoulis and 
LaPlaca, 1982). In recent years one of the most influential activity stage models is a 







Concept development involves generating ideas from market research, and exploring 
technical possibilities and product requirements. This phase feeds into product planning 
decisions on product architecture, conceptual design, desired performance, target 
market, and investments. Product planning may involve testing, for example, with lead 
users (see next section). Depending on the outcome of testing, the process moves on to 
product/process engineering, which entails detailed engineering, prototyping, and 
development of production tools and equipment. Once - or if - the product delivers the 
required performance, product specifications are released. This leads to pilot 
production, which involves low volume pre-series production, factory start-up and 
modification. Finally, the process undergoes ‘ramp-up’, gradually entering series 
production.
Wheelwright and Clark’s four-phase model is appealing as it simultaneously focuses on 
product and process development. Thus, it counters the problem of many earlier models 
(such as Booz et al, 1971), which largely ignored the need for process development. As 
companies face increasing pressures to reduce time to market (Stalk and Hout, 1990) the 
integration of process development into product development becomes vital to secure a 
viable market offering. Furthermore, the model assumes a ‘funnel’ approach during 
which unfeasible products are continuously filtered. The model is largely derived from 
Japanese large scale operations. However with the ‘Japanisation’ of British industry 
(Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988) and diffusion of Japanese-inspired innovation methods 
and principles in the West, Wheelwright and Clark’s four-phase model seems to be an 
accurate depiction of the product development phases used in many (large-scale) 
Western companies. Consequently, the four-phase model is adopted in this thesis.
Wheelwright and Clark’s model (1992) distinguishes four distinct, although 
interdependent, phases. One of the positive features of their model is that it is based on 
the assumption of a large degree of overlapping between individual phases. Imai et al 
(1985) have worked extensively on the theme of overlapping development phases. They 
describe the innovation process as incremental and iterative, characterised by adaptation 
to the external environment and continuous leaming-by-doing: “The key to identifying 
the various factors that make speed and flexibility possible is to view product
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development as a dynamic and continuous process of adaptation to changes in the 
environment” (p. 340).15
In their 1986 paper Takeuchi and Nonaka lay one of the cornerstones of what has 
become known as concurrent engineering (or development). Based on extensive 
empirical research they argued that the “traditional sequential or ‘relay race’ approach 
to product development....may conflict with the goals of maximum speed and 
flexibility”.16 Inspired by development processes at Honda and Canon they endorsed a 
holistic or ‘rugby’ approach, where the development team goes through the entire 
process (or ‘distance’) as a unit, passing the ball back and forth. They illustrated the 
three dominant models of the product development process as shown below:
Figure 7. Sequential Versus Overlapping Phases of Development
A
c  ___________________________________________
A: Sequential development typified by NASA PPP (Phased Project Planning) system 
B: Overlapping development typified by Fuji Xerox 
C: Overlapping development typified by Honda and Canon
Source: Takeuchi, H. and Nonaka, I. (1986) The new new product development game. Harvard Business, 
Review, January/February: 137-46, p. 25.
The crux of the rugby-inspired Honda and Canon approach is that it not only involves 
overlaps between subsequent development stages, but also overlaps right across 
traditionally distant stages, for example, detail product and process engineering may be 
explored in parallel with concept development. Conversely process engineers working 
on detail process design may alter or reject product concept or architecture decisions
15 Although Imai et al (1985) emphasise leaming-by-doing they also highlight the importance of 
‘unlearning’ as a way to innovate. This chimes with Schumpeter’s notion of innovation as creative 
destruction (1942).
16 They used the analogy of a relay race to describe how one group of functional specialists would pass 
the baton to the next group and then seize its involvement.
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(Gehani, 1992).17 The process is thus much more chaotic than portrayed by traditional 
sequential models (Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986; Nonaka, 1988), and it allows for cross­
functional simultaneous development along three dimensions: market, production
1 8process and product (Freeman, 1991; Hein and Andreasen, 1986). Thus, it has been 
advanced as a way to avoid sub-optimisation within individual departments and to allow 
‘design for manufacture’ (Dean and Susman, 1989; Whitney, 1988; Andersen, 2001). 
For example, it may provide a way to avoid the problem that the R&D department or 
product design engineers take the full responsibility for product engineering and 
therefore do not consider how it can be produced.
The concurrent performance of activities has been identified as one of the pivotal 
reasons why lean Japanese companies have been able to reduce product development 
time as well as development and product costs (Womack et al, 1990; Clark et al, 1987). 
This may not be surprising as the messages are intuitively sound and appealing. 
However, the literature promoting the concept and practise of concurrent engineering is 
based largely on empirical observations from Japanese manufacturers and comparisons 
with US manufacturers. Some commentators (including Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986) 
have maintained that the model of concurrent engineering may be of limited value to 
radical innovation, such as those frequently found in the biotechnology industry, as 
Japanese manufacturers tend to excel at incremental continuous innovation rather than 
radical innovation (Doyle, 1985). In other words, the model ignores the cultural context 
of the study upon which it is based. Furthermore, as Clark et al (1985) have admitted, 
there are dangers in having to commence one phase before the previous one has been 
completed. Moreover, however theoretically sound, it is arguably a normative ideal, 
which may be much more difficult to manage in practice as it is based on the premise 
that different departments or functions are able to collaborate and communicate 
effectively. Karlsson and Ahlstrom (1996) have explored some of these practical 
difficulties that companies pursuing concurrent engineering may experience, and have
17 The process may thus be characterised by chaos rather than order (Nonaka, 1988).
18 The cross-functional imperative is by no means new however. It was one of the fundamental findings 
of the influential SAPPHO studies (Rothwell, 1972; Rothwell et al, 1974), the early work by Myers and 
Marquis (1969), Cooper and his colleagues’ Project NewProd (Cooper, 1979; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 
1987). However, as labelled by Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) these studies emphasised a rational 




highlighted the risks of making costly mistakes, not least because a concurrent approach 
increases project complexity.
It is apparent from this brief review of the concurrent engineering literature that the 
original work within this topic focused predominantly on intra-firm processes. The 
concept has since been taken forward to include supplier involvement (O’Neal, 1993). 
The majority of the literature, however, still seems to concern intra-firm process 
integration.
2.4. From Supplier Involvement to Interactive and Collaborative Innovation
One of the defining features of the work on (primarily) Japanese product and process 
development is that the role of customers and suppliers is recognised (although as 
concluded in the previous section less so in the concurrent engineering literature). 
Suppliers are seen as integral members of project teams as they have a salient role not 
least in ensuring design for manufacture, or process development (Whitney, 1988). 
Customers are also seen as important, for example as consultants, because they are at 
the receiving end of the outcome of the development process. However, even in many 
of the contemporary ‘world-class’ models of product and process development (e.g. 
Hines et al, 2000) the originator or source of innovation is ‘the focal company’ itself 
(e.g. the internal R&D department). There seems to be an assumption in much of the 
innovation literature that innovation is generated by an individual entrepreneurial 
company (Hakansson, 1987), although this picture has begun to change.
A fundamentally different view of innovation is to understand this as a process which 
takes place between companies rather than within them. An invention may be the 
product of a lonely inventor; innovation, however, more or less by definition implies 
that external actors become involved during commercialisation as it reaches the market 
place.19
Von Hippel’s seminal research on user-initiated (novel) product innovation from the 
1970s pointed out the dominant role of users in idea generation (1976, 1978). His early
19 In extreme cases of vertical integration it may of course be possible to reach the market place without 
going through external intermediaries.
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study (1976) focused on a large number of successful innovations in scientific 
instruments, concluding that the innovation process in scientific instruments is a user- 
dominated process. This picture, however, was later modified, as the source of 
innovation was shown to vary significantly depending on the industry in focus; 
scientific instruments, semi-conductors, printed circuit boards, and pultrusion process 
innovations were shown to be largely user developed, however others have been found 
to be manufacturer dominated. This led to two paradigms (Von Hippel, 1978): the 
Manufacturer-Active Paradigm (MAP) and the Customer-Active Paradigm (CAP). The 
latter is now supported by a number of empirical studies, for example, industrial 
machinery (Foxall and Tiemey, 1984), medical or scientific instruments (Shaw, 1985; 
Biemans, 1989), software (Voss, 1985) and machine tools (Parkinson, 1982). These 
studies also contributed to an extension and refinement of Von Hippel’s early concept 
of CAP, extending the role of users to include not only idea generation, but in some 
cases all stages of product innovation (see also Foxall, 1986 and Foxall and Johnston, 
1987).
The seminal work by Piore and Sabel (1984) also highlighted the fact that the large 
corporation is coming to the end of being the centre of production and innovation. 
Using data from MERIT - Co-operative Agreements and Technology Indicators20, 
Hagedoom (1995) claimed that 70 per cent of strategic alliances made for the purpose 
of technology transfer or creation through R&D in the 1980s were in the sectors of the 
new core technologies of IT, biotechnology, and new materials, and 25 per cent in 
chemicals, aviation/defence, automotive and heavy electrical equipment. This is hardly 
surprising given Powell et aVs (1996, p. 116) literature finding that “the R&D intensity 
or level of technological sophistication of industries is positively correlated with the 
intensity and number of alliances in those sectors” (see also Freeman, 1991).
Hakansson’s (1987, 1989) research on supplier-customer interaction during
technological development has conceptualised and provided further empirical evidence 
for the stream of research on user-involvement in product development. His research 
stressed the interactive nature of the process: “An important and fundamental precept in 
our work has been that we consider technological development as being the result of the
20 MERIT (Maastricht Research Institute on Innovation and Technology) - Co-operative Agreements and 
Technology Indicators is a database containing information on co-operative agreements.
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interaction between different corporations, organisations and individuals instead of 
being the consequence of one individual actor’s performance” (Hakansson, 1987, p. 1)
Hence, H&kansson’s view is that the process of innovation is always interactive. It is not 
simply a question of the manufacturer or the customer being the active party, or MAP or 
CAP. Rather, both parties are active: “An innovation, therefore, should not be seen as 
the product of only one actor but as the result of an interplay between two or more 
actors; in other words as a product of a ‘network’ of actors” (H&kansson, 1987, p. 3).
Hakansson advances three arguments why a company may consider technical co­





Knowledge development is promoted by bringing together different bodies of 
knowledge that creates two effects. Firstly, an interactive effect which is the result of 
knowledge being developed at the interface of different bodies of knowledge and 
perspectives. Secondly, a multi-competence effect which is the result of bringing 
together diverse knowledge and competencies. Resource mobilisation is important 
because in order for any invention to be transformed into an innovation it is dependent 
on other products, systems, and services. The innovation process thus has elements of 
learning, adaptation, and even socialisation. Resource co-ordination is critical as 
resource scarcity means that companies specialise their development resources only in 
limited areas. This co-ordination is handled through a series of exchange relationships 
linking all units together. According to Hakansson (ibid) technological development 
thus becomes almost synonymous with technological collaboration.
The work by Hakansson represents the school of thought on industrial customer- 
supplier relationships and networks known as the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing 
(IMP) Group (e.g. Ford, 1990; Axelsson and Easton, 1992; Hakansson and Snehota, 
1990). Albeit many different schools of thought on inter-organisational relationships
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and networks exist, the IMP Interaction and Network Approach is adopted as the 
primary theory on which this inquiry leans. This is therefore the subject of Chapter 
Four.
2.5. Conclusions
In Chapter Two a set of core concepts of innovation that are critical to understand in this 
inquiry have been defined and specified. These definitions serve as points of reference 
and concern: innovation, product innovation, new product development, process 
innovation, and technological innovation.
Innovation is about the making of something new. It encompasses commercial 
exploitation -  if not commercially exploited ‘invention* is the proper term (Saren, 
1984). The concepts of change and newness are therefore central to understanding 
innovation. Most scholars now seem to agree that innovation refers to a continuum of 
degree of change (scope), with terms such as radical, novel, minor, and incremental 
describing positions along the continuum. Furthermore, innovations vary in terms of 
scale; whether they are single (or autonomous) innovations or inter-related (or 
systemic). ‘Systemic’ will be used in this thesis to refer to inter-related clusters of 
innovations.
This thesis primarily concerns the development of new products. Here, two concepts are 
fundamental: product innovation and new product development. The review of the 
innovation literature found that any distinction between the two is highly ambiguous 
and problematic. Some authors view product innovation as implying a higher degree of 
product change than new product development (e.g. Hart, 1996). To add to the 
confusion, some authors make a distinction between new product development and 
product development, based on the assumption that new product development is about 
the development of new products. Hence, this is a very similar definition to that of 
product innovation. A further problem is that any objective measurement of degree of 
newness is difficult as innovation is in the eye of the beholder; it may be new to a 
specific market or industry, or to the world, but it may also be new to the company 
developing or adopting the innovation (Tidd et al, 1997). Based on the broad generic 
definition of innovation, which encompasses a continuum of different degrees of
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change, it can be concluded that it is problematic to make any meaningful distinction 
between product innovation and (new) product development.
Process innovation refers to innovation, or change, in production processes. It is 
primarily considered in this thesis in its relation to product innovation. However, one of 
the conclusions from Chapter Two is that process innovation is intrinsically linked to 
product innovation, as companies are striving for design for manufacture and 
continuous improvement or kaizen (Bessant, et al, 1994). Together, product and process 
innovation constitute technological innovation. This implies that technological 
innovation comprises application of new product technology (the knowledge and ability 
incorporated in a product), new process technology (the knowledge and ability of 
producing a product), and/or new marketing technology (the knowledge and ability of 
commercialising product and process technologies). Again, the term ‘new’ is likely not 
to refer to any radical change but to an incremental upgrade or change. It may also refer 
to a technology that is simply new to the specific focal company, or the industry, but not 
new to the world.
A review of a range of models depicting the product development process was 
undertaken to provide a basis for this study of the management of product innovation. 
Most of the models reviewed were so-called stages models, which presume a sequential 
development process. A so-called activity stage model was chosen as appropriate for 
this inquiry for determining the points at which external collaboration parties may be 
involved to add value to the process and thus the outcome. This model distinguishes 
four phases (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992): concept development, product planning, 
product/process engineering, and pilot production/ramp-up.
However, from the perspective of this thesis a limitation of the majority of product 
development stage models is that they hardly consider how external parties may relate 
to the different stages. Considering that the value added by external parties, notably 
suppliers, during the development process may now equal the value added internally 
(Moller, 2002) and 80 or 90 per cent of material costs in the final product in industrial 
companies is now sourced from external suppliers (ibid.), the almost exclusive internal 
focus of product development stage models can be seen as a significant weakness. A 
non-sequential model was introduced called IDEFO (Input-Definition-Output). As a
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conversion or transformation model it is applied in this thesis to conceptualise the 
process of collaborative innovation.
The lack of an inter-organisational perspective and understanding of the management of 
product development processes, directed us towards an inter-organisational view of 
innovation. In recent years many bodies of knowledge have contributed towards the 
understanding and modelling of inter-organisational behaviour. The Interaction and 
Network model developed over the last 25-30 years by the IMP Group has been chosen 
here as the primary approach. This school of thought holds that the locus of innovation 
is not within individual companies but between them (Hakansson, 1987, Powell et al, 
1996). Thus, from an interaction and network perspective innovation is generated 
through interaction processes between companies. The following chapter thus shifts the 
analysis towards the Interaction and Network Approach to innovation.
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CHAPTER THREE: INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS
3.0. Introduction
The conclusion of the previous chapter was that customer-supplier interaction is pivotal 
for understanding the process of innovation. The point of departure for this chapter is 
therefore that industrial customers and suppliers are both active actors who seek to 
manage, or cope with, other business relationships. The first section of Chapter Three 
thus examines in more depth how companies interact in business markets. The second 
section identifies some of the main characteristics of relationships. The third section 
examines the existing theory and knowledge concerning the role of individual 
relationships within wider networks. As the meaning of ‘networks’ is often ambiguous 
the third section seeks to define the concept of networks and introduces a generic model 
of networks that helps to understand how individual components of relationships are 
inter-woven within networks. The fourth section discusses different types of inter- 
organisational network and further explores how different levels of analysis and 
different perspectives on networks affect the way we describe and perceive networks. 
Within this section the two concepts of supply chains and supply networks are 
examined, with particular reference to how these emergent business forms and practices 
have influenced the way companies relate to each other at the individual dyadic level 
and the network level.
3.1. Interaction in Customer-Supplier Relationships
Early models of how companies do business with each other had their roots in, most 
notably, consumer marketing. Organisational buying behaviour theories (e.g. Webster 
and Wind, 1972; Sheth, 1973) were based on a consumer marketing model (Kotler, 
1994; McCarthy, 1960), in which sellers were seen as the active parties seeking to 
approach buying organisations to persuade them to buy their products or services.
Hence, buying organisations were simply seen as passive recipients. The main problem
0 1for the seller was to identify and access the right people in the buying organisation.
21 Early literature tends to use the term ‘buyer-seller’ relationships. More recently the term ‘customer- 
supplier’ relationships appears to have gained popularity, indicating a shift in emphasis from the 
relationships between the individual persons with responsibility for buying and selling, to whole 
organisations as customers and/or suppliers.
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Early purchasing models took point of departure from the same basic tacit assumption 
of one active party seeking to access and mobilise the passive party. However, in the 
early purchasing literature it was the opposite situation: active buyers dealing with 
passive sellers (e.g. England, 1970; Lee and Dobler, 1971).
In the 1970s two bodies of theory emerged that laid some of the cornerstones of the 
later interaction model of buyer-seller relationships: inter-organisational theory (e.g. 
Van de Ven, 1976) and new institutional economics (e.g. Williamson, 1975). Inter- 
organisational theory was concerned with the relationship between individual 
organisations and the environment and relationships between groups of organisations 
(Hakansson, 1982). The new institutionalists sought to explain the economic rationale 
of alternative forms of organisation, i.e. their relative efficiency. Having grown out of 
dissatisfaction with the way in which traditional microeconomic theory viewed inter- 
organisational relations, the main concern in institutionalist studies tended to be on 
transactions between companies, which given conditions of uncertain outcomes, 
infrequently recurring transactions, and high asset specificity (unique or transaction- 
specific investments), can be performed most efficiently within vertically integrated 
hierarchies (Williamson, 1975, 1985).22
The interaction model was developed by a group of researchers known as the 
International Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) research group (e.g. IMP Group, 1982; 
Ford, 1990; Hakansson and Johanson, 1987; Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). The 
founders of the IMP group began explorations into buyer-seller relationships in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. They conducted a large international empirical survey and in- 
depth case studies of buyer-seller relationships. This study has become known as the 
‘IMP1 study’ (Hakansson, 1982; Turnbull and Cunningham, 1981). It was a study that 
fundamentally changed the way in which buyer-seller relations and relationships were 
understood. Rather than studying discrete one-off exchanges or transactions, they 
focused on long-term aspects of customer-supplier relationships, such as inter-company 
dependency and evolutions, adaptations, and institutionalisations over time. 
Furthermore, they recognised the important role of the social interaction that occurred in 
parallel with the business interaction. Perhaps the most important finding of the first 
IMP study was the active nature of both supplier and customer. Their model
22 See Williamson (1985) pp. 95-96 for a discussion of the concept of asset specificity.
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fundamentally broke with the tacit assumption of earlier studies and models that one 
party was active whereas the other was a mere passive agent. Hence the IMP group’s 
approach has become known as the Interaction Approach (IMP Group, 1982; Turnbull 
et al, 1996). The central model resulting from the early IMP study will therefore be 
examined in more depth in the following section.
3.1.1. The IMP Interaction Model
The interaction approach is based on continuous ‘exchange relationships’ occurring 
between a limited number of identifiable actors (Hakansson and Snehota, 1990). The 
interaction approach provides a picture of relationships and exchange within them. It is 
an important conceptual work in trying to understand long-term bonding, various forms 
of adaptation, and the development of trust and mutuality.
There are four types of variable, which describe and influence the interaction between 
buying and selling companies (see Figure 8):
• The elements and process of interaction
• The participants involved in the interaction (individually and organisationally)
• The environment in which the interaction takes place
• The atmosphere affecting and affected by the interaction
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Figure 8. An Illustration of the Interaction Model
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Source: Ford, D. (1990) Understanding Business Markets, 2nd ed. Thomson Learning
Within the interaction process the interaction model distinguishes between short-term 
episodic exchange, such as the placing of an order, or long-term exchange within 
relationships that institutionalise and adapt (Hakansson, 1982). Episodes can involve 
product or service, information, financial, and/or social exchange. The original model 
distinguished either product or service exchange, however, the combination of the two 
into an ‘offering’ may be a more current perspective (e.g. Ford et al, 2003). Information 
exchange relates to several types of data communication, although in the original model 
information technology was not included. This has been an important focus of 
subsequent IMP research, identifying the impact of IT on information exchange 
processes (e.g. Naude et al, 2002 -  IMP lb; Naude and Buttle, 2000; Walter and Ritter,
2002). Financial exchange is incorporated into the model as a key exchange ingredient. 
However, the social exchange dimension may be less straightforward, albeit potentially 
more critical as social exchange has an important function in reducing uncertainty in the 
relationship (Hakansson et al, 1977). Social exchange and bonding (Aldrich, 1979; 
Granovetter, 1985; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Wilson and Jantrania, 1997) has also 
been linked to the creation of trust, a concept, which has been investigated in much later 
research as a potential safeguard against uncertainty in the form of opportunistic 
behaviour e.g. a series of follow-on studies has further highlighted the role of trust in 
relationships. Trust is seen as an important mechanism, which can contribute (along 
with other relationship factors such as commitment (Dwyer et al, 1987; Ring and Van
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de Ven, 1994) to preventing the occurrence of opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Sako, 1992; 
Newell et al, 1998; Thorelli, 1986; Kumar, 1996; Smeltzer, 1997). On the basis of 
Williamson’s conception of transaction economics (1975, 1985), Sako (1992) makes a 
significant contribution to the idea of trust in inter-firm relationships. In the context of 
her discussions of ‘arms-length contractual relationships’ versus ‘obligations 
contractual relationships’, she distinguishes three types of trust: Contractual Trust: The 
trust that the other party will adhere to the, explicit and implicit, points of the contact as 
agreed. Goodwill Trust: The trust that the other party will perform tasks in excess of the 
agreed terms and conditions. Competence Trust The trust that the other party has the 
ability, or competence, to be able to produce what the contract requires. The latter two 
become more important as the relationship develops over time. In fact, social 
relationships have been argued as being the very foundation of much described Japanese 
methods of maintaining efficiency (Sei, 1996). An important point regarding exchange 
is thus that there is no requirement for a transaction of physical goods to take place. 
Information or technical knowledge may be sufficient, as long as the exchange is 
recognised as important by the involved organisations. Thus, relationships can very well 
be with research institutions, consultancy firms, and service-related organisations 
(Torvatn, 1996).
Transaction is a one-off exchange that, once completed, could end the exchange 
process. Continued transactions can lead to a relationship between the parties that ties 
the parties together economically, technically, and socially. Relationships arise through 
exchange processes among the parties and over time, repeat transactions enable them to 
be more routinised (Ford, 1980). Thus the episodic relationship becomes a matter of 
expectation and a behaviour pattern that is taken for granted and hence institutionalised.
According to the Interaction model (Hakansson, 1982), adaptations and investments 
required in relationships are important, since they provide an important insight into the 
change that takes place in a relationship. Adaptations are prerequisites for the 
development and the continued existence of a relationship; they reflect mutual 
commitment. Relationship development requires effort and hard work (Huemer, 1998). 
Adaptations can be made in technical, administrative, and logistic activities. Later 
research has indicated that although adaptations are important features of relationships, 
these are not necessarily entirely positive investments, as they may reduce the freedom
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of actors in developing new relationships due to the sunk, or non-retrievable (Wilson, 
1995), costs within existing relationships, and the opportunity cost o f adapting for one 
actor may be foregoing another good partnering opportunity (Han et al, 1993; Brennan 
and Turnbull, 1999; Ford and Hakansson, 2002).23
Johanson and Mattsson (1987) later made a further distinction between the relationship 
and the interaction. They concur with Hakansson in identifying two types of interaction: 
exchange processes and adaptation processes (Figure 9). Johanson and Mattsson defined 
a relationship as a contact between two firms that is acknowledged by both parties. In 
their model, relationships need to have a mutual orientation, mutual dependence, and 
bonds tying the actors (see also Ford et al, 1986). Development models of relationships 
emphasise gradual probing and reciprocally increasing and deepening mutual 
expectations and commitment.24
Figure 9. Relationships and Interaction in Industrial Markets
InteractionRelationship
Mutual Orientation
• Preparedness to interact
• Mutual knowledge







•  Business exchange





Johanson J. and Mattsson L.G. (1987) Inter-organisational relations in industrial systems: a network 
approach compared with a transaction cost approach. International Studies o f  Management and 
Organisation, Vol. 18, No 1.
Within the interaction model exchange takes place between two participants or actors. 
The model differentiates two levels of actors: organisation and individual. At the
23 Adaptations are conceptually similar to the concepts of asset specificity and transaction specific 
investments often used in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985), although the focus is on (long­
term) relationships rather than discrete transactions. See also Johanson and Mattsson (1987) for a 
comparison of network theory and transaction cost theory.
24 It is arguably problematic to restrict the definition of relationships to those including a mutual 
orientation. Mutuality may grow over time, however, a relationship may also lack this dimension. The 
important issue is not to identify whether or not a relationship exists or should be created, but to 
understand the nature of relationships (Turnbull et al, 1996; Blois, 1998).
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organisational level technology plays a prominent role, as it sets the basic conditions for 
the interaction. Not surprisingly, this dimension has received extensive attention in 
further IMP research (see Hakansson, 1987, 1989; Ford and Saren, 2001). Furthermore, 
according to the interaction model (Hakansson, 1982) organisational size (including 
power), structure, strategy and experience determine the relative positions of each party. 
The important issue here is that these factors are considered at the relationship level 
rather than in relation to an anonymous competitive environment or industry. At the 
individual level the buyer and seller (at each side of the relationship) are the key actors, 
however, increasingly a much wider range of cross-functional personnel is involved in 
the process. Individuals may have their own aims and experience, which will affect their 
behaviour and performance. The importance of social bonds is emphasised as an 
important factor in this process of interaction amongst persons.
The interaction environment consists of market structure, dynamism, 
internationalisation, position in the manufacturing channel (what is now often seen as 
the value or supply chain), and the social system (Hakansson, 1982). One of the 
important messages in this regard is that the environment is seen as ‘enacted’: 
individual actors are part of the environment and can influence, and in turn can be 
influenced, by the environment (Weick, 1979). More recently, Ford and Hakansson 
have described this as a view of the environment being ‘interacted’ (2002).
The atmosphere encapsulates the interaction process and can be described in terms of 
the power-dependence relationship between the parties, the level of conflict and/or co­
operation, overall closeness or distance and mutual expectations (Hakansson, 1982, p. 
20). The economic dimension of the interaction is captured through the closeness of the 
relationship, for example, a close relationship has the potential to reduce transaction 
costs. The control dimension concerns the power/dependence position of the two 
parties. Power/dependence is a salient and complex concept, which deserves a few 
words of explanation.
The interaction model portrays power as one of a number of relationship characteristics 
constituting the atmosphere, although such a view may be criticised for demoting the 
role and importance of the power/dependence dimension (see for example Caldwell,
57
Chapter Three
2003).25 Power may be defined in the following terms: “the power of actor A over actor 
B is the amount of resistance on the part of B which can be potentially overcome by A” 
(Emerson, 1962, p. 32). In other words, power is concerned with the ability to persuade 
another person to do something that he or she would not otherwise have done (Dahl, 
1961). Lukes (1974) later identified that the exercise of power involves conflict and that 
the control of resources or knowledge by one actor in excess of that of another enables 
that actor to make decisions and achieve outcomes (see also Fairhead and Griffin, 
2000). Accordingly, power is concerned with the visible control of one actor by another 
through wielding power gained via superiority or sovereign power, what can be 
described as a one-dimensional or utilitarian view of power (Lukes, 1974). Conversely, 
power may be used less overtly to influence the process of decision-making so that 
certain issues are never allowed to emerge (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). Such a 
dispositional view of power concerns ‘behind the scenes’ effects on behaviour that 
prevent events or outcomes; it is covert and subtle (Lukes, 1974; Caldwell, 2003). 
“Power resides implicitly in the other [actor’s] dependency” (Emerson, 1962, p. 32), but 
as argued by Provan and Gassenheimer (1994) not all organisational dependencies are 
related to actual influence, as power may not always be enacted or exercised. Their 
further argument, however, that “dependencies built on long-term co-operation and 
deferred gratification may well result in different power outcomes at any given point in 
time than dependencies embedded in a relationships where commitment is low, in 
which short-term norms of self-interest drive behaviour” (p. 56), may be dubious. Ford 
et al (2003) have pointed out that reliance on trust and collaborative working does not 
mean absence of power and conflict, as firms become increasingly inter-dependent (p. 
148). Nevertheless, power may be applied either coercively or in a collaborative way 
(Frazier and Antia, 1995); coercive power may often be applied in low-involvement or 
adversarial relationships, but is less appropriate for high-involvement collaborative 
relationships (Ford et al, 2003).
The relationship between power and dependence implies that co-operation and conflict 
co-exist within the relationship, making relationships more complex than a simple 
matter of degrees of closeness. Indeed, any attempt to understand relationships along a 
simple continuum ranging from e.g. ‘close’ to ‘distant’ or ‘good’ to ‘bad’ would be an
25 Some authors view power as a more fundamental characteristic and driver of business (and non­
business) relationships (see for example Cox et al, 2000).
58
Chapter Three
oversimplification; relationships have too many dimensions to fit into such 
classifications (Turnbull et al, 1996).
In summary, the interaction approach has focused on relationships between actors as the 
central unit of analysis rather than the individual transaction. Hence, the long-term 
processes have tended to be the main body of concern in the interaction approach. This 
implies that co-operation and collaboration are critical elements of industrial customer- 
supplier relationships. The conceptual difference between collaboration and co­
operation is far from clear however.
3.1.2. Collaboration and Co-operation
The previous section identified co-operation as part of the relationship atmosphere, 
along with power and dependence, closeness, and expectations. Thus, co-operation can 
be seen as a fundamental characteristic of industrial customer-supplier relationships.
A scrutiny of the relationship and network literature shows that although many authors 
frequently refer to both collaboration and co-operation, few definitions of collaboration 
exist. Hakansson and Henders (1992) have provided a broad definition of co-operative 
relationships as “those relationships where the counterparts have realized, and begun to 
exploit the benefits of working together- the relationship is characterized by co­
operative rather than contentious interaction” (p. 35). Formalisation of the co-operation 
is not seen as an essential ingredient, but rather the organic growth of the relationship 
over time.
Stem (1996) has defined co-operation as “behaviour that involves joint striving for a 
goal or object, is direct or indirect (explicit or implicit), and personal, in which the goal 
or object that is controlled by a third party can only be secured if the focal parties 
coalesce” (p. 4). In a similar vein Araujo and Mouzas (1997) state that co-operation 
involves a combination of object-centred and collaborator-centred activity based on 
compatibility of goals, aims, and values. Therefore, following the definition by Araujo 
and Mouzas, co-operation is defined by reference to collaboration and thus indicating 
little difference between the two concepts. Similarly Anderson et al (1994) define co­
operation as “similar or complementary co-ordinated activities performed by firms in a 
business relationship to produce superior mutual outcomes or singular outcomes with
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expected reciprocity over time” (p. 10). Ring and Van de Ven (1994) view co-operation 
more broadly as characterising a particular form of inter-organisational relationship, 
however, this thereby reverts to a definition of collaborative relationships rather than 
collaboration per se.
Synthesising the above contributions it seems that co-operation and collaboration are 
often used interchangeably to imply behaviour and/or relationships involving mutuality, 
sharing, reciprocity, goal, and value compatibility. These are indeed many of the 
defining features of relationships (Johanson and Mattsson, 1987), although arguably not 
all relationships need to be collaborative.
It is apparent from the review of the relationship and network literature that there are 
few specific definitions of collaboration. Thus resorting to the Oxford Advanced 
Learner’s Dictionary (2003) it defines collaboration as “the act of working with another 
person or group of people to create or produce something”. In comparison, it defines co­
operation as “the act of doing something together or of working together towards a 
shared aim”. Hence, according to these definitions both concepts involve ‘working 
together’ and are therefore descriptions of joint acts (or activities). However, 
collaboration is related to the creation or production of ‘something’ thus indicating a 
tangible outcome, whereas co-operation seems to imply ‘shared aims’ (of which a 
tangible outcome of course could be one such aim). For this reason, collaboration is 
viewed as the more appropriate term for describing product innovation (as the creation 
of a tangible product is the intended outcome of product innovation) and is hence the 
term adopted in this thesis. It is a broad and inclusive definition. Whether relationships 
are collaborative or not is a matter of degree rather than a question of either/or.
The discussion of definitions of collaboration and related concepts implies that there are 
supposed benefits of such joint activity. Nevertheless, the findings of empirical research 
into the actual results of collaborative innovation are not altogether positive.
26 See Johnsen and Ford (2002) for a recent conceptualisation of relationship characteristics.
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3.1.3. Empirical Evidence o f  Actual Results o f Collaborative Innovation 
Searching for empirical evidence of actual performance results of customer-supplier 
collaboration for innovation, one finds that the existing research either analyses the 
impact of supplier involvement on product development or the impact of customer 
involvement. Thus, the main bulk of the studies that can be found does not adopt an 
interaction perspective. The body of research regarding supplier involvement in product 
development seems to have provided the more rigorous findings (although many 
findings are still rather anecdotal). Given that these studies effectively concern 
customer-supplier collaboration, albeit adopting a broadly non-interactive perspective, 
they are used here as proxies for collaborative innovation in relation to both suppliers 
and customers. Table 2 provides an overview of some of the most significant empirical 
findings on supplier involvement in product development to date.
Table 2 Empirical Findings on Supplier Involvement in Product Development
Clark and Fujimoto (1991) Japanese auto study: reduced time to market by 4-5 months + 
saved vehicle manufacturers app. 800.000 engineering hours 
per car development project (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, Clark, 
1989).
Hartley (1994) Study of 79 SMEs: industrial equipment, computers, and 
analytical instruments: Insignificant effects on product costs, 
quality or development lead-time.
Birou (1994) Study of 83 US automotive, electronics, defence, and medical 
equipment firms: negative effect. Higher product and 
development costs, often longer development time and 
product performance.
Ragatz et al (1997) Study of 60 companies: improvement of 40 per cent for 
product quality, 25 per cent for development cycle time, and 
15 per cent in product costs.
Bruce et al (1995) Increased process complexity, no effect on market 
responsiveness, no facilitation of incorporation of new 
technology.
Bidault and Butler (1995) Reduction of development time by 30 to 50 per cent 
(experienced manufacturers).
Droge et al (2000) Study of 57 first tier North American auto suppliers. Found 
significant relation between ‘supplier closeness’ (consisting of 
supplier development, supplier partnership and JIT 
purchasing) and development time ability.
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 
(1995)
Exploring a set of rapid ‘adaptive processes’ (including 
supplier involvement) across 72 development projects within 
36 Asian, U.S. and European computer firms. Mixed results.
In a major comparative study of the automotive industry (International Motor Vehicle 
Programme: IMVP), Clark and Fujimoto have reported that collaboration with suppliers 
for product development in Japan resulted in the reduction of time to market by four to
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five months and savings of around 800.000 engineering hours per car development 
project for vehicle manufacturers (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, Clark, 1989). These 
findings were also reported in Womack et al (1990). Out-sourcing of ‘black-box’ parts, 
where suppliers conduct detailed engineering based on functional specifications 
provided by vehicle assemblers, seemed to be a key explanatory factor in their study. 
The widely-cited study by Imai et al (1985) provides important complementary results 
to the IMVP-based findings.
However, in other contexts the benefits that have been reported are less clear and 
outcomes may even be negative. In a cross-industry survey, Hartley (1994) found few 
or no effects of closer supplier involvement in product development on product costs, 
quality or development lead-time.27 Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) explored a set of 
rapid ‘adaptive processes’ (including supplier involvement), and reported mixed results 
on development time. There was a limited correlation between supplier involvement and 
pace of development times, although more technologically predictable projects showed 
a more positive effect on development time due to the more certainty regarding which 
suppliers to use; less predictable projects showed no significant effect. Yet this is 
inconsistent with the findings of Wasti and Liker (1997).28 The results by Birou (1994) 
were even more disappointing: in a study of 80 U.S. firms she found that the results of 
supplier involvement in product development across several industries were in fact 
negative, both in terms of development time and product performance.
On the basis of a study of 25 European, US and Japanese manufacturers into early 
supplier involvement in product development, Bidault and Butler (1995) claimed a 
correlation between the level of experience of supplier involvement and manufacturers’ 
reducing development time by 30 to 50 per cent; the level of experience implying a 
focus on quality improvements rather than cost reductions. Bruce et al (1995) found that 
many respondents stated that collaboration makes product development complex and 
difficult to control and manage, that is does not make it respond better to market 
opportunities, and does not facilitate the incorporation of new technology.
27 In a later project of assembler firms Hartley et al reported that working with suppliers with technical 
capabilities reduced development time (1997).
28 Wasti and Liker examined the link between the level of supplier involvement and technological 
uncertainty of components. This may indicate that although development time is not reduced in such 
projects, supplier involvement is nevertheless prevalent and important in technologically uncertain and 
complex projects (see also Kamath and Liker, 1994).
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Ragatz et al (1997) presented findings from 60 companies indicating that the most 
successful cases of supplier involvement resulted in median improvement of 40 per cent 
for product quality, 25 per cent for development cycle time, and 15 per cent in product 
costs. It was not measured, however, how many successful projects the companies have 
had, hence difficult to draw overall conclusions. More recently, Droge et al (2000) have 
reported a significant relationship between what they term ‘supplier closeness’ (a 
jumble consisting of rather diverse factors, including supplier development, supplier 
partnership and JIT purchasing) and development time ability. The highly statistical 
nature of this study, however, arguably contains little analytical depth.
Interpretation of the divergent empirical results needs to be based on an appreciation of 
not only regional and industrial differences, but also trends in customer-supplier 
relationships. When studies of supplier involvement in product development first 
emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese companies were far superior to 
their western counterparts in their ways of involving suppliers in product development 
(e.g. Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). The empirical results point to the importance of 
experience in supplier involvement as well as working with competent counterparts. 
Takeishi (2001) has recently highlighted the importance of developing and maintaining 
internal capabilities (particularly architectural knowledge) in order for firms to be able 
to co-ordinate and thence capitalise on external collaboration with suppliers; an 
absorptive capacity needs to be present (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Furthermore, 
effects of supplier involvement can be very difficult to measure, as all projects are 
heterogeneous and the effects are ambiguous. The fact that projects tend to be analysed 
in hindsight does not help reliability due to the unavoidable risk of biased ex post 
evaluations.
Finally, not all benefits of involving suppliers in product development can be measured 
by project outcome results. Some impacts are long-term and strategic rather than short­
term and operational, such as the potential for increased efficiency and effectiveness of 
future project collaboration (Dyer and Ouchi, 1993) and improved possibilities for 
influencing future technological investments (Van Echtelt and Wynstra, 2000). Thus, 




In summary, although there may be benefits to be reaped from collaborative innovation 
the empirical evidence tells us that the process is difficult to manage and may therefore 
not lead to the expected results. This implies that there is a real need to advance the 
current understanding of the management of collaborative innovation. The premise of 
this thesis is that some of the problems of managing collaborative innovation pertain to 
the need to understand individual dyadic relationships from a network perspective. 
Indeed, inter-dependencies in and between relationships and thus networks were the 
subjects of the second IMP study (Hakansson and Snehota, 2000). The network 
perspective of customer-supplier relationships and its implications is therefore 
examined in the next section.
3.2. Understanding Relationships as Parts of Complex Networks
Although the IMP interaction model (Hakansson, 1982) advanced the level of 
understanding of what happens within relationships at the dyadic level, it was not until 
relationships became understood as parts of networks of relationships that a more 
complete and complex understanding of relationships emerged.
From a network perspective relationships are viewed as a parts of a larger whole - a 
network of interdependent relationships (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Ford et al, 
2003). These relationships are ‘connected’ since what happens in one relationship 
affects positively or negatively the interaction in others (Cook and Emerson, 1978; 
Blankenburg and Johanson, 1990). This implies that what happens in a relationship 
between two companies depends upon a number of other direct or indirect relationships 
within which the two parties are involved.
The problem with the network perspective is that the concept of ‘network’ itself has 
become overused and often tends to be ill defined. The following section thus seeks to 
define in more specific terms the precise meaning of ‘network’.
3.2.1. Defining Networks
One of the early definitions of networks was provided by Mitchell (1969) who referred 
to a network as a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects or 
events. The set of persons, objects or events of which the network is comprised can be
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called ‘actors’ or ‘nodes’ (Ford and Hakansson, 2002; Mitchell, 1969). Cook and 
Emerson (1978) defined exchange networks as: “a set of two or more connected 
exchange relations” (p. 725). They later specified that in a business context networks 
are sets of connected exchange relationships between actors controlling business 
activities (1984). “Connected refers to the extent to which ‘exchange in one relation is 
contingent upon exchange (or non-exchange) in the other relation” (Cook and Emerson, 
1978, p. 725). Thus, Mitchell (ibid.) and Cook and Emerson (ibid.) used ‘sets’ to define 
networks thereby indicating that networks consist of a number of actors or nodes, albeit 
no minimum (or maximum) number was specified.
In recent years, however, the concept of ‘network’ has often been used rather loosely. 
As Nohria has pointed out, the frequent “indiscriminate proliferation of the network 
concept threatens to relegate it to the status of an evocative concept, applied so loosely, 
that it ceases to mean anything” (1992, p.3). Part of the problem is that as a concept 
‘network’ has been used and has attracted scholars from many different fields. Easton 
(1992) draws upon Mintzberg’s five alternative metaphors for understanding strategy 
(1992) to suggest four metaphors for industrial networks: - networks as relationships, 
structures, processes, and positions.29 Consequently, Easton defines ‘network’ as a 
model or metaphor which describes a number, usually a large number, of entities which 
are connected. The use of the word ‘metaphor’ in Easton’s definition hints at one 
problem with networks, namely that ‘network’ often means different things to different 
people, and thus perhaps constitutes a fifth metaphor or a ‘meta-metaphor’: network as 
perspective. In any case, the way networks are defined and perceived will not only 
affect the way we think networks function, but also the way we focus our interests and 
delimit our problems (ibid). Table 3 provides an overview of Easton’s four metaphors 
of networks.
29 The use of ‘metaphors’ for understanding networks is inspired by Morgan’s (1986) use of metaphors as 
a means to analyse and perceive organisations, such as a cultural or a political metaphor.
30 The table is mostly based on Easton’s analysis, although examples of some more recent contributions 
have been added here.
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Table 3. Four Network Metaphors
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relationships
Activity, actor, and 
resources structures
Focal firms in 
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As Table 3 shows, network phenomena have been analysed by a wide range of scholars 
for a wide range of purposes and perspectives. Arguably Easton’s presentation of 
research in the field leans heavily towards contributions made by IMP group members. 
Elsewhere he (with Araujo) makes it more apparent that the field has been developed by 
researchers from many different fields (Araujo and Easton, 1996). Indeed Araujo and 
Easton (ibid.) identify ten fields of network related research, classified amongst other 
factors according to factors such as the disciplinary background of contributors, 
research goals, and methodological orientation. The implication of their analysis is that 
although the IMP school of thought on networks may be seen as very influential it is but 
one school of thought.
Owing to such a variety of different network forms and ways of using the concept of 
‘network’, it is useful to identify a set of meta-level classifications. Easton (1992) 
identifies three broad definitional groups: one set of definitions describes a network as 
the total pattern of relationships within a group of organisations acting in order to 
achieve common goals (Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). The second set of definitions 
focuses on the bonds or social relationships that link loosely connected organisations 
(Aldrich, 1979, Lundgren, 1995). The third set of definitions focuses on the exchange 
dimension in two or more connected relationships, where exchange in one relationship
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is contingent upon exchange in another (Anderson et al, 1994). The components of 
exchange within the relationship can include the product or service, information, and 
financial and social elements. These three groups of definitions each reflect different 
levels of analysis.
Hence, the assumption of Van de Ven and Ferry’s definition (1980) seems to be that a 
network consists of a group of organisations that are all driving towards the same goal. 
This is therefore, in many ways, akin to the concepts of ‘group’ or ‘coalition’ (Pisano et 
al, 1988). The concepts of strategic networks (Jarillo, 1988), networks o f innovators 
(Freeman, 1991; Debresson and Amesse, 1991) or innovation networks (Oliver and 
Blakeborough, 1998), and learning networks (Bessant and Tsekouras, 2000) all fall 
within this definition. The second definition (Aldrich, 1979, Lundgren, 1995) 
specifically addresses the issue of network boundary by stating that the organisations 
involved are ‘loosely connected’, which implies that, by definition, it is problematic to 
conceive of a fixed boundary surrounding a network (Cova et al, 1998). Networks 
include both strong and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1998). This has important 
implications for the use of the concept, including the type of analysis one can conduct. 
Finally, Anderson et a/’s definition (1994) focuses particularly on the ‘connectedness’ 
aspect, hence not addressing the issue of network boundary, but shifting the focus 
towards inter-connectedness between what are effectively dyadic relationships. Thus, in 
their definition, a network is not something ‘out there’, but a particular perspective. An 
overall feature of the various definitions seems to be that networks entail inter­
connectedness and/or inter-dependency. This issue will be discussed in more detail 
later.
The concept of industrial networks adopted by Johanson (1989), falling under Easton’s 
third category (1992), specifies that industrial networks are coupled to industrial 
activities and hence not to be confused with social networks (e.g. Brass and Burkhardt, 
1992), although the social aspect of any network is always an important feature (Nohria, 
1992). This therefore excludes purely social links (those not linked to industrial 
activities), but still emphasises that there is no such thing as a network boundary. This 
also implies that industrial networks are not designed, but emerge as a consequence of 
exchange between semi-autonomous, inter-dependent actors (Johanson, 1989). As 
Johanson explains, strategic networks may be embedded in industrial networks, but are
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not the same. Hakansson and Snehota’s term business network (1995) follows 
Johanson’s line of thinking, although the term ‘business’ implies a slightly wider focus 
than the manufacturing focus implied in the term ‘industrial’.
Thorelli (1986) has contended that networks (in the generic sense) are neither markets 
nor hierarchies but an intermediate form. Nevertheless, it may be possible to conceive 
of a continuum of networks. At one end is the ‘networks as markets’ approach, which is 
evident in the IMP approach, where the concept is generally used to provide a better 
understanding of how companies and markets are inter-woven through complex 
relationships (Easton and Hakansson, 1996). At the other end is the ‘networks as 
organisations’ approach which is evident e.g. in the research by Cravens et al (1995) but 
also in the concept of, for example, supply networks, as will be discussed later. Such a 
continuum derives from an institutional economics conception of organisational forms -  
free markets, vertical integration, or bilateral governance (Williamson, 1975). 
Institutional economists analyse many of the same issues as industrial network 
researchers, including forces of friction and inertia in customer-supplier relationships; 
such friction is conceptualised as transaction costs in institutional economics. 
Institutional economics, or transaction cost economics (TCE) is, however, limited in its 
assumptions of equilibrium under cost minimisation and economic bounded rationality 
(Easton, 1992), and consequently of its assumption of opportunism as standard 
(rational) behaviour.
Building on the work by Moller and Halinen (1999), and Moller et al (2002), the author 
suggests thinking along a four-level framework:
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Table 4. Four Levels of Analysis in Network Research
Level 1:
Industries as Networks
Networks: configurations of actors and value activities 
Understanding network structures, processes and evolution 
Influencing and coping with inter-connected actors
Level 2:
Focal Net(work)s
Groups or coalitions of firm with common purpose, defined 
according to particular purpose of analysis 




Portfolios: multiple relationships classified along, typically, two 
dimensions
Balancing relationships: investment relative to relationship intensity 
Appropriate relationship development and management
Level 4: Exchange 
Relationships
Dyadic relationships: building block of networks 
Relationship analysis and management
Understanding past, present and future direction of relationships
The implication of Table 4 is that research on networks can legitimately be conducted at 
different levels and for different purposes. There are inevitable advantages and 
disadvantages of different levels o f analysis. For example, macro analysis at level one is 
likely to result in a holistic and comprehensive understanding of the inter-connectedness 
of network actors and actions, behaviour, and developments that may impact on the 
future actions of several network actors. However, the management perspective of any 
one focal firm is easily lost in the complexity. Conversely, analysis at a more ‘micro’ 
network level may help to generate a more actor-specific perspective, but at the expense 
of the more complete understand of wider network changes.31 The subject of inquiry of 
much IMP research appears to relate to levels one and four (and to a lesser extent three) 
and the interplay between these levels. Level two is arguably one level of analysis, 
which has not been explored to the same extent by the IMP group. However, the 
research by scholars from outside the IMP group, such as Jarillo (1988) and Lorenzoni 
and Baden-Fuller (1995), can be classified within this category. Gemiinden’s analysis of 
the trend in unit of analysis in IMP proceedings from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s 
(1997) would appear to endorse this perception. The network focus in this thesis is on 
focal firm networks and relates predominantly to level two.
31 The relationship between relationships and networks bears resemblance to the ‘Hermeneutical Circle’ 
(Gadamer, 1960), which shows that parts give us a sense of the whole, but in order to understand the 
significance of the whole we have to appreciate the parts (although the whole is never fully realisable 
through the parts). The thinking can be usefully transferred to how relationships and networks need to be 
understood. One needs to understand (individual dyadic) relationships in order to understand and sense 
networks (as networks consist of relationships); conversely one needs to appreciate networks in order to 
understand relationships (as these are embedded in, and thus affected by, networks).
32 It is not entirely clear in his analysis how ‘network research’ was measured and classified
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The following section pursues the inquiry of the substance or building blocks of 
networks. This will be explored by examining a central IMP model of networks.
3.2.2. A Network Model: Actors, Resources, and Activities (ARA)
The IMP network model suggests that the core elements of any network are actors, 
activities, and resources (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). These elements are equally 
important and mutually inter-dependent. Actors are defined by the activities they 
perform and the resources they control; they are connected to other actors via resources 
and activities. Each actor’s unique combination of resources and activities constitutes its 
identity. This is known as the Actors-Resources-Activities (ARA) model.
In the ARA model, a relationship is developed as two companies build up activity links, 
resource ties, and actor bonds. These constitute the substance of business relationships 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Through relationships the knowledge of resources can 
be confronted and adapted in different ways. Activities can be linked to allow better co­
ordination, and each actor can change their perceptions of each other and better interpret 
the situations of individual actors. An example can be a relationship where the activity 
links are relatively weak while bonds between actors and resource ties are strong. The 
three layers are not independent; there is interplay between them. The existence of 
bonds between actors is a prerequisite for them actively to develop activity links and 
resource ties. Actor bonds can take a variety of forms, including technical, planning, 
knowledge, socio-economic, and legal bonds. Actor bonds are important since they 
influence how two actors perceive each other.
Activities in two companies can be linked technically, administratively, or 
commercially. Resource ties connect various resource elements, such as technology, 
material, knowledge, and other intangibles. An important point is that a relationship is 
itself a resource (Ford et al, 2003; Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). Relationships 
between actors represent valuable bridges as they give one actor access to the resources 
of another. Through relationships it is possible for individual actors to mobilise 
resources.
Figure 10 shows the relationships among the three layers at three levels of analysis. The 
first level is the level of a single actor (a firm or a segment of a firm). The second level
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of analysis is the dyadic relationship between two actors. The third level is the business 
network. Hakansson and Snehota (1995) consider actors, resources and activities at the 
network level, regarding these as activity patterns, resource constellations and webs of 
actors. “Every relationship has the network function; activity links are important in the 
activity pattern, resource ties in the resource constellation and actor bonds in the web of 
actors” (p. 39).
According to Hakansson and Snehota (ibid.), the advantage of the third level of analysis 
is to identify where and what effects are likely to occur as a relationship is established, 
developed or is interrupted, and to identify the factors that affect the possibility of the 
development of a relationship (p. 44). Further, by adopting a network perspective it is 
possible to analyse indirect relationships, or the effect on third parties and from third 
parties. An indirect relationship refers to the relationship between two parties that are 
not directly related, but which is mediated by a third party with which they both have 
relationships.
Figure 10. Activities, Actors and Resources Versus Level of Analysis
Company Relationship Network
Activities Activity structure Activity links
t














Source: Hikansson, H. and Snehota, I (1995) Developing Relationships in Business Networks, 
International Thomson Business Press, London. P 45.
Contemplating the actor, resource, and activity model, Anderson et al (1994) 
conceptualise a number of constructs that capture the connectedness of a focal 
relationship. A positive effect of the connectedness on decisions and activity of a focal 
firm in a dyadic relationship is related to anticipated resource transferability, anticipated 
activity complementarity, and actor-relationship generalisability (ibid.). Resource
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transferability comprises of both aspects of the use of knowledge and solutions from 
other relations, and use of created knowledge or solutions in other relations. Activity 
complementarity consists of positive scale effects and positive qualitative effects. 
Actor-relationship generalisability refers to the positive broader implication of co­
operation with a certain actor for other actors.
In summary, ‘connectedness’ is a core concept in the industrial network approach. A 
network approach allows a move from dyadic analysis to examination of the impacts of 
indirect relationships on individual relationships. Resource ties, activity links, and actor 
bonds are the substance of relationships. In addition, resources are not specific to the 
firm, but can be acquired through interaction with other firms in the network. 
Relationships make it possible to access and mobilise the resources of other parties in 
the network.
3.3. Supply Chains, Supply Networks or Industrial Networks?
The supply chain has emerged in recent years as a salient inter-organisational 
management concept. Whereas the focus in supply chain management used to be 
predominantly on the integration of production processes across customer and supplier 
boundaries, the contemporary focus is as much on integration of innovation processes.
The emergence of supply chain management has undoubtedly assisted industrial 
developments towards various forms of relationship and partnership strategy. However, 
it is both conceptually and practically flawed (Lamming et al, 2000b). One reason is 
that it assumes that companies engage in a simple linear vertical ‘line’ of tiered 
relationships with suppliers and customers. This may well be very useful for 
identifying, for example, bottlenecks in critical chains of supply. However, according to 
a network perspective the model is an over-simplification of the reality of the structure 
of business-to-business relationships which is much more complex, often involving 
horizontal, diagonal relationships (e.g. companies engaging in supplier associations). In 
addition, the image of a ‘tiered’ structure, largely based on observations from Japanese 
automotive networks directed by powerful vehicle manufacturers (Cox, 1996; Lonsdale, 
2001), leads to the false assumption that suppliers are organised in a logical hierarchy; 
in reality so-called ‘third tier’ suppliers may deliver through a layer of tiers for one 
material, but deliver straight to the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) for
72
Chapter Three
another, by-passing several tiers thus technically being a ‘first tier’ supplier (ibid). This 
problem is at least as pronounced in the recent concept of value stream management, 
which has been advocated by a group of researchers who developed the concept of lean 
production (e.g. Hines et al, 2000; Womack and Jones, 1996; Diamanescu et al, 
1997).33
Another limitation of the concept of supply chain management is that the term 
‘management’ implies that one party is the manager and the other party the one being 
managed. Thus, exploiting its sovereign power (Lukes, 1974; Dahl, 1961) one company 
is perceived to delegate and ‘tier’ the ‘supply chain’, and force all the other ‘managed’ 
firms to cease determining their own destinies at the expense of some form of joint 
destiny. This argument, however, makes little sense if one recognises the inter­
connectedness of business relationships, as most suppliers have several different 
customers, which may pull them in different directions.34 There may be significant 
advantages for a company in aligning its activities and resources with those of key 
suppliers and customers, but the ultimate concern of any individual company is its own 
profitability and destiny.
Recently, the concept of supply networks has emerged in an attempt to address the 
conceptual limitations of the supply chain and to provide a wider and more strategic 
view of supply (e.g. Harland, 1996; Johnsen et al, 2000). The term supply networks 
refers to the set of supply chains involved in the production and supply of a particular 
product or product family, but the concept also seeks to incorporate links between, or 
across, individual supply chains. The term ‘network’ is used to include the inter­
connections of individual relationships and chains and to provide a more holistic picture 
of the system and process of supply (Harland, 1996). Although based more firmly on an 
IMP perspective, Gadde and Hakansson (2001) appear to be embracing the term supply 
networks in a similar vein.
33 Even if  the concept, tools and techniques of value stream management arguably have helped to advance 
the management of industrial customer-supplier relationships across several ‘tiers’ through practices such 
as value transparency, value stream mapping, and supplier development.
34 Not all suppliers have more than one key customer, however, most companies recognise the dangers of 
too high dependency on one customer. These dangers were only recently illustrated by the dissolved 




The term adopted in this thesis is neither supply chain nor supply network, but 
industrial network (Johanson, 1989).35 This is firstly because it seeks to capture those 
activities which take place between companies that are wider than those focused on 
supply, notably activities such as the development of new products, processes, and 
technologies, and their commercialisation or marketing. Secondly, ‘industrial network’ 
is adopted as it has been developed to provide a better understanding of how customer 
and supplier markets are connected through long-term industrial relationships rather 
than something ‘out there’, the ‘factor market’ assumption of traditional economics (and 
early industrial marketing) (see Barney, 1986). The concept of industrial networks is 
associated with a ‘networks as markets’, or context, view as opposed to a ‘network as 
organisations’ or ‘extended enterprise’ view (see also Lamming et al, 2000b). Figure 11 
shows the interpretation of the differences in terminology according to the dimensions 
discussed here.




In this thesis the term industrial network is used to refer to the complex context 
provided by the inter-connectedness of multiple relationships, including both vertical 
customer and supplier relationships and horizontal relationships e.g. with indirect 
suppliers or competitors. However, the primary focus is on vertical collaboration taking 
place within customer-supplier relationships, which are conditioned by a myriad of 
other relationships. The term ‘industrial network’ has been favoured instead of
35 As explained earlier my use of networks is a ‘level two’ focus: focal firm networks.
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‘business network’. It provides a more explicit link to an industrial setting and thus 
excludes actors that are not connected specifically to industrial activities. As discussed 
in Section 3.2.1 it is recognised, however, that the question of deciding on inclusion and 
exclusion of network actors is inherently problematic (Cova et al, 1998).
3.4. The Role of the Network as Constraint and Enabler of Innovation
Whereas the supply chain model largely ignores the problem of inter-connected 
customers and suppliers, and individual actors lacking a position of sovereign power, 
the IMP model of networks focuses on and conceptualises the ‘connectedness’ of 
individual actors and their activities and resources. This connectedness implies that 
what happens in one relationship affects both positively and negatively, what happens in 
other relationships within the network (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Blankenburg and 
Johanson, 1990; Ritter, 1999). Some examples of positive effects may be reference, 
duplication, and combination effects. Examples of negative effects may be hindrance 
and competition effects (Ritter, ibid.). Every relationship has this network function; it 
serves to connect activity links to the activity pattern, resource ties to the resource 
constellation, and actor bonds to the web of actors. For example, through the network 
function change in the activities of any one relationship affects the overall activity 
pattern.36
The implication of the network function is that any actor, and any dyadic relationship, 
within a network is affected by the actions of other direct and indirect actors and thus 
has to cope with these (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). For individual actors pursuing 
innovation, this implies that the process of innovation is both enabled and constrained 
by the network in which it is embedded (Hakansson, 1987).
3.4.1. Network as Constraint
The notion that networks may constrain the behaviour and actions of actors embedded 
in networks is by no means new. Research on social networks and contagion (social 
influence) has traditionally worked on the assumption that individual behaviour is 
constrained or even determined by network position (Nohria, 1992). In resource
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dependency theory (one of the precursors of IMP network theory) this view is also 
central (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Heide, 1994). Burt (1983) has argued that such 
constraints even operate at industry level, for example, when an industry in which a 
firm is embedded is itself embedded in a larger network of inputs and outputs, thus 
giving some firms less autonomy than others because of cross-industry dependencies. 
Traditional research on networks thus emphasised the behavioural constraints of actors 
being embedded in networks, and to some extent depicted individual actors, whether 
individual or organisational, in a passive role (Galaskiewicz, 1996).
This thesis focuses on two important ways in which networks serve as constraints to 
innovation, both potentially leading to loss of control over technologies and 
competencies, some of which may be regarded as ‘core’. These two ways can be 
described as ‘increased dependency’ and ‘risk of dissipation of knowledge’.
The Problem o f Dependency: Core or Network Competencies?
The first way in which the management of collaboration activities is constrained by 
networks concerns dependency, as increased collaboration suggests increased 
dependency on collaboration parties. Dependency implies that companies lose an 
element of control over the management of their business and potentially their strategic 
direction. From an innovation perspective, it implies that companies lose an element of 
control over the management of their product innovation projects, as they may become 
dependent on, for example, the product and process technology of other companies 
(Ford and Saren, 2001). Fundamentally, the problems of dependency and control can be 
seen as closely related to the question of what companies should develop and make in- 
house (and thus control) and what they should buy in - or source -  externally; in 
strategy terms this becomes a matter of the defining the core competence of the 
organisation (e.g. Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).
The notion of the different forms of network dependency is not easily compatible with a 
core competency (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) or a resource-based view of the firm (e.g. 
Penrose, 1959/1995; Wemerfeldt, 1984). The resource-based view regards the firm as a 
collection of heterogeneous resources, which provide the source of sustained
36 An example that may be easy to relate to would be the dependence of a married couple on other family 
members and friends. These may be very positive, for example in financial terms. Conversely they may 
also be detrimental, for example, due to emotional interference.
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competitive advantage. As such resources need to be of superior value, due to 
ownership of, or access to, valuable, rare, non-imitable, and non-substitutable resources 
(Barney, 1991). Barney has argued that non-imitability, or imperfect imitability, may be 
achieved if resources are characterised by three factors: historical dependence, causal 
ambiguity, and social complexity. Hence, according to the resource-based view 
resources that are socially complex and knowledge-based and have a strong tacit 
dimension may be difficult for competitors to copy (Peteraf, 1990; Winter, 1987). 
Therefore, firms rely on and protect their heterogeneous and unique resources to 
generate sustained competitive advantage, deploying what Rumelt has termed ‘isolating 
mechanisms’ (1987). Companies can be expected to be seeking to nurture and develop 
such resources internally, leaving those that are ‘non-core’ to be developed and supplied 
by external companies (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Quinn, 1999).
The paradox of developing innovations within networks is that the more companies 
collaborate with other companies, the less independent they become. To put it 
differently, they effectively lose control over their technologies, some of which they 
may regard as ‘core’. This implies that core competencies and technologies ultimately 
become vested in relationships rather than within the firm. The risk of such an approach 
is that companies may become hollow rather than truly networked or ‘virtual’ 
(Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). From a network perspective, however, a core 
competency strategy does not imply that companies should only rely on external 
companies for non-core resources. In debating multi-technology corporations, 
Granstrand et al (1997) have shed some light on this management problem and argued 
that multi-technology corporations need to have distributed rather than distinctive core 
competencies. In their view “the challenge for management is to give more attention to 
the distribution of corporate technological competencies beyond the core, the 
enhancement and integration of new competencies, and the potential for related new
product markets While the emphasis in production has been on increasing focus and
out-sourcing, large firms have at the same time been spreading their technological 
competencies beyond their distinctive core. These competencies include the capacity to 
improve and to co-ordinate change in complex production systems and supply chains as 
well as to explore and exploit emerging new technologies” (pp. 15-16).37 Hence, 
Granstrand et aV s view (1997) implies that the management of the critical network
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relationships that form part of and add value to core competencies and core technologies 
becomes pivotal. Thus a collaborative approach is required and the ability to manage the 
collaboration within complex networks potentially becomes critical: it becomes a matter 
of network (or networking) competence (Ritter, 1999).
In summary, the literature indicates that companies that seek to concentrate on their core 
competencies are likely to become increasingly dependent on the resources, 
competencies and technologies developed and supplied by or with other companies. The 
problem of dependency is therefore genuine in a world, which has seen more and more 
companies out-source what they previously considered to be ‘core’ to their own 
business (Quinn, 1999; Granstrand et al, 1997). The next section discusses different 
forms of dependency that can be identified through the literature.
Types o f Dependency
Hdkansson (1987) identified four common types of dependency that may obstruct 
innovation: technical dependencies, knowledge dependencies, social dependencies, and 
logistic or administrative dependencies. These four types of dependency may each have 
a negative bearing on innovation if they do not pre-exist or if they are not developed 
along with the innovation.38 These four types will now be discussed in turn, 
commencing with technical dependency.
Technical dependency is a central problem of innovation management because products 
consist of, and incorporate, bundles of different forms of technology (Ford and Saren, 
2001). Customers do not buy technologies per se but the benefits of those technologies 
as applied in a specific product/service offering. As discussed earlier, technologies may 
be product technologies, such as ABS brake systems in cars, or process technologies, 
such as EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) purchasing systems. As the example of EDI 
indicates, such technology often does not reside within companies but between them; 
they are used to facilitate activity links, resource ties, and actor bonds and they are 
exploited through these network connections. Indeed, a technology has no value in
37 Granstrand et al (1997) make the important distinction between the diversification and distribution of 
products and technologies: their concept applies to the latter.
8 Cousins (2002) offers a comparable typology of inter-organisational dependencies, distinguishing 
historic, economic, technological, and political dependencies. Historic dependency is similar to path 
dependency discussed later in this section; economic dependency is more unclear but appears to be 
related to a ‘commercial’ dependency; technological dependency is similar to Hakansson’s technical
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itself, it is only valuable when related to other network actors (ibid.). In the context of 
systemic innovation technical dependency may be particularly important (Chesbrough 
and Teece, 1996). Technological innovations, such as Apple computers and Beta videos 
(Rosenbloom and Cusumano, 1987), illustrate this point. Both were apparently superior 
in terms of technological performance, however, they failed to succeed because they 
were dependent on a series of other innovations which ultimately did not take place. 
Technical dependency, however, is not merely present at the level of systemic 
innovation. It is present also within incremental product development projects. As 
companies are increasingly outsourcing technologies that they consider to be non-core, 
technical and technological dependency increases (Ford and Saren, 2001). Companies 
are relying on external companies to develop, manage and supply technology, which 
increasingly comes in bundles that form part of complex system offerings (Granstrand 
et al, 1997; Gadde and Jellbo, 2002). There are now signs that such system, or modular, 
offerings have begun to change the structure of industrial networks across a range of 
sectors, with large system suppliers taking on more responsibility on behalf of 
assemblers (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Doran, 2003). The implication of such industrial 
network restructuring change processes is that individual actors become more dependent 
on other actors in order to perform their own activities. Consequently individual actors 
lose their ability to control technologies and technology applications in-house; this 
implies that they are constrained in their actions and activities and therefore ability to 
manage the innovation process.
Knowledge dependencies are closely related to technical dependencies, particularly if 
one perceives technology as incorporating knowledge elements as well as physical 
artefacts (Ford and Saren, 2001). Individual actors are dependent upon the knowledge, 
capabilities, and competencies of other direct and indirect network actors. Indeed such 
knowledge include not only explicit but also tacit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). The relatively recent endorsement of the relevance of learning in networks 
(Powell et al, 1996), network learning (Knight, 2002; Hakansson and Johansson, 2001), 
and even learning networks (Bessant and Tsekouras, 2000), indicates the importance of
TOknowledge exchange and inter-organisational learning. Such arrangements reflect
dependency; political dependency is of particular relevance to government organisations where there may 
be obligations for example to source from domestic suppliers.
39 The publication by Bessant and Tsekouras reports findings from Project ION, of which the author was 
a member. In Project ION ‘learning networks’ were conceived as groups of actors coming together 
simply to learn e.g. about a new manufacturing process or technology.
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attempts to share, capture and formalise both explicit and tacit knowledge through, for 
example, directed experiment and reflection. The implication of such networked 
knowledge exchange and learning, however, is that individual actors become more 
dependent on other actors and their knowledge in order to perform their own activities. 
Individual actors become constrained in their actions and activities; they are unable to 
manage and control the direction of the innovation process independently.
Social dependencies matter because, as Nohria (1992) has argued, all organisations and 
networks are socially embedded, and social interaction facilitates the development of 
good personal relationships. Indeed, socialising and social networking are often seen as 
ways to obtain important ‘know-who’ information (Gadde and Hakansson, 2001; Blau, 
1964). Uzzi (1997) has proposed that socially embedded relationships have three 
important features: trust, fine-grained information transfer and joint problem-solving 
arrangements. Granovetter (1973, 1985) has shown how weak, often informal, ties may 
provide conduits to important information. Thus, social networking may facilitate 
business and innovation processes. Grandori and Soda (1995) have discussed social co­
ordination and control as a mechanism to obtain stable relationships based on group 
norms, reputation, and peer control. This implies that the social part of business 
relationships provides the trust and long-term stability, which can help to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour (Johanson and Mattsson, 1987). The long-term stability 
provided by social dependencies means, however, that social dependencies present a 
constraint on innovation because relationships and networks may be difficult to break 
into for new actors (Hakansson, 1987) and they may be difficult to dissolve.
Logistic and/or administrative dependencies are important to bring innovations to 
market in an effective and efficient manner. They also create problems for the 
management and control of new product development processes and the direction of 
technological innovation. Hakansson (1987) refers to an example of a bolt 
manufacturer, which was introducing a new range of bolt products. He discovered that 
despite the superior technical features of the new bolts the manufacturer’s efforts failed 
because it could not cope with the requirements of internationally dispersed after- 
market operators. Indeed, the trend towards internationalisation and global networks 
(e.g. Dicken, 2003) can be expected to make administrative and logistical dependencies
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even more important. Despite this, there is little evidence of research in the network 
literature that has attempted to examine this form of network dependency.
In addition to the four types of dependency suggested by Hakansson (1987) and 
examined over the previous three pages, ‘path dependence’ has been employed as a 
concept in economic history and historical sociology literatures to explain sequences of 
events and patterns of evolution within economic structures, including industrial 
networks (Araujo and Harrison, 2002). This concept is examined in more depth in the 
following as the final form of dependency considered as part of this literature review.
In classic economics, history was hardly given any serious attention; economic theory 
was static in its lack of recognition of past actions.40 In basic terms path dependence 
implies that future action is dependent on past actions i.e. history matters. However, it is 
a complex concept, which has been defined by David (1985, p. 332) as: “A path 
dependent sequence of economic changes is one of which important influences upon the 
eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings 
dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces. Stochastic processes like 
that do not converge automatically to a fixed-point distribution of outcomes, and are 
called non-ergodic.”
Thus, path dependence is a property of sequences of events, steeped in history and 
therefore influencing the present and the future; it creates friction (Hakansson and 
Waluszewski, 2002). Path dependent processes also combine general processes with 
elements of chance, making them inherently unpredictable (Araujo and Harrison, 2002). 
Path dependence implies an ‘out-of-phaseness’ between the operation of causal 
mechanisms and effects (Sayer, 2000, p. 15). Current events and actions bear the 
imprint of past events and actions through the operation of social and material structures 
that act as the ‘carriers of history’ (Araujo and Harrison, 2002). Cause (or causal 
mechanisms to use Sayer’s critical realist term) and effect are distant in time and
41space.
40 As indeed were the models of strategic planning that dominated the late 1970s and 1980s e.g. Porter 
(1980, 1985).
41 We return to Sayer’s Realism in Chapter Five.
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Research on industrial networks has also shown how path dependence can explain 
stability and change processes of technological systems (Lundgren, 1995; Hakansson 
and Lundgren, 1997; Hakansson and Waluszewski, 2002). Longitudinal case studies 
have shown that path dependence implies a constraint on future options. Path 
dependence implies that events follow a path or trajectory and that the ordering in which 
events happen affects their sequence and temporal unfolding (Tilly, 1994). The path 
implies that future decisions and actions are constrained although they are not 
predetermined or fatal. We may choose to alter a historical path by breaking with the 
path, jumping on another path, or shaping a new one. In contrast, all our actions are past 
dependent. A useful analogy may be that of a large ship on an ocean, which often needs 
several miles to change its path but can do so if it must. So path dependence is not the 
same as past dependence.
Path dependence may constrain what can be done within dyadic relationships. Actors 
invest in relationships over long periods of time and it becomes both difficult and costly 
to terminate existing relationships in favour of new ones; relationships become a burden 
or ‘resource heavy’ (Hakansson and Snehota, 1998; Ford and Hakansson, 2002). 
Moreover, path dependence affects whole technological systems (e.g. Lundgren, 1995; 
Hakansson and Lundgren, 1997). As Araujo and Harrison (2002) point out, historical 
sociologists and economic historians often focus on conjunctures arising from the 
temporal intersection of different trajectories. As discussed in Chapter Two innovations 
that are discontinuous or disruptive (Linton, 2002) often involve companies shifting 
from one technological path or learning curve to a more attractive one (Dosi, 1982; 
Nelson and Winter, 1977). Firms may decide to jump on a trajectory created by 
bandwagon effects and pursue the ‘technological corridor’ (Georghiou et al, 1986) 
offered by the trajectory. Hence, paths and trajectories impact on the past, present and 
future.
The different forms of network dependencies can be summarised as presented in Table 
5.42
42 The different forms of dependency may be present at not only network but also dyadic level (although 
these two are arguably problematic to separate as dyadic relationships are embedded in networks). This 
inquiry is specifically concerned with dependency at the network level. For example, there can be 
technical dependency within a dyadic relationship, which affects a product development project.
However, as the dyad is part of a wider network the technical dependency may not be purely within the 
dyadic relationships but ultimately within the network.
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Granstrand et al (1997) 
Baldwin and Clark 
(1997)
Ford and Saren (2001) 
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different forms of 
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the present and the future. 
Actions of focal actors 
depend on past actions












Risk o f  Dissipation o f  Information and Knowledge
The second way in which networks may serve as constraints on innovation concerns the 
dissipation of information and knowledge, which can happen through inter-connected 
relationships. Valuable knowledge may be lost to third parties, including competitors, 
for instance, through common suppliers. Firms are faced with the dilemma that on the 
one hand they wish to learn from their partners yet at the same time retain their own 
core proprietary assets and thus prevent leakage of crucial know-how (Kale et al, 2000). 
This may constrain the process of collaboration by limiting, for example, the extent of 
information and knowledge transferred and shared within partnerships. The interaction 
of different bodies of knowledge, which generates innovation in the first place would 
thus be hindered. This may be particularly important as companies increasingly
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compete on knowledge and competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995) as they risk losing their competitive advantage.
Companies in industries such as pharmaceuticals or biotechnology, where technology 
provides the competitive advantage, and where industrial espionage is not uncommon, 
are often concerned about the protection of proprietary knowledge. As illustrated by the 
recent problems of music producers in retaining copyright in the face of Internet piracy 
copies, patents and other legal means of protection are often imperfect in protecting 
against imitations. This is particularly so in regimes of ‘weak appropriability* (Teece, 
1986; 1998), where intellectual property systems provide limited legal barriers to 
imitation (e.g. in electronics), and knowledge is codified or explicit rather than tacit and 
thus relatively easy to replicate. In comparison, the appropriability regime in the 
pharmaceutical sector is often strong, as patents provide effective legal means against 
imitation and are difficult to ‘invent around’ (Teece, 1998). Teece suggests that product 
technology is much more difficult to protect because unlike process technology firms 
must expose these in order to profit from the technology. Mansfield et al (1981) found 
that approximately 60 per cent of patented innovations was imitated within four years. 
In a later study, Mansfield (1985) found that information concerning product and 
process development decisions was generally in the hands of several rivals within 12 to 
18 months (Teece, 1986). Other industries are also exposed to these risks, possibly 
mostly those that possess some forms of ‘unique’ and innovative technologies 
(Lamming et al, 2000a). For example, Dyson, the vacuum cleaner manufacturer, is very 
cautious about collaboration with external parties for innovation and has patented every 
single piece of its technology to protect it from being copied by competitors (Muranka 
and Rootes, 1996). This is consistent with recent research seeking to classify different 
types of supply network, which highlighted how companies supplying ‘innovative and 
unique’ products were reluctant to share information with suppliers. This was the case 
in two pharmaceuticals, one electronics and one telecommunications case (Lamming et 
al, ibid.) i.e. all high-tech industries but in different intellectual property regimes.
Bower and Keogh (1997) focused on the risks innovative, technology-based firms run 
when working closely together with clients (customers) and suppliers in terms of losing 
their competitive edge through knowledge or know-how transfer to potential 
competitors. As emphasised by Bower and Keogh these risks arose as a result of the
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necessity for firms involved in close collaborations to transfer whatever tacit and formal 
knowledge was required for the relationship to be successful. One of their findings was 
that technology leader firms in the oil and gas industry limited their contributions when 
they were obliged to enter into close partnerships where there was a potential for 
knowledge flows to exceed what they deemed desirable, thereby creating barriers to 
innovation within those alliances. Bower and Whittaker (1993) and Bower and Keogh 
(1997) observed that many of these dangers were not recognised by the firms involved. 
They concluded that firms sharing leading-edge technology might act in ways 
detrimental to the industrial network as a whole (and therefore also themselves) if they 
perceived there to be any conflicts of interest.
Trust would appear to be an important factor in preventing loss of knowledge through 
network connections (Gulati, 1995; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 
1992; Madhok, 1995). Indeed the function of trust is to prevent the opportunistic 
behaviour associated with leakage of information and knowledge (Gulati, 1995; 
Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Madhok, 1995). Dyer and 
Nobeoka report how Toyota has mastered the balancing act of motivating network 
‘members’ to participate and openly share valuable knowledge whilst preventing 
undesirable spillovers to competitors (2000). They found that members of Toyota’s 
network were encouraged to share their knowledge with everybody else within the 
network: proprietary knowledge was defined not at the level of the individual company 
but at the level of the network. Whereas this to some extent seems to ignore the overlap 
between different networks, it does implicitly emphasise the need for a strong 
segregation of knowledge belonging to different networks. Ford et al (2003) refer to 
‘Chinese walls’ as a metaphor for understanding such divisions of knowledge.43 The 
demands on trust thus become ever critical to facilitate the sharing and protection of 
network knowledge (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Sako, 1992; Hakansson and Snehota, 1995).
The risks of dissipation of sensitive valuable knowledge through networks pose a 
problem for companies. In a very direct sense, they can lose control over knowledge and 
technology to competitors. Such risks can be conceived of as a negative consequence of 
networks. Any company’s attempts to manage the innovation process may thereby be 
constrained by networks.
43 Ford et al (2002) refer to Neville Pawsey, Blue Windmill Consultants, for the idea o f ‘Chinese walls’.
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3.4.2. Network as Enabler
The previous section discussed how networks may constrain the actions and activities of 
network actors. However, the implications of the network function are dual, and 
therefore positive effects also can be derived. In other words, researchers have begun to 
focus on networks not only as constraints but also as opportunity structures 
(Galaskiewicz, 1996). It is important to distinguish between two network enabling 
issues. The first is the opposite or flip side of the network constraint issues discussed in 
the previous section. An example of this is that dyadic technical dependency is directly 
associated with a positive network effect. To put it more succinctly, companies 
collaborate to gain technical knowledge and specialised capabilities from collaboration 
parties. The second network enabling issue is what companies do to exploit the network. 
This is concerned with their strategies for coping with network constraints and 
capitalising on the resources, activities, and actors available through the network. 
Although these two issues may be difficult to distinguish in practice, this inquiry 
focuses specifically on the second issue as this is where there seems to be a lack of 
existing research. This section therefore identifies and discusses different approaches 
and strategies that appear to be prevalent amongst companies across a variety of 
industries.
Within social network research Granovetter (1985) argued that a social network should 
be viewed as a form of social capital, or an asset, which an actor can use to further its 
own interests. Granovetter’s concept of the strength of weak ties (1973, 1985) indicates 
that strong resource connections in networks have to be complemented by a set of weak, 
often informal, ties, as each of these is likely to provide a conduit to important 
information. Indeed weak ties may prove to be strong as they are the ones that an 
individual actor does not normally exploit (Granovetter, 1973). The recent trend 
towards ‘networking* in a business context (Harland et al, 2003) may signify a 
recognition of the value of gaining access to and exploiting such relationships or ties 
through networks.
The exploitation of networks is relevant not only at the individual or personal level but 
also at the company level. For example, Bower’s analysis (1993) showed how a small 
group of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies deployed a pool of critical 
resources through a wide network through extensive networking. Similarly, in his
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analysis of a joint R&D project between ASEA and Nybo, set up to develop a new steel 
production process, Laage-Helman (1987) showed how the success of the project was 
an outcome of Nybo’s interaction with several other organisations, both direct and 
indirect. The interaction, or networking, in such reported cases seemed to be of an 
emergent nature rather than following any organised planned pattern. Nevertheless, the 
benefits of networking in such cases are evident. It should be emphasised, however, that 
the concept of networking can be perceived in different ways. For example, in Ford et 
aVs recent conceptualisation of ‘networking’ (2003), networking captures not only 
positive but also negative effects of networks i.e. both as a way exploiting and coping.
One of the criticisms of the IMP research on networks is that it has predominantly 
focused on the negative constraining implications of networks. Within the IMP group 
there seems to be an implicit assumption that networks imply a ‘muddling-through’ 
approach to management and strategy (Mintzberg, 1992), whereby actors can only cope. 
Valla (1998) has argued that recent industrial changes demonstrate a capacity for 
purposive action of individual actors in networks. However, he does not believe that 
IMP research has yet responded to the challenge. In a similar vein Harland and Wensley 
(1996) have described the IMP approach as ‘strategy leaf kicking’, arguing that the 
network approach is based on a Mintzbergian assumption that other companies will 
dictate the extent to which any one network actor is free to decide its own destiny. The 
positive effects of networks, whereby they can be used to advance and enable the 
actions of individual network actors, have traditionally been under-emphasised in the 
IMP network research, although very recently it appears to be gaining increasing 
attention (e.g. Ford et al, 2003).
There is an evolving body of research, describing case examples of firms that have been 
argued to have managed their networks and achieved some form of competitive 
advantage (Harland et al, 2003). Benetton (Jarillo and Stevenson, 1991), Toyota 
(Womack et al, 1990), and Nissan (Nishiguchi, 1994) are examples of such accounts. 
The practices described by these authors appear to present an organised and pro-active 
approach to managing in networks.
The studies by Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) and Imai et al (1985) suggested that whole 
networks were committed to a ‘lead manufacturer’, such as Fuji-Xerox. Although
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acknowledging that these networks have emerged in a self-organising manner in Japan 
during the post-war economic boom and gathered around lead manufacturers plants, the 
authors described how suppliers were divided into so-called ‘primary’ and ‘secondary* 
subcontractors, equivalent to what has also been termed first and second tier suppliers 
(Nishiguchi, 1994). According to their study it was this detailed division of labour and 
tasks, which gave the innovation process more momentum. For example, subcontractors 
were able to respond very quickly to special requests and adapt to changes in the 
environment. Whether or not the division of work was indeed a process of rational 
design may be questionable; from a network perspective it seems likely that historical 
and cultural factors may at least partly explain how the industries studied have evolved 
into so-called tiered network structures (see for example Pascale, 1990).
The IMVP study (Womack et al, 1990) elaborated on the division and co-ordination of 
work in automotive supply chains. Womack et al described how lean Japanese car 
assemblers assigned the design and development of whole modules to a group of first 
tier suppliers who in turn usually utilised a team of second tier suppliers, conducting the 
detailed development and engineering. However, within lean Japanese car assemblers 
not only groups of suppliers at different tiers were involved in the process; car dealers 
also played an important role. They formed an integral part of the whole production 
system and even the development team, providing frequent customer information. As a 
consequence they had elaborate knowledge about the products they sold which in turn 
meant that they were in a strong position to feed into the development process. The 
findings by Womack et al (1990) thus indicated that lean car assemblers benefited 
significantly from delegating and co-ordinating responsibilities in their supply 
networks. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995) and Jarillo (1988) have reported similar 
findings involving a range of firms in different industries, including Apple, Benetton, 
Coming, McDonald’s, Nike, Nintendo, Sun, and Toyota. When compared with many 
IMP findings on networks (e.g. Hakansson and Snehota, 1995), one may question the 
extent to which these findings are a result of different network perceptions or pictures 
(Ford et al, 2003) or indeed whether the reasons for different results are ontological (as 
will be discussed in Chapter Five). Consistently with much supply chain management 
research, these studies tend to assume the presence and leadership of a powerful hub at 
the ‘centre’ of the network.
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Dyer and Nobeoka’s (2000) analysis of Toyota’s knowledge-sharing network can be 
seen as belonging to the same body of research. Their recent work, however, offers an 
arguably more realistic account of the ‘Toyota’s network’, highlighting that effective 
and efficient knowledge-sharing networks do not have a large controlling ‘hub’ at their 
centre, with suppliers being committed purely to the ‘hub’. Rather, even Toyota’s 
network can be seen as one of multi-lateral relationships of which Toyota is not the sole 
disseminator of knowledge. All actors both disseminate and absorb knowledge gained 
through and with other actors.
Recently, research on networking within different types of supply network has indicated 
four broad strategies of managing in supply networks. These are cascade, intervention, 
vertical two-way development, and network development respectively (Lamming, 1996; 
Lamming et al, 2000b; Johnsen, 2000). In this body of work these four strategies have 
been applied specifically to the process of supplier (or supply) development. Although 
based on a supply perspective, they may provide a useful point of departure for 
distinguishing strategies for drawing on networks during technological innovation. 
Figure 12 illustrates the logic of the first two strategies when originally applied to the 
problem of supplier development:







Cascade Strategy Intervention Strategy
Source: Adapted from Lamming, R.C., Johnsen, T, Harland, C.M. and Zheng, J (2000) Managing in 
Supply Networks: Cascade and Intervention, 9th International Annual IPSERA Conference, University of 
Western Ontario, Canada, p. 404.
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The cascade strategy describes the imposition of initiatives and performance 
requirements from the customer to the supplier, and thence to sub-suppliers (Lamming 
et al, 2000b). It offers a strategy for drawing on several layers of suppliers and sub­
suppliers; it is based on the assumption that customers have a simple supply chain 
logically divided into ‘tiers’. The customer firm, often a large OEM, perceives that its 
power may be cascaded throughout its supply base. The cascade strategy is often most 
strongly exemplified as a corporate supplier development scheme. The fundamental 
assumption is that the ideas and practices that flow from the customer, or the ‘top’, are 
naturally good. It has been suggested that this assumption is derived from the old 
cornerstone of marketing that the customer is ‘king’ (ibid.). At its basic level cascading 
is a way for a customer to delegate responsibility to its suppliers; in practice, it has been 
contended that it often takes the form of a more imposing style of leadership (ibid.).
The ‘intervention’ strategy is similar to the cascade strategy but entails the customer 
directly becoming involved in its indirect supplier’s activities (e.g. ‘second tier’ 
suppliers) and thereby effectively converting an indirect relationship into a direct one. It 
may be applied in cases where the customer seeks to help out an ailing supplier, 
applying its management skills to operational problems (Hines, 1996). It has been 
argued, however, that it may also be practised because the customer does not trust the 
supplier, for example, to implement operational improvements itself. The customer 
therefore engages directly in the supplier’s activities to ensure proper implementation. 
This direct involvement is suggested by the straight arrows in Figure 12 (Lamming et 
al, 2000b), however, logically the connection is arguably directly with sub-suppliers.
The cascade and intervention strategies may be useful in this thesis for depicting 
different strategies for drawing on networks. However, as suggested by Lamming
(1996) and Lamming et al (2000b) the problem with both strategies is that they assume 
that customers hold a position of knowledge and operational superiority, and hence 
sovereign power (Lukes, 1974; Caldwell, 2003). Consequently, Lamming et al (2000b) 
conceptualised two alternative theoretical models that fits within the concept of lean 
supply. These were named ‘vertical, two-way development’ and ‘network 
development’. Data from Project ION cases provided early indications that such 
approaches may be forming in practice, although the concepts remain loosely defined.
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Thus, it has been suggested that some large and powerful companies manage a (focal 
firm) network of direct and indirect relationships (e.g. Womack et al, 1990; Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000; Imai et al, 1985; Lamming et al, 2000b). It is unclear, however, 
whether these companies operate in a particular set of circumstances, which allows 
them to exercise a high degree of control of their supplier network, and hence manage 
part of it very effectively. Also, even if the circumstances exist to enable this type of 
strategy, it is unclear whether it is always appropriate for firms to try to exert control 
over their network through different network strategies.
An assumption of the IMP work is that actors cannot manage or control their network; 
they can merely cope (e.g. Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). From a critical point of view, 
however, this assumption may be seen as rather conservative given the accounts of 
powerful companies discussed in this section, which appear to manage, or at least 
convene effectively within the network (Lamming et al, 2000b). Using the term 
‘orchestration’, Moller and Svahn make a similar argument (2003). The important issue, 
however, may be more about the benefits of attempted ‘network management* than 
whether or not it is achievable. Recently, Ford and Hakansson (2002) proposed a set of 
network paradoxes, one of which was that the more a company attempts to control the 
network in which it is enmeshed, the less effective the network may in fact be. This 
argument can also be logically extended to apply to the management of innovation in 
networks, as successful innovation is often characterised more by chaos than control 
(see for example Nonaka, 1988). However, it is contrary to current supply chain 
management practice, which appears to have influenced how companies manage 
process innovation initiatives, such as supplier development.
3.5. Conclusions
Chapter Three set out to examine the concept of interaction between industrial 
customers and suppliers. The examination has highlighted the significance of 
understanding the nature of the interaction process and the factors that impact upon it, 
including the elements and process of interaction, the participants, and the atmosphere 
and environment in which the interaction takes place. From the perspective of 
understanding how the process of innovation involves external actors (individuals and 
organisations), an understanding of the interaction process and the consequences of an 
interaction perspective is pivotal. A substantial body of research is emerging, which
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examines how manufacturers (generally assemblers) can involve their suppliers in the 
product and process development. From an interaction perspective this can be seen as 
assuming an active customer but a rather passive supplier that simply responds to the 
customer’s ‘supplier management’. There is a lack of current research which adopts a 
true interaction perspective on the process of technological innovation.
It has been discussed that interaction may extend to ‘collaboration’ or ‘co-operation’ in 
which relationships are likely to be high involvement, mutual, sharing, reciprocal, and 
have elements of goal and value compatibility. Collaborative relationships are also 
long-term and require significant effort and investment (Huemer, 1998). The definition 
and use of the term ‘collaboration’ in this thesis is inclusive rather than exclusive: it 
assumes that most relationships have collaborative elements and that it is a matter of 
degree of collaboration rather than either/or.
Another major conclusion of Chapter Three is that although an interaction perspective 
helps to understand how companies relate to and do business with each other, it is 
inadequate unless it is combined with a network perspective. A network perspective 
takes the interaction perspective one step further by emphasising the need to understand 
the embeddedness of individual dyadic relationships in wider networks. Hence, a dyadic 
relationship is affected by other relationships that are directly or indirectly connected to 
the dyad. It is through this network that innovations are managed and can be exploited.
Interaction implies that network actors have to cope with the behaviour and actions of 
other network actors, but at the same time they can influence the behaviour and actions 
of others. Such a view contrasts with the assumption present in the dominant model of 
modem strategic management, the resource-based view (e.g. Wemerfeldt, 1984), that 
companies develop and nurture their own unique and distinctive resources and 
competencies internally and need to protect these from other organisations (e.g. Rumelt, 
1987). Ford et al (2003) refer to this view as ‘the myth of completeness’ because it 
leads to the myth that companies are complete organisations in their own right able to 
operate on the basis of their own resources and competencies. In contrast, the network 
perspective assumes that resources, competencies and technologies are developed and 
deployed through networks. Companies are relying on external companies to develop,
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manage and supply technology, which increasingly comes in bundles that form part of 
complex system offerings (Granstrand et al, 1997; Gadde and Jellbo, 2002).
The consequence of an interactive network perspective on innovation is that the process 
of innovation and thus product development is both enabled and constrained by other 
network actors and their activities and resources. Research on networks from across 
different schools of thought has sought to describe and conceptualise these enabling and 
constraining effects (e.g. Hakansson, 1987).
The literature has revealed that the process of innovation may be constrained as a result 
of actors operating in networks. Two main forms of such constraints have been 
discussed. The first concerns ‘dependency effects’: when companies collaborate with 
external companies they become dependent upon them. Five main forms of dependence 
have been identified and discussed: technical or technological, administrative or 
logistic, path, knowledge, and social dependencies. The second network constraint 
concerns the risk of dissipation of information and knowledge. Both are seen as 
potentially critical problems as more and more companies choose to collaborate. The 
IMP interaction and network approach has contributed much to advancing the 
knowledge of these network constraints. However, a criticism of the IMP research is 
that it has focused predominantly on the negative, constraining, side of networks (e.g. 
Valla, 1998; Harland and Wensley, 1996). This criticism is focused on the tendency to 
almost portray individual actors as passive recipients of the behaviour and actions of 
other network actors.
Conversely, the literature has revealed that networks may enable the process of 
innovation. The importance of distinguishing between two network enabling issues has 
been emphasised. The first is the flip side of the network constraint issues at the dyadic 
level. For example, although technical dependency is a negative network effect it is 
directly associated with a positive effect as companies collaborate to gain technical 
knowledge and specialised capabilities from the collaboration parties. The second 
network enabling issue is what companies do to exploit the network. This concerns their 
approaches to, or strategies for, coping with network constraints and capitalising on the 
resources, activities and actors available through the network. Although the two issues
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may be problematic to distinguish in practice, this inquiry focuses specifically on the 
second issue as this is where there seems to be a lack of existing research.
An emerging body of research focuses on what companies can do to exploit the positive 
side of networks. The theory of supply chain management assumes a very active role 
and behaviour of individual network actors, albeit predominantly those that occupy a 
powerful customer position. Thus, it can be regarded as a way to act in a purposive or 
intentional fashion (Valla, 1998). Two strategies for managing or convening actors, 
resources and activities in the wider network were subsequently identified and 
discussed: cascade and intervention. The drawback of these is that they are based upon 
the supply chain management assumption of a linear model of the structure of business 
relationships into vertical hierarchies, which ignores the complexities and constraining 
consequences of networks.
Hence, the outcome of Chapter Three has been an understanding of the process of 
interaction in business relationships and the implications of an interaction and network 
view. The next step is to try to conceptualise how the process of managing collaborative 
innovation in networks is constrained and/or enabled by the innovating actors being 
embedded in networks. It is this that will be the focus in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER FOUR: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
4.0. Introduction
The discussions so far centre on the need to understand the process of innovation as one 
of interaction in complex industrial networks. Chapter Three culminated by examining 
the implications of networks on the management of innovation, and identified different 
forms of enabling and constraining network effects as discussed in the literature. 
Chapter Four follows on from this theme and presents the conceptual framework of the 
thesis. This provides a way of thinking about the process of managing collaborative 
innovation in networks and potential constraining and enabling network effects on 
specific innovation management processes. The conceptual framework presented here 
has underpinned the empirical investigations conducted as part of the thesis. It has been 
developed from the literature review and undergone iterations following the exploratory 
mini-survey and the pilot case study.
The chapter commences with an explanation of how a set of collaborative innovation 
activities was developed. These form the core of the conceptual framework. Each 
activity is subsequently examined one by one, drawing on literature that justifies their 
inclusion. This part of Chapter Four includes a review of literature which has not been 
examined already in Chapter Three. It therefore continues the literature review but 
focuses specifically on developing a set of collaboration activities for inclusion in the 
conceptual framework and has thus been included in this chapter. Next, the 
conceptualisation of the different forms of network effects is presented. This 
conceptualisation is based on the examination of network effects presented in the 
previous chapter, but explains the specific interpretation and use of the concepts in this 
thesis. The conceptual framework is then presented and the chapter concludes by 
outlining the emerging research questions, which guided the case studies.
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4.1. Developing a Set of Key Activities of Managing Collaborative 
Innovation
4.1.1. The Initial Set o f  Activities
The set of activities has evolved and been refined throughout the project. An initial set 
of activities was constructed on the basis of the literature review. This set is shown in 
Table 6:
Table 6. Initial Set of Activities
Identifying/Selecting The process o f identifying actors, including selection 
criteria
Mobilising The process o f motivating actors to commit to project, 
including arranging sharing o f risks and benefits
Synchronising The process o f adapting activities and resources, 
including procedures, processes and systems
Informing The process o f informing other actors o f e.g. concepts, 
technical specifications, procedures and performance 
feedback
Assigning Human Resources The process o f assigning (on long-term basis) staff to 
development projects e.g. resident design engineers
Co-ordinating The process o f adjusting and adapting activities within 
network
Timing The process o f deciding the moment or stage o f involving 
actors in the project
The initial set of activities was used for the exploratory mini-survey and was refined 
following further literature review. ‘Identifying/selecting’ was replaced by ‘uniting’ as 
the exploratory mini-survey, together with the further literature review, indicated that 
actors in some cases were not simply identifying and selecting other actors in a rational 
fashion. Rather, in some cases they were at least as much subjected to being identified 
and selected. The two activities of ‘informing’ and ‘assigning human resources’ were 
substituted with, respectively, ‘communicating’ and ‘exchanging human resources’ for 
the same reason. ‘Co-ordinating’ was removed from the set as it became to be seen as 
an element of all activities. Instead it was included in ‘network effects’, as will be 
explained in Section 4.3. and thus it was unnecessary to include it as a separate activity.
The pilot case included ‘knowledge exchange’ as a separate activity from 
‘communicating’. However, these two activities proved to be overlapping and thus
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difficult to distinguish. ‘Knowledge exchange’ was replaced with ‘problem solving’, 
which emerged as an important activity in the pilot case and subsequently also found 
support in the literature (as discussed in the following section).
4.1.2. The Eventual Set o f  Activities
The set of collaboration activities that emerged from the exploratory exercises resulted 
in a set of activities which is presented in this section. The activities form the core of the 
conceptual framework and reflect ways in which individual companies manage 
innovation projects vis-a-vis other actors and are thus relationship and interaction 
orientated but firm-specific. Table 7 provides a brief definition of each activity.
Table 7. Collaboration Activity Set
Uniting The process o f identifying actors, including selection 
criteria -  or being identified/selected
Mobilising The process o f motivating actors to commit to project, 
including establishing ground rules and objectives and 
arranging sharing o f risks and benefits
Synchronising The process o f mutually adapting activities and 
resources, including development procedures; aligning 
objectives and technology roadmaps
Communicating The process o f exchanging e.g. design ideas, concepts, 
technical specifications, policies, procedures and 
performance information
Problem Solving The process o f resolving e.g. technical or 
manufacturing/supply problems
Exchanging Human Resources The process o f allocating (on long-term mutual basis) 
staff to development projects e.g. resident design 
engineers
Timing The process o f deciding the moment or stage o f involving 
actors in the project
The following section discusses each of the activities as presented in Table 7.
Uniting
Much research has emphasised the need for thorough systematic processes for 
identifying and selecting appropriate suppliers in new product development projects 
(e.g. Handheld et al, 1999). There is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that 
selecting the right suppliers and customers is an appropriate starting point for any 
innovation venture (e.g. Handheld et al, 1999; Bruce et al, 1995; Littler et al, 1995).
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However, the view associated with such research implies a non-interactive view of 
customer-supplier relationship development, as the customer is supposed to merely 
select a group of passive suppliers. The concept of ‘uniting’ used in this thesis 
emphasises that the identification and selection process is often interactive. To put it 
differently, a company may not decide alone with whom it wants to work; instead its 
desires to choose its preferred partners may be conditioned by other actors’ 
identification and selection processes.
Von Hippel’s seminal research (1976, 1985, 1986, 1988) indicated the dominant role of 
so-called ‘lead users’ in idea generation. His research highlighted the importance of 
identifying those customers who face particularly demanding needs before the bulk of 
the market place. These users would hence be in a position to facilitate novel innovation 
where ‘normal’ customers would be inappropriate. Von Hippel’s research was 
originally based on a survey focused on scientific instruments but his studies are now 
endorsed by a large number of empirical studies (e.g. Foxall and Tierney, 1984; Shaw, 
1985; Biemans, 1989; Voss, 1985; Parkinson, 1982). Further, Hakansson’s research 
(1987; 1989) has conceptualised and provided further empirical evidence for this stream 
of research. Hakansson stressed the interactive nature of the process, although this was 
also a feature of Von Hippel’s research as the process was seen as ‘user-initiated’. 
However, the normative message concerning the management of novel innovation 
projects was for suppliers to identify the lead users and involve them in product concept 
development (Herstatt and Von Hippel, 1992). The research by Biemans (1995) was 
akin to the research on lead users, although concerned more generally with integrating 
customers in the process of innovation. By studying 17 case studies of medical 
equipment innovations in the Netherlands, he also highlighted the importance of 
‘partner selection’ as a key activity.
Hakansson and Eriksson (1993) also stressed the importance of selecting suitable 
partners. Based on the findings from 123 Swedish SMEs having ‘important co-operative 
relationships’ (Hakansson, 1989) and two illustrative case studies, they presented four 
key issues, or co-ordination activities, for “getting innovations out of supplier 
networks”. These related to combining and integrating different supplier relationships, 
the first of these being ‘prioritising’. According to their definition this included the 
selection of suitable partners and criteria to consider when choosing partners. The 
authors specified that not only technical competence matters, but also how well the
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supplier is connected with other actors in the field. Compared with the lead user focused 
research, Hakansson and Eriksson’s work was undertaken specifically from the 
perspective of customers. Their work has since been continued not least by Wynstra’s 
extensive empirical research involving 20 cross-industry case studies in Sweden and the 
Netherlands and building on a prior survey of 500 Scandinavian customer-supplier 
relationships (1998).
More recently Oliver et al (1999) examined a set of key processes of managing multi­
party alliances, through an exploratory survey of 26 ‘innovation networks’ and six case 
studies focusing on automotive and biotechnology networks. These ‘innovation 
networks’ consisted of buyer-supplier relationships and horizontal relationships when 
aiming to develop new products or technologies. One of the key processes included was 
what they coined ‘network creation’, defined as partner selection/assembly and the 
original raison d’etre of the network. Overall, the research discussed in this section 
supports the inclusion of the assembly, or uniting, of the key actors in the network as a 
critical starting point for any innovation project.
Mobilising
The second activity is what can be termed ‘mobilising’. It is closely related to uniting as 
it concerns ‘getting actors involved’. However, it concerns more specifically 
motivational issues, including establishing ground rules and objectives, and developing 
incentives for key actors.
The importance of mobilising as a core activity for involving key actors in innovation 
projects has been maintained first of all by the supplier-orientated research by 
Hakansson and Eriksson (1993) and Wynstra (1998). These authors defined mobilising 
as getting support from or engaging suppliers in the development project. Biemans’ 
research (1995) complemented their research by stressing the need for identifying and 
motivating the right person(s) and formulating clear-cut agreements. This included 
explicit clarification of the basis of the collaboration (division of tasks, link with 
responsibilities, reasons for entering the partnership, goals, project life, contributions, 
divisions of costs and benefits etc.).
The findings from the IMVP (Womack et al, 1990) on the process of product and 
production development in lean Japanese car assemblers, which concerned many of the
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same issues as the earlier studies by Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) and Imai et al (1985) 
to some extent underpinned the findings of Hakansson and Eriksson (1993) and 
Biemans (1995). These, however, were conducted on a more international basis 
(including Japanese companies). Their very substantial empirical results pointed to the 
significance of establishing a basic contract to ensure the long-term commitment of the 
parties and to establish the ground rules for determining prices and quality assurance, 
order and delivery, proprietary rights and materials supply, making the parties work 
together to mutual benefit, and enabling sensitive information and knowledge to be 
exchanged (relating to the activity of communicating which shall be discussed later). 
This body of research is complemented by Littler et al‘s work (1995), which examined 
the key success factors for collaborative new product development in 106 UK firms. 
Amongst a variety of other success factors they concluded that establishing partnership 
equity, and ensuring that parties contribute as expected, are key to partner motivation 
and commitment. This is further supported by the study by Ragatz et al (1997) 
involving 60 companies which pointed to formalised risk and reward sharing 
agreements and joint agreement on performance measures, amongst other factors. The 
research by Oliver et al (1999) substantiated these findings. Their findings from six case 
studies, three automotive networks and three bio-medical networks, identified the 
critical role of risk and benefit sharing and motivation.44
There is thus substantial empirical evidence to suggest that mobilising is a critical 
activity for involving key actors in innovation projects. Existing research has 
emphasised specifically the establishment of ground rules and arrangements for sharing 
of risks, benefits, and objectives. These factors appear to be crucial for the development 
of trust and commitment between innovating companies.
Synchronising
The third key activity is synchronising. This is first of all emphasised in the research by 
Hakansson and Eriksson (1993), and is defined as the mutual adaptation of activities 
and resources. This has since been further investigated and refined in Wynstra’s 
research (1998). In recent years Brennan and Turnbull (1997) have identified and 
discussed different forms of adaptation in buyer-supplier relationships, such as product,
44 They suggested that a variety of contingencies shape how activities are discharged. The authors have 
initially identified that the degree of routinisation, the presence or absence of a key ‘system architect’ and 




production process, production planning, and organisational structure, further specifying 
that these can be classified according to degrees of formality and scale. They also 
highlighted that adaptation can be made by the customer and/or the supplier. Their work 
built on an extensive body of research developed not least by Turnbull and Valla (1986) 
and Ford (1980), linking adaptation to commitment over the course of different 
relationship development stages. When compared with adaptation it appears that 
synchronising is different in that it implies a more mutual orientation. From an 
innovation project perspective it might include the synchronisation of project objectives 
or milestones, and potentially also the alignment of more long-term strategic objectives.
Hakansson (1989) and Ford and Saren (2001) stressed the need for companies to align 
the technological developments and strategies of network actors. Handfield et al (1999) 
emphasised that one of the cornerstones of effective supplier involvement in product 
development is the sharing and alignment of technology roadmaps, which describe the 
performance, cost, and technology characteristics of future products each company 
plans to develop and introduce over a given time span. They describe how such 
behaviour may even become institutionalised when the actors meet regularly to share 
roadmaps. In summary, synchronising appears to be crucial for the development of 
commitment.
Communicating
The fourth core activity is communicating. This may not be surprising as good 
communication is often seen as the key to good networking. Internal and external 
communication has been studied in its own right as one of the success factors of 
innovation (e.g. Ancona and Caldwell, 1990). There is substantial empirical evidence to 
maintain that it is critical to collaborative innovation.
Wynstra (1998) and Hakansson and Eriksson (1993) included ‘informing’ as one of a 
small set of key activities, which companies can apply to improve innovation 
performance. Wynstra defined this as “acquiring and sharing information internally as 
well as externally” (p 121). The term ‘informing’, however, implies that this is from the 
perspective of a customer company informing its suppliers rather than vice versa. In 
other words, the focus is on one-way communication and arguably a slightly static view 
of the process. The research by Hakansson and Eriksson (ibid) and Wynstra (ibid),
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although conceptually and empirically extensive, is largely based on Swedish and Dutch 
case studies.
Communication, not least in terms of sharing knowledge, was also central to the 
research by Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) and Imai et al (1985), discussed in Chapter 
Three. Studying a small number of cases of successful Japanese product development 
efforts, in terms of speed and flexibility of development, they described how members 
of supplier networks reached out across functional boundaries and shared risk, 
responsibility, and information. The ‘lead manufacturer’ and its suppliers exchanged 
substantial information and the authors also observed extensive lateral/horizontal 
information exchange between suppliers at the same tier. These suppliers tended to 
share information more freely, including leading edge information and suggestions as to 
possible improvements to existing products as well as new product ideas. Vertically the 
ties were stronger and much direct exchange of information took place. The findings by 
Womack et al (1990) further emphasised how the basic contracts (discussed under 
‘mobilising’ and thus showing a link between these two activities) made it possible for 
manufacturers and suppliers to exchange even sensitive information and knowledge. 
This included, for example, mutually establishing prices, analysing costs, and the 
supplier openly disclosing each step of its production process, including cost, quality, 
and technology details. Through this process the two parties jointly sought ways to cut 
costs and improve quality. Focusing on the cost aspect, Lamming (1993) later 
conceptualised this as ‘cost transparency’, although emphasising that true cost 
transparency involves two-way disclosure of cost and value information as opposed to 
one-way ‘open book’ negotiations, which tends to imply that the supplier’s books are 
disclosed but not the customer’s (Lamming et al, 2001). Such openness and 
transparency of communication has been linked to the development of trust. Helper’s 
(1990) voice strategy, which she suggested as a better alternative to an ‘exit strategy’, 
was based not least upon the development of communication systems, facilitating a rich 
flow of information. Using Ghoshal and Bartlett’s (1988) three innovation stages, 
sensing (the development of ideas), response (development of product and processes), 
and implementation (exploitation - production, distribution etc.), Lindquist (1996)
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found that limited geographical distances were an advantage during the response stage 
in developing trust through face to face communication and thereby reducing cost.45
From a more specific new product development perspective, Littler et aV s work (1995) 
examined the key success factors for collaborative new product development in 106 UK 
firms. They also found, amongst a variety of other success factors, that frequent inter­
company communication increased the likelihood of success. The study by Ragatz et al
(1997) involving 60 companies supplemented those findings, identifying direct, cross­
functional, inter-company communication as the most widely used technique for 
integration. They also found that common barriers are the sharing of proprietary 
information and the ‘not-invented-here’ syndrome. This was recently corroborated by 
Oliver et a /’s (1999) study, which highlighted the importance of information processing 
and knowledge capture, and by McGloin and Grant (1998) and Ballou et al (2000) who 
suggested that open and effective information exchange is a prerequisite for successful 
relationships. Open communication thus seems to be a salient factor in creating trust and 
commitment between collaborating actors.
Problem Solving
The fifth key activity is problem solving. Integrated problem solving was a central 
message in Clark and Fujimoto’s study (1991). In a similar vein Lamming (1993; 1996) 
highlighted the importance of a joint approach to problem solving in (primarily process) 
innovation. Based on his automotive research, which was part of the IMVP project 
(Womack et al, 1990), Lamming identified that one of the crucial problems in many 
customer-supplier relationships was the tendency to blame the supplier whenever a 
problem arose. He argued that lean Japanese automotive companies took a much more 
mutual and problem-orientated approach, seeking jointly to identify the root cause of 
problem symptoms, and thereby remove a significant amount of waste.46 Such an 
approach to problem solving has since become one of the core elements of the concept 
of lean supply (Lamming, ibid.), although not universally acknowledged as a core 
technique of lean product development (Karlsson and Ahlstrom, 1996). Takeishi (2001) 
recently reported that auto-makers’ problem solving process with suppliers had a 
significant effect on component design capability.
45 During the sensing and implementation stages, access to large, diverse quantities of information was 
crucial, internationally as well as nationally, but less broad and more focused during the response stage, 
thus giving the process an ‘hour-glass’ shape.
46 Ishikawa (or fishbone) diagrams provide a well-known tool for the practise of root cause analysis.
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The ability to solve problems on a joint basis has further been emphasised by McGloin 
and Grant (1998) and Sako et al (1994). Sako et al (ibid.) pointed out the role of solving 
problems between suppliers and customers, and identified that “an increasing proportion 
of UK suppliers said that their customers would help them to match a competitor’s 
effort” (ibid. p. 240) Similarly, as discussed earlier Helper (1990) advocated a ‘voice’ 
strategy as an alternative to an ‘exit’ strategy, where the customer works with the 
original supplier until the problem is resolved (the exit strategy secures a supplier’s 
compliance by use of a credible threat to terminate the relationship).47 Naude and 
Buttle (2000) and Mohr and Spekman (1994) also linked problem solving to customer- 
supplier relationship quality.
Achrol (1991) linked conflict resolution to the development of trust through three 
structural mechanisms: shared information systems, interlocking directorates, and 
executive exchanges/rotation. The author identified that trust is enhanced by mutual 
satisfactory conflict resolution through the interaction process. Oliver et al‘s research 
(1999) later identified conflict resolution as a key process for managing innovation 
networks. The importance of developing mechanisms was emphasised, as these can help 
to overcome the conflicts as quickly as possible. Problem solving therefore appears to be 
a key factor in the development of mutual trust.
Exchanging human resources
The sixth key activity is exchanging human resources. The findings from the IMVP 
(Womack et al, 1990) and Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) and Imai et al (1985) 
emphasised the role and importance of assignment of teams of resident design engineers 
to car development teams. As shown by Clark and Fujimoto (1991), such co-operation 
may enable not only manufacturing process improvements, but also product 
development.
The usefulness of exchange of human resources was also identified by Dyer’s (1996) 
research regarding supplier networks. This study revealed that tightly integrated and 
spatially condensed production networks, with high levels of co-specialised human 
resources, outperformed more loosely integrated production networks with low levels of 
inter-firm specialisation. He later continued and refined this work (see for example Dyer 
and Nobeoka, 2000) focusing on the practise of shukko (inter-firm employee transfer) in
47 Helper used Hirschman’s earlier concepts of exit, voice and loyalty (1970).
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Japan as a means to create a network identity.48 Based on Japanese experiences in 
supplier development, Hines (1996) discussed the wide use in Japan of both permanent 
and temporary exchange of staff such as ‘business group integration’, ‘employee 
release’, and loaning of staff during periods of labour shortage.
The literature examining human resource exchange often adopts a non-interactive 
perspective, whereby the focus is on one party allocating staff to the other party. Using 
the concept of the quasi-firm (Blois, 1972), Lamming (1993) suggested that a more 
interactive understanding of the process may be obtained by viewing the relationship as 
an entity that takes on an identity of its own and should be managed as such. 
Consequently, staff can be allocated to the relationship from both sides for development 
purposes. Adapting this idea to human resource exchange this idea can be depicted as 
below:
Figure 13. Interactive Human Resource Exchange
Quasi
Team } Customer TeamSupplier Team /
The interaction perspective conceptualised here suggests that the project development 
team is viewed as a ‘stand-alone’ team, which neither exists within the customer or the 
supplier, but in between.
Timing
The final, but perhaps fundamental activity, is timing. In other words, the timing of all 
the other activities, including the moment of involvement of partners (Wynstra, 1998). 
Hakansson and Eriksson (1993) distinguished between timing of involvement within a 
single company (between various functions and projects), the timing within a
48 They reported how Toyota annually transfers app. 120-130 individuals to other firms in the ‘value 
chain’, mostly suppliers. Such transfers are both permanent and temporal.
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relationship (the co-ordination of the two parties’ activities over time), and the timing of 
the relationships in relation to each other (network).
The literature on supplier involvement in product development tends to assume a 
sequential stage model, sometimes including overlapping stages (see the earlier section 
on the product development process), where suppliers can become involved at different 
stages of the process. This is illustrated in Figure 14.
Since the 1980s the normative emphasis has been on early involvement of suppliers, for 
example providing a role for key suppliers in preliminary technical assessment and 
specifications. Handheld et al (1999) argued that as much as 80 per cent of total product 
cost is committed or Tocked-in’ during the concept and design stages. Therefore, 
decisions made early in the design process have a significant impact on the resulting 
product quality, cost, and cycle time. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly difficult and 
costly to make design changes as the process moves on. Thus, as much technical 
expertise needs to be brought in as soon as possible (p. 63). As Figure 14 shows, 
Handheld and his colleagues (ibid.) argued that suppliers of strategic importance (high 
involvement) should be involved early on in the process, whereas suppliers of less 
strategic importance (low involvement) should be involved later in the process.
Figure 14. Product Development Stages and Supplier Involvement
Source: Based on Handheld, R. B., Ragatz, G. L., Petersen, K. J., Monczka, R. M. (1999) Involving 
suppliers in new product development, California Management Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, Fall, p. 62.
From an international cross-industry sample of 134 companies, Handheld et al (ibid.) 
found that 23.1 per cent of companies approached involved suppliers at idea generation,
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22.3 per cent at preliminary assessment, 37.2 per cent at concept development, 14.9 per 
cent at engineering and design, and 2.5 per cent at prototyping/ramp-up.49 Overall, the 
findings indicated that ‘supplier integration’ in product development projects had been 
‘fairly successful’. Nevertheless, over 45 per cent of their respondents stated that they 
were not satisfied the results of their supplier integration efforts. Handfield and his 
colleagues pointed to the lack of companies’ experience of how to implement supplier 
involvement as one cause of this negative result.
Early supplier involvement was a prominent feature of Takeuchi and Nonaka’s research 
(1986) discussed earlier. In their five case studies, suppliers were invited to join the 
project team in the early phases of the project to develop or test some parts, delegating 
authority to trusted suppliers. These in turn were able to realise a learning curve effect 
even for bench models through ‘learning in arrangement*, as numerous companies 
ordered bench models with different shapes and sizes, but many of the orders required 
the same production technology and skill. Certain suppliers were also said to specialise 
in prototype production.
Bonaccorsi and Lipparini’s later work (1994) on strategic partnerships in new product 
development placed particular emphasis on the importance of early supplier 
involvement. They distinguished three models of supplier involvement in product 
development. The first of these is the traditional model where the full range of 
suppliers, or an approved vendor list, was requested to quote a price and offer full 
technical and commercial conditions against technical specifications. Secondly, the 
Japanese model where suppliers became involved already at the concept stage before 
product design. Thirdly, the advanced model where a group of preferred suppliers was 
requested to invest in early development work to provide technical solutions and 
demonstrate with simulations, drawings, and computer printouts, the performance of 
component, parts, or systems (see also Birou and Fawcett, 1994). In this last model 
supplier selection took place relatively late as all suppliers were invited to invest in 
development work even though only one of them would win. The authors called this a 
‘partnership’ model, although the benefit of the relationship seemed to be mostly for the 
manufacturer and the winning supplier. The importance of their model is that it
49 Although it was an international sample, 68 per cent of the responses came from North American 




emphasised the timing of involvement and indicated that different activities may be 
performed differently at different stages of the innovation project.
There is thus a large emphasis on early supplier involvement in current research. 
However, as pointed out by Wynstra (1998), the assumption that ‘the earlier the better’ 
is of questionable value as the role of the supplier during the very early stages may be 
problematic. The recent findings by Moller (2002) endorsed this view. In his case 
studies involving the Danish hi-fi manufacturer Bang & Olufsen and its suppliers, he 
found that the iterative rather than sequential progress made early supplier involvement 
difficult. It was difficult for suppliers to relate to the highly dynamic characteristics of 
the very early stages where design specifications and goals are highly fluid. Moller’s 
findings suggested that suppliers encounter difficulties in relating to the highly abstract 
language being used during the conceptual stages, including subjective and tacit 
specifications that are difficult to translate into a language that the supplier can interpret. 
In fact, he argued that early involvement of suppliers is such a resource demanding 
activity that it may be impossible for many companies to cope with it, and hence not 
reap the benefits of early supplier involvement.50 This may provide some explanation 
for the negative findings on the benefits of early supplier involvement by Birou (1994), 
Hartley (1994) and Hartley et al (1997). Moller’s results (2002) also suggested the 
limitations of a project specific view, as some suppliers may be involved across several 
development projects through general R&D involvement. These findings correlated 
with Wynstra’s (1998) acknowledgement of the limitations of a development project as 
the unit of analysis, and Lamming’s conceptualisation of lean supply in which customer 
and suppliers collaborate on a continuous basis, sharing a common search and selection 
environment (Lamming, 1993; Nelson and Winter, 1977), and aligning policies and 
strategies. Overall, these recent results pointed to the appropriateness of ‘timely’ rather 
than early involvement. Timing thus seems to be a suitable construct for capturing the 
process of deciding the moment of involvement.
Table 8 provides an overview of the key activities, their background and empirical 
support.
50 The suggestion by Moller concerning specification problems in early supplier involvement was 
complemented by Karlsson and Ahlstrom (1996) who reported difficulties in suppliers providing detailed 
cost estimates during early supplier involvement.
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Table 8. Literature Support for Set of Key Activities
Uniting • Prioritising: selection of suppliers and level of 
intensity of involvement
• Partner selection criteria e.g. knowledge, 
willingness to co-operate, market position, 
confidentiality
• Specification of lead user indicators and 
identification process
• Network creation: assembly of network parties
•  Systematic supplier selection process
• Hakansson & Eriksson (1993); Hakansson (1989); 
Wynstra (1998)
• Bruce et al (1995); Littler et al (1995); Biemans 
(1995)
• Von Hippel (1976, 1985, 1986, 1988) Herstatt & 
Von Hippel (1992)
• Oliver et al (1999)
• Handfield et al (1999), Monczka et al (2000)
M obilising • Mobilising: getting support from or engaging 
suppliers, motivating
• Motivating and risk & benefit sharing with 
suppliers
•  Establishing ground rules and ensuring equality 
is key to motivating and commitment
• Hakansson & Eriksson (1993); Hakansson (1989); 
Wynstra (1998)
• Oliver et al (1999); Womack et al (1990)
• Bruce et al (1995); Littler et al (1995); Biemans 
(1995)
Synchronising •  Synchronising defined as mutual adaptation of 
activities and resources
•  Aligning objectives and technology roadmaps
• Hakansson & Eriksson (1993); Hakansson (1989); 
Wynstra (1998)
• Handfield et al (1999), Monczka et al (2000)
Communicating • Informing suppliers and sharing information
• Importance o f communication
• Open and extensive information sharing
• Problems of proprietary information exchange; 
knowledge capture
• Cost and value transparency
• Wynstra (1998)
• Biemans (1995)
• Imai et al, 1985); Quinn (1985); Takeuchi & 
Nonaka (1986); Womack et al (1990); Monczka 
et al (2000); McGloin and Grant (1998); Ballou 
e ta l { 2000)
• Oliver et al (1999); Ragatz et al (1997)
• Lamming et al (2001)
Problem solving • Joint no-blame problem solving: focus on root 
cause analysis
• Problem solving approach helps relationship 
quality
• Conflict resolution mechanisms
• ‘Voice’ as alternative to ‘exit’ strategy
• Lamming (1993, 1996); McGloin and Grant 
(1998); Sako et al (1994); Monczka et al (2002)
• Naude and Buttle (2000)





• Shared division of labour - resident design 
engineers
• Give suppliers active role on project team
• Benefits of co-specialised human resources
•  Cross-transfer and loaning of staff
• Womack et al (1990)
• Monczka et al (2000)
• Dyer (1996)
• Hines(1996)
Tim ing • Timing o f activities within company, 
relationship, and network
• Benefits of early supplier involvement
• Problems of early supplier involvement
• HSkansson & Eriksson (1993); Hakansson (1989)
• Wynstra (1998)
• Ragatz et al (1999); Bonaccorsi & Lipparini 
(1994)
• Meller (2002)
In conclusion, none of the existing sets of activities that have been examined in this 
section are totally comprehensive and some are somewhat static in focus. Wynstra’s 
evolving model is becoming very comprehensive (see for example Wynstra and Van 
Echtelt, 2001), although it focuses more specifically on the involvement of purchasing 
as opposed to external network actors (see also Dowlatshahi, 1992). It is also slightly 
static in focus, as it does not take into account how a focal company’s attempts to 
manage supplier involvement are conditioned by the wider network.51 The interactive 
emphasis is pivotal, as it assumes that one party can only perform activities depending 
on other actors and their strategies and actions. The interaction perspective also makes it 
realistic to assume that the same activities apply for the management of upstream as
51 Wynstra’s activity ‘co-ordinating’ seems to represent an attempt to capitalise on network resources, but 
is arguably only a partial consideration.
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well as downstream relationships, as these are essentially the same forms of 
relationship, customer-supplier relationships, only viewed from different perspectives.
4.2. The Set of Collaboration Activities: Possible Inter-Connections
The activities discussed in the previous section have all been included as part of the set
of activities that form the core of the conceptual framework, because each is regarded as 
important in its own right. Nevertheless, the process of conceptualising a set of 
collaboration activities always involves a risk of overlapping amongst individual 
activities. These overlaps are highlighted in this section and illustrated below.











As Figure 15 illustrates, communicating and timing are seen as more generic than the 
other activities, as they to some extent underpin these. As indicated in Section 4.1, there 
are communication elements of all the non-generic activities. For example, one reason 
why companies may consider exchanging human resources is that this activity provides 
a practical mechanism for improving communication during product development 
projects. Timing is defined as the timing of all the other activities (see also Wynstra, 
1998) and is thus similarly generic in nature.
Within the non-generic activities, uniting and mobilising are closely inter-related as 
mobilising concerns a number of motivational issues that may influence whether or not 
actors will choose to become involved in a project (Hakansson and Eriksson, 1993). 
Furthermore, problem solving and exchanging human resources can be seen as being 
closely inter-related, since the resolution of problems has been identified as a core 
reason why companies should wish to engage in the exchange of staff (Hines, 1996).
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Despite the inter-connections between some of the collaboration activities that have 
been included in this piece of research, it is believed that each activity, in the light of the 
existing research evidence discussed in the previous section, is important in the 
management of collaborative innovation projects. It is held in this thesis that the set of 
activities is useful for describing and understanding key processes of collaborative 
innovation management. However, the premise of this thesis is that activities cannot be 
managed in isolation of other network actors’ similar attempts to manage activities in 
their part of the network. Hence, the control of focal actors on the management of 
collaborative innovation activities is subject to complex network effects. These are 
conceptualised in the following section.
4.3. Network Effects on Collaborative Innovation Activities
The premise of this thesis is that a company’s innovation activities do not take place 
within a vacuum but are part of a complex network or pattern of activities that link webs 
of actors and constellations of resources. Therefore, network connections may serve as 
enablers of the process of innovation and at the same time may constrain each of those 
activities. The following section presents the conceptualisation of network effects and 
relates these specifically to the activities discussed in the previous section.
4.3.1. Network Enablers on Collaboration Activities
Chapter Three identified that networks may affect the process of managing 
collaborative innovation both positively and negatively. On the positive side, it may be 
possible for a company, engaged in new product development, to deploy resources and 
thus technologies within its network, thereby using the network as an enabler of 
innovation. The literature has indicated that this is often managed through a process of 
what can be broadly described as ‘networking’ in the sense of using one relationship to 
gain access to others. Recent work by Ford et al (2003) has suggested that networking is 
a wider concept involving choices related to conforming and/or confronting network 
relationships, consolidating and/or creating network positions, and conceding and/or 
coercing in relation to other actors in the network (see also Harland et al, 2003). In
52 A full examination of the implications of these new concepts is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, it is apparent that changes are being made within the IMP group of relationship and network 




comparison, the reference to and use of the concept of networking in this thesis is more 
restricted. It reflects a predominantly informal activity of using the network function 
(network connections) to access indirect network relationships through direct 
relationships. To avoid any confusion with other interpretations of the concept of 
networking, the term applied in this thesis to denote such a networking approach is an 
‘access strategy’.
The access strategy suggested here entails network actors gaining access to, and 
exploiting, indirect relationships through direct relationships. One example would be 
accessing an indirect ‘second tier’ supplier through a direct ‘first tier’ supplier. The 
access approach is thus close to the concept of ‘interaction’ although the focus here is 
on one actor reaching beyond the dyadic relationship.
In addition to the access approach, research has indicated that it may be possible, at 
least for relatively powerful companies, to influence how activities are managed in the 
wider network by means of different network co-ordination strategies. There is evidence 
to suggest that companies can do more than simply ‘network’; they may be able to 
capitalise on the network by adopting a pro-active approach and co-ordinating and 
delegating activities amongst individual actors. Hakansson and Eriksson (1993) and 
Wynstra (1998) discuss co-ordination in a similar vein, although their conceptualisation 
of co-ordination appears to be more specifically concerned with “the adjustment and 
adaptation of development activities and resources between suppliers and the 
manufacturer” (Wynstra, 1998, p. XIII). The conceptualisation of network co-ordination 
strategies in this thesis is as a way of delegating responsibility and exerting influence 
beyond direct relationships.
Two network co-ordination strategies were discussed in Chapter Three: cascade and 
intervention. Here, these two strategies are re-conceptualised for application to the 
management of collaborative technological innovation in networks. Hence, due to the 
focus in this thesis on new product development as opposed to supplier development, 
(process innovation) ‘policies, protocols, and preferences’ (see Figure 12), have been 
replaced with ‘specifications and preferences’. Moreover, the nature of the intervention 
strategy has been re-conceptualised, in an attempt to address the problem of the 
concepts of cascade and intervention as discussed earlier, namely that they are based
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upon a rather simplistic linear and hierarchical conception of industrial network 
structures. The re-conceptualisation of network strategies is thus shown below:







Following Figure 16 ‘network intervention’ entails a network actor actively involving 
itself in an ‘indirect’ relationship and thereby effectively converting an indirect 
relationship into a direct one by circumventing a direct supplier to reach an indirect 
supplier (although not in supply terms). This may be for the purpose of providing, for 
example, design specifications or sub-supplier preferences (e.g. safety and 
environmental standards). ‘Network dissemination’ entails a focal actor instructing 
another actor to disseminate or forward the focal actor’s specifications and preferences; 
it is a strategy of delegation. It is similar to the cascade strategy, although it does not 
rely on the arguably restricted interpretation of structured vertical supply chains (see for 
example Rich and Hines, 1998). As the models illustrate, both the intervention and 
dissemination strategies may (at least theoretically) work from supplier to customer as 
well as vice versa.
In comparison with the dissemination and intervention strategies, the conceptualisation 
of the access approach suggests a less imposing style; there is little attempt to seek to 
influence how other actors manage their relationships. Thus, in the conceptual terms of 
Ford et al (2003) the access strategy may be conceding and consulting rather than 
assertive and coercive.
53 The cascade model applied by Rich and Hines (1998) may have its use in particular contexts for 
particular purposes, such as policy deployment in Japanese or Japanese inspired supplier associations, 
however, this research indicates the limitations o f such a hierarchical model when depicting technological 
innovation processes in networks.
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Table 9 provides an overview of the two conceptualised network co-ordination 
strategies and the access strategy for enabling collaboration activities within the 
network:
Table 9. Network Co-ordination
Style Assertive and 
coercive: seeking to 
control other actors
Assertive and 
coercive: seeking to 
guide other actors
Conceding and 
consulting: seeking to 
work with and through 
other actors




converting these into 
direct relationships: 
action












4.3.2. Network Constraints on Collaboration Activities
Networks may constrain innovation, because the more companies collaborate with other 
companies, the less independent they become, so they lose an element of control over 
their technologies, some of which they may regard as ‘core’. The discussions in Chapter 
Three indicated that ultimately this may imply that technologies become vested in 
relationships rather than within the company. The literature indicates that companies 
risk becoming hollow if they fail to manage those critical relationships in an appropriate 
manner.54
This thesis focuses on technical or technological dependence, administrative/logistic 
dependence, and path dependence. Knowledge is viewed here as a central ingredient of 
technology and thus seeks to capture knowledge dependencies through technological 
dependencies rather than as a separate issue; for this reason technological rather than 
technical dependency is the term used from this point onwards. Social dependency is 
also not going to be pursued as a separate form of dependency as it is assumed that a 
focus on social aspects of relationships and networks constitutes a large but somewhat 




Risk of dissipation of knowledge and technology is seen as a potentially critical 
problem as more and more academic models and theories encourage companies to share 
not only tactical but also strategic information and knowledge with key collaborators. 
Network inter-connections can be seen as a problem as they provide conduits through 
which knowledge and technology may dissipate to network actors, most critically 
competitors.
The conceptualisation of the dual effects, network constraints and enablers, is shown in 
Table 10. The two halves (left and right) of the table are not intended to accurately 
portray the mirror sides of network effects. Hence, the column ‘network as enabler’ 
purely identifies the conceptualisations of three different strategies that some companies 
reportedly use to capitalise on the network in which they are enmeshed;55 it does not 
seek to encapsulate the corresponding network enabling effects of the different forms of 
dependency effects and ‘risk of dissipation of knowledge’.
Network as Constraint Network as Enabler
Increased Dependency:
Technological dependence: Focal actors depend 
on bundles of different forms of technology 
available within and through network 
connections: product, process and marketing 
technology
Administrative/Logistic dependence: Focal 
actors depend on administrative and logistical 
requirements and practices of other network 
actors
Two Network Co-ordination Strategies:
Dissemination: Actor imposing its specifications 
and preferences to direct actor, explicitly 
requesting these to be disseminated to indirect 
actors
Intervention: Actor directly engaging in indirect 
actor’s activities to impose and control 
specifications and performance requirements
Path dependence: Property of sequences of 
events, steeped in history and therefore 
influencing the present and the future. Actions 
of focal actors depend on past actions
Risk of Dissipation of Knowledge:
Risk of loss o f valuable knowledge and 
technology through inter-connected 
relationships may constrain the extent of sharing 
and openness in relationships._______________
Access Strategy:
Actor accessing and exploiting indirect actors 
through direct actors
54 It was noted earlier that dependency due to collaboration is initially on dyadic relationships but, as the 
dyad is part of a wider network, dependency is ultimately on the wider network of relationships (the latter 
being the focus of this thesis).
55 From here on, unless otherwise specified, this is the intended meaning of the term ‘network as enabler’.
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4.4. The Conceptual Structure
This section presents the conceptual framework that is structured around the set of 
activities and seeks to capture the complexities of operating in a network of inter­
connected relationships, focusing specifically on network enabling and constraining 
effects on the conduct of each activity.
The basis for the conceptual framework, shown in Figure 17, is two-fold. Firstly it uses 
a simple functional model known from systems theory as ‘IDEFO’, which identifies 
input-process-output factors and mechanisms and constraints of this process (Godwin et 
al, 1989). In operations management the model is often used to describe basic 
transformation processes. In IDEFO ‘Process’ refers to the conversion of inputs 
(resources) into outputs (goods and services). ‘Constraints’ describe barriers to the 
process, such as attitudes or general circumstances, which govern the transformation, 
while ‘mechanisms’ or ‘enablers’, may represent people or devices. The IDEFO model 
can also depict product development as a transformation process; in Chapter Two this 
type of model was classified as a conversion model. Despite the simplicity of the IDEFO 
model it provides a useful basis for the conceptual framework as it can be used as a 
simple way to capture how the process of managing innovation projects in networks, is 
governed by constraining and enabling factors.
Secondly, the conceptual framework incorporates the network model developed by the 
IMP group (Hakansson, 1987), which identifies the three essential building blocks of 
networks as actors, resources and activities (ARA). Actors and resources, and the pool 
of technologies available through these two network components, provide the input in 
the framework. The set of collaboration activities, which was presented and discussed in 
the previous section, forms the centre of the framework: the activities ‘transform’ actors 
and resources into the output i.e. collaborative innovation. The framework then focuses 
specifically on the positive and negative effects of the network on the conduct of the 
activities.56
56 A similar logic was used in Project ION to construct a model of ‘networking processes’ in supply 
networks (see Harland et al, 2003), although this did not include consideration of the role of the network 
as constraint or enabler.
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Using the models of ‘IDEFO’ and ‘ARA’ it becomes possible to conceptualise the 
process of managing collaborative innovation projects in networks as a transformation 
process of actors and resources into innovation through the use of the set of key 
collaboration activities. The focus and advantage of the framework is that although 
many factors may constrain and/or enable the collaboration activities, the conceptual 
framework concentrates distinctly on the role of the network as a constraint and/or 
enabler of the process of managing collaborative innovation.57
Different actors can apply each collaboration activity at any one time. For example, 
many network actors will be trying to unite with preferred counterparts at any one time. 
Based on the literature review the activities are assumed here to be useful and beneficial 
for companies seeking to manage innovation projects. The framework neither testifies to 
any intention to, nor provides a structure for, testing the usefulness of the activities. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that whilst the activities are firm-specific, they 
are relationship and interaction focused: the effects of ‘network as constraint’ and
57 The focus within ‘network as enabler’ is, as previously explained on how companies use the network to 
enable innovation: this view o f ‘enablers’ is consistent with the IDEFO model.
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‘network as enabler’ present different ways of managing (and/or coping with) the
C O
activities in the network context.
Based on the derived set of collaboration activities, Table 11 differentiates a number of 
aspects to be examined within each activity.59 Moreover, it exemplifies some of the 
ways in which enabling and constraining network effects may be expected to be 
manifested in each activity.
58 It is recognised that although the advantage of the IDEFO-based framework is its simplicity, this may 
also be its limitation. For example, it does not allow for any sequential analysis of the innovation process. 
We return to these limitations in the closing part o f the thesis.
59 The term ‘managing collaboration activities in networks’ does not imply that any one actor alone 




Table 11. Aspects of Collaboration Activities and Possible Network Effects




• Attractive third party 
affecting choice
• Co-ordination of wider 
pool of actors
• Ending up with existing 
suppliers
• Avoiding particular 
suppliers due to 
confidentiality concerns 
or relationships with 
competitor
Mobilising • Motivational 
arrangements:




ground rules and 
objectives
• Third party helps to 
motivate/ mobilise
• Attempts to influence 
indirect supplier 
mobilisation
• Motivational difficulties 
with existing suppliers
• Lack of supplier 
commitment due to high 
dependency on other 
customer
Synchronising • Synchronising of 
development 
procedures
• Alignment of 
technology roadmaps




suppliers due to 
commitment to other 
company
Communicating • Communication of 
design concepts and 
specifications
• Communication of 
policies and 
procedures




communication due to 
attractive third party
• Communicating 
messages to wide pool of 
actors and encouraging 
inter-actor 
communication
• Withholding information 
from particular actors 
due to confidentiality 
concerns
• Withholding information 
due to supplier 
relationship with 
competitor
Problem Solving • Procedure for 
resolving design or 
manufacturing 
problems
• Involving third parties in 
identifying cause of 
problem
• Assembling large group 
of actors to resolve 
problem
• Past actions causing 
problems
• Problems occurring due 




• Allocation of resident 
design engineers to 
project
• Allocating resident 
engineer due to attractive 
third party
• Allocating staff from 
indirect suppliers
• Avoiding resident 
engineers from suppliers 
due to confidentiality 
concerns
• Avoiding resident 
engineers due to similar 
arrangement with other 
company
Timing • Moment/stage of 
supplier involvement
• Involving suppliers early 
due to third parties
• Attempts to influence 
timing of indirect 
suppliers
• Delaying involvement of 
supplier due to 
confidentiality concerns 
or past behaviour
• Delaying involvement 
due to supplier’s 
relationship with 
competitor
The indicators of the concepts provided in Table 11 have provided guidance for the 
empirical data collection and analysis. The possible manifestation of network effects 
exemplify some of the ways in which enabling and constraining network effects might 




The literature reveals a variety of activities which companies may benefit from applying 
when managing supplier-customer collaborations. As all of the existing activity 
frameworks are more or less partial the most significant ones have been combined and 
developed into a more comprehensive set of collaboration activities. These are: uniting, 
mobilising,, synchronising, communicating, problem solving, exchanging human 
resources, and timing.
A conceptual framework has been presented, which has at its centre the set of key 
activities of managing collaborative innovation that was identified in the literature 
review. These activities are conceptualised as ways of transforming the product, 
process, and marketing technologies possessed by actors in the network, into 
innovation. The framework focuses on the positive and negative effects of the network 
on the conduct of these activities. Thereby it provides the basis for a more detailed 
understanding of how each collaboration activity may be enabled or constrained by the 
network.
The focus on network constraints lies within two main forms. The first is conceptualised 
as ‘dependency effects’: when companies choose to source technologies from other 
companies rather than developing them in-house, they become dependent upon these. 
Five main forms of dependence have been identified and discussed in Chapter Three: 
technical/technological, administrative/logistic, path, knowledge, and social 
dependencies. This thesis focuses on the first three of those. The second network 
constraint is conceptualised as ‘risk of dissipation of knowledge’: knowledge may 
dissipate through network inter-connections. As companies increasingly compete on 
unique knowledge and competencies such dissipation may present a serious risk.
The focus on network enablers also lies within two main forms. The first has been 
conceptualised in this thesis as an ‘access strategy’; this captures the use of one 
relationship to gain access to other indirect relationships. This effect is perceived here to 
be predominantly an informal use of networks, implying a conceding style. The second 
has been conceptualised as ‘network co-ordination strategies’. Two such strategies have 
been conceptualised: network intervention and network dissemination; they have been 
formulated as means to capture attempts to co-ordinate or convene actors, resources and 
activities in the wider network. They are seen as potentially more explicit, assertive and
120
Chapter Four
coercive attempts by companies that aim to capitalise on a wider part of the network in 
which they operate. Thus, the network co-ordination strategies can be regarded as ways 
to act in a purposive or intentional fashion (Valla, 1998) and as ways to operate at a 
‘higher’ network level.60
4.6. Emerging Research Questions
The final part of Chapter Four outlines the research questions that have emerged from 
the analysis of the current literature on the management of innovation in industrial 
networks. Following the logic of the conceptual framework these are as follows:
1. For which collaboration activities is the access strategy important in product 
innovation projects?
2. In which collaboration activities are network co-ordination strategies applied in 
product innovation projects?
3. How does the risk of dissipation of knowledge to other network actors affect 
different collaboration activities in product innovation projects?
4. How do different types of network dependency affect different collaboration 
activities in product innovation projects?
5. In which situations might network co-ordination strategies be appropriate?
6. In which situations is the conduct of collaboration activities most likely to be 
constrained?
The set of research questions outlined here forms the basis of the empirical data 
collection. Questions 1 to 4 are explanatory in focus whereas questions 5 and 6 are more 
managerially orientated. Chapter Five identifies and discusses the most appropriate 
research strategy for exploring these questions.
60 ‘Higher’ is used here the way four levels of network analysis were described in Table 4.
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Part Two:
Research Process and Empirical Findings
Overview of Part Two
The chapters in Part Two of this thesis revolve around the empirical phase 
of the study.
Chapter Five describes and justifies the research strategy and methods, in 
the context of the critical realist research philosophical perspective adopted 
in the thesis. The empirical data collection comprised two empirical 
investigations: an exploratory mini-survey and four in-depth case studies. 
The first, exploratory, phase involved five focal network companies in 
pharmaceutical/biotechnology and automotive industries; the second, 
analytical, phase involved four focal companies in the automotive and 
telecommunications industries and a selection of suppliers and customers.
Chapter Six reports the findings from the exploratory mini-survey and 
draws out the key lessons from this phase and conceptual and empirical 
implications. Chapter Seven presents, in sequence, the findings from each 
of the four in-depth case studies, including the context and network effects 
on each collaboration activity identified within each case. Chapter Eight 
focuses on cross case comparative analysis of the problem areas of the four 
case studies and hence draws conclusions on the research questions. The 
findings are discussed in relation to prior research, thereby addressing the 
contribution and implications of the findings. Part Two completes with a 
discussion of lessons on the conceptual structure and observations on the 
limitations and validity of the research findings.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND 
METHODOLOGY
5.0. Introduction61
Chapter Five provides an overview of the research philosophy and methodology 
adopted in the thesis, and explains the decisions about research strategy and data 
collection methods. It begins by discussing the philosophical and epistemological 
perspective adopted, making a case for the chosen critical realist philosophy by 
distinguishing it from the philosophies of positivism and phenomenology. A discussion 
of the research strategy follows, explaining why the so-called ‘abductive’ approach, 
advocated by, for example, Dubois and Gadde (2002), provides the most accurate 
reflection of the actual process. The philosophical stance and the approach determine 
what form of research strategy is appropriate; the subsequent section outlines the 
research strategy: four in-depth case studies preceded by an exploratory mini-survey. 
Issues concerning units of analysis, case selection, and analytical methods employed are 
discussed, and an evaluation of issues of research credibility concludes the chapter.
5.1. Research Philosophy and Epistemology
Inter-organisational relationships have been researched and analysed using many 
different methodologies. The IMP Group has traditionally resorted to in-depth case 
studies based on face-to-face interviews or larger scale questionnaires. The reasons for 
this have been many, but a significant factor has been the practical problems of carrying 
out this type of research in terms of attempts to understand the complexities of the 
phenomena in question. As Easton convincingly argues (e.g. 1998; 2002), there is, 
however, also an epistemological defence for adopting case research as the 
methodology to the study of networks. Easton promotes a ‘realist’ epistemology as the 
most appropriate way to study relationships and networks. However, before outlining 
what this means, it is appropriate to consider the basic aim of conducting research in the 
first place.
61 In this chapter the first person, ‘I’ is used to facilitate easier explanation of methodological decisions.
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According to Easton (1998), research is fundamentally concerned with seeking valid 
explanatory knowledge. The concept of ‘explanation’ is intrinsically linked to the 
problem of causality. Explanation, however, means different things, and is identified in 
different ways, in different research philosophies.
In positivism, which continues to dominate social sciences in various forms (not least in 
the USA), ‘explanation’ - or causality - is uncovered through the identification or 
analysis of event regularities within systems (Ramsay, 1998). Ontologically, human 
actors are assumed to be passive agents observing and recording events.
The view of explanation in phenomenology (or constructivism or interpretivism) is very 
different. Reality is regarded as socially constructed rather than as an objective 
phenomenon: there is not one reality but many, depending on the observer. 
Ontologically, humans are assumed to be active, self-aware, and capable of perceiving 
and generating meaning (Ramsay, 1998). Phenomenological research therefore focuses 
on human interpretations of meanings perceived in phenomena and events, rather than 
events themselves. A closer look at positivism is appropriate at this point to appreciate 
the background and assumptions of this philosophy.
5.1.1. Positivism
Positivism originally emerged in the ‘hard’ physical sciences from the work of, for 
example, Comte, Hume and Kant. Comte chose the word ‘positivism’ on the ground 
that it indicated the ‘reality’ and ‘constructive tendency’ that he claimed for the 
theoretical aspect of the doctrine. It can be argued that the world of positivism reflects a 
mechanistic view of the world, which can be associated with Newton, whose release of 
‘Principia’ in 1686 founded a mechanistic view of the world, which coincided with the 
rise of an early factory civilisation, and emphasised stability, order, uniformity, and 
equilibrium. It concerned machine-like closed systems operating independently of the 
outside world and it implied that a linear relationship between cause and effects was 
assumed in which small inputs yielded small predictable results (Prigogine and 
Stengers, 1984). Hence, positivism is particularly suited to the study of closed systems.
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Positivism is based firmly on the premise that knowledge has to be observed empirically 
in the form of testing hypotheses that have been derived through a process of deductive 
reasoning. Hence, the positivist researcher examines existing theory and deducts 
hypotheses to be tested empirically on a large number of representative cases so that 
these can be statistically analysed for correlations and patterns in events. These 
correlations or patterns are then assumed to reflect causes and effects (rather than 
simply co-variances) and generalisations can be made.
The emphasis on empirical testing or verification has meant that positivism has become 
known in various forms as logical empiricism. As such it was - and still is - a response 
to what some people would call ‘arm-chair theorising’. Law-like relationships are 
hypothesised among a set of operationalised, and therefore empirically measurable, 
constructs and data are collected and analysed to identify correlation (Easton, 1998). 
The more tests that are applied, the more confirmation or dis-confirmation.
The problem with positivism is that few social systems, including business systems, can 
be described as ‘closed’. In fact, according to Bhaskar (1978) three conditions have to 
be fulfilled if a system is to be described as fully closed:
1. The extrinsic condition:
A closure thus depends upon either the actual isolation o f a system from external 
influences or the constancy o f those influences (Bhaskar, 1978, p. 74).
As an example, it is practically impossible to establish whether the overall success of a 
company (such as increase in turnover) over a given period of time is the result of a 
specific internal initiative (for example a business process re-engineering programme) 
or the result of some external change, such as a decrease in interest rates amongst other 
factors.
2. The intrinsic condition:
This condition is also very difficult to satisfy in social systems. Bhaskar (1978) calls for 
the necessity for the ‘internal structure’ of the object, individuals, or processes making 
up the system to be constant. This condition is very difficult to satisfy in human systems
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as people undergo changes and interpret and reflect upon events as they go along. It is a 
condition that truly distinguishes social systems from machines.
3. The non-additive principle:
Finally, Bhaskar (1978) develops the non-additive principle which stipulates that 
closure can only be attained if the overall performance or behaviour of the system can 
be derived as an additive function of the behaviour, or states of the individual system 
components (Ramsay, 1998). This is clearly related to the intrinsic and extrinsic 
conditions, but seeks to confirm that no other factors influence the object being studied.
The positivist (or empiricist) conditions for closed systems, as interpreted by Bhaskar 
(1978) are arguably difficult to fulfil in social systems research. One may think of 
examples and (brute) data that satisfy the conditions, such as number of employees, 
sales turnover, or purchasing expenditure. However, inter-organisational relationships 
and networks do not easily fit these conditions. In fact, networks are defined as ‘open 
systems’. In other words, they have no boundary even if for the purpose of analysis one 
may draw an arbitrary boundary around a network based on, for example, selected 
inclusion of those relationships related directly or indirectly to the unit of analysis 
(Cova et al, 1998; Harland et al, 2003). Thus, I believe that a positivist orientation is 
inherently problematic for the study of collaborative innovation in networks.
5.1.1. Phenomenology
The premise of phenomenology is that reality is merely a social construction. 
Phenomena studied by researchers only exist to the extent that they are studied and 
interpreted by the researchers, there is no underlying objective or ultimate truth (Mir 
and Watson, 2001). Human interpretations of meanings perceived in phenomena and 
events, rather than events themselves, are what matter to the Phenomenologist.
From a phenomenological perspective it is logical that different researchers observe 
different things and offer different explanations. An example is the case of ‘strategic 
networks’ (e.g. Jarillo, 1988) versus ‘industrial networks’. Jarillo studied the Italian 
textile manufacturer Benetton and observed and concluded that Benetton created and 
managed its network in a strategic manner and generated a competitive advantage
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through a deliberate strategy. Womack et al (1990) arrived at similar conclusions based 
on studies of the automotive industry, although they used the terms ‘supply chain’ and 
‘lean enterprise’ instead of ‘network’. These findings are in contrast to the findings of 
the IMP Group, which has conducted a large number of in-depth case studies and 
surveys, and which continues to find that networks emerge, are not controlled by any 
single actor within it, and actors embedded within the networks are highly constrained
f f )by the actions of other network actors. The phenomenological explanation for this 
divergence is that researchers, who investigate similar phenomena, tend to see what they 
are capable of seeing - or would like to see. Shaped by previous research experience and 
armed with a set of models and assumptions, researchers interpret findings according to 
their own paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). This is the reason why Ford et al (2003) stress the 
significance of different network pictures: people form their own network pictures 
based upon their perception of the world around them; some see simple supply chain 
structures, others see complex networks. One may speculate that if Jarillo, or his 
colleagues, studied the same cases as studied by the IMP group it is plausible that he 
would find that network actors behaved in similar ways to Benetton. Hence, cases such 
as Benetton may be unique but a more likely explanation for this variation in network 
findings may be found in the different philosophical orientations of the researchers, and 
thus their beliefs and assumptions. These include ontological differences in 
assumptions; researchers within the IMP tradition assume that network actors 
(ultimately humans) interact within a complex network of actors. They can act within 
the network, but the network also ultimately determines the impact of their actions. In 
contrast, strategic management academics, such as Jarillo, tend to assume that humans 
have more power to act and determine the direction and destiny of other actors.
Different forms of phenomenology (or constructivism) exist, where some are more 
radical and uncompromising than other more moderate versions (Hess, 1997 cited in 
Kwan and Tsang, 2001). Nevertheless, the danger with a phenomenological orientation 
is that i f  philosophical positions determine research findings, then reality has no input 
to and control over scientific research (Kwan and Tsang, 2001, p. 1164). Hence, no 
research findings can be objectively assessed and theories are but an act of the 
researcher’s generation instead of a formalisation of underlying reality (Mir and
62 This dichotomy between two schools of thought within network research is naturally exaggerated. 
However, a marked difference between the two schools arguably exists in their most archetypal versions.
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Watson, 2001). The standpoint adopted in this thesis was that the phenomenological 
philosophy for these exact reasons, did not offer a satisfactory solution.
5.1.2. The Philosophical Stance Adopted in this Thesis: Critical Realism
Easton (1998, 2002) advocates a realist ‘apologia’ to the study of relationships and 
networks as a better alternative to e.g. positivism and phenomenology. According to 
Easton the fundamental assumption of realism is that “there is a reality ‘out there’ 
waiting to be discovered and that reality is independent of us” (1998, p. 76). He stresses 
that we are not talking about a naive reality, which is easy to discover or self-evident, 
but he disputes the argument that it is socially constructed. Easton suggests that the 
researcher has to remain critical and objective and thereby try to uncover ‘reality’ rather 
than assume it is an entirely social construction in the mind of the researcher. 
According to Lewis (2001) “critical realism asserts that the world investigated by 
science consists of objects that are structured and intransitive: structured in the sense 
that they are irreducible to the events of experience; and intransitive in the sense that 
they exist and act independently of their identification” (p. 487). Hence, reality does 
exist in an independent form away from the researcher but it is not a simple objective 
reality in the positivist sense.
The discussion of ontological differences between the positivist and phenomenological 
philosophies highlights the importance of maintaining objectivity and reliability. The 
discussion also indicated the importance of understanding in the context of complex 
contingencies. Although descriptive studies may be very interesting it is difficult to 
learn from studies, which do not seek to explain why, for example, decisions are taken 
or why a company is successful. In a critique of the influential work on lean production 
by Womack et al (1990), Cox (1996) asserts that the authors showed very limited 
understanding of the particular circumstances that allowed Japanese auto assemblers to 
exert such great control over their supply chains.64
63 The recent debate between Mir and Watson (2001) and Kwan and Tsang (2001) shows that there is 
much uncertainty as to the differences between constructivist (or phenomenological) and critical realist 
philosophies, and that there are different interpretations of their respective merits.
Indeed Cox contends that the fact that companies across the world have attempted to replicate the 
Toyota production line and supply chain without proper understanding of the circumstances which allow 
Toyota to behave the way they do, is highly problematic.
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The need for understanding brings us back to the question of explanation and therefore 
also the unavoidable problem of causality. The present research has sought to identify 
causality, as it is argued that without an understanding of causality we do not know why 
companies act in a given way and whether other companies can learn from their ways of 
acting. Causality in critical realist terms, however, does not concern relationships 
between discrete events (cause and effect), but as Easton explains (1998), referring to 
Sayer (1984), “the ‘causal powers’ or ‘liabilities’ of objects or relations, or more 
generally their ways-of-acting or mechanisms” (p. 105). The important difference 
between causality understood as cause-and-effect, identified through correlation, and as 
causal power is that causality is contingent. Extrinsic and intrinsic contingencies are 
used to provide explanations via causal mechanisms (Tsang and Kwan, 1999). Thus, 
rather than identifying that there is a relationship between, for example, the nature of 
technology and a company’s approach to innovation, this inquiry seeks to identify those 
contingent factors which explain why certain practises seem to work and the mix of 
mechanisms which allow this to happen.
However, this thesis does not intend to deliver true explanations of reality on its own. 
The critical realist orientation implies that verification and falsification are never 
conclusive, especially in social sciences, thus replicability of empirical tests is key to 
establishing ‘reality’ (Mir and Watson, 2001, Bhaskar, 1978). Such replicability or 
critical testing of theories need to be carried out continuously (Kwan and Tsang, 2001). 
Therefore, this thesis forms part of an overall research agenda into the problems of 
managing collaborative innovation in networks. I am hopeful that it will be regarded as 
a piece of research that offers another critical perspective on and evaluation of existing 
theories. I highlight a variety of complex contingencies, or contextual factors, which 
appear to influence the patterns in the findings. However, further evaluation will be 
required by other researchers to continue the research in the search for underlying (but 
by no means ultimate) truth. The main features of the philosophical stance adopted in 
this thesis are summarises in Table 12.
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Table 12. Beliefs and Assumptions of this Thesis
Nature of reality Neither objective nor socially constructed; reality consists of objects 
that are structured and intransitive: structured in the sense that they are 
irreducible to the events o f experience; and intransitive in the sense 
that they exist and act independently of their identification” (Lewis, 
2001, p. 487).
Explanation and causality Explanation is sought through ‘“causal powers’ or ‘liabilities’ of 
objects or relations, or more generally their ways-of-acting or 
mechanisms” (Sayer 1984, p. 105). Extrinsic and intrinsic 
contingencies are used to provide explanations via causal mechanisms.
Evidence Never conclusive. Continuous replicability of empirical tests is key to 
establishing ‘reality’ (Mir and Watson, 2001, Bhaskar, 1978).
Possibility of generalisation Analytic not empirical generalisation is possible (Yin, 1989)
5.2. Research Approach and Process
The research approach can be seen as one step from the choice of philosophical 
orientation towards the more practical methodological choices. The mainstream 
literature tends to distinguish between two approaches: deductive and inductive. A 
deductive approach logically follows from a positivist philosophy, testing a hypothesis 
derived through deductive reasoning, whilst an inductive approach follows from a 
phenomenological philosophy i.e. formulating theory from empirical data. A deductive 
approach is usually based upon quantitative data, whilst an inductive approach is more 
geared towards a qualitative approach. In general, an inductive approach is more 
flexible, providing opportunities to address any unexpected issues that may arise during 
the research. As identified by Preece (1994), the conclusion of a piece of inductive 
research can contain new ideas, which may be enhanced by additional supporting 
evidence arising from the research undertaken.
The inductive approach has been regarded -  often implicitly rather than explicitly - by 
many qualitatively minded European relationship and network researchers (such as the 
majority of IMP scholars) as the natural way to approach research projects. Others lean 
more towards a deductive approach, systematically deducting hypotheses from the 
literature. In reality research projects that examine inter-company relationships and 
networks are often neither entirely inductive nor deductive. The present research project 
has been approached from a mixture of the two extremes; at times relying on literature, 
other times relying on own experience and empirical data collection. Dubois and Gadde 
describe the process as ‘systematic combining’ (2002). The process can be described as 
an iterative learning process rather than a systematic process of either deduction or
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induction. Dubois and Gadde have made similar observations on IMP-based research. 
They argue that the process is one of abduction, defined by Ayer as a process that 
“consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them” (1968, p. 85). Ayer’s 
definition implies that abductive research does not work from a preconceived conceptual 
framework derived from the literature, but rather “is successively modified, partly as a 
result from unanticipated findings, but also from theoretical insights that are gained 
during the process. This approach creates a fruitful cross-fertilisation where new 
combinations are developed from established theoretical concepts and newly developed 
ones when confronted with reality” (Dubois and Gadde, 1999, p. 4). Systematic 
combining thus implies continuous improvement of the conceptual structure as well as 
the crucial role of theory in interpretation of empirical observations. It becomes a matter 
of going ‘back and forth’ (Dubois and Gadde, 2002 p. 555). To some extent the 
empirical fieldwork parallels theoretical conceptualisations. An advantage of an 
abductive approach is that as researchers we do not have to claim to have been free from 
the influence of prior knowledge, as implied by methodologies such as grounded theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Furthermore, it presents a more accurate and authentic 
picture of the cumulative process and sometimes almost chaotic development of my 
understanding of concepts and empirical findings.
Figure 18 provides an overview of the research approach and process with specific 
reference to the relationship between the different stages of refinement of the conceptual 
framework and the theoretical and empirical investigations.
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Participation in Project IMPlb/MaGNet: 
Complexity in networks, network change, 
managing in networks
Participation in Project ION: 
‘Managing’ different types of network: 
supply, innovation, and learning networks
Figure 18 shows that Project ION served as an initial point of inspiration, both 
empirically and conceptually. Founded largely on an operations and supply chain- 
orientation, Project ION delivered a conceptual model for the creation and operation o f 
different types of network (Harland et al, 2003), in addition to a taxonomy of supply 
networks (Harland et al, 2000). The mainly industrial marketing based IMP and 
MaGNet projects (e.g. Naude et al, 2002) revealed a more comprehensive understanding 
of the complexities and implications of managing in networks, and to some extent served 
as a counterweight against the more mechanistic supply chain conceptions gained during 
participation in Project ION. Therefore, the inter-play between the two research projects 
inspired the theoretical approach and conceptual structure of the thesis. In this way the 
idea and concept generation in the research project mirrored the interaction view of the 
innovation process reviewed in the innovation and network literature.
An initial conceptual framework was devised following a preliminary literature 
investigation, using Projects ION and IMPlb/MaGNet as specific sources of inspiration. 
The conceptual framework underwent several iterations based on both conceptual 
insights and empirical findings. The initial framework was applied in the first stage of 
the empirical research: an exploratory mini-survey. Lessons from this exercise were used
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to generate a revised version of the framework combined with further investigation of 
the literature undertaken during the exploratory survey. This involved refinement of the 
set of collaboration activities and operationalisation of network effects. The first case 
study functioned as a pilot case, after which a change was made to the collaboration 
activities. However, this was as much due to a conceptual realisation following further 
examination of the literature. Similarly, the specific nature of the research questions 
formulated after the exploratory mini-survey gradually evolved during the course of the 
case study data collection and analysis.
The risk of continuous refinement of the conceptual framework was that it would make 
cross-case comparisons problematic, as potentially each could be based on a slightly 
different version.65 Hence, the framework was kept constant during the exploratory 
mini-survey, during the pilot case and during cases two to four.
5.3. Research Strategy
Chapter Four culminated with an outline of six research questions that concern the 
management of a set of collaboration activities and problems and opportunities of 
controlling these activities in networks. The research strategy needs to be able to capture 
the inherent dynamics and complexities of such complex inter-organisational systems, 
in which the boundaries of phenomena under scrutiny are fuzzy. It also needs to allow 
access to the different actors involved in the collaboration projects chosen for study.
This section outlines the research strategy of the part of the thesis that concerns the 
empirical data collection. Following the advice provided by Easton (1998, 2002) I 
decided to adopt a case study strategy, however, I decided that an exploratory mini­
survey was appropriate to try out emerging ideas and concepts. The following section 
therefore explains the purpose and nature of the first stage of empirical data collection: 
an exploratory mini-survey. This is followed by a more extensive explanation and 
justification of the case study research strategy.
65 Such a risk would be less significant in single case research as advocated by e.g. Easton (1998), 
however, in Section 5.3.2 it is argued why it was decided to conduct more than one case.
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5.3.1. Initial Data Collection: An Exploratory Mini-Survey 
The purpose of the exploratory mini-survey was:
1) to explore whether and how focal companies, engaged in collaboration with external 
parties for the development of new products and technologies, apply the set of 
collaboration activities emerging from the research
2) to explore how the management of the activities may be constrained and/or enabled 
by the surrounding network
3) to explore possible differences in the management of collaboration activities and 
network effects across different circumstances
Given the exploratory nature of the study it was decided to focus on two industries: 
automotive and biotechnology/pharmaceutical. These industries were chosen because of 
their relative importance to British industry and because existing research from which 
the collaboration activities had been identified often include these two industries, but 
have not fully considered the problems and opportunities offered by the surrounding 
network. ‘Best practice’ of managing collaborative ventures could therefore be expected 
in these two industries. An attempt, however, was made to include both large influential 
firms, which might be expected to behave ‘intentionally’ and possibly seek to exert 
control over the network, and relatively smaller firms whose behaviour in contrast 
might be expected to be one of ‘coping’.
Each interview focused on a specific product or technology development project and the 
role of each collaboration activity during or related to that particular project. Current or 
recent projects of particular importance to the companies were chosen to reduce the risk 
of biased responses, such as post-project rationalisation. Although all activities were 
effectively conducted within dyadic relationships by the focal firms the network 
perspective implied that the particular focus was on the inter-connectedness of each 
activity. The significance of this ‘inter-connectedness’ was captured through the notion 
of ‘third party relationships’. The activity of ‘co-ordinating’ specifically sought to 
capture the extent to which efforts were made to co-ordinate activities beyond one-to- 
one dyadic relationships, bringing a wider group of actors together for the development 
project and utilise all their individual technologies and capabilities.
134
Chapter Five
The interviews were semi-structured with a list of specific questions around which a 
discussion took place. Mapping, or drawing, of the network was used as a technique to 
assist and focus discussions.66 Each interview lasted app. two hours and was structured 
around the following headlines:
1) Company background
2) Identifying appropriate technology
3) Mapping/drawing network pool of technologies and identifying collaboration 
partners (upstream, downstream, and others)
4) Management of collaboration activities within the network (as drawn)
The interviews were all carried out as confidential. This was necessary given the 
sensitivity of the subject, especially as some of the projects in focus were still in 
development. All but one interviews were taped and transcribed or summarised, and 
returned to respondents for comments and corrections. Efforts were made to establish 
the possibility of referring to company names, which was successful only in the case of 
the car engine development project, analysed through TVR Engineering as the focal 
point. The five new product development projects being studied, the units of analysis, 
the focal companies involved in the study, and the position of the respondents in focus 
were as shown in Table 13 below:
Table 13. Exploratory Survey Characteristics
Development of Car 
Engine
Small Car Manufacturer: 
500-600 employees
Chief Design Engineer Automotive
Development of Exhaust 
System





Development of Car Large Car Assembler: 
35000-40000 employees
Logistics Manager Automotive








Company: + 50.000 
empolyees
Purchasing Director Pharmaceutical
Two consequences of the nature of the respondents are worth-wile emphasising. Firstly, 
the wide spread of people being interviewed helped to obtain a useful understanding of 
the type of business functions that are likely to be concerned with the problem of 
relationships being embedded within a complex network. Secondly, the negative
66 The mapping identified actors as nodes (most often companies but also individuals) and their
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consequence of the wide spread of the background and perspectives of respondents, is 
an unavoidable loss of consistency. However, to minimise this, efforts were made to 
ensure that all interviewees had been closely involved in the chosen new product 
development project.
The data from the exploratory interviews were analysed and interpreted through a 
process of transcription, respondent validation, and matrix construction. The analysis 
process followed the same procedures as used in the in-depth cases, albeit the process 
was less extensive (see Section 5.6).
5.3.2. Data Collection: Four In-depth Case Studies
I have offered a number of arguments why not only a critical realist philosophy, but also 
case research in particular is suited to the study of networks. Therefore, case studies 
were chosen as the core part of the research strategy.
A case study has been defined by Yin (1989) as “an empirical inquiry that: investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used” (p. 23). This type of inquiry suits the study of collaborative 
innovation in networks, as previously discussed, due to the fuzzy boundary between 
companies, relationships, and networks. Two other arguments are the large number of 
human actors within the loosely defined structures that make up networks, and the focus 
of the study on innovation, which is a dynamic concept, more easily captured in a case 
study (Eisenhardt, 1989).67
Unit o f analysis
The research study is concerned with collaborative innovation; hence the process of 
collaborative innovation formed the central unit of analysis. By implication, there are 
three relevant issues to consider in relation to unit of analysis: relationships, networks, 
and innovation projects. These are considered in the following.
technologies and components.
67 Eisenhardt’s proposed theory building case study process is positivistic and thus relies more on a 
hypothesis shaping approach than what is proposed here. See Dyer and Wilkins for a critique of her 
suggested approach (1991), which they argue is too concerned with the development of constructs and 




Networks include relationships of different degrees of formalisation and closeness/level 
of involvement. As the research project concerns collaborative innovation in networks, 
it was deemed essential that the innovation project within each case include both 
customer and supplier relationships in addition to other, more horizontal, forms of 
relationship. Some of these had to be high-involvement or collaborative.
It was deemed to be inappropriate to ‘measure’ the degree of collaboration in any 
quantitative manner. However, an indication of the extent to which the key relationships 
that had been examined could be described as collaborative was nevertheless seen as 
important. Therefore, the conceptual framework was used as the basis for devising
/ T O _
appropriate indicators of collaboration. This model is shown below:
F ig u re  19. E x te n t  o f  C o l la b o ra t io n  in K ey Focal F i r m  R e la t io n sh ip s
Non-CollaborativeIndicator: = >  Collaborative
Uniting - Dictation
- Formal vendor assessment procedure
- Joint choice
- History & trust important
Tinting Involved in detail engineering or later Involved in idea generation or concept 
development
Mobilising - No sharing of development costs
- Individual goals
- Sharing of development costs
- Shared goals
Communicating - Non-transparent exchange of 
information
- One-way flow
- Transparent exchange of information
- Two-way flow
Exchanging HR No allocation of engineers to project Engineers allocated to project
Synchronising - Imposed project plan
- Isolated technology development
- Agreed project plan
- Alignment of technology 
development
Problem Solving Blame of other party Focus on root cause analysis
The model was used to map the profile of each of the relationships that had been 
investigated. This exercise indicated my interpretation of the level of collaboration 
displayed within the conduct of each activity, subsequently validated by central focal 
firm respondents. Whereas the exercise could only result in and serve as a crude 
indication, it highlighted the perceived levels and variations of collaboration within a 
selection of the focal firm’s key relationships as well as the overall collaboration profile 
of some of the focal firm key relationships.69
68 The collaboration activities were regarded as useful indicators o f collaboration, as these represented 
different ways in which actors could develop and/or increase their collaboration with other actors.
69 The exercise only concerned relationships with those companies that had been chosen for interview by 
the researcher in consultation with the focal companies.
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Networkfocus: focal firm network perspective
The focus in each case was on sets of inter-organisational relationships, consistent with 
the IMP tradition. However, unlike much IMP research the focus in my cases was on 
focal firm networks, or the network as seen from the perspective of a single (focal) 
actor.
The literature review revealed that the majority of case studies to date in the area of 
innovation and networks have centred on OEMs or assemblers. The cases conducted as 
part of this thesis are different as the majority have as their focal points a key ‘first tier’ 
supplier, although in one case the focal firm is more appropriately classified as an 
OEM. Each case focused on how the focal firm managed the collaboration activities 
within the network of supplier and customer relationships in which it was embedded 
and thus conditioned by other network actors.
The focal firm network perspective is different from a non-focal firm network 
perspective, as it includes only those relationships that are, directly or indirectly, 
connected to the focal firm. My use of the term ‘focal firm’ simply reflects the chosen 
point of entry to the network: a focus point. The focal firms in the cases are not claimed 
to be ‘focal’ in the sense that they are natural network centres or hubs the way some 
authors interpret and apply the term ‘focal’ (e.g. Jarillo, 1988). Such a view of networks 
is problematic, as it assumes that whole networks exist, and are defined, by their 
relationships with a single network actor. From an IMP perspective there are no natural 
network centres, even if some actors may be significantly more powerful than other 
actors (Harrison, 2001).
A major limitation of a focal firm network perspective is the fact that it is restricted and 
arguably biased and distorted. From an IMP perspective it gives an incomplete view of 
the world surrounding the focal firm and the actual or potential influences on it (Ford et 
al, 2003). The rationale for the focal firm focus adopted in this study was 
methodological and indeed pragmatic. ‘True’ non-focal firm network research is highly 
complex and time consuming, but it also presents a problem of defining the network 
boundary (Cova et al, 1998). In this research several interviews were conducted within 
each focal firm and one interview (with one or two respondents) was conducted with 
each external actor. This was done to compensate for the disadvantages of a pure focal
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firm network perspective. In practice, the problem with non-focal firm network research 
is that if one were to conduct empirical non-focal firm network research several 
interviews with several actors would be required. Multiple cases become practically 
impossible and the problem persists that there are always more relationships to pursue.
Project focus: product or technology innovation?
A considerable decision concerned whether to focus on product or technology 
innovation or development projects. Initially, it was the ambition to concentrate on 
technology development, as the literature had indicated that some of the wider 
implications of networks would be of particular relevance to technologies rather than 
products (e.g. Lundgren, 1995; H&kansson, 1987). However, the ambition to focus on 
technologies proved to be problematic.
The decision to adopt a focal firm perspective influenced whether a technology would 
be an appropriate unit of analysis. To capture technology development from a focal firm 
perspective, it was decided that the technology to form the centre of each case would 
need to be ‘micro* and product application orientated rather than macro and ‘blue sky* 
orientated.70
It proved problematic to identify suitable technology development projects, which 
involved high-involvement customer and supplier relationships. Pilot case facilitation 
work, involving three interviews in one potential but later abandoned case, indicated 
that companies may engage in a number of both product and technology development 
projects. These early facilitation efforts included a major telecommunications OEM, an 
engineering supplier, and a boat manufacturer. However, technology projects were 
predominantly internally concentrated and very R&D controlled (and indeed more 
Research than Development focused). The use of external actors in any collaborative 
manner seemed to be limited.
Having spent approximately one year unsuccessfully trying to identify appropriate 
technology development projects, I decided to focus on product development projects. 
Underlying technologies applied in the products that were studied were examined as a 
context issue rather than units of analysis in their own right. Thus, it was decided to
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focus on a set of product or product component innovation projects, which have applied 
new process and/or product technology.
Case Selection
At the heart of case study methodology is the idea that the case study is studied in its 
own right, not as a sample from a population (Robson, 1997). The present research 
project has involved four in-depth cases or what has been described as multiple cases 
(Yin, 1989). The multiple case study strategy has not been adopted in an attempt to 
achieve statistical generalisation to satisfy a positivist requirement. Case selection is not 
the same as sampling in quantitative research (Sykes, 1991). Rather, a multiple case 
study strategy was adopted to externally validate the findings from a single case, to 
ensure that any one case is not unique in any way (Eisenhardt, 1989). Multiple cases 
also enable an improved understanding of each case, that is, what the contingent factors 
are in each that differentiates the cases from each other. Contingent factors are 
important in critical realist studies and hence in this study; my study seeks to identify 
different situations in which collaboration activities are constrained or enabled by the 
network in which they are embedded. To put it more succinctly, the aim of producing 
case studies and indeed multiple cases is analytical generalisation (Yin, 1989); 
generalisation not to a population but to the theoretical propositions and conceptual 
framework (see later section on External Validation).
Although it makes little sense to talk about sampling when choosing case studies it is 
still important that there is a logical rationale for case choice. According to Robson 
(1997) cases have to be selected either so that the theory would suggest that the same 
result would be obtained or that predictably different results will be obtained (see also 
Eisenhardt, 1989). The cases shared a number of important characteristics, such as 
sector (automotive and telecommunications) and except from one case supply chain 
position (‘first tier’), and size (medium to large), and UK-based focal firms (although all 
with complex global links). They were deliberately chosen from two industries to 
ensure some familiarisation and learning of specific drivers and issues within one 
industry without the risk of appearing as a sector-specific study. The two industries 
were chosen on the basis of my personal interest and level of understanding e.g. from 
previous research projects. In addition, the fact that both industries constitute two major
70 Lundgren’s study is an excellent example of a more ‘macro’ based, non-focal firm focused
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UK industries that are commonly regarded as ‘flagships’ of not only UK but also global 
manufacturing, was also taken into account: the automotive industry as ‘the industry of 
industries (Drucker, 1946), and telecommunications arguably as the new industry of 
industries.
Table 14 provides an overview of the nature of the four case studies.
Table 14. Case Study Characteristics
Project Focus on fuel tank 











technology for data 




JV between UK 
company and 
European company. 
JV small but both 
JV partners large 
automotive 1st tier 
suppliers.
1st tier engineering 





1st tier electronics 
supplier to telecoms 
network providers.
Telecoms networks 
OEM: major global 
player.
The pilot case concerned the development of a fuel tank module for a Japanese vehicle 
manufacturer’s new car development project. The fuel tank applied a recently developed 
material technology. The focal company, ‘EuroPart’, which operated as a ‘first-tier’ 
supplier to the automotive industry, is a joint venture between a UK company and a 
continental European company. The data collection comprised twelve semi-structured 
interviews: seven internal and five external interviews. It was attempted to collect 
performance data through a performance questionnaire to establish process and output 
performance of the innovation project. However, as discussed later this proved to be 
problematic and it was subsequently decided to incorporate part of the questionnaire 
into the interviews.71
The second case concerned the development of a car; the focal company in the case, 
AutoEngineer, had the full turnkey responsibility for vehicle design and engineering, 
and plant construction in Asia. The car project applied a new material technology and
technological innovation study.
71 As Eisenhardt (1989) explains one of the advantages of case studies is that they allow for adjustment 
of, for example, constructs and research instruments as the researcher learns from individual cases.
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was further complicated by involving the simultaneous development of a plant and 
supplier network in Asia. The case study was based on seven semi-structured interviews 
within AutoEngineer and three external interviews with two key suppliers and the 
customer, a vehicle manufacturer.
The third case study revolved around the development of a new component for base 
stations manufacturers, referred to as the ‘RFC’ project. The project was a new 
application of proven technology. ‘TelePart’; the focal company in the case, was a 
telecommunications ‘first tier’ supplier. The TelePart case was based on twelve 
interviews: eight internal and four external interviews.
The fourth and final case study was distinct from the other cases as the project 
concerned the development of interception technology for data transfer on 
telecommunications networks, a technological shift from second generation to third 
generation technology. The focal company in the case was ‘NetCom’: a 
telecommunications OEM. Hence, it was a differently positioned focal company 
compared with the focal companies in the other three cases. In addition, this case 
differed from the other cases in that the project concerned, from NetCom’s point of 
view, a component technology, rather than a product. The case was based on five 
interviews in total: four focal firm interviews, of which one was conducted by telephone 
as it was with a USA-based respondent, and one interview with the key supplier of the 
interception technology.72
5.4. Data Collection
In addition to three interviews conducted during pilot facilitation the four cases 
involved in total 39 semi-structured interviews with managers at different levels and 
from a variety of functions within the focal firms and with a selection a key suppliers 
and customers. Moreover, four follow-up meetings were held with the main contact 
within each case to validate findings (see later). They were taken as opportunities to 
make further enquires about recent developments and areas of ambiguity and to validate
72 In the Interception Gateway case only one supplier in addition to the focal company could be 
interviewed. The supplier was the provider of the technology. No customer could be interviewed, as the 
effective customer was a government law enforcement agency. The high degree of confidentiality 
restricted further external interviews.
142
Chapter Five
observations, perceptions and conclusions. These meetings included both face-to-face 
and telephone meetings. In total including the abandoned case, the case studies mounted 
to 46 interviews.
The principal criterion for determining whom to interview was the level of knowledge 
of and involvement in the subject area of the individuals.73 Within the focal companies 
several people were interviewed. Snowball sampling was used as a technique for 
identifying and gaining access to the appropriate people to interview within each focal 
company. Initially, a relationship was established with an individual who would act as 
the main contact person. This individual was briefed about the research project through 
a written project summary and an initial ‘set-up’ meeting. He/she was either the first 
person contacted or someone identified by the initial point of contact. For example, in 
the case of the focal company AutoEngineer, the initial point of contact was the 
Managing Director, who appointed the Manufacturing Director as the main contact. 
However, after some time he appointed another person, the Business Unit Director, as 
the main (and final) contact for the research project. The researcher and the main 
contact person jointly performed the identification of further interviewees.
The process and criteria for the choice of external actors to interview followed a similar 
snowball methodology. Either the main contacts or other focal company individuals 
identified relevant customers and suppliers for interview. The appropriateness of each of 
these was then discussed with the researcher, considering their level of involvement and 
collaboration in the innovation project, and their perceived willingness to partake in an 
interview. As interviews often concerned issues of a confidential or political nature all 
interviewees were promised confidentiality; only by promising and keeping 
confidentiality was it possible to conduct the interviews (hence all names being 
concealed). The promise of confidentiality enabled many sensitive and confidential 
issues to be revealed, in the majority of the cases even with the tape recorder running. 
Only a few times did respondents ask for the tape recorder to be switched off for a 
period of time. The formation of trust between the researcher and respondents was 
important to reassure respondents of the purpose and use of the information and insights 
they provided. Some respondents were highly concerned about confidentiality, often 
because of the imminent project launch and the risk of leakage, which in itself was
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interesting given the subject of inquiry. For example, in one case the focal company 
contact person had persuaded the customer to participate in the interview at the focal 
company’s premises, but had warned that he would probably not want to even reveal the 
company for which he was working. Initial explanations and assurances, however, 
persuaded the respondent to ‘open up’.
Each interview was of a duration of app. one and a half to two hours, although some 
were as long as three hours. The research instruments were semi-structured interview 
guides structured around the conceptual framework, leaving space for discussions, 
encouraging examples and teasing out critical incidents.
As a basis for discussing the activities an initial interview, using Interview Guide One, 
was held with the main contacts within each focal company; this concerned the 
particular context, or essential company, market and supply characteristics. This 
interview guide is appended in Appendix B. Network mapping was conducted to 
identify the major actors involved in the innovation project and their respective 
components and technologies. The emphasis on understanding these complex 
contextual factors was critical due to the critical realist approach. Finally, a discussion 
on how the respondents believed the activities could be employed to improve their 
management of innovation projects was undertaken. This was an attempt to move from 
the discussion of the past and present to a more future and improvement-orientated 
focus. This was seen as a visionary technique to explore how the respondents felt they 
could better apply the collaboration activities within their specific circumstances, and a 
way to discuss the potential usefulness of the collaboration activities in a specific set of 
circumstances.
On the basis of the initial contextually focused interview the next round of interviews, 
using Interview Guide Two, focused on the set of collaboration activities and how each 
activity was constrained and/or enabled by the network. This is appended in Appendix 
C. In some cases the main contact was interviewed once more for this purpose, 
however, in general the second round of interviews sought to collect data from other 
key informants within the focal companies.
73 See Appendix H for an overview of respondents.
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Following examination of the focal firm, the case studies continued with confidential 
interviews with a set of suppliers and, in three of four cases, the main customer. The 
focal firm facilitated external interviews, or what can be described as ‘snowball’ 
sampling. Using Interview Guides Three and Four (Appendices D and E), the subject of 
those interviews was the set of collaboration activities and network effects, as perceived 
by actors on ‘the other side of the relationship’, which was essential to gain a critical 
understanding of the collaboration activities. Furthermore, the interviews with external 
actors discussed how the activities related to the focal firm’s innovation project were 
performed in other parts of the network. In other words, the discussion of the 
collaboration activities was two-directional: 1) discussions between the focal firm and 
the external actor being interviewed and 2) discussions between the external actor and 
its own relationships ‘further away’ from the focal firm. As part of the exercise external 
actors were asked to identify the network actors as seen from their network position. As 
in the focal firm interviews, interviews with external actors concluded with a brief 
discussion of how respondents believed collaboration activities could be improved.74
The interview style was conversational rather than treating respondents as objects of 
research. The interview guides acted as a loose rather than rigid structure, so discussions 
often took unexpected turns. Whereas this presented a danger that the data might not be 
relevant and required an element of control on behalf of the researcher, such discussions 
also provided rich insights that often later proved to be valuable.
It was originally planned to combine face-to-face interviews with questionnaires to a 
wider group of employees from key departments related to a specific collaboration 
project within each focal firm thereby triangulating the data as a method to increase the 
reliability and validity of the findings (Ramsay, 1998). However, the pilot case showed 
that it was problematic to gain access to and persuade potential respondents to complete 
a questionnaire. Hence it was decided instead to include a set of structured performance 
assessment questions as part of the interviews.
In addition to formal interviews, information has been acquired, which can best be 
characterised as ‘informational residue’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Informational
74 This aspect o f the interview also provided an incentive for external actors to participate in interviews, 
as they could benefit from the interview if the focal firm decided to follow-up on any discussions
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residue is information that accumulates without intent on the part of either the 
investigator or the respondent (ibid., p. 279). Such informational residue was 
accumulated in all four case studies (and indeed prior to the four case studies during 
early unsuccessful case facilitation). An example of informational residue acquired 
during the case studies related to an insight gained during lunch with two respondents in 
one case during which they revealed that the culture of the focal company was highly 
technical, not least because of the personal academic background of the Chairman. This 
insight informed subsequent interpretation of reasons for the relatively low levels of 
collaboration with some network actors. Such informational residue proved to be very 
useful and whereas it was rarely a planned acquisition the researcher sought to be alert 
and receptive to such information.
Finally, relevant company reports and other secondary documentation were collected. 
These provided supplementary introductory information to companies and their official 
practices. Company and industry web sites were consulted prior to interviews as a 
modus operandi. All of the companies interviewed had company web sites and although 
many of these were superficial and promotional, and hence biased, many included links 
to articles that had been written by, for example, industry analysts. Some companies 
even had web sites documenting their internal managerial processes and systems, and 
although these were generally idealistic they still helped to grasp and follow 
conversations and interpret data. This was particularly useful in the case of the 
Interception Gateway project, which had to be understood in the context of, for 
example, 3G telecommunications developments and requirements.
5.5. Time Horizons
The question of time horizon is important in research, which addresses dynamic topics 
such as innovation, change processes, and networks. The ideal time horizon would have 
been longitudinal, for example following the whole length a new product development 
project. However, it was decided against such a strategy due to the implications on the 
length of time of such a strategy in relation to the prescribed time of the thesis. Hence, it 




approximately four to eight months, which allowed for the tracking of some 
developments although too limited to make the study truly longitudinal.
Another temporal issue concerned the ideal stage of development of chosen projects. It 
was decided to concentrate on projects that were approaching launch or had recently 
been launched. This was important to make sure that the project experience was fresh in 
the respondent’s memory, especially problems and conflicts as post-rationalisation 
would otherwise be likely. It was important that the projects be close to launch, as 
otherwise respondents would not have undergone all the project phases, including the 
final often precarious points in a project. Moreover, the ambition to evaluate the 
perceived performance of the project would be impossible unless the project was nearing 
its end. Several potential cases were investigated, including initial exploratory 
interviews, only to find that these had to be terminated, as the projects had not 
progressed sufficiently.
5.6. Analysing and Interpreting Data
5.6.1. Analytic Strategy and Technique
The analytic strategy adopted in this thesis was to seek to relate data to the research 
questions through the conceptual framework. The analytic technique adopted to achieve 
the best possible fit between research questions and the data can be described as pattern 
matching (Yin, 1989), comparing the case study results with the theoretical propositions 
or research questions. Given the focus on understanding and explanation there was also 
an element of what Yin terms ‘explanation building’ although no formal stipulation of 
causal links was developed. Rather, the critical realist orientation and abductive 
approach meant that the analysis sought to uncover combinations of contingencies, or 
contextual factors, by continuously reflecting on the data and revisiting the literature.
5.6.2. Intra-Case Analysis
In the majority of cases the interviews were tape-recorded. In these cases interview data 
were transcribed or thoroughly summarised. In the cases where recording was not 
possible, usually due to respondent’s concerns about being recorded or a noisy meeting 
venue, notes were taken during and after the interviews and summaries written as soon
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as possible whilst the interview was still fresh in memory. Transcripts were initially 
produced by the researcher, later by professional transcribers recommended by CRiSPS. 
Early transcripts were thoroughly checked for correctness and any mistakes, such as 
misunderstood terminology, were discussed with the transcribers to avoid future 
mistakes.
Transcripts or summaries were read and annotated to match data with the conceptual 
framework i.e. collaboration activities and different forms of network effect. The 
annotation used in this study would be described by some as first level coding (e.g. 
Miles and Huberman, 1984; Robson, 1997), although the use of a formally structured 
coding framework was restricted to the collaboration activities and network effects, as 
discussed below. In addition, contextual factors and emerging themes raised by the 
respondents were identified. Data from the interviews were then complemented with the 
documentary data and any informational residue.
The set of collaboration activities and the conceptualised forms of network effect were 
captured in the conceptual framework, which provided a conceptual structure guiding 
the further content analysis. The analysis followed the logic illustrated in the Figure 20.
Matrices were constructed and used as tools, or coding frameworks, for analysing 
network effects on each collaboration activity, on the basis of the method identified in 
Figure 20. The matrices were sorted by interpretations of each activity and network 
effects across respondents, which were extracted, interpreted and summarised from the 
annotated transcripts. Different forms of network effect were highlighted in the matrices
Figure 20. A Framework of Analysis
Network as 
Constraint
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by the use of different types of bullet. Thus, the matrices were what Miles and 
Huberman describe as ‘role-ordered’, but also included elements of their ‘effects 
matrix’ (1984). Two types of matrix were constructed: firstly focal actor interpretations 
and secondly ‘external’ actor interpretations. These are appended in Appendix F. Meta 
matrices captured the overall pattern of activities and network effects, thus representing 
what could be seen as the aggregated picture of the underlying reality.
Important contextual factors were derived from the list of contextual questions that 
formed a large part of the first focal firm interview guide and the first parts of customer 
and supplier interviews. Contextual factors included project details, including levels and 
forms of innovation represented in the project, product characteristics, firm 
characteristics, and network characteristics. The latter was analysed by means of 
network mapping, drawing a picture of the network in conjunction with the respondent, 
as an introductory part of each interview. Network maps were then refined using a PC 
after interviews, and validated with respondents as interviews progressed within each 
case. Matrices similar to those developed for collaboration activities and network 
effects, were constructed to capture different interpretations of important contextual 
factors.
Quotes were extracted from transcripts to provide illustrations of important issues or 
themes. Only those quotes that were viewed as representative of the case as a whole 
were included. This was established through comparison with the overall data set. 
However, some quotes have been included to illustrate particular points of view. 
Potential quotes from respondents that were seen as peculiar were excluded.
5.6.3. Inter-Case Analysis
The purpose of inter- or cross-case comparison and analysis was not least to provide 
external validation (see the following section) of the individual case study findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, patterns were to be identified in terms of commonalities and 
divergences across the individual cases. These patterns were identified through cross­
case comparison meta matrices (Miles and Huberman, 1984), which focused on the 
collaboration activities and network effects, again highlighting the latter by the use of 
different types of bullet (see Appendix G). The patterns identified through the meta
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matrices had to be related back to the contextual characteristics that had emerged from 
each case. Seeking out contrasts (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was a useful tactic in 
developing an understanding of the particularities of each case. This analysis process 
led the way for identifying and revealing the particular contingencies of each case and 
how these, or a particular set of these, could help to elucidate particular patterns of 
collaboration activities and network effects.
The critical realist approach implied a search for the more objective reality underlying 
the perceived and more subjective reality. Matrices provided a means to uncover 
‘reality’ by enabling an aggregated picture of intra- and inter-company interpretations. 
Patterns emerged that revealed both differences and similarities across respondents. 
When combined with the contextual analysis, which provided understanding of e.g. 
companies, relationships and individuals, it became possible to build explanations 
through identification of patterns in answers and views. Following the critical realist 
perspective, the analysis did not seek to identify simply causal relationships; the 
analysis sought to build understanding and explanation through the ‘causal powers’ 
represented by the contextual, or contingent, factors captured.
Although there was an attempt to make the process of analysis and interpretation 
systematic and logical it was by no means linear and ordered. Instead, it was an iterative 
and sometimes messy process of trial and error. Interview transcripts provided the main 
source of data but these had to be complemented with, and interpreted in the light of, 
documentary data, informational residue as well as the researcher’s own experience, 
knowledge and beliefs. Transcripts were read and re-read, and interpretations revisited 
following new information and emerging realisations. The final stage of data collection 
and analysis was obtaining feedback on the draft findings, as described in the following 
section.
5.7. Validating Findings: Testing’ Research Credibility
Yin (1989) identifies four criteria, or tests, used to establish the credibility of any case
n c
study research -  construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.
75 There are discussions in the methodology literature regarding the applicability of such concepts as 
‘internal validity’ in the context of qualitative research. For example, Lincoln and Guba (1985) make a 




Robson (1997 p. 68) defines the principle of construct validity as “does it measure what 
you think it measures?” Validity is about the truth and ‘goodness’ of the findings. Yin 
has suggested three approaches to ensuring construct validity (1989), which were 
adopted in this thesis. The first of these was to collect data from multiple sources. 
Primary data were collected through interviews, whilst secondary data were collected 
via company reports and internal documentation in addition to desk research. The 
second was to have case study reports read by key respondents, and follow-up meetings 
to discuss and validate the observations and conclusions made in reports that had been 
forwarded; this is what Reason and Rowan refer to as ‘respondent validation’ (1981). 
Respondents were asked to comment on the description of the project and level of 
innovation identified, the companies involved and the network map, technology issues, 
collaboration activities, whether anything had been misunderstood, missed out etc.. 
Furthermore, they were asked to comment on whether in their opinion any activities 
should have been added or excluded, and whether they agreed with or wanted to add 
anything to report conclusions. All respondents asked to comment on reports were of 
the opinion that the reports were accurate and that the analysis was very perceptive. 
Some had evidently read the report in more detail than others and were keener to ensure
7 Athat all details and conclusions were correct.
The third approach was to allow an external observer “to follow the derivation of any 
evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions” (Yin 1989, 
p. 98). The project supervisor primarily filled this role, but feedback from colleagues 
within CRiSPS and the University of Bath, in addition to my wife, who has been 
undertaking a Ph.D. study into a related area of research, also constituted valuable 
sources of such validation.
5.7.2. Internal Validity
Internal validity is a question of consistency in content between a nominal and an 
operational level (Andersen and Gamdrup, 1990). It is a matter of measuring what one
that Yin’s criteria are appropriate given my approach and research strategy, and in any case are 
comparable with those of e.g. Lincoln and Guba (ibid.).
76 In one case the main contact held a doctorate and thus had a natural interest in the process of research 
and in accuracy of findings and conclusions.
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intends to measure, in positivist terms, or gaining full access to the knowledge and 
meanings of informants (Easterby-Smith et al, 1996). Sykes describes internal validity 
as the internal coherence of the findings -  the snugness of the fit between the data and 
the findings or conclusions (1991, p. 10). The purpose of the exploratory mini-survey 
and the pilot case study was partly to ensure such internal validity by fine-tuning the 
research instruments, ensuring appropriate ‘operationalisation’ of concepts and 
constructs. Furthermore, discussions with supervisor and other researchers in the field, 
for example within CRiSPS, helped to improve the internal validity of conclusions in 
relation to the data.
5.7.3. External Validity
The question of external validity depends greatly on the philosophical stance. To 
researchers leaning towards positivism external validation concerns generalisability of 
findings (see for example Silverman, 2000), however, to researchers leaning towards 
phenomenology external validation concerns the generalisability of conceptual 
structures. Yin (1989) suggests that a case study must not be regarded as a ‘sample’, and 
that the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalise theories. This approach is also 
known as analytic generalisation.
The choice of four case studies conducted across two industries was motivated by a wish 
to maintain external validity and analytic generalisation in particular. It was the reason 
for not conducting one very extensive case study, as advocated by e.g. Easton (1998) 
and Dubois and Gadde (2002), as the risk of such a strategy would be the utter 
peculiarity of any one case, with little relevance to any other cases. The external validity 
provided by four cases constitutes a first step towards replication and thus testing of the 
findings, in different intrinsic and extrinsic contingencies (Tsang and Kwan, 1999). 
Comparisons of the empirical findings with the literature was the final step in trying to 





Reliability concerns the ‘repeatability’ or consistency of findings (Sykes, 1991).77 
Kirkeby (1990) distinguishes between intra-subjective and inter-subjective reliability, 
where the former would require the same researcher to reach the same findings if the 
study were repeated, whereas the latter would require another researcher to reach the 
same findings. Frequent discussions with colleagues working in the same or a related 
field of study have sought to increase the reliability of the findings from this thesis. It 
was a deliberate decision to position myself in two different research communities, IMP 
and IPSERA, and it has also reflected an attempt to avoid reliability problems. Both 
IMP and IPSERA are concerned with the study of very similar phenomena, customer- 
supplier relationships and networks, albeit often from different perspectives and 
research paradigms. Any researcher who purely relates his or her research to any one 
research community and paradigm arguably runs the risk of a myopic understanding of 
the research.78
5.8. Conclusions
This chapter has discussed some philosophical and methodological issues in connection 
with the main empirical part of the thesis. I commenced with a discussion of the three 
philosophies of positivism, phenomenology and critical realism, evidence of which can 
be found in previous innovation and networks research. I argued that a positivist 
philosophy is inappropriate for this inquiry into collaborative innovation in networks, 
because it is characterised by systems that are by definition open. Such openness is 
evident not least in my focus on twter-organisational relationships and connectedness. 
Any attempt to isolate the system under scrutiny in an attempt to provide explanation 
through simple law like causal relationships could therefore be seen as misguided. The 
phenomenological philosophy is often adopted by researchers in social sciences to 
counter many of the disadvantages of positivism, most notably through its premise of a 
socially constructed rather than objective reality. In contrast to positivistic research, 
phenomenological research tends to be predominantly qualitative in nature to allow for 
a deeper understanding of contextual factors. However, I observed that the danger with
77 The problem of reliability was discussed in the previous section 5.1.
78 Conversely, presenting one’s findings to a ‘foreign’ audience can sometimes be problematic as I 
experienced at a conference recently when one person cried ‘There are no networks! ’ Reverse statements 
such as ‘There are no supply chains’ may be experienced in ‘the other camp’.
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a phenomenological orientation is that the philosophical position adopted dominates the 
research findings and disregards any other reality than the one constructed by the 
researcher (Kwan and Tsang, 2001). The researcher’s subjective reality therefore 
becomes perfectly satisfactory, which thus divorces the notion of reality from 
subjectivity. I reached the conclusion that the phenomenological philosophy for these 
reasons did not offer a satisfactory solution. Instead a critical realist philosophy as 
advocated by Easton (1998, 2002) and underpinned by e.g. Bhaskar (1978) was chosen 
as the most appropriate for the subject of inquiry. The concept of ‘reality’ within critical 
realism, however, does not concern relationships between discrete events (cause and 
effect), but ‘causal powers’. Extrinsic and intrinsic contingencies, rather than simple 
causality identified through correlation, are used to provide explanations through such 
causal powers. Thus, I seek to highlight a variety of complex contingencies, or 
contextual factors, which appear to influence the patterns in the findings. I also 
highlighted the notion of replicability in critical realist research. However, I stated that I 
perceive this thesis as but a part of an overall research agenda into the problems of 
managing collaborative innovation in networks. Therefore, further evaluation and 
replication of the findings and conclusions will be required to continue the research in 
the search for the underlying, but by no means ultimate, truth.
Case studies were adopted as the most appropriate research strategy due to the 
complexity of the phenomena of the inquiry; case studies allow identification of ‘causal 
powers’ and complex contingencies (Easton, 1998). It has been explained how an 
exploratory mini-survey helped to form the conceptual structure and refine research 
questions. It has also been explained that the unit of analysis needs to be considered at 
three levels; the focus is on relationships, new product development projects, and focal 
firm networks. It is important to recognise that whereas there are inevitably 
disadvantages of such foci, my judgement is that these are outweighed by considerable 
advantages. The four case studies were introduced and justification for why those 
particular cases were chosen was provided. Strategies, tactics and methods of analysing 
and interpreting the case study data were discussed. It was highlighted that although 
attempts have been made to ensure that this process was systematic it was by no means 
a linear ordered process. Nevertheless, I believe that the results of the four cases show a 
satisfactory degree of validity and reliability.
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The next three chapters of the thesis present and discuss the empirical findings about 
collaborative innovation and different forms of network effect. The following chapter 
presents the first part of this: the exploratory mini-survey.
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CHAPTER SIX: FINDINGS FROM AN EXPLORATORY MINI­
SURVEY
6.0. Introduction
This chapter reports on the findings from the exploratory mini-survey, which 
constituted the first stage of empirical data collection of the thesis: exploratory 
interviews with five focal companies across two industries.79 The purpose of the mini­
survey was: 1) to explore the usefulness of the initial set of collaboration activities 
emerging from the research; 2) to explore how the management of the activities may be 
constrained and/or enabled by the surrounding network; 3) to explore possible 
differences in the management of collaboration activities and network effects across 
different circumstances.
The first section of the chapter introduces the five projects investigated to provide a 
basic understanding of the specific contingencies of each case. Thereby, the patterns of 
collaboration activities and network effects across the five projects can more easily be 
appreciated. The second section explores the patterns of the set of collaboration 
activities and apparent network enabling and constraining effects across the five
Q A
projects. The conclusion discusses the theoretical and methodological lessons from the 
study and the implications of these lessons on the main empirical part of the data 
collection: the four in-depth case studies.
6.1. Five Development Projects
As explained in Chapter Four it was decided to focus on the automotive and 
pharmaceutical industries, because of their relative importance to British (and 
continental European) industry and because existing research, from which the 
collaboration activities had been identified, often include these two industries, yet have 
not fully considered the problems and opportunities offered by the surrounding network.
79 The findings from the exploratory mini-survey were also discussed in Johnsen and Ford (2000).
80 The term ‘case’ in this chapter is not used to imply that the five interviews that were conducted were 




Within these two industries it was decided to include projects of different scales (e.g. in 
terms of intended production volume and value) and focal firms of a variety of sizes, to 
explore different forms of focal firm network behaviour in different circumstances.81
This section introduces the five projects investigated to provide an understanding of the 
contextual settings of each of the cases and thereby enable the later discussion of 
illusive patterns of collaboration activities and network effects across the five projects.
6.1.1. Viral-Drug Development Project
The viral drug development project began in 1992 as a concept of a vaccine to target a 
common viral infection. The founder of the focal company ‘Bio-PhamT, a university 
Professor, generated the initial idea for the technology, but Bio-Pharm quickly became 
involved and obtained a license from the university. In addition to the relationships 
between the focal company and various academic parties, a major pharmaceutical 
company became involved to assume the production, supply and marketing 
responsibility once the drug had been sufficiently developed and tested; this required 
process and marketing capabilities and technologies that Bio-Pharm did not possess on 
its own. At the time of data collection the pharmaceutical company marketed 
comparable products treating the virus, however, its drugs did not eliminate the cause of 
the virus. The relationship between the focal company and the pharmaceutical company, 
which had an official status as ‘corporate partnership’, although essentially a licensing 
agreement, began when the drug development was reaching clinical trials. It took some 
time to develop the technology for the particular drug application, but Bio-Pharm had 
been able to use it as a delivery system in other drugs as well, so the project was 
essentially a platform development. At the time of data collection the project was
o n
entering Phase Two trials testing with a small selection of human patients. It was due 
to be launched in 2003.
The project was regarded as highly important to Bio-Pharm. The corporate partnership 
with the pharmaceutical company was significant not least from a financial point of 
view due to large milestone fees. It was also important because it constituted a platform 
technology on which a number of other products could potentially be based. Hence, the
81 Please return to Chapter Five for further details of selection criteria in the exploratory mini-survey.
82 Phase Three refers to testing on a large number of people with disease.
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project represented both a product and a product technological innovation. Due to its 
carrying capacity it could be used, for example, to target cancer tumours or Parkinson’s 
disease. Patents had been filed, as Bio-Pharm was highly protective of its intellectual 
property rights.
6.1.2. Drug Development Project
The product in focus of this study was a compound drug that was launched shortly 
before the interview in 1999. It was licensed by the focal company, Pharma, from 
another pharmaceutical company, at which time only a molecule had been designed. 
The process for manufacturing at a large scale in a safe manner still remained to be 
developed. The main external parties involved in the project were the licensing partner 
and a number of strategic suppliers of active ingredients. Furthermore, at Phase Two 
hospitals and patient care groups became involved in clinical trials.
The project presented a challenge to the actors involved due to the potentially hazardous 
manufacturing process. Therefore, following Phase Two manufacturing processes had 
to be developed in tandem with the development of the product. Most of these processes 
already existed, but the drug necessitated a new combination of these. The innovation 
within the project was thus mainly in process technology, in addition to the new 
product; as the drug represented Pharma intellectual property it was patented for 
protection. The focal company in this case, the drug manufacturer, appeared to attempt 
to exert some degree of influence and control over the network, particularly in relation 
to its supplier network.
o  1
6.1.3. AJP8 Engine Development Project
Around 1994 the focal company in this case, TVR Engineering, decided to set out on a 
seemingly impossible task: to develop its own engine: the AJP8 eight cylinder engine. 
This was a response to fears that Rover, TVR’s engine supplier, would be unwilling to 
supply engines to TVR in the near future, because its new corporate parent at the time, 
BMW, marketed competitive products. Developing its own engines helped TVR to 
progress as a company and limit its dependency on Rover whose engine manufacturing
83 As the focal company TVR approved that the information revealed during the interview did not have to 
remain confidential the real names of the actors involved are used.
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was declining as it became transferred to BMW in Germany. The project represented a 
significant innovation to TVR and involved application of materials (such as crank shaft 
materials) that were new, at least to TVR. The AJP8 engine was successfully completed 
and launched in the ‘Cerbera’ in 1997.84
The initial engine development was managed by a technical consultancy company, 
however, TVR began to view the relationship as too much of a one-way street where it 
supplied more knowledge to the consultancy than vice versa. So, it was a conflict of 
interest that put an end to that relationship. The AJP8 project enabled TVR to develop 
its later six cylinder engines without relying on external consultants.
The engine development project was by no means a case of strategic or controlled 
network co-ordination or management, indeed the case seemed to be predominantly 
characterised by a ‘coping’ approach. The management took place within dyadic 
relationships and resources and technologies in the wider network were accessed 
through extensive networking.
6.1.4. Exhaust System Development Project
The project in focus of this case concerned a new generation of exhaust systems, which 
used a two-stage catalyst to conform to EEC emission requirements. The focal company 
in the case was a joint venture between a major British automotive parts supplier and a 
German equivalent. Neither joint venture party possessed all the required competencies 
in-house, so the joint venture was established to develop the new generation of exhaust 
systems and to share the costs and risks of the R&D for mutual benefit. The joint 
venture was initiated approximately one year prior to the interview in 1999 and was to 
be launched, or fitted to cars, in late 2000.
The initiating factor for the project was EEC emissions requirements, which spurred 
vehicle manufacturers and component suppliers into developing new technology to 
meet the new stringent requirements. The main customers of the British and German 
component suppliers had therefore initiated the development and one German vehicle
84 The two or three years between the interview and project launch is inevitably a limitation of the 
findings, which may affect validity and reliability due to, for example, distortion of the memory of the 
respondent. Nevertheless, the fact that this was the focal company’s largest and most significant engine
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manufacturer played a lead role in the design. The product technology was proprietary 
and thus protected, although the respondent recognised that the whole industry had to 
develop similar technologies to meet the same emission requirements. The innovation in 
this case thus concerned the new product technology being developed to meet the new 
EEC standards.
6.1.5. Car Development Project
The project in the final case concerned the development of a new car concept, which 
began in 1995.85 Launched in 1997 the car sought to combine performance, design, and 
affordability in a new way, challenging the assumptions of the traditional market 
segmentation. The car also introduced several new product technologies, enabling new 
performance capabilities. The car represented a significant innovation to the focal 
company, the vehicle manufacturer. Not only was it based on a different vehicle 
platform from what the company normally used, several features of which were 
patented, but it was also going to be significantly higher volume than what the company 
was used to producing and supplying.
For the focal company, the vehicle manufacturer, the project also brought about an 
attempt to move away from the dual sourcing strategy and relatively arms-length 
supplier relationships of the past; an overall aim was to improve supplier involvement in 
product development.86 Moreover, a group of dealers representing nation-wide 
dealerships were involved in the project by providing product feedback, for example on 
design and functionality, and taking part in project team discussions of production and 
supply issues. Hence, of all the five projects explored during this stage of the empirical 
data collection this project was at the largest scale and appeared to be characterised by 
attempts by the focal company, the vehicle manufacturer, to exert some degree of 
influence and control over the network.
development project to date meant that the experience was still fresh in the memory of the respondent at 
the time of the interview.
85 The notion of a truly ‘new’ and innovative car is arguably problematic in an industry as mature as the 
automotive.
86 About 180 direct, or ‘first tier’, suppliers and at least 400 or 500 indirect, or ‘second tier, suppliers were 
involved in the project.
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6.1.6. Some Key Contextual Differences
The introduction to the five projects examined as part of the exploratory mini-survey 
reveals a variety of different contingencies. Although the selection was divided into two 
industries it is clear that even within the chosen industries the projects differed 
substantially. Some represented highly formalised and organised projects, whereas 
others appeared to have been much more loosely organised. This seemed to follow the 
pattern of the size of the focal companies involved and the volume and value of the 
projects. Importantly, the nature of the projects varied significantly in terms of the 
nature of the unit of analysis; in some cases the development of end or assembled 
products provided the focus, in other cases the focus was on the development of 
component parts and/or product technology of end products. The apparent relationships 
and patterns between these contingencies and the collaboration activities and network 
effects are to be discussed in the final part of this chapter.
6.2. Observations on Collaboration Activities Across the Five Projects
This section presents the findings on each activity from across the five projects. It 
briefly describes the nature of each activity, exploring any intriguing issues, and 
identifies the apparent constraining and/or enabling network effects.
The initial set of activities formed the heart of the data collection at the exploratory 








The mini-survey did not attempt to test the significance of network effects, but rather to 
evolve an understanding of how network effects might reveal themselves in different 
ways within each of the initial collaboration activities. Therefore, it did not make sense 
to try to ‘operationalise’ network effects in too much detail. It was decided merely to 
translate network effects into interview language by referring to the enabling and 




Table 15 provides an overview of the findings on each collaboration activity across all 
five focal companies interviewed, including the different ways in which the activities 
appeared to be affected by the network.
Table 15: Collaboration Activities and Network Effects Across Five Projects
Projects
Activities







• Emergent and informal process: companies 
‘accidentally’ come together
• Main route of identifying suppliers is through 
suppliers and (technical) consultants 
suggesting suppliers. May also obtain better 
quote through other suppliers (1st tier) having 
long rels. with (2nd tier) suppliers
■ Process often hindered by 3rd party rels. when 
suspecting that FC components/technologies 
would be offered to competitors
• Historical suppliers involved in project - set of 
selection criteria e.g. cost, technology, quality, 
service: different factors qualify different 
suppliers
Process probably not hindered by 3rd party rels.
• Process probably enabled by suppliers 
believing they would get additional business
■ Structured supplier nomination process: 
long term partners (suppliers) become 
preferred choice at nomination stage - but 
FC also wants some competition
• Supplier selection related to long term 
strategy and wish to maintain local supply 
base: 3rd party constraints not visible
■ Process enabled by supplier’s other rels., 
as client list is reference of experience and 
capability
• A process of going out, trying to make 
parties interested
Few constraints due to 3rd party rels., but 
conflicts of interest when selecting 
consultants (and occasionally clinicians) 
as they may be working for competitors 
- Clinicians, universities and consultants, 
become involved because they have 
interacted with other people - by 
reputation or word of mouth.
FC sourcing team identify suitable suppliers 
for new projects through a model of 
suppliers’ competencies, providing 
structured mechanisms and criteria: almost 
all strategic suppliers used to be raw 
material supplies 
■ Process not constrained by suppliers having 
other rels., as long as they can allocate 
sufficient resource and responsiveness. FC 
encourages suppliers to have other rels. as 
this is a source of knowledge
Timing ■ No formal framework, but large no. of actors involved early.
• Process not affected by 3rd party rels.: in or 
out. Some suppliers involved later as FC leant 
about them through other suppliers.
• Suppliers became involved during detail 
engineering
• 3rd party rels. would not have influenced 
timing
• Different suppliers get involved at 
different stages: no hard rules
Corporate partner/customer gets involved 
later on, when FC has developed basic 
technology
• Suppliers become involved as early as 
possible: Phase 1 or 2 regardless of 3rd 
parties. Timing affected by time and 
regulatory constraints.
Mobilising ■ Process enabled by FC’s reputation and when 
FC’s business is large part of suppliers’ total 
business. However many large companies do 
not want to become involved with a small 
company like FC
■ Motivation and commitment of consultants 
and some suppliers decrease over time as they 
develop other client relations
• Some partners involved in FC’s improvement 
programme, others became involved as they 
had unique technologies
• 3rd party rel. probably did not influence 
mobilisation, although FC may ask questions of 
suppliers other customers/commitments
• Majority of suppliers existing suppliers for 
other products: incremental business
• Do not know of 3rd party effect
• Corporate partner and regulatory 
authorities mobilised by penetrating to 
their highest possible position
• FC applies risk & benefit sharing 
arrangements once process is fixed. FC 
generally ensure suppliers are involved 
throughout PLC
• Once involved suppliers not difficult to 
motivate
Assigning Limited and informal: FC likes to keep everything under control and close to the 
company
- Some suppliers allowed to use FC’s testing 
equipment on site - even if for another 
company, because FC will benefit eventually
• Would have been a person or team of [supplier] 
people allocated to project 
■ Doubt the process would be constrained by 3rd 
party rels.
■ Resident engineers brought in to FC 
• No perception of difficulties due to 3rd 
party rels., but security videos and security 
discussions at conferences
• Limited, some on development side: e.g. 
academics may come in for short time or 
vice versa (contract basis). Also regular 
meetings and discussions.
Confidentiality agreements help to 
segment knowledge
• Extensive during validation: team spend 1 
month with suppliers ensuring manu. 
processes are OK. Suppliers may transfer 
people to FC when developing novel 
innovation
• Not constrained by 3rd party rels.: 
controlled by trust and secrecy agreements
Informing Informal process: mostly phone, e-mail and meetings (some suppliers require written 
documents)
• Race car customers lease engines and provide 
feed-back on problems and improvements 
(data logging)
Loss of sensitive knowledge and info, a major 
concern when technology can be copied by 
competitors: mostly governed by trust, but 
sometimes confidentiality agreements
• Clear communication through improvement 
process i.e. Gantt charts, time scales, 
milestones, and KPIs
• Info, and knowledge constrained by suppliers’ 
agreements with other customers - parties 
would keep knowledge separate and respect 
confidentiality
• Contracts widely used
■ One-to-one communication between key 
supplier and FC people + supplier 
conferences, logistics focused workshops 
and other programmes 
FC guidelines on security e.g. re. leaving 
parts exposed or info, on notice boards, 
(videos and security conferences). 
Suppliers informed on ‘need to know 
basis’
Dealer council provide product, potential 
markets and dealership capacity feed-back
Confidentiality agreements help to keep 
info, and knowledge segmented 
■ Communication of forecast info, with 
corporate partner
■ Little leakage of knowledge: industry a 
fairly closely-knit community. May be a 
problem when dealing with countries that 
have limited regard to IPR
Synchronising • Very limited
Suppliers may have to synchronise amongst 
themselves
■ Synchronisation of EDI and e-mail systems, 
data transfer, technical specs, paletisation, and 
possibly transport: would be resolved at this 
stage (prior to production)
• Would probably not have been constrained by 
3rd party rels.
• Milestones synchronised and suppliers 
required to perform to various standards 
e.g. EDI, 1S09000 and technical standards
• Different EDI standards for different 
automotive companies (e.g. multi-national 
suppliers): standards have to conform to 
FC
• Agreed processes and work undertaken 
to agreed timetables for certain stages 
and milestones have to be synchronised. 
Contracts establishing IPR
• Conflicts of interest as people work for 
different people at the same time: 
different priorities
■ Systems are synchronised. Not imposed by 
FC, but suppliers increasingly adopt similar 
standards e.g. SAP or e-mail 
• FC encourage suppliers to adopt similar 
principles rather than mechanisms as 
suppliers have many customers
Co-ordinating ■ No formal co-ordination structure: FC initiate and rely on suppliers to unite themselves 
(suppliers tend to know each other very well 
anyway)
• FC do not rely on modular suppliers: believe 
design becomes conservative. Only viewed as 
relevant for [proprietary! suppliers
FC would encourage suppliers to unite as a 
group across chains and tiers - unsure about 
FC’s specific role, but FC try to bring 1 st tier 
suppliers together to ensure parts fit together
Suppliers encouraged to unite when 
involved in same mechanisms/systems. 
Modular suppliers responsible for co­
ordination
1 st tier suppliers left to co-ordinate across 
tiers (only exceptionally specified by FC)
■ FC’s role is to manage all rels.. Some 
‘round tables’ with several partners.
- Problem of divorcing discussions: 
possible to discuss one thing with a 
person at one meeting, which cannot be 
used at other meetings with same person: 
controlled by confidentiality agreements
■ Strategic suppliers generally supply all FC 
sites, hence co-ordination is important to 




The degree of formality in the identification/selection process varied across the five 
cases from the one extreme of companies ‘coming together’ more or less accidentally, 
to a very structured and seemingly rational supplier nomination process. In the case of 
customer-supplier relationships, large powerful customers, such as the vehicle 
manufacturer in the car development project and the large pharmaceutical company, to a 
large extent chose their suppliers and submitted these to complex and demanding 
selection procedures. Often a sourcing team would identify suitable supplies for new 
projects, using a model of structured mechanisms and selection criteria. In other cases 
customer companies were simply not in a position where they could dictate with whom 
to work. For example, the TVR respondent believed that many potential collaborators 
would not want to become involved with a small company such as TVR. Moreover, as 
the respondent in the exhaust development project stated:
Some people probably would say we chose our suppliers and would not like to
acknowledge that it is [vehicle manufacturer] driven.
Hence, although people may often believe, due to ontological assumptions, that they are 
in control of a rational selection process, the underlying reality may be different. It was 
not always a case of the customers simply identifying and selecting with whom to 
collaborate; the process was interactive to different degrees, depending on the 
circumstances.
In terms of network effects there was evidence of extensive networking in several 
projects, but perhaps so mostly in the case of the engine development project:
Our budget was very low which forced us to the bottom end of the consultancy market. 
So we looked at the small people, so you tend to get less good people. E.g. with some of 
the casting work we had done, one supplier quoted us, but he was too expensive. We 
then subsequently used them through another supplier, which was doing machining 
work for us and used them a lot and then got a better quote. We have then dealt with 
them ever since through that 3rd party. It's another funny relationship where we gained 
from our relationship with this machinist because he managed to source us good quality 
castings at good prices which we ourselves couldn’t do. And the casting company was
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happy because they could deal with a known customer. You get a lot of that. (TVR 
Chief Engine Designer)
Indeed, in the case of the engine development project most contacts were made through 
network connections. However, in the case of the car engine development project, TVR 
expressed a concern that third party relationships might also constrain the process of 
selecting suppliers when suspecting that TVR’s technologies would be offered to 
competitors:
[It happened with] a company making e.g. crankshafts for us. I  stopped using him for 
the kind of profiles we had spend a lot of time designing in house because I  knew he 
would offer them to other customers and we wanted to keep that information to 
ourselves. We stopped dealing with him for that particular reason, but we still deal with 
him for components where we are not worried about that. (TVR Chief Engine 
Designer)
The respondent from the viral drug development project highlighted that such conflict 
of interest might particularly concern consultants as these would often consult for a 
range of companies.
Conversely, third party relationships, often influenced the selection process positively 
as suppliers would use impressive lists of their customers to provide reference points of 
experience and capability. Indeed, relationships with consultants illustrated the 
paradoxical nature of relationships. On the one hand it was a cause of concern that 
consultants might transfer knowledge to competitors; on the other hand it was generally 
recognised that they possessed, and therefore offered, their knowledge as a result of 
having worked for other clients.
Finally, the history of supplier relationships seemed to be important in most cases. The 
view was often expressed that suppliers could not simply be looked up in a directory.
6.2.2. Timing
The timing of the moment of involvement of suppliers did not appear to be influenced 
by third party relationships. In the case of the viral-drug development project, the
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corporate partner of the focal company ‘Bio-Pharm’, which was the main customer 
eventually to license the product, became involved with ‘Bio-Pharm’ at a later stage. 
The corporate partner became involved late in the project to ensure that sufficient 
clinical testing had been successfully completed and thus that the product potential was 
sufficiently strong. The particular pharmaceutical context of very long development 
times and extensive product testing seemed to cause the difference in this case as well 
as the fact that this related to a relationship based upon a licensing arrangement.87 It was 
also interesting that it was the supplier deciding when to involve the customer and not 
vice versa. This indicated that it is not always the case of the customer deciding when to 
involve its suppliers, but at least in some circumstances a more interactive process.
There was no indication that network effects in any way influenced the timing of 
involvement of suppliers. The general policy was that if it had been decided to involve a 
particular party then the party should be involved at the appropriate time, independently 
of any conflicting network relationships, or their consequences.
6.2.3. Mobilising
The focal company TVR appeared to be the only actor of those interviewed with 
problems of mobilising suppliers to deliver parts to its engine development project. The 
TVR respondent believed that the lack of size and thus purchasing volume and value 
elucidated its mobilisation problems. This was despite the good reputation of the focal 
company:
Some people are very keen to deal with us because they want to include us in their 
portfolio and be able to say: “We make this part for TVR or whatever”. We are seen as 
a high profile product. Particularly some new suppliers just so they can say they deal 
with us and they will be very helpful - particularly at the beginning. (TVR Chief Engine 
Designer)
Nevertheless, TVR often found difficulty in mobilising larger suppliers. This seemed to 
be a result of the small proportion of the business of large suppliers for which TVR 
accounted; in those terms this problem could therefore be attributed to a network effect.
87 The respondent from ‘Pharma’ specified development times as ‘at least 8 - 1 0  years’ and costs as ‘at 
least 120 million UK pounds’.
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In another two cases, the car development project and the viral-drug development 
project, the incremental and historical nature of the relationships seemed to provide an 
impetus for the suppliers of the focal companies. The two large focal companies seemed 
to have few problems mobilising their suppliers; the value of their business may explain 
this pattern. It should be noted that the situation of the focal company ‘Bio-Pharm* was 
different from the focal companies of the other cases, as its involvement was mainly 
‘downstream’ or ‘horizontal*. As a biotechnology-based pharmaceutical company, its 
supplier network was limited in size and significance compared with, for example, the 
supplier network of a car. Mobilising in the case of ‘Bio-Pharm’ was therefore a process 
of identifying the right individuals and convincing them of the potential of the 
technology being developed and thereby persuading them to invest in the future of the 
product and underlying technology.
6.2.4. Assigning Human Resources
There was evidence of some form of assigning of human resources in all the cases. For 
example, in the drug development project people had been extensively exchanged 
during validation. A commissioning team from the focal company, Pharma, spent one 
month with suppliers to ensure that their manufacturing processes were satisfactory, 
effectively working as part of the supplier’s company. Similarly, suppliers would 
sometimes transfer a whole team to work within Pharma. This was the situation when 
suppliers had developed a novel innovation and thus need to ensure apt integration. 
Hence, ‘assigning’ human resources was by no means a one-way process, but an 
interactive process of mutual exchange of both individuals and in some cases whole 
teams.
Assigning of human resources seemed to be less extensive in the cases of the engine 
development project involving TVR and the viral-drug development involving ‘Bio- 
Pharm’. One explanatory factor may be that these were both relatively small companies 
whose resources could not extend to such resource demanding initiatives. Indeed, the 
three large focal companies were involved in extensive arrangement of short-term 
exchange of employees, such as resident engineers, with suppliers.
There did not appear to be significant network effects on the activity of assigning 
human resources. All the focal companies interviewed were concerned about
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confidentiality risks, however they seemed to manage this by high levels of trust and 
confidentiality agreements.
6.2.5. Informing
The risk of loss of knowledge seemed to be a concern in all the cases. Nevertheless, the 
view was often expressed that limited leakage of information and knowledge occurred. 
Even in the case of the drug development project the industry was seen as a closely-knit 
community, so that if a company or individual were to leak knowledge they would have 
no future in the industry. However, one respondent perceptively described the 
paradoxical nature of this problem:
I f  we are working with people at the forefront of what is going on people tend to get to 
know about it. But you are also using the fact that they have knowledge because they 
have interacted with other people. (Bio-Pharm  Business Development M anager)
The companies had different means of handling the inevitable risks, but efforts to 
segment knowledge and inform people on a ‘need to know basis’ seemed to be the 
common way in which these companies coped with the risk:
We have a corporate partnership with [two large pharmaceutical companies], but we 
keep them separate and we have separate confidentiality agreements. You try to build 
up different brick walls. It is a small world. Also sometimes people change jobs. (Bio- 
Pharm  Business Development M anager)
The respondent in the car development project explained how suppliers were expected 
to be aware of the risks involved in new vehicle projects and provided guidelines on 
security videos and conferences as to what could and could not be divulged, for 
example, that parts or information on notice boards must not be exposed. Nevertheless, 
there was also evidence that the amount of information would be restricted if there were 
risks that valuable knowledge would be lost to third parties through common 
relationships. The TVR respondent expressed it this way:
One example is some new material on crankshafts, where because we are in this unique 
situation that we don’t need very many we can’t afford high cost tooling. So we ’re
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always looking for ways to make better products with lower cost tooling. So we have 
looked at doing a different type of castings, which really started in America on high 
volume stuff. They developed a newer type of cast iron with better properties. So we 
started working on that, but no one else in the UK was using it at the time. We started to 
work with a company that was doing the heat treatment process for us which is the key 
to the technology. They were very interested. So this was a bit of a partnership were 
both parties gained. They gave us a lot of help and experimented a lot with the heat 
treatment. They gainedfrom the knowledge. At the end it went a little bit wrong because 
[a large vehicle manufacturer] became involved in wanting to develop this for their 
crankshafts and they knew this company was doing it in the UK. A conflict of interest 
developed because we didn’t want to divulge too much information that we had learned 
from the mechanical design to make the casting heat treatment properly. The heat 
treatment company obviously wanted to work for them and wanted to help them as 
much as possible. So we had gone along really well, but came to this point where 
another manufacturer became involved and we started to become a bit reserved as to 
what we told them, because we knew they were dealing with a competitor of ours. From 
previous dealings with [the large vehicle manufacturer] we knew they had copied 
things from us after having come round our factory. (TVR Chief Engine Designer)
Thus, the companies interviewed seemed sufficiently confident that, if managed 
properly, confidentiality would be respected. In those cases where it could not be 
avoided it was an inevitable risk with which companies simply had to cope.
6.2.6. Synchronising
In all cases except the engine development project the focal companies had made 
substantial efforts to synchronise systems, such as EDI or e-mail, and milestones and 
timetables, in addition to technical and quality standards such as IS09000. The focal 
company in the engine development project, TVR, recognised that this was probably a 
limitation due to TVR being permanently under-staffed. Thus, its lack of management 
resource may explain its reliance on suppliers to synchronise amongst themselves.
Systems were synchronised in the case of the drug development project. Pharma did not 
impose these, but suppliers increasingly adopted similar standards and technologies. A 
network effect in this case was that actors supplying a range of customers could end up 
with different systems. Pharma coped with that problem by encouraging suppliers to
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synchronise principles rather than mechanisms or systems. In the case of the car 
development project a synchronisation problem caused by network inter-connections 
related to different EDI systems:
EDI is an example of that because several suppliers have different standards of 
communicating to different automotive partners, so the more multi-national suppliers 
may have more than one type of EDI. They have to make sure their standards conform 
to ours. (Vehicle Manufacturer Logistics Manager)
In the majority of the cases, however, there seemed to be no other significant network 
effects on synchronising.
6.2.7. Co-ordinating
The focal companies across the five cases made various efforts to try to co-ordinate 
their suppliers, but some largely left this to their first tier suppliers.
In the case of the engine development project TVR did not attempt to actively engage in 
network co-ordination. The rationale provided was that “These people tend to know 
each other better than we do ” (Chief Engine Designer). TVR’s lack of influence and 
resource also elucidated this approach.
Other respondents, however, and most evidently the respondent representing the vehicle 
manufacturer in the car development project, tried to co-ordinate suppliers more 
formally through mechanisms such as supplier conferences and workshops. In this case 
the core product development team, which included not only staff from different 
functions within the focal company but also staff from suppliers and main dealerships, 
served as the co-ordination point. In addition, some suppliers were actively encouraged 
to unite when involved in the same mechanisms or systems. However, in the case of 
modular suppliers it was the module supplier’s responsibility to control and co-ordinate 
sub-suppliers thus indicated a dissemination strategy. There was also evidence of the 
vehicle manufacturer specifying, for example, seat plane suppliers to the modular seat 
supplier, hence indicating an intervention strategy. The evidence of such co-ordination 
across the five projects, however, was only beginning to form.
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6.3. Discussion and Conclusions
In the final section of this chapter, the results of the findings are addressed in terms of 
the three objectives that were outlined in the introduction to the chapter. These were: 1) 
to explore the usefulness of the initial set of collaboration activities emerging from the 
research; 2) to explore how the management of the activities may be constrained and/or 
enabled by the surrounding network; 3) to explore possible differences in the 
management of collaboration activities and network effects across different 
circumstances. These objectives are considered in the subsequent three sections, 
followed by a section on overall methodological lessons from the exploratory mini­
survey.
6.3.1. The Usefulness o f the Initial Set o f Collaboration Activities
The ‘cases’ demonstrated that although the concepts of identifying/selecting, timing, 
mobilising, synchronising, assigning human resources, and co-ordinating, were useful in 
describing and analysing collaborative innovation in networks, not all were equally 
refined. Therefore, some adjustment was required.
The exploratory mini-survey revealed different aspects of each collaboration activity 
and network effects and thus helped to develop ways of operationalising the activities 
for the case studies. However, it became clear that the nature of some of the activities, 
most notably identifying/selecting, informing, and ‘assigning human resources’, was 
largely unidirectional, as the perspective in these activities was predominantly on the 
actions of one actor, the focal firm, at the expense of the actions -  and re-actions -  of 
other network actors. Hence, the perspective was not entirely interactive.
‘Partner selection’ and ‘prioritising’ were key activities in the research by Wynstra 
(1998) and Hakansson and Eriksson (1993), which had inspired the construction of 
‘identifying/selecting’ as a key collaboration activity. However, the exploratory
interviews indicated that neither was a satisfactory construct. The exploratory
interviews illustrated that actors were not simply identifying and selecting other actors 
in a rational fashion; in some cases they were at least as much subjected to being 
identified and selected. In fact, several respondents used the expression ‘coming
together’; thus the exploratory mini-survey led us to replace the process of
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‘identifying/selecting’ with ‘uniting’. The two activities of ‘informing’, one of the core 
constructs in the research by Wynstra (1998) and Hakansson and Eriksson (1993), and 
‘assigning human resources’, developed on the basis of e.g. Womack et al (1990), had 
to be substituted with, respectively, communicating and exchanging human resources 
for the same reason.
Furthermore, it seemed important to distinguish pure information exchange (or 
communicating) from knowledge exchange. Information can be defined as “easily 
codifiable knowledge that can be transferred without loss of integrity once the 
syntactical rules required for deciphering it are known. Information includes facts, 
axiomatic, propositions, and symbols” (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000, p. 348). In 
comparison, know-how, and knowledge, is often tacit, ‘sticky’, complex, and difficult to 
codify (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Recent innovation research has highlighted the 
importance of knowledge management and exchange of different forms of knowledge 
(e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1995). The findings gained as part 
of ‘informing’ did not fully capture the wider spectrum of knowledge in addition to 
information, including the tacit and complex dimensions. Therefore, it was decided to 
divide information and knowledge exchange into two separate activities.
The activity of ‘co-ordinating’ appeared to constitute an important part of managing 
collaborative innovation in networks. However, there seemed to be co-ordination 
elements within several activities. Inclusion as a separate activity therefore implied an 
overlap in the conceptual structure. So following the exploratory mini-survey it was 
decided to remove it from the set of activities as it was seen as an element of all 
activities. Instead it was included in the conceptual framework as one form of network 
effect (see Chapter Four). As a result, the lessons concerning the set of collaboration 
activities led to a reformulation of the set of activities as shown in Table 16:
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Table 16. Revised Set of Collaboration Activities
Uniting The process of identifying actors, including selection 
criteria -  or being identified/selected
Mobilising The process of motivating actors to commit to project, 
including establishing ground rules and objectives and 
arranging sharing of risks and benefits
Synchronising The process of mutually adapting activities and 
resources, including development procedures; aligning 
objectives and technology roadmaps
Communicating The process of exchanging e.g. design ideas, concepts, 
policies, procedures and performance information
Knowledge exchange Exchanging e.g. technical knowledge, and end customer 
demand knowledge
Exchanging Human Resources The process of allocating (on long-term mutual basis) 
staff to development projects e.g. resident design 
engineers
Timing The process of deciding the moment or stage of involving 
actors in the project
In summary, the initial activities were useful in describing different ways in which focal 
companies involved a variety of different actors in different forms of innovation 
projects. However, three of the activities within the initial set of activities were 
primarily unidirectional. Hence, this led to the development of a revised set of 
collaboration activities that was more interactive than the initial set of activities. 
Moreover, one activity, informing, was divided into two activities: communicating and 
knowledge exchange; another activity, co-ordinating, was removed from the set of 
activities and was incorporated into the conceptual structure as part of the ‘positive 
network effects’. Further conceptualisation (see Chapter Four) led the researcher to 
believe that the revised set of activities would be useful in analysing collaborative 
innovation management in networks.
6.3.2. Constraining and Enabling Network Effects on Collaboration Activities
The cases unveiled a number of constraining and enabling network effects across the 
initial set of activities. For example, in the case of the engine development project, TVR 
viewed the risk of loss of knowledge to competitors via common suppliers as a real 
problem. The respondent specified that as a direct consequence of fears of such risks 
TVR avoided dealing with large suppliers because they often worked for its 
competitors. Several examples of how third party relationships had constrained 
technical development were highlighted. At the same time the cases revealed the 
criticality of network connections in technological innovation. In fact, the cases
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illustrated the dialectic nature of collaboration. On the one hand focal companies such 
as TVR had serious concerns about dealings with companies that supplied competitors 
and could be expected to transfer knowledge and technologies to competitors. On the 
other hand several focal companies, including TVR and Bio-Pharm, appreciated that 
their collaboration partners possessed their knowledge and expertise exactly because 
they supplied other companies.
The cases demonstrated that although ‘third party relationships’ did capture some 
network effects, it only presented a partial element of network effects on collaboration 
activities. For example, it did not reveal much evidence of different forms of network 
dependency. Likewise, it did not produce many examples of network co-ordination. The 
engine development project was not a case of strategic network co-ordination or 
‘management’. There was extensive networking within dyadic relationships and within 
the wider network. Whereas this might have been expected, the relative lack of 
examples of network co-ordination in the cases of larger focal (or non-focal) companies 
was disappointing. The lack of such examples could be because these effects were not 
important, however, a more plausible explanation was that not all network effects had 
been captured through the concept of third party relationships, indeed most examples 
were captured as part of discussions of ‘co-ordinating’. This implied that different ways 
of capturing different forms of network effect had to be considered for the in-depth case 
studies (see Chapter Four).
6.3.3. Different Patterns Across Different Circumstances
The final objective of the exploratory mini-survey was to explore possible differences in
the management of collaboration activities and network effects across different
88circumstances.
Comparing the automotive and pharmaceutical cases, the idiosyncrasies of the 
pharmaceutical industry in many ways stood out. Supplier involvement in product 
development appeared to be less of an issue in the biotechnology case as there were 
hardly any suppliers of ingredients involved due to the R&D nature of the focal
88 Looking across the five projects, it was clear that the focus of the discussions, and therefore data 
consistency, varied significantly. This was due to the exploratory nature of the study, which meant that 
premature operationalisation was not desirable.
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company. Rather, a number of ‘horizontal’ relationships appeared to be significant, such 
as relationships with academics and licensing and alliance partners. Investigation of the 
literature subsequent to analysis of the exploratory survey highlighted that similar 
observations had been made elsewhere (Tidd and Trewhella, 1997; Tidd et al, 1997). 
From an analysis point of view, different forms of horizontal relationship may be 
problematic to compare with relationships that can be classified as customer-supplier 
relationships. Indeed, Tidd et al (1997, p. 63) warn against generalising conclusions 
across the automotive and pharmaceutical/biotechnology industries, as the challenges 
faced by companies within these industries are profoundly different. The role of 
regulatory bodies also seemed to be particularly important in the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology cases. Whereas regulation was clearly important in the automotive 
industry (it was after all a trigger of the exhaust system development) it appeared to 
constrain development and management processes and systems in a much more 
fundamental way in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry.89 This included the 
role of testing, which is important in the automotive industry, but is arguably more time 
consuming and regulated in the pharmaceutical industry. Conversely, the strong role of 
regulation might also provide an advantage in the extent to which sensitive knowledge 
can be protected as it provides the basis for the relative strength of the intellectual 
property regime in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries (Teece, 1986; 
1998). Whereas the differences between the two industries therefore provided useful 
contrasts, comparisons of the patterns of collaboration may be problematic. For these 
reasons, it was decided that the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry should not 
be included as part of the in-depth case studies, but substituted with an industry that 
would be more easily comparable with the automotive industry: telecommunications.
The survey also indicated that contextual factors, such as company size might affect 
patterns of collaboration and network effects. It appeared from the findings that the size 
of the focal companies and consequently their relative lack of resources, had a bearing 
on the extent to which they were able to engage in network co-ordination; their main 
approach seemed to be informal networking. This is consistent with prior research on 
the impact of size as a contextual variable, which has shown that small firms differ in 
terms of their access to resources and so need to develop more linkages and network 
more extensively (e.g. Rothwell and Zegveld, 1982). The relative lack of power and
89 For a discussion of the relative importance of regulation across a variety of industries see the MIT
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influence of small firms over other network actors also seemed to be a key contextual 
factor, as did their vertical ‘value chain’ or ‘supply chain’ position. The majority of 
existing research has examined collaborative innovation from the perspective of 
powerful assemblers rather than component suppliers. Existing research shows that 
large powerful assemblers, such as vehicle manufacturers (e.g. Womack et al, 1990), 
may be able to exert a great deal of power and control over their supplier networks. Less 
research has examined the problems of managing collaborative innovation projects from 
the perspective of suppliers. This was therefore seen as an avenue of future research to 
be pursued in this study.
6.3.4. Methodological Lessons
The final part of this section discusses two methodological lessons that were gained 
from the exploratory mini-survey.
Unit o f analysis: product versus product technology
All the five projects studied as part of the exploratory mini-survey included discussions 
of products, and product and process technologies. The literature review had attempted 
to clarify the meaning of these concepts and identified that the distinction between the 
concepts is often blurred. It is particularly problematic as distinctions often depend on 
the perspective, as one actor’s ‘product’ can constitute another’s bought-in technology. 
However, the main unit of analysis in three of the projects investigated in the mini­
survey, concerned ‘finally assembled products’ rather than product technologies. In the 
case of the exhaust development project the unit of analysis concerned a vehicle product 
technology; in the case of the viral drug development the development of a new product 
technology and its application into a new product (and potentially several new products) 
was the main focus. The result of this diversity in units of analysis made comparisons 
problematic; it was to some extent an outcome of the chosen focal companies within 
each case but also a result of the choice of unit of analysis. More clarity as to the 
problem of unit of analysis would be required for the in-depth case studies.
survey (1995) on the impact of innovation (Http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice).
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Choice o f respondent
The exploratory mini-survey experimented with interviewing people from a variety of 
functions within focal companies, representing engineering, purchasing, supplier 
development, logistics, and business development. In addition to experimenting with the 
type of respondents that would be relevant to include in the in-depth case studies, there 
were two main reasons that had led to such a spread: 1) a pragmatic consequence of 
using existing contacts of the researcher; 2) it is increasingly problematic to identify 
potential respondents based on stereotypical functional roles, such as engineering, 
marketing or purchasing, because organisations no longer conform to traditional 
functional structures. Despite these reasons, the widely different roles and 
responsibilities of the respondents resulted in somewhat biased findings. It is likely that 
the risks of bias were significant as a result of this diversity. From this experience it was 
concluded that respondents representing the commercial functions of purchasing and 
marketing, in addition to engineering/technical would be most centrally positioned and 
thus likely to fully appreciate and comprehend the subject matter, more so than, for 
example, logistics or supplier development managers (although the case studies would 




CHAPTER SEVEN: FINDINGS FROM FOUR IN-DEPTH CASE 
STUDIES
7.0. Introduction
Chapter Seven reports on the findings from the four in-depth case studies that form the 
core of the empirical study. Each case is discussed in sequence, beginning with an 
outline of the specific context of the case; identifying the main features of the focal 
company, the innovation project (the main unit of analysis), and the structure of the 
network. Each case then continues with findings on network effects on each 
collaboration activity, divided into enabling and constraining effects. A summary of the 
main network effects on collaboration activities is then provided, followed by an 
assessment of the performance of each collaboration activity, including the perceived 
extent of collaboration shown in each activity. Chapter Eight focuses subsequently on 
cross-case analysis and discussions.
7.1. Fuel Tank Project
7.1.1. Context10
The fuel tank development project concerns the second product application of a new 
technology. The focal actor in this case concerns a company, here referred to as 
‘EuroPart’, which is a relatively recent joint venture between a UK company and 
another European company. The actual JV is a relatively small organisation, however, 
both JV partners are very large organisations that are primarily automotive component 
suppliers.
EuroPart has a small product portfolio, concentrating on the manufacture of fuel tanks 
for vehicle manufacturers. It is based on a new and unique technology which has only 
been applied in a few products to date; it had some level of input in the design and 
development of product applications of the technology, but the JV was not directly 
involved in the development of the actual technology; this was mainly the contribution 
of one of the JV partners.
90 Some details of the case studies have been concealed for confidentiality reasons, including the 
identities of the companies, technologies and products concerned.
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The innovation project was primarily chosen because it has been recently completed, 
entering production ramp-up in the beginning of 2001. EuroPart regards the underlying 
technology as very innovative, although a few competitors have now developed similar 
technologies. The actual product application is not viewed as particularly innovative, 
although some of the processes used, e.g. unique testing technology, were first 
developed for this application.
The structure of the network is illustrated in Figure 21. Some of the components are 
included, although the actual names are disguised to retain confidentiality. EuroPart is 
placed in the middle of the drawing as the focal company. EP-JV1 refers to the 
European JV partner, whereas EP-JV2 refers to the UK JV partner. It is also a 
noteworthy feature of this case that there is only one customer: ‘J-Car’ which is a 
Japanese vehicle manufacturer, with headquarters and R&D centre in Japan, and a UK 
sales office. JapComp is the dual source used by J-Car and thus the competitor of 
EuroPart.91 On the supplier side the network map includes a small set of suppliers that 
appeared to be important in this project. PlasticMaster is a key plastics supplier. 
ToolMaster is a small tooling supplier, which is a specialist in blow- and injection 
moulding and high-pressure die-casting. It produces and supplies the tools, although not 
the major blow-moulding tools which are internally supplied within the JV, and supplies 
injection-moulded parts to EuroPart. J-Car Commerce is fully owned by J-Car. Its role 
is purely to source so-called ‘child parts’, or sub-components, into European tier-one 
suppliers for J-Car. J-MasterPart UK Sales is the UK sales office for a major Japanese 
parts supplier (J-MasterPart Japan) with strong links to several Japanese vehicle 
assemblers. The main types of components are included in the drawing.
The network map highlights some of the inter-connections between key actors; the 
effects of these will be discussed in more depth later.
91 It should be stressed that only the apparently most important actors are included in this map: the 
multitude of subsidiaries and so on of each individual actor is only included here in its most basic form.
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• Full lines: Relationships involving physical exchanges/supply
• Dotted lines: Commercial and technical exchanges, including design changes, volume schedule 
changes, phase out/in timing information.
• Doubled headed arrow: Perceived competitive relationship (by EuroPart)
The activities that took place during the course of the project as part of the management 
of the relationships shown in Figure 21 are to be discussed in the following section.
7.1.2. Collaboration Activities
Uniting
This activity referred to the process by which EuroPart identified and selected the 
customer and the key suppliers in the project (or was identified and selected hence the 
term ‘uniting’). The findings indicated that EuroPart was chosen by the customer, J-Car 
UK, having successfully tendered for the business in competition with three or four 
suppliers. The process was formalised by the customer, using a performance 
measurement system. It could thus be described as an interactive process, with the 
customer actively managing a process of supplier selection and EuroPart, equally 




Network as enabler of uniting:
The main theme in this case concerned the issue of network intervention by means of 
sub-supplier nomination, in terms of J-Car specifying second and third tier suppliers for 
key components. One of EuroPart’s suppliers, J-Car Commerce, explained the rationale:
The reason that most of these child parts come from Japan is Japan as [J-Car’s] 
mother country, they will not basically for want of a better word trust anyone else to 
make [the key part] So although some of the Japan suppliers that I  source parts from 
have European operations, [J-Car] R&D will not authorise the localisation of that part 
at present.
J-Car Commerce itself, however, was not one of the specified suppliers, but acted as a 
conduit to two Japanese specified suppliers:
[EuroPart] would have probably said Well, we have no relationship with Japan. We ’re 
not a Japanese transplant. How can we source these ’ and at which point J-Car would 
have said ‘Ah! We have a trading company. You don ’t have to use them but you may be 
able to, they should be able to give you the cheapest possible cost and they also will 
assist you because breaking the language barrier, communicating with the 
manufacturers, they will not have any design responsibility but they will be able to help 
you out by passing through any requests you have to Japan. ’ So it’s a sort of fait 
accompli in a way.
The rationale for the strategy of intervention in choices of key suppliers, was captured 
by J-Car UK:
[It is a] safe pair of hands really. They ’re known to, because they’ve got the advantage 
of being with the, like I  say the Japanese team in Japan, very close links, they ’11 feel a 
lot happier giving them business as opposed to some company maybe in the UK. It 
might be just as good to be able to make the parts just as well but there’s no history, no 
links, no close contact.
In other words, network intervention in uniting was exercised through sub-supplier
specification or nomination and was used as a means to reduce risk in crucial supplier
relationships. Hence, the trust that had been developed over time in the culturally
similar relationships provided a means to reduce the risk inherent in any innovation.
Moreover, the network acted as an enabler in the case of J-Car Commerce acting as a
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sourcing, and hence conduit or access, function. This appeared to be important in this 
case not least due to the cultural and geographical distance between EuroPart and its 
sub-suppliers.
Network as constraint of uniting:
Whereas sourcing through J-Car Commerce was supposed to be an advantage for 
EuroPart, interviews with respondents within EuroPart as well as suppliers revealed that 
the consequence of this system was that they had little control over the critical decision 
concerning their choice of suppliers. It resulted in the company being ‘landed’ with 
relationships, which were not of their own choice. Thus, the company had no ownership 
of the supplier network which meant, for example, that EuroPart’s opportunities for 
making a profit, were limited in its core relationships:
“If you 're given nominated suppliers the customer already knows the price, so you 
can't put any profit on there. In other ways it does benefit us because we can turn 
around and say ‘You nominated them. ” (EuroPart)
Respondents were also asked whether they had avoided any suppliers. The analysis 
shows some discrepancy regarding whether EuroPart deliberately avoided any suppliers 
or customers; one respondent reported that a problematic supplier had been avoided, 
another that no particular suppliers had been avoided. However J-Car-Commerce 
admitted:
I  would deliberately have avoided [RubberMasterl] if I  had had any choice at all. They 
are a pain in the neck supplier for me. But basically I  have no choice because J-Car 
have nominated [them] to make that part, [EuroPart] need that part in their [fuel tank].
The practice of sub-supplier nomination exemplifies one type of network influence in 
this activity: intervention in the supply base. From EuroPart’s perspective this was 
largely seen as a damaging exercise as it reduced its level of influence on a critical 
managerial decision for managing innovation in networks: the choice of key supplier 
relationships. Therefore, it constituted an administrative or logistical dependency.
Path dependency also seemed to be significant in this case. This was not only in terms 
of the importance of primarily ending up with suppliers which the company had worked
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with in previous projects, but also in terms of the importance of suppliers being able to 
show a track record; a portfolio of relationships to their benefit:
“By the nature of the components we supply, we 're not looking for suppliers who will 
only supply parts to [EuroPart]. We '11 be looking at their proven track record. " 
(EuroPart)
However, as the quote implied this functioned more as an enabler than as a constraint, 
providing an important term of reference. It indicated that EuroPart deliberately wished 
to involve suppliers which had other customer relationships, perceiving this as a definite 
strength rather than a problem. This was a general characteristic of the culture of the 
whole network as the same attitude was expressed, for example, by J-Car UK:
Basically if they make mistakes with them we can learn from those mistakes, [EuroPart] 
will learn from those mistakes. IPs always good if they are doing that and also you get 
some kind of understanding whether they 're a good supplier because they've got other
customers We can learn from their mistakes and also we can share facilities. So in
this case you can't necessarily share everything but [the key machine tool] for instance 
we share with [another vehicle assembler].
Hence, there was evidence of administrative or logistical dependency on the process of 
uniting, significantly constraining the process of uniting in terms of the lack of freedom 
of supplier selection. This was a negative consequence of the intervention strategy 
applied by J-Car, EuroPart’s large customer in this project. There were also elements of 
path dependency, although this had a positive enabling effect on uniting rather than a 
negative effect.
Timing
This activity referred to the stage at which actors become involved in the project. Early 
supplier involvement has been proposed as a core concept in improving, for example 
manufacturability, however, as this case showed this did not necessarily mean that it 
always happens. In fact, one of EuroPart’s suppliers, ToolMaster, explained how late 
involvement of tooling suppliers was a common problem in the industry:
[When we 're involved too late] it gets to the point where their delivery or supply parts 
for [the vehicle assembler] or whoever that date is very much in stone and we get
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involved so close to that date that we can’t make changes so it has to go with the 
design.... We’ve done so many tools here that we know are wrong and we’ve told them 
they ’re wrong with that spec, but they mould it and then modify later on, with costs.
Several respondents suggested EuroPart was involved at the design/concept stage prior 
to nomination and that its key suppliers became involved immediately afterwards or in 
parallel with EuroPart. On the surface, the indication from the internal EuroPart 
interviews was that it was a case of early supplier involvement throughout all key 
relationships. However, other respondents, notably J-Car UK and J-MasterPart, revealed 
that the design was more or less completed by the time EuroPart joined the project. The 
design sprang from a similar development already having been completed in Japan. The 
EuroPart Purchasing Manager considered what he believed to be the late involvement of 
his company to be a source of many problems during the project. However, as 
highlighted in the following section, several respondents were still of the view that 
timing of supplier involvement overall had not been a weak point in this project.
Network as enabler of timing:
EuroPart was keen to involve its suppliers as soon as possible in the process. This was 
not least an outcome of previous experience, which in this case evidently functioned as 
an enabler rather than a constraint:
I  would say actually for [EuroPart], if anything, we probably got involved earlier than 
we would have done because from experience from [the first product application] we 
knew how long the lead time was. We knew, not how difficult the Japanese 
manufacturers could be but, how inflexible they could be and it was a case that if 
between us and [EuroPart] we started rattling cages early, we knew we would get the 
rewards later on. (J-Car Commerce)
This quote indicated the positive effect of shared experience, and thereby path 
dependency, on the timing decision. It was clear, however, from all the internal 
interviews with EuroPart that although it was eager that its suppliers be involved as 
early as possible in the project, it did not seek to influence at what stage its suppliers 
were to involve their suppliers, regarding it as a decision best left in their hands. 
Although this could indicate an implicit strategy of dissemination there was no evidence 
of any explicit attempts to disseminate or delegate decisions regarding the timing of 
sub-suppliers. EuroPart also believed that its performance monitoring process would
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have highlighted any problems of indirect suppliers not being involved on time. This 
was the same picture across all supplier interviews, albeit the interview with J-Car UK 
revealed that it did make sure that suppliers further down the ‘supply chain’ were 
involved and assessed.
Thus, there was evidence of a positive path dependency effect on the timing of supplier 
involvement, although there were no recorded attempts by EuroPart to influence the 
timing of sub-suppliers.
Network as constraint of timing:
A possible restricting effect of the network on timing might have been that companies 
would deliberately seek to delay the involvement of certain suppliers, for instance, 
because of confidentiality concerns. However, all of the internal and external 
respondents were of the view that once it had been agreed and approved that suppliers 
were to be involved there was no reason not to involve them as soon as was possible 
and feasible. The general consensus was that if there had been any concerns whether a 
supplier was trustworthy, it would not have been involved in the first place.
Therefore, there were no apparent negative network effects on the process of timing.
Mobilising
This activity focused on measures used to motivate and establish ground rules within 
relationships. It included issues related to the sharing of risks and benefits and the 
formulation of project objectives.
The risks in relation to costs incurred in connection with development were generally 
incorporated into piece cost, leaving the eventual costs to be covered by J-Car, although 
EuroPart had to finance some work itself e.g. testing. Furthermore, EuroPart financed 
tooling costs in some relationships. EuroPart initially developed a project plan in 
response to J-Car’s requirements during quotation. However, several respondents were 
of the view that there was some uncertainty regarding ground rules, as explained in the 
following sections.
Network as enabler of mobilising:
The enabling effects of the network on mobilising appeared to be limited. EuroPart’s 
relationships with, for example, its American and Continental European arms had had a
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useful impact on its dedication to the project in the UK, enabling it to benefit from the 
experience and expertise available through those relationships. This was seen by J-Car 
UK as a particularly important factor in EuroPart’s ability to cope with the project.
Regarding active network co-ordination for mobilisation purposes, the general 
consensus within EuroPart was that the company hardly had the resources to motivate 
its direct suppliers and thus preferred to concentrate its efforts on those rather than 
attempting to mobilising beyond direct relationships. There were no explicit accounts of 
use of a dissemination strategy.
Network as constraint of mobilising:
As a whole, EuroPart did not believe it had any significant problems mobilising 
suppliers due to the volume, value and prestige of the business. A problem that 
perplexed EuroPart, however, was that its single most important supplier, J-MasterPart, 
did not regard EuroPart as its customer; it viewed J-Car as its customer despite the fact 
that it supplied through EuroPart (see Figure 21). EuroPart considered this de­
motivating and frustrating:
“We had pre-meetings with [J-MasterPart] in the early days and they insisted on 
having those meetings in the presence of [J-Car] in the UK. They didn ’t recognise us as 
their customer, they recognise [J-Car] as their customer and treated us quite 
differently. So we had to use some kind of coercion with [J-Car’s] agreement to get 
them into line. They are very reluctant to deal with us direct, they want to go through 
[J-Car’s UK Office] rather than talk to us direct. ” (EuroPart)
This quote illustrated not only the damaging effect of the relative lack of recognition on 
motivation but also on communication (as discussed later). Furthermore, it reflected a 
rather tense atmosphere within the EuroPart-J-MasterPart relationship. The problem 
seemed to be caused by the different perceptions of the roles and responsibilities of 
different actors within the network and hence effectively the consequence of sub­
supplier nomination. Therefore, the intervention strategy applied by J-Car again 
appeared to have a negative effect. Conversely, this exemplified a form of 
administrative or logistical dependency and it showed the close link between 
dependency and power in the network. The problem even led to suppliers ignoring 
EuroPart’s project manufacturing planning:
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"[J-Car] will obviously issue a master timing plan, which we will then break down into 
our project timing plan which, for simplicity, will suggest if [J-Car] wants parts in 
June, we 7/ try to get delivery for those parts for May, suppliers will then deliver those 
parts for April. But what tends to happen is that our timing planning does not get a lot 
priority in the supplier base, they 7/ concentrate on delivering parts for June for [J- 
Car], They tend to forget our business. That’s a common problem. ” (EuroPart)
It was not only EuroPart struggling with certain suppliers that did not recognise it as an 
important customer. The interview with J-Car Commerce confirmed that the lack of 
“clout”, or power, of European suppliers in Japan meant that EuroPart would always be 
regarded as a secondary business. J-Car UK, the arm of the Japanese vehicle assembler 
which was the originator of the problem, having decided to specify key suppliers, was 
somewhat puzzled by this situation where J-MasterPart refused to recognise EuroPart as 
a customer. The J-Car respondent saw this as a highly unusual situation. J-MasterPart 
was aware that a problem existed and had therefore taken the initiative to hold a three- 
way meeting (mentioned in the first quote by EuroPart above). In addition to J- 
MasterPart, this involved EuroPart and J-Car UK, seeking to resolve the problem, by 
clarifying roles, responsibilities and important ground rules. This effort apparently had a 
mediating outcome on the relationship between EuroPart and J-MasterPart, making it at 
least manageable, given the circumstances.
There were therefore indications that the administrative or logistical dependencies, 
which were manifested through J-Car’s sub-supplier intervention, severely constrained 
mobilisation. The case also showed how the issue of dependency was closely linked 
with the different degrees of power of different actors, and hence their relative 
recognition within the network; it seemed to constitute a source of much conflict and 
friction.
Communicating
Communication between EuroPart and its customer concerned exchange of design ideas 
and drawings, which on the development side mainly took place between EP-JV1 and J- 
Car Japan, and on the manufacturing side between EuroPart and J-Car UK. Most 
problems, as discussed in the following sections, were apparently related to the latter. In 
either case J-Car was perceived to be the focal point of communication. Communication 
also involved the day-to-day communication of more supply-related information, for
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example, environmental, health, and safety policies and procedures, and supply or 
delivery performance information; feed-back during development was more informal 
and irregular than during production, being a case of mutual monitoring through email 
messages.
Network as enabler of communicating:
The network seemed to enable communication by providing informal access to 
information on competitors:
“People are quite open, it happens, it’s quite an incestuous industry, so you know who
deals with who  we all know each other basically. I  bump into our competitors
representatives at our customers ’place all the time. ” (EuroPart)
J-Car Commerce also resorted to this form of ‘networking* when on EuroPart’s behalf it 
attempted to gain some ‘semi-internal’ information from J-Car, for example, concerning 
launch delays, a source of confusion within EuroPart. This type of activity thus seemed 
to exemplify the use of the network to access and thereby facilitate communication.
There was limited active network co-ordination on EuroPart’s behalf. Communication 
beyond the second tier was regarded as the responsibility of the second tier. EuroPart 
would only intervene by directly communicating with, for example, third tier suppliers 
if there were a specific concern, such as wanting to ensure that suppliers were on target 
and able to meet project deadlines.
Network as constraint of communicating
The central theme of EuroPart’s communication with key suppliers and the customer 
revolved around the effects of the complexity of the network. J-Car had a close direct 
relationship in the UK and Japan with EuroPart’s most important supplier, which 
subsequently did not recognise EuroPart as its customer. This meant that EuroPart was 
often circumvented in the communication between these two companies. Moreover, in 
some ways J-MasterPart’s relationship with J-Car appeared to be closer than the 
relationship between J-Car’s headquarters and its UK office. J-MasterPart, in this case 
being second tier, would often receive information before EuroPart as well as J-Car’s 
UK office (see Figure 21). The following quote illustrates this complexity:
188
Chapter Seven
“Japan has spoken to the supplier, especially in the case of [J-MasterPart], So I ’m 
requesting [J-MasterPart] to supply what I  think is the latest level because [J-Car] has 
sent me this drawing, and they say ‘Oh no, you don’t want that, there’s been design 
change since, you want this level’. So [J-Car] is not telling me what I  should buy. ” 
(EuroPart)
EuroPart was thus entrapped in this convoluted arrangement, which provides a salient 
illustration of not only administrative or logistical dependency but also technological 
dependency; its communication suffered from the attempts by J-Car to intervene in the 
network. J-Car UK did not, however, deliberately wish to intervene in the 
communication. However, the agreements, which had been made between its Japanese 
headquarters and two key second tier suppliers, nevertheless had an effect on how 
EuroPart was able to handle its communication. Apart from communication concerning 
design changes, as illustrated in the quote above, there would also be confusion 
regarding whose terms and conditions would apply. EuroPart, as a customer, expected 
its terms and conditions to apply with J-MasterPart, however, due to the unique 
relationship between the latter and J-Car this turned out to be problematic and 
ultimately J-MasterPart’s terms and conditions were largely applied in this relationship. 
This was therefore a frustrating and restraining situation for EuroPart, which had lost 
the control of an important aspect of its business: the ability to set its own terms and 
conditions with a key supplier relationship. Once more, it reflected the tense atmosphere 
in the triadic relationship amongst EuroPart, J-Car and J-MasterPart.
Communication tended to be open within the main relationships except during quotation 
where information was “quite tight”. In general, the relationships seemed to be 
permeated by a culture of openness in which actors were keen, or required, to exchange 
as much relevant information as possible for the smooth running of the project. This 
included cost and margin information, which was recognised by J-Car Commerce as 
putting EuroPart in a difficult position:
This is where it probably in a way works against [EuroPart] in that there’s a very 
transparent pricing system. [J-Car UK] know exactly what price Pm selling it to 
[EuroPart] at. Whereas I  guess if it’s a normal supplier down the road, if [EuroPart] 
can get a very good price for it, then that’s [EuroPart] ’s good purchasing. For the 




This system of enforced cost transparency thus constrained EuroPart’s ability to make a 
viable profit. The relationship between EuroPart and J-MasterPart was also restrained 
with regard to openness of communication. J-MasterPart admitted that design details 
related to its part and underlying technology were withheld from EuroPart because it 
was not seen as “part of the process” and because of fears that EuroPart might use the 
information to develop its own part. This indicated a fear of loss of knowledge through 
the network.
The generally high degree of communication appeared partially to be a result of the past 
experiences of the main actors. Previous experience had meant that EuroPart and J-Car 
Commerce knew that there was a need for as much information to be exchanged as 
possible:
From previous experience I  gave them as much as I  could get which meant getting as 
much from [EuroPart]... because for [the first product application] we had a lot of 
problems as I  said. I  wasn *t prepared to assume that everyone knew about it this time 
and I  think [EuroPart] were certainly the same as well. So although there ’s not masses 
of information available we got as much as we could to Japan. (J-Car Commerce)
Path dependency, in terms of experience, thus seemed to have a predominantly positive 
effect on communication and hence, again, presented more of an enabler than a 
constraint on the fuel tank development process.
In summary, the process of communication was severely restricted by a variety of 
network properties, including administrative or logistical and technological 
dependencies, and (in a positive sense) path dependency. There were also indications of 
a network constraint in the form of fear of loss of knowledge from J-MasterPart to 
EuroPart, which impacted on the transparency of their communication.
Exchanging knowledge
This activity complemented communicating however it focused on ‘technical 
engineering’ knowledge. Thus, it also focused on the issues of technology application 
within the product development project. Other examples included knowledge of testing 
equipment and processes, and production processes.
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Network as enabler of exchanging knowledge
The picture here appeared to be very similar to communication. EuroPart sometimes 
used network connections as points of access, particularly in the situations where it was 
struggling to obtain information itself. Curiously, J-MasterPart acted as EuroPart’s 
access point in some cases as it was often better informed, for example, about design 
changes, than J-Car UK.
An interesting point was highlighted by J-Car UK concerning EuroPart’s other 
customers. It was keen that EuroPart have other customers as it would enable EuroPart 
to leam from mistakes made with other customers and ultimately benefit J-Car. 
However, there was limited evidence of any active network co-ordination by any actor 
specifically aiming to facilitate learning and knowledge exchange, at least in the 
specific context of the project investigated.
Network as constraint of exchanging knowledge:
As in the case of communicating, the close relationship between J-MasterPart and J-Car 
had a negative effect on EuroPart ability to manage knowledge exchange. The 
Manufacturing Manager highlighted one example where EuroPart had become 
concerned about J-Car’s ‘over interest’ in what it perceived to be its unique testing 
technology:
I ’m aware with [J-Car] that at a point they were far over-interested in our technology 
and beyond product quality basis. They were very interested in all our operating 
parameters -  the actual [core] technology. This was beyond was required. (EuroPart)
J-Part Commerce further elucidated the consequence of this apparent “over-interest” in 
EuroPart’s technology:
[J-Car] have expanded into [key parts] in Japan so they are now a supplier, I  think 
maybe for [the car] in Japan.. [The key parts] were not a technology available in Japan 
very easily. [EuroPart].. I  feel a bit sorry for them in that they were the experts in [the 
key part technology] and I would say in a way maybe they were used, information was 
shared and [key parts] are now common in Japan with [JapComp] and another UK 
customer is now taking over.
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These quotes indicated that knowledge was being withheld in certain relationships. 
Rather than openness it was a culture of knowledge exchange on a ‘need to know* basis. 
Another example which supported this interpretation concerned the visibility of overall 
product architecture; suppliers tended to be informed purely of the part for which they 
were responsible. They did not have the visibility of the context in which their part was 
to fit. Some suppliers viewed this as a problem, however, most seemed to accept it as a 
necessity, as it provided a means to protecting knowledge dissipation.
There appeared to be limited impact of path dependency on knowledge exchange. The 
only indication was provided by J-Car UK, which pointed out that development 
experience was carried over from previous projects. Although this was evidently a 
matter of history impacting on the present i.e. past dependency, it is questionable 
whether it reflected path dependency. This is to be discussed in more detail later.
Exchanging human resources
This activity concerned the exchange of technical staff, most notably resident design 
engineers, to the project team; the focus was on long-term exchange, such as 
secondments, rather than mere human interaction such as meetings.
One example was that J-Car had asked EuroPart to allocate a resident design engineer to 
J-Car’s development team in Japan. However, EuroPart decided not to offer this due to 
resource constraints and to maintain sufficient expertise in its continental European 
headquarter. EuroPart did, however have a sales and marketing office in Japan which 
liased closely with J-Car Japan and was responsible e.g. for producing the original 
drawings.
The interviews revealed limited knowledge of this activity because most of the relevant 
activity would have taken place in Japan e.g. possibly between J-Car Japan and J- 
MasterPart. Further interviews in Japan would therefore have been required to cast more 
light on this activity.
Synchronising
This activity concerned adaptations and alignments of systems and procedures. These 
largely revolved around the project, or “programme”, plans that were being developed
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by the various actors involved.92 Also this activity included alignment of technology 
developments or road maps, although there was limited evidence of this. Some degree 
of technology alignment, however, did take place at the level of the industry. Often 
vehicle manufacturers would respond to global requirements, for example, evolving 
legal and safety regulations, and hence ask suppliers how they were to manage these 
new requirements.
Normally, one would expect synchronisation to be a two-way process, however, here it 
was generally viewed as the supplier’s job to synchronise with, or adapt to, customers 
rather than vice versa, albeit one respondent admitted that it was sometimes a matter of 
using whatever appeared to be the best system:
“We try to be pragmatic about it in so much that if they have got a system which works 
and which has all the elements which our system requires then we'd use their system, 
from a quality point of view, because if they know their system they are less likely to 
make mistakes. But if their system is completely non-capable of what we want, then we 
insist on them following certain patterns or rules. We have a document in place in that 
instant when companies are not capable of carrying it out [using their own system] and 
we tell them “Well, you have to follow this document”. And spoon-feed them to a 
certain extent. ” (EuroPart)
This quote indicated that whichever system ended up being applied depended on the 
relative usefulness of the systems. It also implied that it depended on the perceived 
capability level of the supplier. To put it more succinctly, it seemed to be influenced by 
the level of trust in the supplier’s managerial systems capability.
Network as enabler of synchronising:
Suppliers generally seemed to have to synchronise with J-Car to align, for example, 
their milestones and procedures with those related to the vehicle development. As 
discussed in the previous section, one of EuroPart’s problems was that some of its 
suppliers would synchronise with J-Car rather than EuroPart. This might therefore 
indicate that J-Car applied a dissemination strategy in its approach to synchronising, 
however, this was not explicitly verified by J-Car.




Network as constraint of synchronising:
Most synchronisations and adaptations were in place from previous projects, notably 
from the first technology application. Past experiences also allowed EuroPart to be alert 
to possible problems and pitfalls e.g. with particular suppliers. History thus again played 
a positive part in this activity rather than acting as a constraint.
Some respondents within EuroPart expressed concerns about aligning its technologies 
with suppliers as it was seen to be important to have a distinct offering to its customers. 
It was generally recognised, however, that a strategic decision for EuroPart concerned 
the problem of not being a real full-systems, or module, supplier, because of customer 
intervention in its choice of key collaboration partners. Therefore, although EuroPart 
effectively supplied a whole module it neither had full control over the design and 
production of the module, nor the commercial part of it:
What happens is that the customer will negotiate direct with the [key supplier] and 
they 7/ say to [EuroPart] ‘You’ve got to use that [key component], and that’s how much 
it’s gonna cost you ’. So all you do is that you get that [key component] and stick it in 
your [module]. The opportunity for making any money is very limited, other than a 
handling charge. (EuroPart)
Some respondents recognised that it might be a viable strategy to develop some form of 
partnership with key component suppliers, thus maintaining control of the choice of 
collaboration partners. It was conceded, however, that vehicle manufacturers were 
unlikely to be pleased with such a decision, as it would imply that they would lose 
control of the network:
[The vehicle manufacturers] would be horrified, absolutely horrified. They would have 
no control over the costs. And I  don 7 think it would ever work with [J-Car] because 
they’re too close to the supplier base to allow that to happen; we’d never be close 
enough to the likes of [J-MasterPart] or whoever to make a system. (EuroPart)
The challenge faced by EuroPart in seeking to become a full systems supplier was 
therefore very much a question of network control. If EuroPart gained control J-Car 
conversely would have to let go of some of its control of the network; a decision it 
seemed reluctant to accept.
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The administrative or logistical and technological dependencies, which appeared to be 
outcomes of J-Car’s supplier intervention strategy, thus also seemed to affect the 
process of synchronisation in terms of EuroPart’s ability to control its own future 
technological direction.
7.1.3. Summary o f Network Effects on Collaboration Activities
Table 17 summarises the main network effects on collaboration activities.
Table 17. Main Network Effects on Collaboration Activities
Uniting • Admin/logistical, dependency through J- 
Car intervention in sub-supplier 
nomination
• Path dependency: FC suppliers need track 
record to become selected i.e. relationships 
with other customers
• One supplier acting as a 
sourcing/access function to Japanese 
3rd tier suppliers
• J-Car applies network intervention 
strategy through sub-supplier 
nomination
Timing • No examples/cases • Positive path dependency: previous 
experience had shown importance of 
early supplier involvement
• No attempts by FC to influence timing 
of sub-suppliers
Mobilising • Admin./logistical dependency: through J- 
Car intervention in sub-supplier 
nomination and management caused 
mobilisation problems
• Few significant effects: no attempts 
by FC to influence mobilisation of 
sub-suppliers
• FC relationships with JV partners 
increased its dedication to project
Communicating • Admin./logistical and technological 
dependency: FC circumvented in sub­
supplier-J-Car communication re. design 
changes, terms & conditions, and 
cost/margin.
• J-MasterPart withheld design information 
from FC to avoid loss of knowledge.
• Networking is way to access informal 
information e.g. re. launch delays
• Positive path dependency: previous 
experience had shown importance of 
openness of communication.
• J-Car applied network intervention 




• Similar to communicating
• Examples of perceived loss of technology 
from FC to J-Car dual source
• Networking is way to access informal 
information e.g. re. design changes
• Learning through (J-Car-FC-other 




• No apparent effects (limited respondent 
knowledge of activity)
• No apparent effects (limited 
respondent knowledge of activity)
Synchronising • Admin./logistical and technological 
dependency: FC lacked control over its 
own module design and manufacturing due 
to J-Car intervention in choice of sub­
supplier and technology




The purpose of assessing the performance of the project was not so much to obtain hard 
objective performance measures, but rather an attempt to obtain an indication of the
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perceptions of the respondents. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter Five, the attempt 
to collect performance data from the pilot case proved to be problematic mainly due to 
respondents’ lack of understanding of specific performance indicators, and the overall 
complexity of this part of the data collection. Consequently, attempts were made during 
data collection to improve the collection procedure and simplify some questions. A 
major improvement was to incorporate what was originally a separate structured 
questionnaire into the final part of the interviews. This enabled the interviewer to 
explain the meaning of questions that had been perceived as problematic to understand 
by early respondents. As a consequence the last two respondents were able to provide 
some performance information. Hence, the majority of data discussed below stems from 
the two final interviews.
Respondents were asked to indicate how the collaboration activities affected a) product 
development cost, b) product development time, c) the eventual cost of the product, and 
d) the eventual value of the product. Only the customer was able to provide such 
detailed information (second last interview), hence the reliability of the data is highly 
subjective.93 The results are shown in Table 18.
Table 18, Overall Assessment of Respondent Perceptions of Collaboration Activity
Performance■■■
+ +/- + +/- + +/- + +/-
Uniting 1 1 1 1
Timing 1 1 1 1
Mobilising 1 1 1 1
Communicating 1 1 1 1
Exchanging human 
resources94
1 1 1 1
Synchronising 1 1 1 1
Exchanging knowledge 1 1 1 1
NB: Numbers refer to number of respondents having ticked positive, neutral or negative box.
Bearing the limitations in mind, it is interesting to note that the customer perception of 
the performance of the project was very positive, as the customer was very satisfied
93 Although the customer may be seen as the most valid source o f output performance information.
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with both the process and the outcome of the project. All collaboration activities were 
perceived as having had either a positive or a neutral effect on product development cost 
and time, and eventual product cost and value. EuroPart’s European JV partner 
confirmed that both target development cost and time had been met and supported this 
evaluation.95 The customer respondent did recognise that there had been a number of 
problems during the project with regard to EuroPart struggling to obtain parts from 
Japan. However, he believed that these problems had been resolved through customer 
intervention. Given the plethora of problems experienced by EuroPart during the project 
one may speculate whether EuroPart respondents would have provided a much more 
negative picture. In fact, one of the reasons why data were very difficult to obtain from 
EuroPart could well be that EuroPart respondents were reluctant to paint a negative 
picture of their experience to an ‘outsider’.
When asked to comment on possible ways to improve how the activities were managed 
in the future, one of the issues that was raised by several EuroPart respondents was the 
lack of size and resource of EuroPart, preventing attempts to manage activities beyond 
first tier suppliers. Some respondents acknowledged that alliances with other suppliers 
would be one way to overcome this obstacle, thus reducing EuroPart’s dependency on 
powerful customers and allowing it to take a higher degree of control over its own 
actions and strategic direction.
Finally, an attempt has been made to map the level of collaboration amongst the key 
actors in the case. Figure 22 shows the researcher’s interpretation of the level of 
collaboration displayed within the conduct of each activity. Whereas this can only serve 
as a crude indication, it highlights some of the perceived levels and variations of 
collaboration within key relationships.
94 Some respondents regarded this activity as Not Applicable
95 The European JV respondent was not in a position to comment on output performance.
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Figure 22. Extent of Collaboration in Key EuroPart Relationships
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Figure 22 highlights the low degree of collaboration across key relationships. Hence, 
despite the fact that when the case study was initiated it was described by EuroPart 
managers as being representative of a project of a collaborative nature, the findings 
indicated that, when described according to the collaboration activities, collaboration 
was generally low. An important explanatory factor was that EuroPart would have liked 
to believe that it was a strategic supplier to the customer, whereas in reality this was 
clearly not the case. Interestingly, J-Car stated that it was very likely that EuroPart 
would be involved more closely in future projects.
An important methodological lesson from seeking to describe EuroPart’s level of 
collaboration with its key suppliers and customer(s), was that the exercise was 
constrained by EuroPart, as the focal company, being seen by its customer as a non- 
strategic partner, whereas some of the focal company’s suppliers clearly acted as 
strategic (‘first tier’) suppliers to the customer in Japan and were therefore more 
collaborative relationships. Hence, the project when viewed from the customer’s 
perspective involved extensive collaboration with several suppliers. However, the focal 
company in this case study did not happen to be one of these, even if the focal company 
liked to believe that it was.
96 J-MasterPart generally less collaborative than J-Car Commerce
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7.1.5. Lessons and Conclusions from Fuel Tank Project Case
The analysis of this case study has revealed some of the ways in which the network 
affects individual collaboration activities, both positively and negatively. The 
complexities of the network, not least in terms of direct activities between otherwise 
indirect suppliers and customers, have shown some of the problems EuroPart faced 
trying to manage the project effectively and collaborate with suppliers and the customer 
in the best possible way. The findings indicate that EuroPart was in a very difficult 
position during the course of the project, trying to cope with suppliers who were not of 
their own choice; this was an example of a network intervention strategy applied by J- 
Car. The findings indicate that this caused more problems than benefits from the point 
of view of EuroPart and its attempts to interact effectively with a number of key 
suppliers and customers. It also seemed to cause an atmosphere of much tension and 
conflict in the relationships amongst some of the key actors.
Most importantly, the activities of uniting, mobilising, communicating, exchanging 
knowledge, and synchronising, were constrained by the network. They were constrained 
in the sense that EuroPart lost the control over the management of those critical 
activities which would have allowed it to engage in close collaboration with key 
partners of its own choice. Timing, however, did not appear to be negatively affected by 
the network in this case. The effect of the network on exchanging human resources is 
difficult to assess in this case as this practice did not appear to have taken place to any 
great extent in the relationships examined here.
Conversely, the network enabled several activities at the same time as constraining 
them. The primary responsibility of one supplier was to perform as a sourcing or access 
function; this enabled the process of uniting for EuroPart as it allowed it to connect with 
suppliers it would otherwise have found difficulty in mobilising. History generally 
functioned as an enabler rather than as a constraint in terms of the importance of 
suppliers being able to show a track record of having worked for a range of customers. 
This was seen as a key factor in suppliers winning the business, as the customers in this 
case deliberately wanted to engage with suppliers who had experience of other 
customers to assist learning across relationships. Timing was also enabled by history in 
terms of some actors learning from previous experience that early involvement was 
paramount to prevent problems. These historical impacts however were possibly not so
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much a question of path dependency but rather past dependency. The network further 
enabled communicating and exchanging knowledge as it provided access to information 
and knowledge which EuroPart would not otherwise have been able to obtain. Its 
strategy for using the network as an enabler seemed to be characterised by ‘networking’ 
as a way of gaining access to resources within the network rather than deliberate 
attempts to influence or co-ordinate relationships. The co-ordination that was evident in 
this case mainly took the form of intervention from the vehicle assembler, leaving 
EuroPart largely to cope with the network being controlled by a powerful customer 
rather than it seeking to take any deliberate strategic action to control the network. 
There was limited evidence of any explicit attempts to apply dissemination strategies, 
although implicitly such a strategy might have been used to manage, for example, 
timing, mobilising, and synchronising.
The case study of the fuel tank project provides an analysis of network effects on 
individual collaboration activities undertaken in connection with a product innovation 
project. The effects were primarily negative in this case, implying a lack of both 
operational and strategic control for the focal company in this case, the most important 
strategic decision faced by EuroPart did not seem to be whether or how it could avoid 
being in this network, as the only way it could leave ‘the network’ would be to 
terminate the customer relationship. The critical decision seemed to be for EuroPart to 
re-define its strategic position within the network to take full control of its business. The 
importance of modular or full systems offerings thus emerged as a particular theme in 
the pilot case and seemed to impact on the likelihood of network co-ordination 
strategies, such as intervention, being applied. The perceived capabilities of suppliers, 
such as EuroPart, seemed to constitute an additional contextual feature of the pilot case. 
This implied that competence trust in suppliers might be an important factor in 
explaining different patterns of network co-ordination across the four cases.
There were several important lessons from the pilot case. Methodologically, the case 
highlighted a number of problems in the performance assessment exercise. One such 
problem was the subtle yet important difference between what effect each respondent 
believed each activity did have on performance and what he or she believed each 
activity should have. Thus, the fact that respondents were supposed to complete the 
questionnaire independently was seen as risky as the questions could be subject to
200
Chapter Seven
interpretation. Hence, the performance questionnaire was simplified and moved into 
part of the interview guide to resolve this problem.
A conceptual problem was also identified. The most serious problem concerned the 
activity ‘knowledge exchange’; this revealed very limited additional information 
compared with communicating. ‘Technical engineering knowledge’, for example, was 
also discussed under exchange of ‘design ideas and concepts’, as both related to 
exchange of drawings and design specifications. As it began to emerge that another 
potentially important activity, ‘problem solving’, had not been included, it was decided 
to substitute exchanging knowledge with problem solving. This decision was sparked 
by the many conflicts and problems experienced by EuroPart in its key relationships and 
was upheld by a literature investigation, which identified problem solving as an 
important element of successful collaboration (see Chapter Four for details).
The pilot case further provided examples of the nature of different forms of network 
constraint. Particularly, the role of customer intervention as an administrative or 
logistical dependency, and thus a constraint, was highlighted. Network intervention was 
conceptualised as an enabler, but emerged equally as a network constraint. 
Methodologically, this duality signified that one of the problems of a focal firm network 
perspective is the difficulty in capturing the perspective of several actors. An equally 
thorough perspective of the customer when the focal firm is a ‘first tier’ supplier is 
arguably important, including being able to capture the ‘project’ from the perspective of 
the focal firm, when the focal firm’s project merely forms part of a customer’s, or 
assembler’s, project. However, it was decided not to make such a fundamental 
conceptual and methodological change due to the practical complexities of conducting 
non-focal firm network research. Furthermore, it was decided not to limit further case 
studies purely to assemblers to be able to capture some of the negative consequences of 
administrative or logistical dependencies, such as network intervention, on collaboration 
activities.
Furthermore, the pilot case indicated some of the problems of conducting research on
‘collaborative’ relationships. The pilot case had focused on ‘key’ relationships in terms
of high value and volume, assuming that these would be collaborative. However, the
fuel tank project case showed that it is very possible to have a relationship, which is
very ‘key’ but entirely non-collaborative, such as the relationship between Europart and
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J-MasterPart. In addition, a focal firm is likely to describe its relationships as 
collaborative, but the analysis of case study data may show that relationships are largely 
non-collaborative. Therefore, an intention to examine a project involving high degrees 
of collaboration becomes problematic. Furthermore, any innovation project will involve 
a portfolio of relationships of different degrees of involvement and arguably this is a 
feature of successful projects. Hence, a generalised view of a project as either 
collaborative’ or ‘non-collaborative’ is arguably dubious, even if some projects entail 
different degrees of collaboration when ‘aggregating’ relationships. To cope with this 
problem, it was decided to incorporate a screening exercise as part of the initial 
contextual interview with the focal firm to try to ensure that even if not all relationships 
would be collaborative, at least some of these would have collaborative characteristics.
The pilot case showed that the ambition to concentrate on projects involving a high 
degree of innovation in the form of new or first time technology application would be 
problematic. The reasons for this problem were similar to the reasons why 
‘collaboration’ was difficult to capture. Respondents are likely to believe that their 
project and technology is innovative. In the pilot case the high degree of innovation was 
emphasised by the first respondent/main contact and only later emerged as an
07exaggeration. The actual degree of innovation that characterised the pilot case is also 
likely to have influenced how the project was managed. Therefore the findings on 
collaboration activities are likely to have been influenced by the lower degree of 
innovation than intended. Consequently, it was decided to attempt to focus on 
‘innovative’ projects (incorporating first or second application of new technology) in 
the further case studies, although it was recognised that this could prove to be difficult 
given the tendency for respondents to believe in the innovativeness of their own 
technology.
Finally, the nature of the focal company in the pilot case indicated the importance of 
choosing cases in which the focal company possess the necessary information and 
knowledge about all stages of the chosen project and all activities. The pilot case had 
been restricted as a result of the focal company being a manufacturing JV, which was 
not itself involved in the early stages of the project whereas, for example, its European 
JV partner was involved much earlier. Following the pilot case it was contemplated
97 The first respondent emphasised that the current project reflected the 2nd application of the new 
technology, which had not been applied by any other company to date.
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whether the best way to ensure a high level of focal firm respondent awareness and 
knowledge, would be to focus on focal companies with headquarters and/or R&D 
departments in the UK. The difficulty of such an approach, however, was recognised, as 
most large innovating companies are international, and thus very likely to have 
internationally or globally dispersed operations. Nevertheless, it was decided that 




7.2. Asian Car Development Project
7.2.1. Context
This is the story of an innovative vehicle development project aiming at high volume 
sales in a Far Eastern market. The case is predominantly seen through the eyes of a 
company, which shall be referred to as ‘Auto-Engineer’. It acts as the focal company in 
the case and provides engineering services to the automotive industry. It has links to 
motor racing and is seen by many people in the industry as a pioneer in new technology 
and innovation. AutoEngineer generally operates as a ‘first tier’ supplier to vehicle 
manufacturers; however, its role is not easy to categorise. For example, it may become 
involved in production through turnkey arrangements with vehicle manufacturers; one 
such turnkey project is the subject of this case study.98
The project that is the focus of the case study involves the development of a new car, 
which is to be built at a new Asian plant. The car is to take advantage of the first high 
volume application of a new car body material. The customer is a joint venture (JV) 
between a global vehicle manufacturer, hereafter referred to as ‘VM’ and two Asian 
parties. One of these parties is the Asian manufacturing plant; the other is a government 
body. AutoEngineer’s role in the project is to perform the styling, engineering, product 
development, and verification testing, ensuring that all aspects of the vehicle meet the 
agreed specifications. The project set-up is thus a turnkey arrangement. This is therefore 
a very extensive and demanding role for AutoEngineer and the project is regarded as 
being of strategic importance to the future of the company.
The innovation element in the Asian car development project case is two-fold. Firstly, it 
contains a technological innovation by applying a new material, which has not been 
applied to date in volume car production. The inspiration for the material stems from 
outside the automotive industry from the boats and bathroom industries. Hence, the 
material is not a new innovation, but it presents an innovation in the automotive 
industry, as it is being applied in a vehicle design for the first time in the world; several
98 A turnkey project is a project in which the contractor has responsibility for completing all aspects (e.g. 
product design, development, sourcing, factory and process layout design) leaving the customer with a 
system that requires him simply to ‘turn the key’.
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patents are pending from the project. The vehicle, though, is a standard ‘clone’ of an 
already existing car, the only technological innovation in the project concerns the 
material. Secondly, the project is an organisational and market innovation because it 
entails AutoEngineer entering a new market in a region of the world in which it has had 
no historical experience. The project reached production ramp-up in the summer of 
2002. At the ramp-up stage AutoEngineer was to cease its involvement, handing its 
engineering role over to a company here referred to as ADC (see later).
The structure of the network is illustrated in Figure 23. Some components are included, 
although actual names of companies have been made anonymous. The map identifies 
the main actors involved and their contributions to the project, including parts 
developed/to be supplied. It is a complex network of relationships in which some actors 
have a role in production and supply but others only in innovation and development.
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Various Asian and Global 
suppliers: 
Machinery & Equipment
The map is drawn from the perspective of AutoEngineer, which is therefore positioned 
in the centre of the network. AutoEngineer has the overall engineering responsibility for 
the vehicle. The JV and its constituent parties are positioned in the right hand side of the 
map. VM’s R&D department, which is the originator of the material technology to be 
applied in the project, provides a central link to the JV in addition to AutoEngineer and 
the production suppliers. Suppliers are depicted on the left of the map. Prototype 
suppliers constitute one category in the top left hand comer: these have limited 
experience of high volume production, but are considered ‘key players’ due to their 
particular knowledge of the technology applied in low volume racing car production. 
Production suppliers, as the other category, are in the bottom left hand comer. Only a 
selection of the total body of the latter is included in the diagram. AutoEngineer has a
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particular responsibility for the machinery and equipment suppliers, managing the 
transfer of concept designs to detailed drawings, and sourcing all the necessary 
equipment.
The role of two actors should be highlighted as they have particularly central roles in 
the project: ‘Eltra’ and ‘ADC*. ‘Eltra’ is a global first tier systems supplier. It originally 
sub-contracted the design to AutoEngineer. On completion of the design work Eltra’s 
UK branch is to transfer all its responsibilities to its Asian branch. The Asian branch 
will then assume the engineering responsibility in Asia, together with the manufacture 
of its system as a normal first tier supplier. It is, therefore, in one sense a customer of 
AutoEngineer, although AutoEngineer’s commercial agreement is with VM. ADC is a 
design consultancy based in Asia. It is a joint collaboration between VM and the Asian 
Industrial Corporation. ADC conducted the initial styling and produced the original 
basic concept car. During the course of the project it assumed the responsibility for a 
variety of engineering tasks, including engine calibration. ADC is to assume the full 
product engineering responsibility for the vehicle once it reaches production, at which 
point AutoEngineer’s role in the project is to be withdrawn.
The activities that took place during the course of the project as part of the management 
of the relationships shown in Figure 23 are to be discussed in the following section.
7.2.2. Collaboration A ctivities
This section reports on the findings on the set of collaboration activities. The findings 
from each activity are reported sequentially. The sub-sections describe the nature of 
each activity from the perspective of the different actors, and examine the evidence of 
the different ways in which the network may have enabled and constrained the conduct 
of each activity.
Uniting
As the case concerned a complex project there were, not surprisingly, a large number of 
actors that became united for the purpose of the project and, for some suppliers, the 
subsequent vehicle production. Interestingly, the process of uniting took a noticeably 




Regarding the process of uniting between AutoEngineer and production suppliers, it is a 
defining feature of this project that AutoEngineer was never supposed to act as a 
customer to these; it was to have no traditional first tier involvement in component 
production and supply. AutoEngineer’s turn-key role was to identity potential suppliers 
on behalf of VM, as it did not yet have an infrastructure in place in Asia.
AutoEngineer’s uniting with the production suppliers initially took a conventional form 
of supply market research, not least in Asia, and subsequent compilation of a list of 
technically competent vendors. However, the qualitative data revealed that the number 
of actors, and hence decision-makers, involved in the process at the end of this stage, 
transformed ‘uniting’ from what should have been a smooth selection process into a 
rather confusing and conflict-filled adventure. The confusion began when VM 
expressed dissatisfaction with AutoEngineer’s list of suppliers, stating a preference for 
low cost sourcing rather than technical competency. Another actor, the Asian part of the 
JV customer, added to the tangle by expressing a preference for local Asian suppliers." 
The end result consisted of a combination of several lists and preferences, and was thus 
to some extent consensus-based, albeit somewhat chaotic.100
The uniting of AutoEngineer with its prototype suppliers was influenced by fewer 
actors and was therefore less complicated. These suppliers became involved through an 
invitation to quote, giving these ‘a foot in the door’. As such, the process seemed to be 
slightly less formalised and procedural compared with the production suppliers (as will 
be discussed in the following section). The process of uniting of AutoEngineer and VM 
took place in a similar fashion. AutoEngineer had been involved in a previous relatively 
small project to construct an engineering evaluation vehicle, which was used to assess 
the application of the new technology into a vehicle production project.
Therefore, the concept of uniting - rather than, say, supplier selection - seems to reflect 
the interactive and almost chaotic nature of how this activity was conducted.
99 A local presence was required for the following reasons: local sourcing in Asia implies the preferential 
grants and subsidies; it saves on customs, duty and shipping costs; Asian manufacturers are required to 
demonstrate a percentage of local sourcing.
100 Respondents from different companies demonstrated divergent normative perceptions of the supplier 
selection process e.g. AutoEngineer was used to a formal rational process whereas VM seemed more 
content with a more ‘emergent’ process.
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Network as constraint on uniting
The previous section outlined how the process of uniting had been less than smooth. 
This section presents the analysis of uniting, which highlights a number of ways in 
which the network impeded the process.
The first type of ‘negative network effect’ related to different forms of dependency. The 
first of these was path dependency. Path dependency seemed to have an impact on the 
process of uniting of AutoEngineer and the prototype suppliers. Path dependency was 
evident in the form of the historical relationships between the parties. However, this 
effect was not, as conceptualised, a constraint on the process but rather an enabler: 101
I  have worked with them in the past. I  know that you give them a job and they will 
deliver the job on time, on cost, which requires little involvement from engineers here to
follow-up and to chase and to make sure they ’re doing the job correctly....
(AutoEngineer Technical Leader)
The rationale for choosing the two existing prototype suppliers was primarily to reduce 
the inherent risk in the project. The level of risk was high, as it was the first application 
of the new material in a high volume car. The uniting of AutoEngineer and VM seemed 
to follow a similar pattern. Hence, in this case path dependence, in the shape of 
historical relationships, actually enabled the process of uniting by making it less 
complex and risky.
Another form of dependency appeared to relate to VM’s practice of intervening in the 
sub-supplier selection process through specification or nomination. AutoEngineer 
indicated that VM’s intervention was not as strong as it would have been, had it been in 
a more established position, for example, in one of its Western markets. Nevertheless, 
VM decided to intervene at the very end of the supplier selection process, albeit in a 
collaborative rather than a controlling manner:
They never really dictated anything. They were always involved in the discussions and 
agreed the selection and the route forward. There hasn’t ever been a case where 
[AutoEngineer] was just told, "you will do it”. It has always been with some discussion 
and debate and compromise on both parts. (AutoEngineer Business Unit Director)
101 The historical relationships were in fact with AutoEngineer’s sister company.
209
Chapter Seven
There was further evidence of another form of network constraint as some suppliers 
were deliberately avoided due to their network relationships and consequent 
confidentiality concerns:
There were some suppliers that were deemed unsuitable because of their existing 
contacts, their dependency on other organisations, competitors to VM. There was a fuel 
tank supplier that we were unable to work with because of their link back to [a 
competitive vehicle manufacturer]. There were some other suppliers where we would 
have had to have given them information about the technology in order for them to 
make the parts and they were also related to [other competitive vehicle manufacturers]. 
(AutoEngineer Business Unit Director)
The vehicle manufacturer echoed this concern:
In effect there were some people that expressed concerns about me involving [Eltra] at 
that time because their break with [another vehicle manufacturer] had been very 
recent. In fact we had discussions with some of the [Eltra] people to make sure that it 
was clearly understood what the confidentiality issues were. (VM)
These two quotes illustrated that it was the dependency between Eltra and its traditional 
customer, which caused confidentiality concerns in VM. This was therefore an example 
of how inter-dependent bonds between a supplier and different customers can create 
problems of loss of knowledge from one customer to the other via a common supplier. 
In the car development case confidentiality concerns evidently had a constraining effect 
on the process of uniting, as AutoEngineer deliberately avoided some suppliers as a 
direct result of network inter-connections.
Thus, the network seemed to constrain the process of uniting in several ways. There was 
evidence of administrative or logistical dependency in the form of some degree of 
network intervention by the customer, albeit relatively minor and to some extent 
consensus driven. AutoEngineer deliberately avoided several suppliers due to their links 
to inter-connected customer-supplier relationships and associated fears of valuable 
knowledge dissipating to these actors. Path dependence actually enabled the process of 
uniting rather than constraining it.
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Network as enabler of uniting
Although the network clearly constrained the process of uniting in several ways, as 
explained in the previous section, it enabled it at the same time.
Before the Asian car project, AutoEngineer had not had a direct relationship with VM. 
It was, in fact, through the network that AutoEngineer became involved in the project. 
The access in this case was provided through VM’s subsidiary in the Far East, which 
had a strong historical link to AutoEngineer as it managed one of its divisions. 
Curiously, VM had a European subsidiary, which would have been a more obvious 
choice. However, it had a much better relationship with its Asian subsidiary and decided 
that it would be easier to build a relationship with AutoEngineer through that company 
rather than its European subsidiary.
In addition to the network enabling the process of uniting by one actor providing access 
to other actors, there was evidence of deliberate network co-ordination of uniting. This 
happened on a small scale when AutoEngineer co-ordinated the prototype and the 
production suppliers. The co-ordination of the former was not least to minimise the 
inherent risk of the project:
We ashed [one of the prototype suppliers] to work with two companies who they knew 
and they had worked with before and they had a very good relationship. Again, it was 
spreading the risk. We felt that the project needs to have the risks spread out because 
no one company was capable of doing the whole job within the time-scale. 
(AutoEngineer Technical Leader)
The co-ordination of the production suppliers took the form of nomination of sub­
suppliers. Although there were varying perceptions on this issue, some indirect 
nomination of sub-suppliers appeared to have taken place by virtue of the design by 
making part specifications very particular:
There is a fairly strong logic that says the person who holds the pencil actually holds 
the supplier selection as well because the person who does the design work can actually 
dictate who can make that part. So what we did was we ensured that where we found it 
important to use a particular supplier or that supplier's component, the best design was
drawn up using that component So it was probably a little bit sneaky to do it that
way but rather than have a fight with the joint venture and impose our will upon them
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we took the view that the same result would be achieved by designing the vehicle
around those standard parts We didn 't specify those indirect suppliers, we specified
which components had to be used and because they had a very limited tooling and 
development budget they were hamstrung -  they could not then justify going and 
copying that part at another supplier. (AutoEngineer Business Unit Director)
This quote showed that AutoEngineer saw it as imperative to control certain parts, and 
mainly safety-critical parts. Had AutoEngineer been more influential it might have 
attempted to take even more control over parts that it regarded as ‘critical’.102 
Intriguingly, the level of control may reflect an apparent shift in the responsibility of 
‘uniting’ of network actors in terms of nomination of key suppliers. One of the 
respondents argued that it was increasingly large ‘first tier’ suppliers rather than vehicle 
manufacturers that decided on this ‘network design issue’:
I  don’t think it is [the vehicle manufacturers who specify the supplier network], any 
longer. Certainly the Japanese transplants in Europe and more and more the other
European suppliers will decide that they want a steering wheel that performs to a
certain number ofprescribed measures.... and select the supplier for that - then that tier 
1 or tier 0.5 supplier has the responsibility to then cascade those requirements down 
through the supply chain. It used to be the case where [vehicle manufacturers] would 
actually go down to the last nut and bolt in order to understand it. But now I  think 
that’s less and less because the vehicle manufacturers have become more 
assemblers...[with major tier 1 suppliers] who perhaps take that responsibility on. But 
that wasn’t possible in [Asia] because they’re not developed enough to be able to do 
that.
The need for either the vehicle assembler or a major supplier, such as AutoEngineer, to 
influence the design (or constitution) of the supplier network also appeared to be related 
to the nature of the product.103 The vehicle was to be a low-cost and low-specification 
car, despite the application of the new technology. One of the AutoEngineer 
respondents suggested that its strategy would have been to specify more sub-suppliers 
through parts specification had the technical specification level, or part criticality, been 
higher.
102 There was also an attempt to use as many existing parts to reduce cost.
103 Supply network ‘design’ in terms of choice of key suppliers at different levels.
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The responsibility for sub-supplier nomination as a form of network effect, thus seemed 
to be affected by a number of factors: the criticality of the part and the technology, the 
sophistication of the offering, and the level of influence of the vehicle manufacturer 
relative to the ‘first tier’ supplier. One may deduce that had the project aimed to develop 
a sophisticated vehicle containing a large amount of new technology, AutoEngineer, as 
a relatively powerful ‘first tier’ supplier, would have specified a large part of the 
supplier network to reduce the inherent risks of any new technology applications.
Timing
As with uniting it is important to distinguish between the timing of involvement of 
production suppliers and the timing of involvement of prototype suppliers.
The prototype suppliers were involved from the outset of the project during the 
transition from concept development to basic design. They contributed to the early 
detail design and the initial feasibility study together with AutoEngineer. Thus, 
AutoEngineer became involved with VM during its concept development, to complete 
the final feasibility study, and involved its prototype suppliers more or less immediately 
afterwards. Interestingly, in one way AutoEngineer became involved in the project prior 
to VM’s own involvement, as it did not have a project team in place until six months 
after AutoEngineer became involved. Apparently, the explanation for VM’s late 
involvement was, according to one AutoEngineer respondent, that VM never really 
believed the project would continue beyond concept development.
The production suppliers became involved much later in the project. Their late 
involvement was not least a result of the divide between the production suppliers and 
the prototype suppliers. This was much to the frustration and concern of AutoEngineer, 
which feared that the production suppliers would consequently be poorly positioned to 
assume the control of the eventual production task. AutoEngineer therefore sought the 
involvement of the production suppliers sooner rather than later.
Network as constraint on timing:
The interviews with internal and external respondents revealed very few negative 
network effects on the process of timing. There were no apparent effects of path 
dependency on the timing or moment of actor involvement in this project.
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However, one network dependency factor constrained the moment of involvement. This 
concerned the problems the joint venture parties faced in finalising the JV agreement. 
The three joint venture parties could not reach an agreement on the composition of the 
JV contract, struggling to agree the roles and responsibilities and obtain the 
commitment of VM Headquarters to the project. Furthermore, according to 
AutoEngineer, parts of VM lacked the commitment to the project, because they did not 
believe the project would actually proceed. These problems, which were outside 
AutoEngineer’s control, prevented AutoEngineer from involving the production 
suppliers at an early stage. Thus, the joint venture agreement and the apparent lack of 
internal VM commitment had important administrative or logistical dependency effects 
on the process of timing; these seemed to be of a ‘legal* nature as they concerned the 
drawing up of a JV contract.
Network as enabler o f timing:
There was little evidence of positive network effects on timing. Several respondents 
proclaimed that neither AutoEngineer nor VM sought to influence the timing of 
production sub-suppliers’ involvement. The Business Unit Director explained that the 
barriers to influencing sub-supplier timing were not only the geographical distance 
between AutoEngineer and the production suppliers, but also the capabilities of the 
production sub-suppliers:
No we didn ’t [seek to influence the timing of sub-suppliers involvement]. It was very 
difficult from a practical point of view. The lower down the supply chain you go in 
[Asia], the less and less technical capability, language capability, CAD systems etc. It 
was very difficult to involve them in the development process.
According to the Technical Manager, AutoEngineer did, however, encourage the 
involvement of the prototype sub-suppliers’ involvement. VM’s view of the timing of 
sub-suppliers’ involvement was largely consistent with the other respondents. VM did 
not seek to influence at what stage AutoEngineer was to involve its suppliers but left 
that to AutoEngineer to decide. Interviews with the prototype suppliers did not expose 
any network effects on timing.
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Hence, overall the main network effects on the process timing in this project related to 
the administrative or logistical dependency caused by problems in finalising the JV 
agreement.
Mobilising
One of the notable themes in this project was that suppliers at different levels expressed 
a high degree of dissatisfaction. One of the apparent explanations for the dissatisfaction 
was the lack of ground rules, establishing e.g. roles and responsibilities. Several 
AutoEngineer respondents expressed strong concerns about the problem of lacking 
ground rules:
There were absolutely no ground rules and if we’re being 100% honest, the rules that 
we established just about changed by 100% and changed on a daily basis. Without 
doubt it is the most ill-disciplined, fragmented programme I have ever worked on in my 
career. .... Not only have the ground rules changed on a very regular basis — the 
strategy, everything has changed -  also the partners have changed, the people involved
from the customer side with two exceptions have all changed And each person has
brought a new strategy to the programme You can tell the strength of my feeling
on this subject. It has been an absolute nightmare. (AutoEngineer Business Unit 
Director)
The quote illustrated the atmosphere of discontent and frustration, but also highlighted 
the perceived importance of having clear ground rules regarding actor roles and 
responsibilities, as clear ground rules provide a foundation for the otherwise complex 
and dynamic task of mobilising and managing an innovative vehicle development 
project. It also showed how frequent changes of staff within a project team can cause 
mobilisation problems.104 The analysis indicated, however, that some of this frustration 
was related to different individuals in different companies having widely different 
perceptions of the required level of detailing in ground rules and roles and 
responsibilities. It was apparent that VM’s preference was less detailing of 
responsibilities, whereas AutoEngineer constantly fought a battle to obtain a higher 
level of detailing. This conflict provided an example of the consequences of different 
actors having different views and ambitions within a network and again signified how
104 A large number of engine changes (and thus associated changes) coincided with the people changes 
and added to the apparent frustrations.
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the atmosphere in the AutoEngineer-VM relationship was one of friction and even 
frustration.
Network as constraint on mobilising:
Apart from the issue of different actors having different views and ambitions within the 
network, there were also other constraining network effects on mobilising. Path 
dependency seemed to pose no constraint on mobilising, however, an important network 
constraint pertained to the difficulties in setting up the JV, or an administrative or 
logistical dependency of a legal nature. These downstream complications created 
problems further upstream as sub-suppliers had to cope with frequent unpredictable 
technical and strategic changes. Thus, it was not only the administrative or logistical 
dependency but also the technological dependencies in relation to changes in engine and 
power train. The extent of these technological dependencies and their effect on 
AutoEngineer*s mobilisation is evident from the quote below:
When the programme started originally, it was going to take [a 1.1 litre] engine and 
gearbox. That was in the first engineering evaluation vehicle. And the deal to buy [this] 
never happened.... So that was just scrapped, after we had built the first cars and done 
the first round of design. It was then changed to [a 1.6 litre] engine and gearbox but 
[that was subsequently ditched]. These phases are for three and four months. We were 
then directed to use a [1.5 litre engine and gearbox]- we saw the engine etc, got all the 
design information, redesigned the frame to accommodate the front suspension, drive 
shafts etc that came with the engine, redid it. The target was three months. We were 
asked to compress it to shorten any delays to the programme, we compressed it into 
eight weeks of late nights and weekends, and then [the vehicle manufacturer] decided 
they weren’t prepared to sell the engine to VM. So that got scrapped. Then a [1.3 litre 
engine] was scrapped within a couple of weeks. Then we went to another 1.4, which 
was a sleeved version of the [1.6 engine] with [another] gearbox -  never been done 
before and we had to design the interface. Five months ago, VM [for legal reasons] 
asked us to go to the 1.6 litre engine, which was the second engine of the six that we 
had been through. But every time you did this you had to change the suspension and the 
frame and everything else. (AutoEngineer Business Unit Director)
Thus, there were very significant technological dependencies in this case, which had a 
strong effect not least on mobilisation. Interestingly, whereas the technological
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dependencies had a negative effect on motivation amongst the prototype sub-suppliers it 
also had an adverse positive effect:
It almost got to the point though where effectively AutoEngineer and the prototype 
suppliers developed some sort of siege mentality where regardless of the amount ofpain 
everybody kept laughing because it was actually funny. One of the groups of engineers 
was actually running a book on what day or time the next major change of programme 
direction was going to be. So they developed some form of camaraderie around it. VM, 
if you like, by virtue of the problems they had in forming the joint venture in technical 
directions, it actually created a much stronger team elsewhere. (AutoEngineer Business 
Unit Director)
This quote illustrated how the team quickly learned to cope with the frequent changes in 
technological and strategic direction. It also seemed to reflect an ‘us versus them’ 
mentality which suggested an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and conflict.
Network as enabler of mobilising:
There were no apparent positive network effects on mobilising where the network 
actually enabled the process of mobilisation. AutoEngineer did not seek to influence 
how its suppliers mobilised their suppliers and VM apparently had the same attitude. 
The only issue brought up by the VM respondent was that he had encouraged suppliers 
to ensure that the overall goals of the project were clear. One AutoEngineer respondent 
implied that AutoEngineer had not attempted to influence mobilising of sub-suppliers 
due to the high degree of carry-over in design and parts. Thus, one may speculate 
whether AutoEngineer would have managed sub-supplier mobilisation differently had 
the vehicle design sought to incorporate a higher degree of new customised components 
(as opposed to existing off-the-shelf components). Thus, again there may be a link 
between the degree of necessary ‘network co-ordination’ and the nature and 
sophistication of the offering to be developed.
Communicating
The communication between VM and AutoEngineer mainly took place via the VM 
vehicle integration manager, who was placed on site within AutoEngineer as a “keeper 
of the faith”. In addition, there was a very high degree of electronic communication in 
this project and frequent meetings. These included styling review meetings or “clinics” 
where AutoEngineer presented its ideas and concepts to VM.
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The perceptions of the extent to which the actors had communicated different forms of 
information and knowledge varied widely. AutoEngineer perceived VM as unwilling to 
commit to policy and procedure information; hence this was, apparently, limited. In 
addition, communication of actor performance e.g. between VM and AutoEngineer 
seemed to be limited, although the perceptions of performance information varied. 
AutoEngineer believed that it had received purely anecdotal feedback from VM, but had 
provided weekly reports on project progress.105 In contrast, VM’s perception of the 
pattern of performance feedback was that it had provided both frequent and extensive 
performance feedback to AutoEngineer, albeit not formalised. Intriguingly, the 
prototype suppliers also stated that they had neither received formal performance 
feedback from VM nor from AutoEngineer.106 Hence, the perceptions of the required 
level of detail and formality in communication varied widely amongst different actors.
The two prototype suppliers were closely involved in design reviews and on site at 
AutoEngineer approximately two days a week. Conversely, the Asian-based production 
suppliers had relatively limited involvement in the communication loop due to their late 
engagement in the project. They also had limited influence on the design, although 
AutoEngineer perceived the production suppliers as very keen to learn from the project 
and all the actors involved.107 However, the strong desire of the production suppliers to 
learn exacerbated the level of confidentiality within the project team. This meant that 
there was a divide between those actors, who had signed confidentiality agreements, and 
thus received extensive information, and those who had not signed confidentiality 
agreements and consequently received very limited information. However, this division 
also meant that AutoEngineer was concerned that knowledge and experience, gained 
from working with the prototype suppliers, would never be transferable to the 
production suppliers:
[As a consequence of having separate production and prototype suppliers] you are not 
making the best use of the knowledge you've gained because the AutoEngineer 
engineers will never capture all of the knowledge. They will capture all of the 
knowledge of how the vehicle goes together but not all of the knowledge of how the
105 In fact, AutoEngineer respondents stated that they had attempted to persuade VM to complete their 
customer evaluation form, but unsuccessfully -  apparently due to VM resource constraints.
106 A similar source of discontent concerned VM’s unwillingness to listen to AutoEngineer’s suggestions.
107 Substantial language problems and a cultural barrier hindered the process; most of the Asian suppliers 
were SMEs and an interpreter was often required.
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parts are manufactured, the areas to pay particular attention to etc. (AutoEngineer 
Business Unit Director)
Thus, it seemed that although communication in some respects was very open and 
extensive amongst the main actors involved, some respondents were concerned that the 
strong divide between actors could result in knowledge transfer (and thus ultimately 
manufacturing) problems. There were also considerably different perceptions of the 
extent to which communication had been - and should be - formalised. The clash in 
management styles seemed to be a source of frustration.
Network as constraint on communicating
The administrative/logistical and technological dependencies concerning the joint 
venture agreement problems constrained communication between the essential parties 
involved in the project. This was not least manifested in AutoEngineer’s struggles to 
obtain information regarding manufacturing details from VM, thus ultimately a 
technological dependency. Furthermore, VM’s struggle to develop and manage its 
strategic alliance partners and subsidiaries affected communication. The AutoEngineer 
Project Manager explained:
A lot of the way forward — at the time — was hinged on our not having to engineer the 
platform. They couldn’t build this strategic alliance with [another vehicle 
manufacturer] to let us have this engine, gearbox and suspension from their partner in 
[Asia]. So their own building of relationships within their own strategic alliances led to 
us not having information, which we are used to.... the engineering for it and all the 
CAD data was done [by VM’s subsidiary] and we are not allowed to have that, which
we find very strange  When they came to us and did the sell for us to quote to, they
assured us all these partnerships were in place.
Apart from the administrative or logistical and technological dependencies, path 
dependency also affected communication patterns. Path dependency was evident in the 
form of historical relationships between AutoEngineer and other vehicle manufacturers 
that, according to the VM respondent, traditionally had been strained. The VM 
respondent perceived the historically strained AutoEngineer-vehicle manufacturer 
relationships as having initially influenced the extent of communication problems 
between VM and AutoEngineer, as a basic level of trust did not pre-exist. VM appeared
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to be keen to establish ‘open book’ communication within key relationships but to 
restrict the level of communication outside those relationships. In fact, there appeared to 
be at least three levels of involvement: 1) The AutoEngineer project team which was 
fully informed even about the core material technology developed initially by VM 
R&D; 2) other key suppliers (primarily on the prototype side) which were informed 
about most aspects although not core technology issues; and 3) all other actors involved 
which were informed purely on a need to know basis:
We have had to be quite careful with the information that we have given to our 1st tier 
suppliers and the time at which we gave them that information and the level of the 
information. We gave them what they needed to know when they needed to know it 
rather than divulging everything because we needed to protect the confidentiality of our 
customer. There came a time in the programme where we needed to expand on that and 
then we gave them the bare bones to start with, followed by a little more information,
protected with confidentiality agreements  We have protected quite religiously the
[core material technology]. ...AutoEngineer and the R&D department are the only ones 
who know [the composition of those materials]. (AutoEngineer M anufacturing 
M anager)
The issue of path dependency was thus closely related to the second main form of 
network constraint: risk of dissipation of knowledge. Interestingly, the need to keep 
certain issues confidential seemed to be mostly in VM’s interest, as AutoEngineer did 
not regard the technology to be its intellectual property. Nevertheless, AutoEngineer 
believed that VM would have kept more details confidential within the key 
relationships, but that AutoEngineer wanted it to be open due to the fragmented nature 
of project:
 It was such a fragmented programme that you had to take the view that everybody
had to be involved all of the time otherwise one of the elements would have fallen. 
Being honest about it, although we weren’t getting paid to keep the whole thing 
together, that ended up part of the role that [AutoEngineer] had to take, unofficially, 
because [VM] would have kept everything discreet from everybody and only fed out 
certain information to each person. A programme that is as fragmented as this would 
have failed if we had not shared information openly -  it has got very aggressive timing, 
very low development costs. (AutoEngineer Business U nit Director)
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Again, this quote illustrated the differences in perceptions surrounding the maintenance 
and management of confidentiality.
Therefore, several network constraints on communication were evident. Different forms 
of dependency, notably administrative or logistical, technological and path 
dependencies significantly inhibited communication. Similarly, the potential risk of loss 
of knowledge inhibited communication; however, this risk appeared to be effectively 
managed through supplier segmentation, or different levels of openness, or 
transparency, within different levels of supplier involvement.
Network as enabler of communicating:
The previous section discussed how the network in several instances acted as a 
constraint. Conversely, the same network enabled AutoEngineer to access information it 
would have struggled to identify on its own. For example, AutoEngineer networked 
with VM’s alliance partners without VM’s assistance, seeking technical information and 
solutions.
AutoEngineer also encouraged communication between the two prototype suppliers, 
wanting them to work closely together on the project. However, they were not in a 
position to do so with the production suppliers. Overall, there were few examples of the 
use of the network to enable communication.
Exchanging human resources
There appeared to be a high degree of exchange of human resources in the case study of 
AutoEngineer. In the relationship between AutoEngineer and VM, as discussed in 
previous sections, a VM vehicle integration manager was placed on site within 
AutoEngineer. He served as a focal point for communication of design ideas and 
concepts. Furthermore, Eltra allocated a resident engineer to AutoEngineer, and 
AutoEngineer effectively allocated a team of ten engineers to VM, who frequently 
travelled between the UK and VM’s Asian office.108 According to VM, AutoEngineer 
had initially resisted having to allocate resident engineers to the customer.




The two prototype suppliers were very closely involved in the project and on site 
approximately two days a week but not as actual guest engineers on an exchange basis. 
However, AutoEngineer had its own engineering office with engineers based at both 
prototype suppliers to ‘review progress and assist’ with any problems, according to 
AutoEngineer, and to ‘learn’ about the manufacturing process, according to one of the 
prototype suppliers. Hence, there were somewhat different perceptions as to the purpose 
and benefactor of this arrangement. This level of exchange was apparently more 
extensive than on other AutoEngineer projects and seemed to reflect a new way of 
working for AutoEngineer.
In the relationships amongst AutoEngineer and the Asian production suppliers, 
AutoEngineer’s staff paid frequent visits but were not allocated on any longer term 
basis. The Business Unit Director believed that this was not critical due to the relative 
simplicity of the engineering task for production suppliers. There was, however, 
evidence of what could be characterised as ‘human resource exchange’ in these 
relationships the other way around. Several of the Asian production suppliers had 
allocated staff for up to two months for the purpose of training at AutoEngineer’s 
premises.
Finally, two designers from ADC worked at AutoEngineer for six months to understand 
the design processes. This was seen as important as ADC had to assume the control of 
design and engineering following the end of AutoEngineer’s involvement in the project.
Network as constraint on human resource exchange
There appeared to be few constraining network effects on the process of exchanging 
human resources within the key relationships. AutoEngineer had limited experience of 
allocating residents to projects, in fact, VM emphasised that it was not least 
AutoEngineer’s lack of experience in Asia which required it to allocate people. Hence, 
path dependency in terms of the lack of experience of AutoEngineer in similar projects 
appeared to influence AutoEngineer’s willingness to allocate residents to projects.
Despite the high degree of confidentiality in the project, the inter-connected customer- 
supplier relationships did not cause any major concerns amongst the respondents. The 
AutoEngineer Technical Manager explained that only essential project personnel were 
able to enter the project areas:
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In some cases it meant that various of their suppliers would have to work with them on 
site so there would have to be a certain amount of relocation of manpower to ensure 
that everything worked smoothly. At various periods of time people from both 
companies would be required to work in different organisations so they had a certain 
confidentiality to work with.... We set it up so that both companies had secure, 
cordoned-ojf, project-dedicated working areas with signing in and restricted keypad
access They were doing work for other people as well and just like we don’t like
going round to customers and seeing other people’s work there, because it shows a lack 
of confidentiality. Wherever we go we expect to see things covered up or behind closed 
doors and our project was not different. (AutoEngineer Technical Manager)
Thus, managing the potential risk of loss of technological and design knowledge was 
seen as a core part of AutoEngineer’s business process, which earned it its reputation as 
a trusted engineering partner for vehicle manufacturers. This enabled AutoEngineer to 
engage in human resource exchange without impairing confidentiality.
Network as enabler of human resource exchange
The network enabled human resource exchange in the project as this activity took place 
across two radically different parts of the networks, or ‘supply chains’. In other words, 
the Asian production suppliers allocated teams not only to AutoEngineer but also to the 
prototype suppliers. The indirect competition to win the volume production business 
between the prototype suppliers and some of the Asian manufacturers, did not seem to 
prevent exchange of staff across the two chains.
In addition, the network enabled human resource exchange in the sense that two 
engineers from the prototype suppliers’ suppliers had been on site at AutoEngineer’s 
premises to offer their assistance. However, the extent of this activity appeared to be 
limited.
Synchronising
Synchronising in the project primarily related to the development of the overall project 
plan. VM and AutoEngineer mutually discussed and agreed the project plan (with input 
from the prototype suppliers). It was difficult to establish the extent to which the 
production suppliers had been involved in synchronisation. However, the AutoEngineer 
Business Unit Director expressed some dissatisfaction with VM’s reluctance to share 
the project timing with the production suppliers, apparently because of confidentiality
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concerns (see next section). VM’s reluctance was not confirmed or reflected in the VM 
interview, however. The VM respondent revealed that he had deliberately only specified 
an overall level of timings and processes, leaving some degree of flexibility and choice 
with individual suppliers rather than dictating this from VM. Thus, there seemed to be 
some disagreement as to the best way to manage project synchronisation and some 
uncertainty regarding whether production suppliers were part of the planning.
There was apparently limited consideration of alignment of future technological 
development beyond the scope of individual projects; this included the relationship 
between VM and AutoEngineer. The only form of alignment between AutoEngineer 
and vehicle manufacturers related to attempts to liaise with various vehicle 
manufacturers’ R&D departments, although AutoEngineer had recently announced a 
strategic liaison with another engineering company aiming to develop new technology.
Network as constraint on synchronising:
As described above, there were some perceived problems with synchronising, some of 
which can be attributed to negative network effects. The first concerns the 
synchronisation with the production suppliers. This was clearly inhibited by the late 
involvement of these. As discussed earlier under ‘timing’, this was a result of the delay 
in the JV contract. In other words, it was an administrative or logistical dependency, of 
a legal nature.
Moreover, network dependency was evident in the fact that AutoEngineer had to cope 
with different customer processes and procedures. Different customers would use 
different systems and AutoEngineer’s strategy for dealing with this potential conflict 
was to maintain a generic system as far as possible. In fact, AutoEngineer regarded this 
flexibility as a cornerstone of its organisation, or in other words a core capability. Thus, 
AutoEngineer intentionally sought to limit this administrative or logistical dependency 
as it could otherwise make it problematic to synchronise across different customer 
relationships.
Path dependency did not appear to have any significant constraining effects on the 
process of synchronising. However, one of the prototype suppliers raised an issue 
concerning a historical impact. This related to the fact that experience over time with a 
range of customers was useful to assess the attainability of project timings. Hence,
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history again functioned as an enabler in this respect rather than a constraint. The 
AutoEngineer Manufacturing Manager also explained that history had not significantly 
affected the level or ways of synchronising, partly because the project had so many new 
elements and relationships. This was reflected in VM’s decision not to enforce its 
existing processes upon AutoEngineer. Thus, path -  or past - dependency functioned as 
an enabler rather than as a constraint on synchronising.
Finally, there was evidence of network constraint in the form of risk of loss of 
knowledge:
[The lack of synchronisation] was one of my bugbears? [VM] would not share the 
timing of the programme with the production suppliers. Some of the production 
suppliers to this day do not know when full-scale serial production starts. They have 
some rough idea when the non-saleable build is and the saleable build. Full-scale 
supply starts in the first quarter o f2003.... The belief within [VM] in [Asia] is that the 
[Asians] cannot keep a secret and they will share it with all their competitors.... [VM] 
is very very anxious that their competitors don't find out about this programme and 
don’t find out about the materials involved. (AutoEngineer Business Unit Director)
Hence, this problem concerned the perception that VM refused to involve the Asian 
production suppliers in the synchronisation process due to confidentiality concerns. VM 
was concerned that the production suppliers would divulge confidential knowledge of 
the materials to third parties and ultimately to VM’s competitors. The risk of loss of 
knowledge to third parties thus seemed to constitute a negative network effect on 
synchronising.
Network as enabler of synchronising
Apart from the above-mentioned positive effects of history, or in some respects the lack 
of it, there were no other positive or enabling network effects on this process.
Problem solving
The process of resolving problems in this case was rather innovative and interesting. 
The manufacturing manager explained:
AutoEngineer has a ‘concern system which is an electronic method of raising any 
issue on the programme. It is a central database of everything that we have come
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across -  whether it’s a technical issue or whether it’s a business, commercial, logistical 
issue -  anything. AutoEngineer will normally call a meeting of all those with a hand in 
that issue - suppliers -  and the meeting will usually be held at the place the problem 
has shown itself
In addition to this system AutoEngineer would hold weekly design reviews. A virtual 
reality centre, which allowed all CAD data to be projected onto a screen, would further 
enable the problem solving process. During those sessions people from different 
functions, such as product engineers, manufacturing engineers or suppliers, would 
scrutinise the design and seek to identify problems or causes of problems. Individuals 
would be allocated to resolve the problem and ensure the implementation of appropriate 
design changes. These individuals would not only be internal, but also external, such as 
suppliers.
Overall, the focus in the problem solving process seemed to be on joint problem 
resolution. It could also be described as a process focused on identifying root causes of 
problems rather than symptoms, although it was acknowledged that this was often easier 
said than done. The two prototype suppliers and VM also confirmed the mutuality of the 
process and non-blame strategy.
Network as constraint on problem solving
The importance of history, in terms of lack of different types of experience, had an 
effect on problem solving, according to some respondents. Firstly, it related to the lack 
of an existing relationship between VM and AutoEngineer, which meant that there was 
no mutual understanding between the two parties when the project started. Secondly, it 
related to the inexperience not least of AutoEngineer of working in Asia, which caused 
communication problems. Thirdly, the lack of technological history or path in relation 
to the new material application meant that problems arose because there were so many 
unknown factors and no existing benchmarks. This made it difficult to identify root 
causes of problems. Thus, in this instance it was the lack of history and experience, 
which had a negative impact on the process of problem solving in the project.
One respondent mentioned that many problems occurred as a result of the high 
frequency of engineering changes in the project. However, this did not appear to affect 
the process of problem resolution. There were also network constraints, which related to
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disagreements between VM R&D and AutoEngineer concerning the root causes of 
technical problems. This was because the R&D people apparently had limited interest in 
production and thus limited practical input into the problem solving process.
The final issue that emerged from the interviews related to the fact that many 
AutoEngineer employees worked on several different projects with different customers 
and suppliers. According to one of the prototype suppliers, this made these individuals 
very difficult to access. This was therefore a problem of administrative or logistical 
dependency, in terms of managing and balancing the interfaces with different external 
actors.
Network as enabler of problem solving
There was very little evidence of anything that can be ascribed to positive enabling 
effects of the network on the process of problem solving. The only example involved 
the assembly of indirect actors, such as one of the prototype suppliers and VM, with the 
specific aim to resolve critical problems.
7.2.3. Summary o f Network Effects on Collaboration Activities
Table 19 summarises the main network effects on collaboration activities.
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Table 19. Main Network Effects on Collaboration Activities
Uniting - Admin./logistical dependency through limited 
‘consensus-focused’ intervention in supplier 
selection by VM
- Some suppliers deliberately avoided due inter­
connected customer-supplier relationships and 
associated fears of risk of loss of knowledge to 
competitors
- History with prototype suppliers: 
involved by default to reduce risk.
- FC involved through VM subsidiary in 
Far East (access)
- Indirect FC supplier nomination for 
safety critical parts (agreed with VM).
- FC asked prototype suppliers to dual 
source to limit risk
Timing - Late involvement of several parties due to JV 
set up problems, notably production suppliers: 
admin./logistical (legal) dependency
- Limited attempts by FC/VM to influence 
timing of sub-supplier involvement
Mobilising - Frequency of changes in JV set up & ground 
rules: admin, (legal) dependency + frequent 
engine (and related) changes: technological 
dependency: caused frustration/mobilisation 
problems for FC
- VM encouraged suppliers to ensure 
clarity of goals
Communicating - FC experience with other vehicle 
manufacturers restricted communication with 
VM (path dependence).
- Weak VM alliance relations and JV problems 
constrained extent of communication: 
technological and admin, (legal) dependencies.
- Confidentiality concerns restricted 
communication: need-to-know basis (open 
within select relationships).
- FC encouraged communication between 
two prototype suppliers
- FC networked with VM’s alliance 
partners without VM’s assistance, 





- Few network effects: only FC’s lack of 
experience in HR exchange affected its 
willingness to allocate residents to project.
- HR exchange across two ‘supply chains’: 
prototype and production suppliers
- Prototype sub-suppliers offered 
assistance at FC
Synchronising - VM unwillingness to synchronise with 
production suppliers (confidentiality 
concerns/risk of loss of knowledge)
- Delay in JV arrangement caused late 
synchronisation with production suppliers: 
admin, (legal) dependency
- FC coping with different customer systems: 
admin./logistical dependency
- No effect of history on synchronising
- No significant effects, although history 
an enabler in judging attainability of 
project plans e.g. milestones.
Problem solving - Lack of history/existing relationship between 
FC and VM: no initial mutual understanding
- Lack of technological path complicated 
root cause analysis
- Technological dependency: problems agreeing 
causes of technical problems with VM R&D
- Admin, dependency: balancing different projects
- Few effects: assembly of ‘indirect’ actors 
to resolve problems
NB: ‘FC’: Focal Company/AutoEngineer
Next the findings from the performance assessment part of the interviews are discussed.
7.2.4. Performance Assessment
Respondents were asked to indicate how the collaboration activities affected a) product 
development cost, b) product development time, c) the eventual cost of the product, and 
d) the eventual value of the product. As the project had yet to reach completion only the 




Table 20. Overall Assessment of Respondent Perceptions of Collaboration Activity
Performance
positive neutral negative positive neutral negative
Uniting 3 2 3 2
Timing 2 2 +
1 n/a
3 1 1
Mobilising 4 1 3 1 1
Communicating 3 1 1 4 1




Synchronising 4 1 2 2 1
Problem Solving 5 5
NB: Numbers refer to number of respondents having ticked positive, neutral or negative box.
Again, it must be stressed that this exercise did not attempt to obtain any hard objective 
performance measures, but merely an indication of the perceptions of the respondents. 
Bearing this limitation in mind, it is interesting to note that the majority of the 
respondents were generally positive towards how the different actors involved had 
managed activities. There were differing perceptions of the effectiveness/efficiency of 
uniting, although most respondents were positive. The perceptions of timing were 
generally positive although several respondents believed it had had no impact on either 
development cost or time. The views of mobilising were generally positive, as were the 
views of communication and exchange of human resources. The performance of 
synchronising was slightly less well perceived. In fact, no one believed it had positively 
affected product development cost. Finally, the process of problem solving was seen as 
successful. The overall picture was therefore rather positive.
However, when asked to comment on possible ways to improve how the activities were 
managed in the future, a number of concerns did surface within the two prototype 
suppliers. These expressed some concerns regarding communication with AutoEngineer 
due to the frequency of personnel changes within AutoEngineer, and instances of 
‘crossed lines’ as a result of AutoEngineer not having informed VM of issues discussed 
amongst the suppliers. Thus, this indicated that communication was perhaps less 
positive than indicated when asked by a researcher to ‘tick a box’, and a link between 
communication and people interaction and continuity.
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Several respondents expressed the view that the project had presented a major challenge 
due to the complexity of the project. The complexity was caused not least by the 
problems of formalising the JV, and the frequency of precarious technological changes 
such as engine changes. There was therefore some consensus that this had been a very 
frustrating project at certain stages. Despite this, there were indications that the project 
had served as a valuable learning experience for AutoEngineer and many of the 
suppliers involved. It is in this light that the satisfaction with the process of problem 
solving should be seen. When the frequent problems emerged, all the actors involved 
pulled their weight and eventually managed to resolve these.
Finally, an attempt has been made to map the level of collaboration amongst the key 
actors in the case. Figure 24 shows the interpretation of the level of collaboration 
displayed within the conduct of each activity. As explained in the previous case, this 
only serves as a crude indication but seeks to highlight some of the perceived levels and 
variations of collaboration within key relationships. Notably, the ways in which 
mobilising, communicating, and synchronising were conducted amongst the key actors 
appeared to be less collaborative than the other activities; this was particularly 
pronounced between AutoEngineer and the prototype suppliers. The implication of this 
is that the management of these relationships seemed to be somewhat inconsistent, 
being of a collaborative nature in some respects but not all.
Figure 24. Extent of Collaboration in Key AutoEngineer Relationships
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7.2.5. Conclusions from the Asian Car Development Project Case
The story of the Asian vehicle development project, as seen from the eyes of Auto­
Engineer, is a compelling account of a highly intricate and ambitious innovation project. 
Although most of the respondents interviewed indicated that they had found the project 
very interesting, it clearly had presented a major managerial challenge to all the parties 
involved. This project represented a case of doing new things in a new way; it involved 
a technological innovation, an organisational innovation, and a market innovation. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the project in terms of the design and construction of the 
car was very simple; it was driven by low target cost rather than technological 
sophistication.
All activities were significantly constrained by the network, although human resource 
exchange appeared to be less affected. One negative, constraining, network effect that 
was frequently manifested across the activities related to fears of loss of core 
technological knowledge to competitors. This impacted not least on uniting and 
communicating, and to some extent also on synchronising. Moreover, there were 
several types of dependency, which inhibited many activities. These dependencies were 
administrative or logistical, as a result of the problems of the three JV parties in 
formalising their contractual agreement (and thus of a legal nature), and technological; 
they impacted on all activities except human resource exchange. In addition, path 
dependency, conceptualised as a network constraint, did have some impact on the 
conduct of certain activities e.g. on communicating. However, the effect of path 
dependence was predominantly as a network enabler in the form of the positive effect of 
experience e.g. on uniting. In the cases where there was lack of experience, e.g. with 
Asian production suppliers, this can be seen as a network constraint. However, it is 
conceptually problematic to determine whether the lack of a factor qualifies it as a 
constraint (and conversely as an enabler if existing). This may, however, be an inherent 
flaw of the IDEFO model upon which the conceptual model was constructed: enablers 
and constraints on processes seem to be the flip sides of the same coin. There were no 
other obvious forms of dependency. These dependencies all meant that AutoEngineer, 
as the focal company in this case, to some extent lost control over its actions and 
activities; it was unable to manage the project in the way it would otherwise have done.
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However, this could have been even more severe had the customer/vehicle manufacturer 
intervened more than it did here, for example, in the process of uniting.109
The positive, enabling, network effects seemed to relate to significant amounts of 
networking, for example, to access engine technology. This appeared to concern mostly 
uniting and communicating. There was some evidence of network co-ordination. There 
were indications that the intervention strategy employed, for example concerning sub­
supplier nomination by the focal company, was to keep intervention to a minimum due 
to the design simplicity and low target cost driving the project. It also seemed likely that 
the relatively low degree of power of the customer i.e. the JV, prevented it from 
exerting its power through network co-ordination strategies. There was little evidence of 
explicit application of network dissemination to delegate responsibility within the 
network. However, as in the case of the fuel tank project this might indicate an implicit 
approach to dissemination, or delegation, although this may be a problematic conclusion 
as no respondents explicitly confirmed this.
The focal company seemed to be relatively influential within the network, not least vis- 
a-vis its large global customer. Consequently, it was in a position to influence, and 
intervene, even more than it apparently chose to do in this particular project. 
AutoEngineer’s rationale for the relatively low degree of intervention was the simple 
nature and low cost target of the product to be developed. A higher level of product 
specification could therefore have resulted in more elaborate attempts to control 
activities beyond the dyadic level. The network co-ordination manifested in some 
activities was to some extent jointly managed and agreed between the vehicle 
manufacturer and AutoEngineer; this also indicates the collaborative nature of their 
relationship and undertaking. Whether this represents a shift in - or delegation of - 
responsibility of management within networks from vehicle manufacturers towards 
‘first tier suppliers’, is one of the questions emerging from this case.
109 In comparison with, for example, the vehicle manufacturer in the case of the fuel tank development 
project which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight.
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7.3. Base Station Equipment Development Project
7.3.1 Context
The project in this case is called ‘RFC’ and concerns the development of a new high 
frequency component, which forms a critical part of the base stations that make up 
telecommunications networks. The case is seen from the focal perspective of a large 
electronics company, which is part of a multi-national PLC. The PLC specialises in 
commercial wireless communication and other electronic solutions. The part of the 
overall company that forms the focus of this case study will be referred to as ‘TelePart’. 
It was formed only a few decades ago and has grown to be one of the leading suppliers 
of wireless equipment. TelePart generally operates as a ‘first tier’ supplier to 
telecommunications network providers.
The RFC project is described as very different and much more problematic compared to 
usual projects in which TelePart had been involved. The customer for the product is one 
of the major global telecommunications OEMs, in this report known as ‘TM \ Initially it 
was TelePart’s European division that was involved with TM on the project in response 
to the original specification that was released by TM’s European division. RFC was 
then transferred to TelePart UK in October 2001, as the European division did not have 
the required production capability.110 TelePart UK was to re-design the component, 
applying the active devices developed by its European division and combining those 
with a component using the UK technology to provide a product that was more mass 
producible. The transfer process was not without its problems, however, and resulted in 
a project management shake-up, including replacement of the project manager. The 
problems delayed the process by approximately six months and left TM rather 
dissatisfied. At the time of data collection for the case (summer 2002) RFC was in the 
final prototyping stage.
The degree of innovation in RFC is incremental rather than radical. There are no new 
technologies applied in the project, although some new components are used e.g. 
amplifier components and transistors that are new to TelePart. It has therefore taken no
110 The European production technology would have been difficult to replicate in other sites e.g. Far East.
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steps to protect technology applied in the project. As such, RFC can perhaps be 
described as new product introduction rather than new product development or 
innovation. Hence, it is a fairly low risk project. Interestingly this is not least so because 
parts of TM prefer that any new product apply tried and tested technologies.111 The RFC 
project has therefore not been chosen for this case study due to its level of innovation 
but primarily because it is a recent project which presented a number of management 
problems to TelePart.
TelePart applies a number of core technologies in its products, one of which is a 
standard technique that has been used in the component industry for 40 to 50 years. 
New emerging technologies are ceramic single, dual and multi-mode, some of which are 
ready to enter production but have yet to progress beyond pilot/test stage. Figure 25 
illustrates that RFC is the latest product application using the standard technology, and 
that ceramic technology, one of the emerging technologies, is predicted to take over in 
the near future.
Figure 25: Product and Technology Life Cycles in TelePart




More innovation is to be found in the base station unit of which RFC forms a part, as 
base stations have to be developed in line with 3G requirements. However, the type of 
innovation is very different from the mobile phone market, as the following quote 
illustrates:
With the handset its like let’s get innovation out there, let’s ... make it a desirable piece 
of kit. With the network side of it it’s how can we de-risk it and reduce the costs. But
111 TM R&D advocate new innovation but TM Purchasing and Product Engineering prefer the safe and 
tested option. There is therefore a (perceived) division of preference within TM.
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you know, I  am not going to sell more base stations by having more bells and whistles. 
On the base station, if I  make it smaller or make it lighter, or make it lower cost or 
more reliable then those are the much more technological, more technical type of 
drivers rather than you know its got an LCD display that is in full colour or whatever, it 
doesn ’t matter on the base station (TelePart Sales Manager)
The structure of the network is illustrated in Figure 26. Some components are included, 
although actual names of companies are disguised to retain confidentiality. The map 
identifies the main actors involved and their contribution to the project e.g. part 
developed/ to be supplied. TelePart’s supplier network is ‘non-delegated’ in the sense 
that it has made no attempts to delegate sub-system assembly roles to suppliers.112
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112 There is currently a more delegated structure in TelePart’s Asia-Pacific division. In comparison the 
UK strategy is to maintain more control in-house.
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The map is drawn with TelePart as the focal company thus in the centre of the network. 
TelePart is the single source with TM for RFC, although TM usually dual source. At the 
time of interviewing it was still being considered whether to dual source to reduce the 
risk; this second source is the actor ‘NetPart.113 The relationship began in the mid-1990s 
and became much more intense in 1997/98 when TM began to source at a larger global 
scale from TelePart. There is mutual dependency in the relationship, as TelePart 
currently achieves approximately 70 per cent of TM’s business and 60-70 per cent of 
TelePart’s business is with TM. TelePart perceives that it is a strategic supplier to TM, 
yet the TM respondent revealed that TM classifies TelePart as a ‘strategic sub­
contractor’ but not as a ‘strategic partner’ (although possibly on its way to becoming a 
‘strategic partner’).114 This difference is significant as TM partnerships are governed by 
frame agreements and share in TM’s risks and rewards. Partners are also always single 
source and have closer involvement in NPD. Moreover, they share in strategic road 
maps and have early design phase involvement, including participation in conceptual 
feasibility work. This is to be examined in more depth under ‘Collaboration Activities’. 
Part of the reason for not being a partner is that TelePart’s technology is not seen as TM 
core technology, it is considered lower risk and hence there is less need for strategic 
supplier involvement. However, it also emerged from the TM interview that TelePart 
had simply not performed well enough to assume the ‘partner’ status; in other words 
TM did not have sufficient competence trust in TelePart.
The relationship between ‘ECM’ and TM is an increasingly common form of 
relationship. ECM performs a manufacturing function, which TM used to retain in- 
house. As part of an out-sourcing initiative this capability was sold but then brought in 
as a sub-contractor in the RFC project to assist with purchasing and sourcing as TM 
realised that it no longer possessed these capabilities in-house.
AluComp is a medium-sized company that specialises in high pressure and precision 
die-casting and makes component bodies for TelePart. It is perceived as a supplier of 
critical parts by TelePart and thus has some design involvement. 55 per cent of 
AluComp’s business is with the automotive industry, the remaining activity is with the
113 There is a TelePart perception that TM is reluctant for either one of the dual sources to become too 
innovative as it would make transfer from one source to the other more problematic i.e. increase 
dependency.
114 TelePart also supply other products to TM, including some which apply an evolving disruptive 
technology, thus putting TelePart in a more competitive position.
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electronics, telecoms and construction industries. In fact, TelePart only accounts for 
approximately three per cent of its turnover. In other words, its dependency on TelePart 
is very low.
ElectroComp is a small telecoms contract manufacturer, which is highly dependent on 
TelePart business as 70-80 per cent of its business is with TelePart. It is perceived by 
TelePart as being slightly less critical than AluComp and therefore has less design 
involvement. Although due to its prototyping capability it does perform some 
prototyping work, unlike AluComp whose prototyping capability is seen by TelePart as 
minimal. The relationship comes with significant history, as TelePart had recruited 
several people from ElectroComp, including TelePart’s Managing Director. 
Furthermore, strong family ties exist at high levels.
TP Plating is a profit centre based within TelePart. It employs just under 60 people. It 
produces and supplies the silver-plating, however, TelePart purchases materials on its 
behalf, and hence TP Plating has little impact on its supplier relationships. TP Plating 
only works for TelePart, although TelePart has an external dual source for production 
back-up.
As will become apparent from the next section discussing collaboration activities 
between the actors of this case, TelePart sees little need for involving suppliers in 
product development, however, the Programme Director explained that suppliers do 
have a significant role in technology development e.g. ceramic technology 
development. These suppliers may become involved in production later but have to 
compete on an even basis with other suppliers.
The activities that took place during the course of the project as part of the management 
of the relationships shown in Figure 26 are to be discussed in the following section.
7.3.2. Collaboration Activities
This section reports the findings on the set of collaboration activities. The findings from 
each activity are reported one-by-one. This describes the nature of each activity with 
regard to different actors and examines the evidence of how the network in a variety of 




For the purpose of this research project the uniting of actors for the RFC project mainly 
related to the TelePart -  TM relationship, and the uniting of TelePart and its suppliers.
The uniting of TelePart and TM appeared on the surface to be a standard request for 
quotation and proposal process; however, the process was complicated by a number of 
factors. The first of these concerned the internal site co-ordination as the original 
specification/proposal took place between the European divisions of TelePart and TM. 
After initial prototyping the project was transferred to TM UK and consequently to 
TelePart UK; this was because it would allow the project to be managed within the 
same country and because TelePart’s UK manufacturing technology was easier to 
replicate across global sites. ECM assisted TM in its sourcing decision, due to its 
experience in the field.
TelePart’s process of involving suppliers was described as a three-part approval process, 
depending on the level of importance. However, interviews with TelePart suppliers 
revealed a delay in TelePart’s feedback to the suppliers, leaving these unaware of 
whether or not they had won the business.
Network as constraint on uniting
The analysis of uniting across internal and external interviews showed that there were 
several constraints on the process, which could be attributed to network effects.
One form of negative network effect related to different forms of dependency. This was 
firstly in the form of network co-ordination employed by TM, intervening in TelePart’s 
supplier selection process through indirect supplier nomination. TM specified parts but 
not actual suppliers, although this still resulted in a list of approved suppliers.
The list of approved suppliers would typically consist of established suppliers which 
had shown credibility through past performance and where mutual understanding of 
needs and requirements had evolved. This thus constituted a path dependency effect. 
The importance and manifestation of this effect could also be seen by the fact that the 
adoption of new suppliers on the list was seen by some respondents as costly and 
difficult as these had to undergo an extensive qualification process.
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Furthermore, the network inhibited the process of uniting as the list of approved 
suppliers would exclude these suppliers which had failed to respect confidentiality, 
leaking confidential customer information to competitors; alternatively they would be 
classified as ‘non-preferred’. Uniting was thus not only a matter of performance but also 
a question of understanding network connections. The interview with ElectroComp 
indicated the significance of this effect and the inter-relatedness of different forms of 
dependency:
We have offered alternative manufacturers for the approval process, some which would 
alleviate the single-source scenario...., which could potentially offer a cost saving on 
the parts. So far we have not succeeded in introducing [other suppliers]. [Our 
suppliers] are specified by TelePart — some components are specified through TM as in 
the electronic devices.... There has been a lot of negotiation between TelePart and TM 
to get this [approved parts] list together. I f  there is any deviation from that parts list 
then it would need to go back through the re-approval process, which costs thousands 
of pounds and time of the engineers. So once we have produced this product and it has 
been approved by TelePart and TM with the range of components then that is set in 
stone and we can't deviate from that particular range of components. There is a fixed 
number of alternative manufacturers that TelePart and TM would accept.
Whereas this indicated an administrative or logistical dependency effect, it also 
reflected a path dependency effect as it shows how a complex procedure of selecting 
suppliers is unlikely to be repeated and thus effectively restricting new suppliers 
becoming part of the network.
Network as enabler of uniting
Whilst the network evidently constrained the process of uniting in several significant 
ways it also enabled the process. That was the situation, for example, when TelePart 
consulted TM about its assessment of a potential supplier. It also occurred through its 
own nomination of indirect suppliers, although this was limited; most supplier (or part) 
specification was conducted by TM albeit in conjunction with TelePart. Apart from 
these examples of intervention there was no other evidence of network co-ordination.
Timing
TelePart’s initiation into the project with TM occurred during initial prototyping when 
a request for quotation and a specification were released, that is, relatively late.
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However, TelePart Europe had been involved earlier for pre-specification and thus able 
to influence the design specification. In addition, TelePart interacted on a continuous 
basis with TM for long- and medium-term technology development beyond individual 
projects.
The general pattern of timing within this case study, however, was one of relatively late 
supplier involvement, which many respondents perceived to cause considerable design 
and manufacturing problems. Almost all suppliers expressed a desire to become 
involved in the process to better influence design specifications and ensure better design 
for manufacture. The fimdamental problem of the RFC project according to most 
respondents had been the number of design changes, which most suppliers interviewed 
agreed could be improved through their earlier involvement and input into 
specifications. One of TelePart’s suppliers explained the significance of this lateness:
A simple example on the production shop floor is some of the units in manufacture: The 
easiest thing to manufacture is a square board.... I f  the boards we buy are designed to 
be square or rectangle, we can minimise wastage. We are also able to panellise the 
subs so we can get multiple boards on one panel so it reduces our handling time and 
our process time and maximises the throughput of the machine. [However] some of the 
designs have the most fantastic shapes you’ve ever seen -  curves, small hands hanging 
off them, rocket-shaped boards, strange sizes... TelePart’s designers must be looking at 
the size of the base station they need and how the electronics are going to fit... We don ’t 
know, we ’re guessing. We get, “This is what we want you to make. ’’
This quote illustrates how a manufacturing problem may well occur if suppliers are not 
involved in the design specification process.
Network as constraint and enabler on timing:
There were very few real network effects on the timing of actor involvement. The only 
effects related to experience of involving suppliers early on in projects. This was, 
according to one supplier, a likely reason why it had not been implemented to date. The 
history of collaboration between TelePart Europe and TM Europe also seemed to be a 
key factor in early involvement of TelePart Europe. TelePart Europe used to be part of
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TM Europe; hence the personal bonds were very strong.115 Thus, the lack of experience 
of early supplier involvement appeared to constitute a constraint and vice versa. There 
was no evidence of any attempts to influence the timing of any indirect suppliers; this 
was a decision left to direct suppliers to handle.
Mobilising
The division of development costs amongst most actors in this case was primarily 
conducted on the basis of suppliers having to recover investments once products had 
been launched, whether consciously or unconsciously having to manage a balanced 
product portfolio, ensuring that some generate sufficient funds for technological 
innovation. The TM respondent revealed, however, that it had ‘frame agreements’ with 
its partners, which ensured that these received a relatively high margin to cover a 
proportion of its development costs and provide long-term security. Given TelePart’s 
categorisation as in the grey area between ‘partner* and ‘strategic sub-contractor’, it 
apparently enjoyed a good margin, albeit not as good as a TM partner. This will be 
discussed further in the next section.
TelePart had few long-term agreements with any of its suppliers. At most, expensive 
tooling costs were covered (some jointly with TM), or in the case of one of the suppliers 
interviewed, a prototype agreement existed which specified support for development 
work. Suppliers generally felt that risk and benefit sharing was very one-sided. In 
addition, one recent change of TelePart policy regarding automatic charge for reject 
parts had caused much controversy within its suppliers.
Despite the high volume and value of TM’s business there was a perception of frequent 
motivation problems amongst both internal and external respondents. Within TelePart 
this problem seemed to concern engineering staff rather than management and appeared 
to be related to the amount of pressure arising from tight project deadlines, project 
clashes etc. However, TelePart’s own approach to mobilising its suppliers was 
described as a ‘bully’ approach, using an ‘exit’ strategy if suppliers failed to perform or 
conform. This adversarial tactic was seen as very de-motivating to the concerned 
suppliers as they perceived this as reflecting a lack of respect for the supplier. There 
also appeared to be a related issue concerning the lack of future business security.




TelePart’s suppliers commonly spoke of the lack of visibility and clear ground rules, 
which was a particular concern for highly dependent suppliers (see next section).
Network as constraint on mobilising:
The history between the actors involved in the project was generally regarded as a 
positive influence on motivation, hence enabler rather than constraint. However, the 
high degree of what can perhaps best be described as ‘commercial dependency’ of one 
of the suppliers interviewed constrained mobilisation, because it did not always feel it 
had the extent of visibility and future business security to warrant such a high level of 
dependency. The conceptual issue of this form of dependency effect will be discussed 
later. Another supplier interviewed stated that for this reason it had a policy of not being 
over-reliant on any one customer. TM also explained this rationale in relation to its 
relationship with TelePart:
...because they are sub contractor we are quite happy that they have got other
relationships because we don’t want to have all their work because .... one of the
reasons you go to a sub contractor is that you know you have got the flexibility when
times are hard  the worst that can happen is if they are doing like ninety percent
[TM] business it means that we have got zero flexibility, if we stop a contract or we lose 
an order or something they are going to be out of business for three months which 
means they are probably gonna go, not bust, but they are going to have real major 
problems. We would rather they only had about a third of our business so that we have 
got plenty of scope for movement up and down and that’s what we prefer as a strategy. 
It is a little bit different for partners because we have got a frame agreement - there you 
have got some kind of project, a place to support each other. (TM)
Thus, TM clearly had a strategy of avoiding its ‘strategic sub-contractors’ being over­
dependent on TM business. As the next quote illustrates this differentiation also 
impacted on the extent of risk and reward sharing between TM and TelePart:
....we don’t use the word 'partner’ with [TelePart], they are a 'strategic sub 
contractor’.... at [TM] we are quite strong on that differentiation.... A partner is 
someone who is actually sharing with us in terms of risk and reward so they really are 




Finally, one supplier expressed a concern that TelePart’s problems were ‘snowballed’ to 
its suppliers, as it had to put pressure on them when TelePart was putting it under 
pressure.
Hence, there were significant positive path dependency effects on the process of 
mobilising, as well as what may be interpreted as a form of dependency that did not 
appear to be included in the conceptual structure; this could possibly best be described 
as ‘commercial’ dependency. This is discussed in more detail later.
Network as enabler of mobilising:
There was some evidence of the network enabling the mobilisation of suppliers. 
TelePart tried to influence the mobilising of sub-suppliers e.g. by directly driving 
delivery targets. Sometimes this would be conducted in conjunction with TM. 
Furthermore, TelePart intervened in an indirect supplier relationship by negotiating 
costs and margins and thence ‘free-issuing* parts.
The dual sourcing strategies of TelePart and TM also served as a motivator as better 
performing suppliers gained a higher proportion of the business.
Therefore, there were several cases of the network functioning as an enabler of 
mobilising.
Communicating
There appeared to be extensive communication amongst the key actors in the project. 
Such communication concerned, for example, specifications, policies, procedures, and 
cost information, and to a lesser degree, performance information. TelePart had 
conducted a supplier satisfaction survey, obtaining feedback on its supplier 
relationships. This had indicated a number of communication problems, particularly 
lack of consistent communication. As an outcome of the survey a supplier newsletter 
had been discussed but not implemented. In general, much communication was 
formalised through, for example, meeting minutes, but there was also evidence of wide 
informal communication through e.g. email and telephone.
Despite the apparently large quantity of communication, there was a wide perception of 
a communications problem within TelePart, thus impacting on the quality of its external
243
Chapter Seven
communication.116 This was most strongly identified by TM, which expressed 
disappointment regarding the extent to which it felt it needed to drag information out of 
TelePart. This concerned not only information on project problems and delays, often not 
communicated not to lose face, but also design. TM felt it had to specify too many 
details to TelePart and would have preferred if TelePart had been able to manage the
117design itself with less input from TM, or in other words a black box approach. In 
fact, TM expressed a concern that TelePart withheld too much information. The 
communication problem was also recognised within the supplier relationships as these 
all, save the internal supplier, had very strong views regarding the lack of visibility of 
TelePart’s products (e.g. forecasts) and decisions.
It was clear that although TelePart claimed to perceive some of its suppliers to be more 
important than others, there was little real differentiation in terms of communication 
patterns: no one supplier received markedly more information than other suppliers. 
TelePart’s suppliers, however, generally believed that they were more open not only 
with TelePart but also their own suppliers.118
Network as constraint on communicating
It follows from the previous section that communication in this case was not entirely 
transparent and that some information was indeed withheld. One of the TelePart 
respondents explained that this had partly been a personnel issue, as the initial 
Programme Manager, who had been replaced, had withheld much information, 
however, this had changed to some extent with the new Programme Manager. The 
approach to communication, however, was often described as ‘a need to know basis’. 
This was evidently the case with TelePart’s communication both with TM and 
suppliers; the rationale for this was a concern for loss of valuable knowledge to third 
parties. Consequently, there was a very strong culture of confidentiality within TelePart. 
This also affected its suppliers, for example one supplier was not allowed to use any 
product information from its involvement with TelePart for its promotion with other 
customers. These limitations on communication thus indicated a network effect in terms 
of risks of loss of valuable knowledge.
116 Only the TelePart Programme Director thought the problem was exaggerated.
117 The communication problem was recognised by TelePart to the extent that it was involved in another 
academic project concerning communication at the same time as the present study took place.
118 As these were not interviewed it is difficult to verify these assertions.
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There was evidence also of path dependency effects on communication patterns. Again, 
path dependency had a dual effect. On the one hand, it meant that TM suppliers, which 
had failed to respect confidentiality and used sensitive information to their own 
advantage with TM’s competitors, were now classified as ‘non-preferred’ (see also 
previous section on uniting). On the other hand, as one of the TelePart respondents 
explained, historical suppliers would be likely to receive more informal information 
compared with new suppliers.
Network as enabler of communicating:
There were some attempts to use the network to co-ordinate communication. This was 
the case, for example, when TelePart in conjunction with TM conducted supplier 
development activity to share ideas and knowledge. TelePart saw this as a very useful 
activity. It was also the case when TelePart, somewhat to the surprise of one supplier, 
asked two suppliers to collaborate:
[Dual PCB Source] was a bit taken aback by the way [TelePart] expects people to work 
together. There was a UPS shipment from one of our suppliers in Germany that got lost 
and so we contacted [TelePart] and asked them whether the other subcontract 
manufacturer — [Dual PCB Source] -  had any stock available. We both contacted 
[Dual PCB Source] to see if we could get any parts to keep us running. They found it 
strange to be selling parts to their competitor -  although we had both been contracted 
to have 50% of the business each supplying [TM] through [TelePart]. (ElectroComp)
There were no other examples of any attempts to use the network to enable 
communication. The supplier newsletter mentioned in the previous section would have 
been an example of this, but it failed to materialise.
Exchanging human resources
There was no evidence of any human resource exchange in terms of actual secondment 
of staff to other companies. The common response amongst TelePart’s suppliers was 
that this had never been requested. In one supplier’s case, however, this was seen as less 
relevant than other means of interacting, due to its locality, and thus not a consequence 
of the network. In the case of the internal supplier, this was clearly a strong feature of its 




Network as enabler and constraint on exchanging human resources:
TelePart used to exchange staff with TM in previous projects and indeed TM stated that 
it did have engineers of its partners working alongside its own engineers in-house. 
Whether or not the network had any impact on this apparent lack of exchange of staff is 
difficult to infer. The TelePart Programme Director stated that confidentiality concerns 
could have played a part in this, although it could also be because there was a 
perception that it would not positively influence productivity.
Hence, the network may have prevented human resource exchange from taking place 
due to confidentiality concerns. However, there seemed to be other non-network related 
explanatory factors preventing this activity.
Synchronising
Synchronisation in this project related first of all to project planning. This seemed 
largely to revolve around development of Gantt charts by TelePart and TM. The 
perceptions of whether or not suppliers had any visibility of, or involvement in, 
development and sharing of project plans varied. The TelePart project manager stated 
that project plans were synchronised with suppliers. In contrast, judging from the 
majority of the interviews, including interviews with the suppliers in question, the view 
of the project manager appeared to be somewhat invalid. According to the two external 
suppliers they had surprisingly little visibility of any project plans. One of the external 
suppliers saw the exchange of project plans purely as a one-way street: it knew that 
TelePart produced its own project plan but had no visibility of this. The other external 
supplier interviewed expressed its frustration with this situation:
We just fulfil orders. There is project management within [TelePart] but we are not
aware of timing or volumes or mix, goals, milestones  We don’t know when it’s
going to lack in. We have not seen [project details] appear on any forecast information 
so far. We don’t know what capacity would be required to fulfil the orders. We don’t 
know what additional tooling would be required, what additional processes needed... 
We are pretty much in the dark and just waiting for [TelePart’s] lead at the moment. 
Originally I  heard on the grapevine that it was partly for [one OEM]. I  don’t think 
that’s the case now because I  spoke to one of the engineers when we were building the 
first boards and he said it was for [TM]. (ElectroComp)
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Clearly, the lack of synchronisation with certain suppliers related to the late and low 
involvement of these. It seemed that TelePart did not see the need for synchronising 
with any suppliers, preferring instead the flexibility of being able to switch supplier 
until the last possible phase of the project.
The second form of synchronisation related to the long-term strategic alignment of key 
actors involved in the project. It was clear from interviews with TelePart that it made a 
significant effort to communicate and share its technology road maps and quality 
development plans with TM.
The form of sharing of technology road maps was not entirely mutual. TM only 
revealed its technology road maps with ‘key partners’ and given TelePart’s status it 
appeared from the TM interview that such partners were given more detailed 
information than TelePart. For example, TM did not share any details of its product 
strategy with TelePart.119 One TelePart respondent stated that although many 
individuals within TelePart had some ideas of the technological direction of TM, these 
perceptions varied widely. Unsurprisingly, TelePart’s suppliers had no visibility of any 
road maps.
Network as constraint on synchronising:
The inter-connectedness of network relationships evidently constrained the sharing and 
adaptation of technology road maps. As described in the previous section, TelePart 
revealed all its road maps to TM and was keen to ensure that TM knew about its 
technological direction. TM, however, was less transparent about its technology plans. 
According to the TM respondent it was concerned that TelePart had relationships with 
TM competitors, which restricted its ability to become a ‘partner’ and thus share in 
TM’s technology strategy. There was a TM preference for a maximum of 30-50 per cent 
of TM dependency for ‘strategic sub-contractors’, but a higher degree of dependency 
would be allowed for ‘partners’ because frame agreements, including arrangements for
1 90mutual support, were in place to prevent problems arising from high dependency.
In the TelePart -  supplier relationships the network implications on the limited amount 
of sharing and synchronising were unclear. There had, apparently, been some past
119 TM’s strategic feedback to TelePart mainly included market trend information.
120 The rationale for this strategy was illustrated in the TM quote under the earlier ‘mobilising’ discussion.
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concerns about a group of suppliers being used by too many telecommunications 
companies. This implied that there had been confidentiality concerns. Path dependency 
was only evident from the views of one TelePart respondent who believed that most 
synchronisations were in place from previous projects i.e. a positive effect, although 
judging from the majority of the interviews, it was doubtful whether there was any real 
synchronisation.
Network as enabler of synchronising
There appeared to be no positive network effects on synchronising in this case. The only 
issue, which was raised by one supplier, related to its alignment of its systems and 
procedures with its customers. These were aligned with general industry requirements 
rather than any one customer.
Problem solving
The RFC project had been troubled by numerous problems throughout the process. 
Many of these related to re-design and specification problems. Other problems related 
to perceived communication, project management, and risk management problems (the 
latter mostly TM’s concern).
The process for resolving problems was often described as fairly unstructured 
brainstorming sessions. The process generally focused on identifying root causes, 
however, two of TelePart’s suppliers stated that TelePart was quick to jump to the 
conclusion that they problem lay within the supplier’s internal processes. Problem 
resolution was also often woven into supplier development activity.
Network as constraint on problem solving
Only one of the external actor interviewees revealed any network constraints on the 
process of problem solving. This was a path dependency effect manifested in an 
ingrained behaviour:
....Our past history would have had an impact on people’s “This is the way it has 
always been done” attitude -  it’s difficult to change people’s perceptions and




Hence, this apparent reluctance to resolve problems by changing processes, which had 
evolved over time, provides a good example of a negative network effect.
Although one internal TelePart respondent did not indicate any path dependency effects 
on problem solving, another (the Group Quality Manager) believed that history did have 
an influence. This was because TM had developed over time a perception of TelePart 
being very reactive in its problem solving process, relying to a large extent on TM to 
take action. This respondent also highlighted that some of its other customers had 
expressed concerns about TelePart being too dependent on TM and thus not receiving 
the same amount of attention, not least when problems had to be resolved. This 
therefore indicated a perceived administrative or logistical dependency problem, 
specifically of a commercial nature.
Network as enabler of problem solving
There was only one case of any positive enabling effects of the network on problem 
solving. This was raised by the TelePart Group Quality Engineer who pointed out that 
sub-suppliers had been involved in solving complex problems. No other respondents 
identified any relevance of positive network effects on the problem solving process.
7.3.3. Summary o f Network Effect on Collaboration Activities
Table 21 summarises the main network effects on collaboration activities.
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Table 21. Main Network Effects on Collaboration Activities
Uniting • Admin, dependency: indirect sub­
supplier nomination through TM parts 
approval list
• Path dependency: established suppliers 
on approval list- costly qualification 
process to add new suppliers to list. 
Approval list excluded TM suppliers 
failing to respect confidentiality
• Indirect (parts) specification by TP in 
conjunction with TM
• TP consulted TM re. its assessment of TP 
suppliers
Timing • Path dependency: lack of experience of 
early supplier involvement prevents 
practice
• Close historical link between TM Europe 
and TP Europe enabled early involvement 
(positive path dependency)
Mobilising • Admin./logistical (commercial) 
dependency: TM frame agreements 
with highly dependent suppliers
• TP problems transfer across 
relationships and cause chain of 
mobilisation problems
• Path dependency: enabling supplier 
motivation
• TP dual sourcing mobilised supplier 
performance
• TP negotiating with indirect suppliers
• TP drove sub-supplier delivery targets in 
conjunction with TM
Communicating • Information re. project problems 
withheld from TM: TP confidentiality 
culture
• Path dependency: suppliers failing to 
respect confidentiality non-preferred
• Path dependency: historical suppliers 
receive more information
• Two TP suppliers asked to communicate 
to resolve delivery problem
Exchanging 
Human Resources
• Possibly no HR exchange due to 
confidentiality concerns
• No examples/cases
Synchronising • TM reluctant to share road maps with 
TP: partly due to TP having other 
customer relationships: admin, 
dependency
• Only example related to synchronisations 
being in place from previous projects 
(positive path dependency)
Problem Solving • Path dependency: people being change 
averse
• Perceived admin./logistical 
(commercial) dependency problem: TP 
being over-dependent on TM
• Few effects: involvement of TP sub­
supplier in resolving complex problems
TP: TelePart
The following section discusses the findings from the performance assessment part of 
the interviews.
7.3.4. Performance Assessment
Respondents were asked to indicate how they 
collaboration activities were actually carried out 
development cost, b) product development time, c) 
d) the eventual value of the product. The results are
perceived the way in which the 
in this project, affected a) product 
the eventual cost of the product, and 
shown in Table 22.
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Table 22. Overall Assessment of Respondent Perceptions of Collaboration Activity
Performance
+ +/- + +/- + +/- + +/-
Uniting 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1
Timing 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 3 1 1 3
Mobilising 3 3 2 4 2 3 2 3
Communicating 3 3 1 5 1 2 2 1 2 2
Exchanging human 
resources1
3 1 3 1 2 1 2
Synchronising 5 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 2 3
Problem Solving 1 4 2 3 3 1 2 2
NB: Numbers refer to number of respondents having ticked positive, neutral or negative box. The sum of 
these vary as some respondents did not fill in their assessment of all activities
Bearing the limitation in mind, as discussed in the previous two cases, it is interesting to 
note that there was a tendency for the majority of respondents to be negative towards 
how several collaboration activities had been managed in the project. This negativity 
was not least evident from the external actor interviews, but also internal respondents 
expressed dissatisfaction with how the collaboration activities had been managed. 
Bearing the previous analysis in mind it should come as no surprise that timing was 
perceived by several, but not all, as having had a negative impact on several 
performance factors. Mobilising likewise was seen as negative. The most negative 
single effect, however, was the perceived effect of communication on product 
development time: there was a perception that the project could have been completed in 
shorter time had communication been better. Although human resource exchange was 
limited, and thus assessed as N/A by some respondents, the lack of this activity was 
seen by several respondents as having had a negative effect not least on the product 
development process. In contrast, most respondents, not least on product development 
cost, viewed synchronising as positive. This was somewhat surprising given the 
discussions of synchronising, but may indicate that it had not been as poorly performed 
compared with other activities. Finally, the majority of respondents perceived problem 
solving as having had a negative effect on product development cost.
121 Some respondents regarded this activity as Not Applicable
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The rather subjective performance assessment in Table 22 was to some extent 
confirmed by TelePart in its own analysis of some performance factors. It had identified 
a gap between unit target cost and the actual cost. TelePart perceived this to be a result 
of TM’s frequent change of product specifications. It was widely acknowledged that the 
project performance had not been good, but that it had been a good learning experience 
for some individual members of staff.
Finally, an attempt has been made to map the level of collaboration amongst the key 
actors in the case. Figure 27 shows the interpretation of the level of collaboration 
displayed through the conduct of each activity. Whereas this can only serve as a crude 
indication it highlights some of the perceived levels and variations of collaboration 
within key relationships.
Notably, TelePart’s relationships with its suppliers, as reflected in the collaboration 
activities, appeared to be very non-collaborative. In fact, TelePart believed that it did 
not need close collaboration with its suppliers. For example, the Programme Director 
stated that most TelePart suppliers were seen as pure sourcing relationships. 
Nevertheless, the performance assessment indicated there was a range of perceived 
negative effects partly because of the lack of supplier involvement. The extent of 
collaboration in TelePart’s relationship with TM was much more collaborative, 
although as TelePart was not classified as a ‘partner’ by TM the degree of collaboration 
could have been stronger.
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7.3.5. Conclusions from Base Station Equipment Project Case
The base station equipment development case is a story of a highly problematic product 
development, or introduction, project. The degree of innovation in the project was 
incremental rather than radical, building on established technology. Likewise it emerged 
from the findings that the level of collaboration between TelePart and its suppliers was 
rather low, to the extent that the focal firm, TelePart, generally perceived its supplier 
relationships as pure sourcing relationships. The relationship between TelePart and the 
key customer in this case, TM, was much closer, although not quite as close as some 
other TM supplier relationships. This had important implications for the extent to which 
TelePart was allowed to become highly involved with, and dependent on, TM. 
Importantly, the TM respondent revealed that its ‘partnerships’ were governed by frame 
agreements and share in TM’s risks and rewards and these were always single source 
and had closer involvement in new product development. Furthermore, they shared in 
strategic road maps and had early design phase involvement, including participation in 
conceptual feasibility work. TelePart was apparently classified in the grey area between 
‘partner’ and ‘strategic sub-contractor, enjoying some of the benefits of ‘partners’ but 
not all. TelePart’s actions indicated that it was seeking to gain the role of ‘partner’, 
however, this was a road paved with difficulty due not least to patterns of behaviour, 
which had been in place for a long period of time. Such patterns included poor project 
management performance and thus had left TM with a lack of confidence or trust in 
TelePart’s competence in managing complex innovation projects.
The limited degree of supplier involvement in the project appeared to be a central factor 
in explaining the multitude of problems encountered during the process. Key factors in 
particular seemed to be the late involvement of suppliers and the opaque nature of 
communication, or the lack of it. However, the low extent of supplier collaboration was 
reflected across all the activities examined. Hence, the collaboration activities could 
hardly be interpreted as true ‘collaboration’.
Most collaboration activities were significantly constrained by the network in which the 
actors and their actions were enmeshed. One negative network effect, the fear of loss of 
core knowledge to competitors, inhibited several activities, including uniting, 
communicating, synchronising, and possibly human resource exchange. Path 
dependency in the form of historical relationship decisions and actions, also had a
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negative influence on the way activities were conducted, including uniting, timing, 
communicating, and problem solving. Finally, other forms of dependency, such as 
administrative, logistical, and what may be emerging as a new form of sub-form of 
administrative or logistical dependency, ‘commercial’ dependency, constrained uniting, 
mobilising, synchronising, and problem solving. This was not included in the 
conceptual structure, but can perhaps be seen as equivalent to what Cousins classifies as 
‘economic dependency’ (2002).
The collaboration activities were not only constrained by the network, but also enabled. 
As in the other case studies path dependency did not merely have a negative 
constraining effect on activities, causing inertia in the change process. Several activities 
were enabled by path dependency in terms of mutual experience being developed over 
time and thus allowed close relationships to evolve. Timing, mobilising, 
communicating, and synchronising were all positively influenced by history. Other 
forms of network enabling effects included examples of network co-ordination, such as 
when two suppliers were asked to liaise and communicate with each other. However, 
such examples were relatively rare as were examples of use of access strategies. TM 
did, often in conjunction with TelePart, specify indirect parts and compiled approved 
supplier lists, but as this was not direct sub-supplier nomination this did not constitute a 
strong case of network intervention in the process of supplier selection or uniting. Such 
intervention was also rare across other activities, although there were some examples in 
problem solving and mobilising. TM was clearly a very powerful actor in this network, 
however, its approach to managing its supplier relationships seemed to be to rely on its 




7.4. The Interception Gateway Development Project
7.4.1. Context
The present case concerns a project that is driven by the legal need to provide an 
interception gateway to national law enforcement agencies thus enabling these to 
wiretap mobility networks. The product to be developed will interface with network 
switches to draw data from these. This project aims to evolve the existing second- 
generation (2G) technology into third generation (3G) compliance. The main difference 
in this evolution is the change from voice to data transmission; hence the purpose of this
project is to enable the interception of data transfer on mobility networks, for example,
100mobile phone text and picture messaging and email.
The case is seen from the perspective of a mobility networks supplier and is 
predominantly dyadic in nature as it involves mainly two actors: NetCom, the chosen 
focal company and the owner of the intellectual property rights of the finalised product, 
and Securicom Systems, the system supplier.123 NetCom is a major Western global 
competitor. In this market NetCom operates as an OEM whose normal customers are 
the mobility networks providers. However, in this particular case the customers are the 
law enforcement agencies, which fulfil a legal security role rather than a commercial 
role. NetCom and Securicom must ensure compliance with a number of standards and 
regulations, including most importantly CALEA124 (Communications Assistance to Law 
Enforcement Act), and ETSI (European Telecommunication Standards Institute for law 
enforcement agencies). This implies that although Securicom’s aim is to profit from the 
project, the aim of NetCom is to comply with the regulation in order to remain within 
the terms and conditions of the license, rather than making a profit or achieving any
122 The International Telecommunication Union definition of 3G technology stipulates that it must be 
capable of supporting data transmission speeds of at least 144 kilobits per second outdoors and two 
megabits per second inside buildings. One of its key visions is to provide seamless global ‘roaming’, 
enabling users to move across borders while using the same number and handset (http://www.itu.int)
123 As the network map in Figure 27 indicates, many other actors were involved, however, only two actors 
could be accessed.
124 A 1994 law granting law enforcement agencies the ability to wiretap new digital networks and 




competitive advantage. At the time of writing the project was undergoing final testing, 
approximately eighteen months after its initiation.
The present project is part of a rapid development of telecommunications mobility 
technology from 2G to 3G, and the innovation challenge is complex as it is part of the 
major systemic shift from (2G) voice to (3G) data transmission. The recent delay in 
realising true 3G standards on a global scale has revealed the magnitude of this 
technological innovation. The project in focus is thus not developed from scratch but is 
based on a re-development of the 2G technology; this is primarily a change in software 
rather than hardware. Thus, the innovation is driven by a set of well-defined, albeit 
complex, evolving international technology standards; these may be interpreted as the 
current technological paradigm.
The structure of the network is illustrated in Figure 28. Actual names of actors have 
been disguised to retain confidentiality. The map identifies the main actors involved and 
their contribution to the project e.g. part developed/to be supplied.






















The supplier of the eavesdropping equipment is Securicom Systems. It has a division in 
the Middle East, which is the focal sales and marketing point in this project. It is an 
international company with a global presence and one of two key players in the market. 
One of its major products is branded Apollo, which is an integrated hardware/software 
solution. This product, and the future 3G version being developed with NetCom, must 
be compliant with the network switches of all the main players in the market, although 
each may require its own degree of customisation. It must also meet the multitude of 
international standards and regulations. Hence Securicom has relationships not only 
with network vendors, such as NetCom, but also with the law enforcement agencies 
across the world. NetCom considers its relationship with Securicom to be important and 
is looking to develop it into a more strategic relationship. Securicom’s suppliers 
include major PC and other hardware suppliers, however, given the large software 
nature of the technology there are few ‘component’ suppliers, and indeed these are not 
seen as critical. Safeco is the other major player in the market and used by NetCom 
in other regions of the world. The end customers are the law enforcement agencies, 
shown to the right of the network map. These also liaise closely with the network 
operators as it is within their systems that the eavesdropping equipment needs to be 
placed.
The activities that took place during the course of the project as part of the management 
of the relationships shown in Figure 28 are to be discussed in the following section.
7.4.2. Collaboration activities
This section reports the findings on the set of collaboration activities. The findings from 
each activity are reported one-by-one. The nature of each activity with regard to 
different actors is described and the evidence of how the network in a variety of ways 
both enabled and constrained the conduct of each activity is examined.
Uniting
In this case study the process concentrates mainly on the uniting of two actors: NetCom 
and Securicom. The process of how NetCom’s sub-suppliers became involved is 
considered in the subsequent sections as part of network effects.
125 The Securicom respondent nevertheless considered most of its suppliers confidential and was reluctant 
to reveal any detailed information about these.
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NetCom initially underwent internal discussions whether to develop the technology in- 
house, however, having decided to sub-contract the work, an invitation to tender was 
sent out to two potential suppliers. Thus the process was on one level a standard 
tendering process although, as will be discussed in the following section, Securicom 
clearly had ‘a foot in the door’ given its existing status as supplier for 2G-based 
technology. NetCom also had limited choice given the niche character of the market and 
the strict conditions regarding compliance with a number of 3G requirements. Given 
Securicom’s active attempt to become selected the process can be seen as interactive.
Network as constraint on uniting
The analysis reveals a clear path dependency effect on NetCom’s decision to involve 
Securicom. This is illustrated in the following quote:
NetCom and Securicom have a history of collaboration in respect of the second 
generation i.e. GSM network offer and thus in the first instance it was deemed 
appropriate that we would continue that collaboration by extending the second 
generation product relationship to become the third generation. Now having said all of 
that as well in order to validate that view we entered into a competitive tender albeit 
with two suppliers in January 2001.... Securicom was selected predominately on two 
grounds: The first being [that] their existing ... product brought with it a high degree 
of technical compliance with our own technical requirements document and in the
second instance the pricing provided by Securicom was far more favourable....
(NetCom  Supply Chain M anager)
This quote shows how there may be positive path dependency effects on the process of 
uniting, but that in itself past involvement was insufficient to ensure that Securicom re­
won the business, as its offer still had to be competitive. Interestingly, NetCom’s 
Project Manager stated that Securicom’s prior involvement actually worked against it 
becoming re-involved due to its unsatisfactory past performance. Thus, the past may 
work in favour or against a supplier’s re-selection depending on the customer perception 
of the quality of past performance.
A further network constraining effect on uniting was the need for Securicom’s 
technology to be compliant and compatible with a number of vendor switches:
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The Securicom product is very much based around compliance with a large number of
vendor switches Securicom will sell to vendors such as NetCom .... or at other times
Securicom will sell into the operators themselves....They will have to ensure that they 
have a [product] which is capable of interfacing with each of those networks.... So we 
are aware of that but clearly we have to take the view that Securicom are a professional 
organisation who will honour our confidentiality just in the same way they will honour 
our competitor’s confidentiality. That’s the reality of doing business in this place. 
(NetCom  Supply Chain M anager)
As the quote indicates the potential breach of confidentiality, due to different customer 
relationships, is regarded as a necessary albeit tolerable risk. It also illustrates how 
uniting was influenced by wider network concerns given the systemic nature of the 
technology and the innovation.
Network as enabler of uniting
Unlike the other cases there were no real attempts to influence sub-supplier selection, 
neither through direct nomination nor through sub-supplier approval. NetCom viewed 
the choice of its sub-suppliers to be the sole responsibility of Securicom. The factors 
that appeared to govern this were the lack of influence in this particular market as well 
as the large element of software in the technology, which would limit the opportunities 
for NetCom to conduct, for example, value engineering. In addition to this the complex 
integral product architecture also appeared to restrict NetCom’s ability to influence sub­
supplier selection:
You know where we buy products in bulk lets say, where our relationship is stronger 
where our spend is higher, where our influence is greater yes then we will aim to secure 
a kind of leverage over the supplier. We would aim to influence the parts list lets say 
the choice of components to the extent that we might specify them or jointly develop the 
parts list with the vendor.....
Securicom expanded on this:
I  can go to the market and buy all kinds of screw and as long as they have a certain 
thread. ...ok any screw is the same. What I  am talking about, software, every software is 
different, I  need software developers that know this kind of software, now if  I  change 
database I  need other kind of products I  don’t have, I  need to change it that’s very
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expensive for me. I f  NetCom is going to say don *t use this database use that then I  am 
going to say ‘ok but then you need to pay me at least ten years experience of people for 
training them in the new database or to retrain programmers or to hire in programmers 
that's very expensive(Securicom)
Hence from Securicom’s perspective any intervention by NetCom in its supplier 
relationships would be very problematic, as it would have systems-wide implications. It 
appeared that it was at least partly due to the high software proportion of the suppliers 
that it would not merely be a matter of switching from one supplier to another; any 
switch of supplier would affect the rest of Securicom’s system. By implication this 
indicated that it was the non-modular or integral product and technology architecture, 
which rendered sub-supplier nomination impracticable. Hence the structure of the 
supply network was not easily inter-changeable.
Timing
Securicom became involved in the project immediately following NetCom’s internally 
developed product specification. This meant that Securicom had no input into the 
specification, which the NetCom Supply Chain Manager in hindsight believed had had a 
negative effect on the overall product development time as time was wasted with 
Securicom having to make adjustments to the NetCom specification. He believed that 
the main reason why it had decided to produce the specification in-house was simply 
that NetCom had a culture of producing specifications in-house, viewing this as part of 
its own core competence. This is therefore ultimately a network, or networking, 
problem.
Network as constraint and enabler on timing:
The following quote illustrates the dilemma NetCom faced regarding whether or not to 
allow Securicom, or any other qualified supplier, to control the product specification 
process and thus become involved earlier in development projects:
NetCom... have some very adept personnel who can produce highly complex, highly 
detailed, highly accurate technical specifications but that doesn’t mean that we are the 
experts in the field of lawful intercept. Securicom are the experts in that field they have 
relationships at a vendor level i.e. the like of NetCom, they have relationships at an 
operator level they have relationships with the law enforcement agency level and the 
standards body level. I  mean they are the people who are the real experts in this. We
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should take advantage of that and we should take benefit from that. the reason why
they weren ’t involved to the extent that I  have just outlined is cultural frankly in that 
NetCom has a culture of building products in house, specifying products in house, 
developing products in house and whilst that model is shifting to more of an emphasis 
on third party ownership of those activities as NetCom downsizes and as NetCom comes
to grip with a smaller organisation the corporate mind set in end o f2000 beginning
of 2001 when we undertook this exercise was very much along *well we 7/ design it
wejl take the lead and the third party can follow our lead’  Well why should we
spend time money and effort on work which we are not really qualified to do when there
is another party or parties who are eminently qualified to do that  unfortunately
these things aren ’t forced upon you I  guess until the resource is less readily available.
The realisation that Securicom could - or in NetCom’s view should -  have been 
involved earlier to produce the specification, happened to coincide with a process of 
downsizing. Whereas such a process might force NetCom to reconsider its own core 
technological competencies and technologies vis-a-vis other network actors, or the 
make-or-buy decision, the quote also questioned the underlying general principle of 
customer-controlled specifications. Therefore, this was a form of technological 
dependency effect.
No attempts by NetCom to influence the timing of sub-suppliers were unveiled. As 
discussed under ‘uniting’ the management of these relationships in terms of timing was 
left to Securicom.
Mobilising
Financially, the project was controlled by a formal contract that established costs, terms 
and conditions, including ground rules, responsibilities etc.. The NetCom Project 
Manager stated that whereas it had not been a problem to induce Securicom to commit 
to the project, meeting the commitments or deadlines was a different issue. In fact, in 
their totality the interviews exposed the contentious nature of this issue, which was the 




Network as constraint on mobilising:
The problems of Securicom’s willingness or ability to fully commit to the project in 
terms of meeting the milestones as set out in the overall project plan, could partly be 
attributed to network effects:
Well an example of that was I  mean the project itself was split into three phases. The 
initial view on phase three was that that would be deliverable in May o f2002. When it 
came to April 2002 Securicom announced to us that they wouldn 7 be able to complete it 
until August of 2002. The reason being they said was that they felt they had 
underestimated the main resource neededfor that work. Therefore the work would take 
longer than originally anticipated. The problem for us was that didn't sit within our 
overall release programme so to that extent we had to enter into vigorous discussions 
with Securicom and suitable escalation to bring it back on track. That coincidentally 
was at a time where Securicom and NetCom were bidding for other customer work and 
a strong suspicion was that the work required for other customers was taking 
precedence over ours. (NetCom Supply Chain Manager)
The quote indicates that the problem, as perceived by NetCom, was that of different and 
shifting customer priorities. Securicom denied any such customer priority, however, 
NetCom was convinced that this was the cause of problem. The situation was likely 
exacerbated by the fact that NetCom was a relatively small customer of Securicom and 
therefore was not in a position of power and influence over its supplier. NetCom had a 
perception of receiving little attention and limited resource allocation from Securicom at 
a crucial stage of the project. Such inter-dependency between different customer 
relationships therefore indicated a negative network effect in the form of a 
administrative/logistical dependency in the form of the limited commercial or economic 
dependence of Securicom on NetCom.
Network as enabler of mobilising:
None of the respondents indicated any attempts to enable the process of mobilising by 
means of the network; again the management of NetCom’s sub-supplier relationships in 
terms of mobilising was delegated to Securicom.
Communicating
The communication between Securicom and NetCom was partly handled through
formal documentation and oral presentations and partly through frequent emailing,
conference calls and so on. One of the constraints on, for example, face-to-face
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communication in this case was the geographical distance between Securicom and 
NetCom. However, of more importance seemed to be the cultural differences and the 
mutual lack of understanding that resulted from this, particularly in relation to openness 
and speed of response:
For example somebody from NetCom sent me an e-mail.... after a week he goes mad.... 
he says ok why didn’t you answer the e-mail? I  don’t know what he is yelling about I  
don’t understand it, [because] it is going to take me two or three weeks [to come up 
with an answer], a month I  don’t know whatever and you are going to receive an 
answer [sooner or later]. (Securicom)
This quote again portrays the sense of frustration and lack of understanding that 
dominated the atmosphere in the relationship, apparently a result of cultural differences 
in communication behaviour.
Network as constraint on communicating
The risk of leakage of knowledge was not seen as a problem by any of the respondents. 
The presence of non-disclosure agreements and the trust that underpinned these, were 
regarded as sufficient guards against any such problems. The risk was also regarded as 
minimal due to the tacit nature of the knowledge involved and hence the problems of 
replicating it to own advantage in other relationships. In other words, it was not a 
concern because even if a third party obtained any knowledge, it would be unable to do 
anything with it, as it did not have the experience and ingrained knowledge to put it into 
its context and make it explicit. Perhaps the fact that this case concerned communication 
interception and security technology was an additional explanatory factor in the strong 
culture of respecting confidentiality, a explanation supported by the relative 
unwillingness of the Securicom respondent to reveal issues of a sensitive nature.
Network as enabler of communicating:
None of the respondents indicated any attempts to enable the process of communicating 
by means of the network; again the management of NetCom’s sub-supplier relationships 
in terms of communication was left to Securicom.
Exchanging human resources
The NetCom respondents stated that there had been several Securicom engineers at 
NetCom’s sites during installation and testing, albeit less frequent and for shorter
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weekly duration compared with other NetCom projects. It was explained by the 
NetCom Project Manager as being due to the relatively small amount of development 
work required, although the Supply Chain Manager provided a more likely explanation:
Quite simply... in the overall scheme of things this probably isn ’t regarded as one
of the key development programmes within NetCom. It’s one of those things that’s 
needed and it’s one of those things that gets a lot of attention if it goes wrong but it’s 
not because it’s not a revenue earner because it’s a legal necessity rather than a 
revenue earner it’s not always given significant attention.
This quote seems to be a likely explanation of the lack of this activity in this project.
Network as enabler and constraint on exchanging human resources:
It follows from the explanation in the previous section that the lack of commercial 
incentive within NetCom influenced its decision not to seek more human resource 
exchange. It appeared to be this consideration rather than any network effects, which 
governed this process, although the presence of NDAs (Non Disclosure Agreements) 
and mutual trust ensured that the extent of human resource exchange that did take place, 
was not regarded as entailing any risk of breach of confidentiality.
Synchronising
The project seemed to be well synchronised through exchange of project plans, mainly 
Gantt charts. From a long-term perspective there were two emerging issues. The first 
pertained to the specific strategic alignment between Securicom and NetCom, where 
once more there were concerns on NetCom’s behalf:
Certainly the aim of this exercise was to ... align our road map with Securicom’s. To 
align Securicom’s road map with ours and if you like to plug any gaps by [appropriate] 
development. Having said that you know my aim would be to remain conversant with 
Securicom’s road maps such as it might be. I  do have a problem therein that Securicom 
inform me that they don’t really have a road map. I  find that difficult to believe. I  know 
to an extent the development of their product will be driven by customer standards 
needs which aren’t always easily anticipated but I  have to say I  do have a certain 
amount of frustration in it, they don ’t feel able to give me a forward view on their 
product planning. (NetCom Supply Chain Manager)
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This quote provides another illustrates the frustration of lack of mutual understanding 
that seemed to characterise the relationship between the two main actors. The second 
issue concerned the alignment of strategies at the network level. This is therefore 
discussed in the following section.
Network as constraint on synchronising:
The alignment of strategies at the network level related to the importance of aligning 
with the general technological trajectory and regulation within the industry. Most 
importantly, both NetCom and Securicom saw compliance with 3G as pivotal. The 
complex yet specific guidelines for 3G technology made it critical that any new 
technology and any new product be compliant with the regulatory standards as set out 
by e.g. CALEA and ETSI. This was evidently a strong technological network 
dependency effect, as any new product or technology, which was non-compliant, could 
mean that the 3G license would be lost.
At a more immediate network level the problem of the lack of road map exchange was 
at least partly explained by Securicom in terms of the problem of synchronising 
development plans and technology road maps with different customers as these often 
have conflicting directions. The Securicom respondent explained how he was often 
struggling within his own company to obtain strategic attention:
I  go to my management [and] I  scream that I  want NetCom first priority and somebody 
else goes ‘no my customer is first, my customer has priority' so we fight and eventually 
the senior decided ok this is the first priority for me it’s the second and so on 
(Securicom)
Ultimately, however, the importance of 3G compliance and the ability to interface 
Securicom’s technology with any customer technology appeared to override the 
significance of any dyadic alignment. Synchronising at the wider network level seemed 
to be paramount due to the systemic nature of the technological innovation.
Network as enabler of synchronising
None of the respondents indicated any attempts to enable the process of synchronising 
by means of the network. Again the management of NetCom’s sub-supplier 




The main problems related to Securicom’s problems in meeting milestones and product 
functionality. The NetCom respondents stated that escalation was required in a few 
instances but eventual agreements were reached. The process was described as focused 
on identifying root causes rather than apportioning blame. However, the NetCom 
Supply Chain Manager believed that Securicom had been somewhat unwilling to 
recognise the existence of any problems, perhaps hiding the fact that a problem existed 
in the hope that it would be able to resolve the problem internally. The Supply Chain 
Manager offered an explanation for this behaviour:
I  still suspect that the main problem could be that at times they aren ’t as open with us 
as they could be and that you know that may well be a cultural thing, either related to 
their locality or within their organisation. I  have said to them I always want to know of 
problems ideally before they exist and we conduct regular reviews you know to try and 
ensure that that the case so that we are in a proactive position. Nevertheless from time 
to time we came to surprises. (NetCom Supply Chain Manager)
His quote indicated that a cultural difference was the reason for the different approach 
to problem solving. Overall, it seemed that this cultural difference also contributed to an 
atmosphere of conflict and friction.
Network as constraint and enabler on problem solving
None of the respondents indicated any attempts to enable the process of problem 
solving by means of the network. As in several other activities the management of 
NetCom’s sub-supplier relationships in terms of problem solving was implicitly 
delegated to Securicom.
7.4.3. Summary o f Network Effect on Collaboration Activities
Table 23 summarises the main network effects on collaboration activities.
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Table 23. Main Network Effects on Collaboration Activities
Uniting • Path dependency: 2G collaboration history 
partly constrained FC’s choice of 
Securicom
• Path dependency: 2G collaboration 
history partly enabled FC’s choice of 
Securicom
• No attempt by FC to specify sub­
suppliers
Timing • Technological dependency: FC produced 
specification in-house due to internal 
competence (afterwards recognised 
supplier’s technical specification 
competence is stronger)
• No attempt by FC to influence timing 
of sub-suppliers
Mobilising • Logistical/admin, dependency: Securicom 
struggling to commit resources due to other 
customers (commercial dependency)
• No examples/cases
Communicating • No confidentiality concerns: managed 




• No confidentiality concerns: managed 
through NDAs and trust.
• No examples/cases
Synchronising • Securicom reluctant to share road maps 
with NetCom: possibly due to different 
customer requirements: admin, dependency
• Technological dependency: need to comply 
with technological trajectory set by 3G 
standards.
• No examples/cases
Problem Solving • No examples/cases • No examples/cases
FC: NetCom
The following section discusses the findings from the performance assessment part of 
the interviews.
7.4.4. Performance Assessment
Respondents were asked to indicate how they perceived the way in which the 
collaboration activities were actually carried out in this project, affected a) product 
development cost, b) product development time, c) the eventual cost of the product, and 
d) the eventual value of the product. In this case this exercise had been problematic. 
Firstly, it was not possible to collect any reliable assessment from the supplier, as the 
respondent provided only rudimentary responses to most issues and preferred not to 
provide an answer to others. Secondly, the interview with the NetCom Project Manager 
had been conducted via telephone; hence a simplified version of the usual procedure 
was applied. Thus the only data that could be collected were from the two NetCom 
respondents. The results are shown in Table 24.
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Exchanging human resources 1 1
Synchronising* 1
Problem Solving 2
NB: Numbers refer to number of respondents having ticked positive, neutral or negative box. The sum of 
these varies, as some respondents did not fill in their assessment of all activities.
* One of the NetCom respondents thought the effects of this process could only be measured long-term
In addition to the limitations of this exercise explained in the other cases, the 
assessments provided in Table 24 rely merely on the subjective perceptions of only two 
respondents, who both provided the NetCom perspective. The strongest indication was 
that communication was seen as having had a negative influence on project 
performance. As Securicom implied that it was aware of communication problems this 
assessment seemed to be fair. The opinions regarding the activities of uniting, 
mobilising, and problem solving were positive, whereas the views of the performance 
implications of the remaining activities were divided. However, there seemed to be no 
doubt that Securicom’s failure to meet deadlines and milestones had caused a project 
launch delay.
Finally, Figure 29 shows the interpretation of the level of collaboration displayed 




Figure 29. Extent of Collaboration in Key NetCom Relationships
Non-Collaborative Collaborative
Uniting - Dictation _^
- Formal vendor assessmenU»^cCtIufe
© in t choice
- History & trust important
Timing Involved in detail engineering or later Involved in idea generation or concept 
development
Mobilising - No sharing o f development costs
- Individual goals
- Sharing of development costs
- Shared goals
Communicating - Non-transparent exchange oN  
information and knowledge
- One-way flow'
- Transparent exchange o f information 
and knowledge
- Two-way flow
Exchanging HR No allocation of engineers to prc©ct Engineers allocated to project
Synchronising - Imposed project plan
- Isolated technology development
- Agreed project plan
- Alignment of technology 
N^velopment
Problem Solving Blame o f other party R © s  on root cause analysis
O Netcom -  Securicom Relationship
7.4.5. Conclusions from the Interception Gateway Project Case
The story of the lawful intercept gateway project, as seen from the perspective of 
NetCom as the focal company, is a case of a project driven by legal compliance rather 
than commercial ambitions. It was not possible to interview any customer in this case 
study due to the highly confidential nature of the case, and there was a large reliance on 
one respondent due to practical limitations. Moreover, due to the idiosyncrasies of the 
case it focused primarily on the collaboration between NetCom, as the ‘project 
integrator’ and Securicom as the key supplier. Indeed, this division of the respective 
roles of NetCom and Securicom became clear during the course of the data collection 
process. In hindsight Securicom would possibly have been a more appropriate focal 
company as it would have been more comparable with the three other case studies. 
However, practical considerations would have made this impossible, as Securicom was 
less willing to take part in the research than NetCom. Thus, overall the data collection 
was restricted in many ways and the relative validity of the case likely to be smaller 
than the other three cases.
The project concerned the development of a software intensive technology, which 
formed part of the mobility networks provided by NetCom. The innovation was 
incremental rather than radical, providing an evolution of previous generation 
technology. The project was driven by cost rather than technological sophistication, as 
NetCom did not view it as a core product, which would be able to generate any
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competitive advantage. This would most likely have been different had Securicom been 
the focal company.
The idiosyncratic nature of the case appeared to influence the pattern of collaboration 
activities. Most importantly, NetCom did not seem to be concerned with using the 
network as an enabler of any activities, although path dependency influenced uniting as 
an enabler as well as a constraint. Hence there were no attempts by NetCom to specify 
or in any other ways influence Securicom’s supply network. All such decisions seemed 
to be left in the hands of Securicom thus possibly indicating an implicit approach to 
dissemination, although as in the other cases this could not be confirmed. It seemed that 
any intervention by NetCom in Securicom’s supplier relationships would have been 
very problematic, due to the possible systems-wide implications. There were indications 
that this could partly be explained by the integral and systemic nature of the technology, 
which meant that suppliers would have been difficult to replace. The case thus raised 
the question of whether it was the characteristic of the integral, or non-modular, product 
and technology architecture, which rendered sub-supplier management through an 
intervention strategy impracticable. NetCom’s lack of power and influence over 
Securicom due to Securicom’s low dependency on NetCom’s business seemed to be an 
added factor in understanding this patterns of network behaviour.
There were a number of negative network constraining effects on several activities in
the case. Path dependency affected uniting: positively or negatively depending on the
perceptions of the respondents. Path dependency seemed to affect no other activity.
There also did not seem to be any confidentiality concerns regarding loss of knowledge
to any third parties. This was managed through trust and NDAs. Securicom were
reluctant to share road maps with NetCom but the network effect on this were uncertain.
There were two instances of technological dependency. The first concerned the issue of
timing in terms of the perceived need to involve Securicom in the technical
specification process. One of the NetCom respondents stated that he believed NetCom
should take more advantage of Securicom’s technical capabilities in producing
specifications; this ultimately seemed to be a question of the level of NetCom
competence trust in its supplier. The second concerned synchronising and the need to
comply with the wider 3G standards. In other words, NetCom had to ensure that it
pursued the technological trajectory as determined by the industry standards bodies. As
these standards were set by actors on the periphery of the NetCom network and hence
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out-with NetCom’s control, this presented a real constraint. Finally, there was one case 
of administrative or logistical dependency on the process of mobilising in terms of 
Securicom’s struggle to commit resources to NetCom due to its relationships with other 
larger customers. Synchronising was similarly negatively influenced by this form of 
dependency; it seemed to be of a commercial or economic nature. In summary, the were 
several network constraints in this case; the most serious of these seemed to relate to the 
wider network effects related to the problems of legal compliance with the technological 




Overview of Part Three
Chapter Eight discusses the cross-case comparative analysis of the four 
case studies. Thereby, conclusions are drawn on the research questions, 
which were set out at the end of Chapter Four. The analysis builds on the 
empirical findings and relates these to the literature and, in particular, the 
conceptual structure. The section concludes by discussing some of the 
lessons from the case studies, assessing the usefulness and limitations of 
the conceptual structure.
Chapter Nine presents the overall conclusions from the thesis. 
Conclusions are drawn upon the aim and objectives that were set out in 
Chapter One. Then the contribution and limitations of the findings are 




CHAPTER EIGHT: CROSS CASE COMPARISONS AND 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
8.0. Introduction
Chapter Eight discusses the cross-case comparative analysis of the problem areas of the 
four case studies. Although more specific cross-case analysis was conducted prior to 
addressing the research questions, the findings are presented here according to, and 
structured around, the research questions, which were set out at the end of Chapter Four. 
Appendix G contains the cross-case analysis meta-matrices that were used as the basis 
for identifying patterns in terms of commonalities and divergences across the individual 
cases. This is particularly relevant for the discussions of different situations of 
appropriate network co-ordination strategies and network constraints. The cross-case 
analysis is therefore mainly the subject of sections 8.5 and 8.6.
The analysis builds on the empirical findings and relates these to the literature reviewed 
in Chapters Two and Three and, in particular, the conceptual structure. Concepts not 
considered in the literature review are only introduced when relating to emergent 
themes that were not identified during the literature review. The section concludes by 
discussing some of the lessons from the case studies, assessing the usefulness and 
limitations of the conceptual structure.
8.1. Importance of the Access Strategy’ in Enabling Collaboration 
Activities in Product Innovation Projects
The first research question addressed the problem of identifying the relative importance 
of the access strategy in enabling collaboration activities in the context of product 
innovation projects. Hence, this question sought to identify whether some activities 
would draw on the access strategy more than other activities. The access strategy was 
conceptualised as a way for network actors to gain access to, and exploit, indirect 
relationships through direct relationships. The access strategy was seen as conceptually 
close to the concept of ‘interaction’ although the focus here was on one actor reaching 
beyond the dyadic relationship through network connections. The case studies sought to 
capture the use of the access strategy within collaboration activities by identifying ways 
in which one relationship had been used to gain access to another.
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The understanding and conceptualisation of the access strategy evolved during the 
literature review and the empirical data collection. For example, the exploratory survey 
included several examples of actors using network connections extensively to gain 
access to the resources and technologies of other actors. Such examples were also 
identified in the in-depth cases. However, the cases demonstrated that the concept of the 
access strategy was problematic to pin down and characterise as a ‘strategy’. It seemed 
to simply describe a basic characteristic of networks and indeed the network function 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). For example, whenever a company connected with a 
direct supplier it effectively made use of that supplier to access all of that supplier’s 
relationships. Similarly, a supplier connected with a direct customer to access indirect 
customers and eventually end customers. Nevertheless, this phenomenon did not appear 
to relate to all collaboration activities. In fact, the case studies seemed to indicate that 
companies mainly made use of the access strategy in two collaboration activities; these 
were uniting and communicating. Within these activities, the case studies revealed a 
number of interesting practices. Despite the conceptual limitations of the ‘access 
strategy’, which are expanded on in section 9.3, some of these practices were interpreted 
as denoting the access strategy. These are therefore discussed in the following.
The use of the access strategy to unite with dispersed network actors seemed to be the 
modus operandi in most cases. In the fuel tank development project, the dedicated role 
of one supplier was specifically to serve as a gateway to other suppliers, which were 
geographically and culturally distant, being located in Japan. Thus, the presence of a 
dedicated network role to facilitate the uniting of different network actors seemed to 
exemplify a network access strategy. In the other automotive case, such use of networks 
was also evident, although there seemed to be no formalised network roles. The case of 
the base station equipment project provided another example of the use of networks to 
enable companies to unite with network actors; the focal company consulted its 
customer for its assessment of its own existing and potential suppliers. Such practice 
thus seemed prevalent across the cases.
Another activity in which companies used the access strategy was communicating. This 
was often in the form of using contacts in the network to obtain information that was 
difficult to obtain by other means. In the two cases of the Asian car development project 
and the fuel tank development project, the focal companies obtained critical
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information, for example regarding design changes, through the use of their network 
connections.
Companies did not appear to use the access strategy to enable the remaining 
collaboration activities. Therefore, it can be concluded that of the seven collaboration 
activities examined in the four case studies, companies only appeared to use the access 
strategy to enable uniting and communicating. The remaining activities were conducted 
and managed within dyadic relationships, but individual actors did not seem to take 
advantage of the access strategy to the same extent to enable those activities.
The findings on the relative significance of network access on uniting and 
communicating appear to be consistent with other empirical IMP findings. For example, 
Hakansson and Eriksson (1993) and Wynstra (1999) have indicated the importance of 
suppliers being well connected for supplier selection (or ‘prioritising’). Similarly, the 
research by Bower (1993) and Bower and Keogh (1997) has shown how a small group 
of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies deployed critical resources through 
networks. The pattern of networking in their accounts is similar to the observations on 
the use of the access strategy in the case studies in this thesis.
The cases included two particularly interesting examples of what could be classified as 
a network access strategy. The first example entailed intermediate actors or nodes, e.g. 
‘direct suppliers’, functioning as network access points, or ‘conduits’ (Easton, 1992), to 
connect, for example, sub-suppliers and assemblers. In this instance suppliers 
provided access to the resources or knowledge of sub-suppliers. The direction in such 
cases was one-way in the sense that the access points connected ‘customers’ with sub­
suppliers through intermediate suppliers. The second example was only observed in one 
case, namely the base station equipment project. The direction in this case was 
essentially two-way as it involved an intermediate supplier consulting its customer, for 
example to gain knowledge about a sub-supplier. The consultation of a customer about 
a sub-supplier seemed to be facilitated by customers performing structuring or co­
ordinating roles.
126 The notions of direct and indirect actor connections are only meaningful here in so much as they refer 
to direct or indirect supply relations i.e. in which physical transactions take place. A direct technological 
relation, for example, may well exist where an otherwise indirect supply relation exists.
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The findings concerning specific network roles can be related to the recent work by 
Harland and Knight (2001) on conceptualising and exploring different ‘network 
management roles’. Building on the work by, amongst others, Snow et al (1992), they 
identified six different roles, including network structuring agent, co-ordinator, advisor, 
information broker, relationship broker, and innovation sponsor. The findings in this 
thesis included examples of such relationship and information brokers (in the case of the 
fuel tank development project), whose roles were to facilitate uniting and 
communication amongst distant network actors. The supplier known as ‘J-Car 
Commerce’ was indeed assigned by the vehicle manufacturer to formally perform such 
a role, not least by brokering relationships and facilitating communication between the 
vehicle manufacturer’s Japanese suppliers and UK and European suppliers. Hence, the 
role played by ‘J-Car Commerce’ was not only to bridge network actors that were 
geographically distant, but also - and perhaps more importantly - to bridge culturally 
distant actors. These findings are consistent with those of Harland and Knight (2001) 
concerning the complexity of such a ‘relationship broker’ role. The findings indicate the 
complexity of such a role, for example in the need to facilitate prevention and resolution 
of (both latent and open) conflict. As Harland and Knight point out (ibid.), the 
relationship broker role thus requires a competent team to smooth out and manage 
potential sources of conflict. Such conflict includes the risk of loss of valuable 
knowledge through networks (Ford et al, 2003). This is the subject of a separate 
research question and will therefore be considered later in this chapter.
The findings on network roles are interesting, as they indicate that some network actors 
actively, and even by means of formal arrangement, try to assign such roles. By 
implication, such assigning of network roles seems to indicate attempts to co-ordinate 
networks for improved control of resource and technology access. This indicated a close 
relationship between network roles and network co-ordination strategies and, therefore, 
leads to the second research question.
8.2. Application of Network Co-ordination Strategies in Different 
Collaboration Activities During Product Innovation Projects
The second research question addressed the problem of how a set of network co­
ordination strategies may be applied to enable different collaboration activities. Recent 
literature has discussed how powerful ‘hubs’ have ‘orchestrated’ or even ‘managed’
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networks (e.g. Moller and Svahn, 2002; Ritter, 1999; Hacki and Lighton, 2001).127 The 
term co-ordination was adopted in this research project, as it does not imply that there is 
one actor or hub designing and controlling the network in any rational fashion. Co­
ordination simply implies attempts to ‘manage’ in the sense of ‘convening’ other actors 
(Lamming et al, 2000b; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000).
Based on the literature review two co-ordination strategies were conceptualised: 
dissemination and intervention. From the total set of activities the focal firms only 
appeared to operate network co-ordination strategies to enable two activities; these were 
uniting and -  to a lesser extent - mobilising. However, as discussed later, other network 
actors (usually assemblers) operated network co-ordination strategies to a higher degree 
than the focal firms and thus enabled a further collaboration activity, namely 
communicating. Hence, analysis from different focal points indicates that network co­
ordination strategies were employed to enable the activities of communicating, uniting 
and mobilising.
Firstly, the findings provided clear indications that companies frequently employed 
network co-ordination strategies to enable uniting. The cases provide a multitude of 
examples of the application of co-ordination strategies in uniting of actors. The most 
prominent example was of the practice exercised by the focal companies in some of the 
cases and their customers (generally assemblers) of nominating (and hence uniting with) 
sub-suppliers. Such practice was observed in two cases: the base station equipment 
development project and the Asian car development project. The focal companies in 
those two cases both sought to exert their influence on sub-supplier selection indirectly 
through parts specification i.e. by virtue of the design by making part specifications 
very particular:
There is a fairly strong logic that says the person who holds the pencil actually holds 
the supplier selection as well because the person who does the design work can actually 
dictate who can make that part. So what we did was we ensured that where we found it 
important to use a particular supplier or that supplier’s component, the best design was 
drawn up using that component.... So it was probably a little bit sneaky to do it that 
way but rather than have a fight with the joint venture and impose our will upon them
127 Many publications discussing network management and orchestration are arguably populist and 
promoted by management consultancies. The article by Hacki and Lighton (2001) provides one such
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we took the view that the same result would be achieved by designing the vehicle 
around those standard parts.... We didn ’t specify those indirect suppliers, we specified 
which components had to be used and because they had a very limited tooling and 
development budget they were hamstrung -  they could not then justify going and 
copying that part at another supplier. AutoEngineer Business Unit Director
In both the base station equipment development project and the Asian car development 
project, the focal firms exerted their influence on sub-supplier selection in collaboration, 
or at least consultation, with their customers. The customers did not appear to dictate 
supplier selection, but relied on debate and mutual compromise, thus again supporting 
the notion of ‘uniting’. Whereas in the case of the fuel tank development project the 
focal company was significantly constrained in its attempts to unite with the suppliers of 
its own choice, other focal companies, including TelePart and AutoEngineer, were able 
to assume much more proactive roles in the ‘sub-supplier’ nomination process. 
Customer power was thus exerted in a more collaborative way (Frazier and Antia, 1995) 
in the cases of the telecommunications equipment development project and the Asian 
car development project compared with the fuel tank development project.
Secondly, the findings provided indications that companies frequently employed 
network co-ordination strategies to enable mobilising. The evidence was limited from 
focal firm analysis; only one focal firm, in the base station equipment development 
project, revealed any attempts to deploy co-ordination strategies to manage or at least 
influence mobilisation beyond its direct relationships: in this case it related to 
negotiation with sub-suppliers and ‘driving’ of delivery targets (in conjunction with the 
customer). Yet, when viewed from the perspective of focal firm customers, generally 
large OEMs, there was much more evidence of co-ordination of mobilisation. From the 
point of view of the focal firms, such co-ordination strategies often translated into 
constraints, most prominently in the case of the fuel tank development project, as will 
be discussed later.
Thirdly, companies attempted to employ co-ordination strategies to enable 
communication at the level of the network. Enabling of communication through the 
network was most evident in the case of the fuel tank development project. In this case 




communicated information concerning, for example, design changes, terms and 
conditions, and cost/margin directly to a group of sub-suppliers. The strategy employed 
by the vehicle manufacturer was one of direct intervention; the vehicle manufacturer 
circumvented the focal firm in its communication with its own suppliers.
The dissemination strategy rarely proved to be conducted as an explicit deliberate 
strategy. It more often took the form of an emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1992) of 
‘leaving it to the suppliers’. When companies made no attempts to co-ordinate 
activities, they tended to perceive their approach as ‘effectively’ a dissemination (or 
“cascade”) strategy (Lamming, 1996; Lamming et al, 2000b). However, it was difficult 
to interpret a ‘leave it to the suppliers’ approach as a dissemination strategy, as no 
instructions had been given to disseminate. In the more implicit form that was observed 
in the cases, however, dissemination may have been used across collaboration activities, 
for example, relying on direct suppliers to decide on the timing of involvement of their 
own suppliers. It should be noted that part of the explanation for the lack of more 
specific and extensive results on the application of the dissemination strategy, might be 
methodological, specifically the way in which interviews sought to capture the 
dissemination strategy. This issue is further discussed in the lessons at the end of this 
chapter.
The cases revealed several examples of focal company intervention strategies. Such 
examples included sub-supplier nomination, or in other words, focal firms seeking to 
influence uniting of network actors beyond ‘direct’ (supply) relationships and sub­
supplier communication. Therefore, the cases provided initial evidence that uniting (and 
indeed supplier selection) was not merely a dyadic activity. It concerned the uniting of a 
potentially large part of the network, although intervention appeared to be a one-way 
process, where the customer specified or nominated an indirect supplier, thus leaving 
the direct supplier, which was to work with the customer-specified supplier, limited 
flexibility in its own choice of suppliers. Given the nature of the focal companies in the 
cases, it was perhaps not surprising that network intervention appeared to be more 
elaborately performed by the focal companies’ customers, in most cases OEMs or 
assemblers, rather than the focal companies themselves (this issue is examined in 
Section 8.2.5). Intervention seemed to be an important strategy, which was practised by 
several actors involved in the case studies, particularly to enable the activities of uniting
and communicating. Such intervention can be seen as increasingly critical, as the need
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for innovating companies to control which parts and technologies enter their offerings 
and how, is increasingly not only a regulatory but also an ethical and environmental 
requirement (Smart, 1992).
The findings support the notion that network co-ordination is not merely confined to 
large powerful assemblers or ‘hubs’. Instead there are indications that networks are 
becoming increasingly complex; even the automotive case studies showed that suppliers 
rather than vehicle manufacturers performed key co-ordination roles in product 
innovation activities:
I  don't think it is [the vehicle manufacturers who specify the supplier network], any 
longer. Certainly the Japanese transplants in Europe and more and more the other
European suppliers will decide that they want a steering wheel that performs to a
certain number ofprescribed measures.... and select the supplier for that - then that tier 
1 or tier 0.5 supplier has the responsibility to then cascade those requirements down 
through the supply chain. It used to be the case where [vehicle manufacturers] would 
actually go down to the last nut and bolt in order to understand it. But now I  think 
that's less and less because the vehicle manufacturers have become more 
assemblers...[with major tier 1 suppliers] who perhaps take that responsibility on. But 
that wasn't possible in [Asia] because they 're not developed enough to be able to do 
that. AutoEngineer Business Unit Director
Thus, this view reflects the suggestion that increasingly it is large ‘first tier’ suppliers 
rather than vehicle manufacturers that perform important network co-ordination tasks, 
although the apparent resistance of some vehicle manufacturers to cease their network 
controlling behaviour, as in the case of the fuel tank development project, may hinder 
this transfer process. This apparent shift in network power and responsibility concurs 
with the findings of e.g. Baldwin and Clark (1997) and Doran (2003) and reflects a 
move across several industries toward modularised product architectures and systems 
offerings. This will be discussed in more detail in section 8.5.
8.3. Effect of Risk of Dissipation of Knowledge on Different Collaboration 
Activities in Product Innovation Projects
The risk of dissipation of knowledge through network interconnections was 
conceptualised as a potential network constraint. This network effect featured strongly
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in the exploratory mini-survey and was also evident in the case studies. Consistent with 
the exploratory mini-survey findings, the case studies suggested that some of the 
companies involved had experienced problems as a result of lost knowledge through 
network connections to competitors, most notably the fuel tank development project. 
Companies in other cases were also concerned about losing knowledge.
However, only the conduct of one activity seemed to be affected by the risk of 
dissipation due to network connections: communicating. It may also have impacted 
upon the two activities of uniting and human resource exchange by excluding activities 
with non-trusted actors.
The finding that communicating was the only activity that appeared to be seriously 
hampered by risk of dissipation of information and knowledge to network actors may 
not be surprising given the logical link between this type of network effect and 
exchange of information and knowledge. The extent of communication in most cases 
was generally conducted on a ‘need to know’ basis. Some actors seemed to make clear 
distinctions between the levels of communication within high versus low involvement 
relationships, thus providing much more extensive and open information to high- 
involvement collaborative actors. Many respondents across the cases also claimed that 
risk of dissipation of knowledge was not a real issue as they would only work with 
trusted companies and would have formal non-disclosure agreements as support. The 
general assessment was often that if a company was deemed appropriate to be involved 
there should be no reason to hide anything. Hence, a sense of professionalism seemed to 
minimise the magnitude of the problem, however, many respondents still admitted that 
they had been less than fully transparent e.g. at certain critical points during projects. 
The issue of actors withholding information may be explained by the fact that many of 
the relationships across the cases were not - explicitly or implicitly - classified as 
‘strategic partnerships’.
Although the process of uniting was hampered by fears of dissipation of knowledge and 
technology to third parties in two cases, this potential problem generally seemed to be 
managed through exclusion of suppliers that had failed to respect confidentiality in the 
past (hence also related to path dependency). Thus, the risk of dissipation of knowledge 
did not appear to present a major constraint on uniting, only in the sense of excluding 
actors that had failed to respect confidentiality in the past.
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The limited extent of human resource exchange, which was uncovered, did not appear 
to be restricted by any concerns over the risk of dissipation of knowledge and 
technology to third parties, although it was likely to have been one reason for the 
absence of this activity in the base station equipment development project. Again any 
perceived risks were generally managed through trust (and often supported by formal 
non-disclosure agreements). In cases of high confidentiality, a common practice was to 
ensure that any external residents did not have access to restricted areas.
The findings are consistent with much existing research, including Bower and 
Whittaker (1993) and Bower and Keogh (1997), although their observation that many 
risks were not recognised by the firms involved in their study did not appear to be 
evident in the cases. Most of the firms in the study seemed to be well aware of the 
inevitable flip side of collaboration, that is, risk of dissipation of knowledge and 
technology to collaboration partners and third parties: it was regarded as a risk with 
which companies simply had to cope and most companies seemed to cope in a very 
professional manner, respecting confidentiality and commercial sensitivity with or 
without contractual back-up.
The findings concur with the literature on trust, which discusses trust as a more
effective alternative, or supplement to, contractual mechanisms (Sako, 1992;
Granovetter, 1985; Thorelli, 1986; Kumar, 1996; Doz, 1996; Kale et al, 2000; Dyer and
Nobeoka, 2000), and as a way to prevent opportunistic behaviour (Gulati, 1995;
Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Madhok, 1995). The expression
‘brick walls’ was used by one of the interviewees in the exploratory survey and is
consistent with the similar idea of ‘Chinese walls’ as referred to in Ford et al (2003).
The notion of ‘walls’ provides an effective metaphor for understanding the segregation
and protection of sensitive information and seems to capture how many respondents in
the cases viewed the mechanisms for avoiding dissipation of information and
knowledge. As Bower and Keogh (1997) observed, actors often have to cope with the
dilemma of meeting the same people in different capacities or for different projects and
not being able to reveal any information or knowledge that may have been discussed at
prior meetings (a dilemma also faced by, for example, ‘Bio-Pharm’ in the exploratory
survey). A ‘Chinese wall’, though, may be too strong a metaphor as it indicates a very
strong boundary. The findings generally support the notion of fuzzy fluid boundaries.
However, for coping with the risk of spill-over to competitors, Chinese walls may
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constitute an essential mechanism. Segregating knowledge also appears to be a key 
factor in Toyota’s approach to coping with the problem of loss of knowledge (Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000).
True transparency only appeared to exist in a few select relationships examined across 
the cases, although this may be explained by the fact that many of the relationships were 
not considered highly collaborative. The findings therefore indicate that the concept of 
transparency, initially in relation to cost (Lamming, 1993) and later value (Lamming et 
al, 2001) is an ideal which is likely only to be applicable in highly collaborative 
relationships characterised by high levels of mutual trust. Communication was generally 
more translucent in the cases than truly transparent. In other words, there were elements 
of information and knowledge not being openly shared, even within the most 
collaborative relationships examined in the case studies in this thesis.
8.4. Effect of Different Types of Dependency on Different Collaboration 
Activities in Product Innovation Projects
The network literature had revealed a number of dependencies attributable to 
embeddedness in networks. Such dependencies included administrative, logistical, 
technical, knowledge, social, and path dependencies. It was decided to focus upon 
technological dependence (including both technical and knowledge dependencies), 
administrative or logistic dependencies (as one), and path dependence. Social 
dependencies were not included as it was seen as a large but somewhat distinct area in 
itself.
The empirical findings indicated that all activities except from human resource 
exchange (where the findings were limited) were constrained by different forms of 
dependency effect. This means that as a result of network dependency constraints, the 
management of the set of collaboration activities was at least partly out of the control of 
individual focal actors; focal actors were dependent on how other network actors 
conducted collaboration activities in their parts of the wider network.
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8.4.1. Administrative and Logistical Dependency Effects
The concept of network co-ordination was constructed as a network enabler, but 
emerged from the findings as a simultaneous network enabler and constraint, depending 
on the perspective. Notably network co-ordination was in the form of intervention, 
which affected the ability of focal companies to control their own collaboration 
activities. Intervention could be seen as a form of administrative or logistical 
dependency exercised by a dominant actor, or ‘hub’, and affecting other network actors, 
including the focal companies in the cases. The picture was therefore interactive: actors 
affected other network actors and their activities, actions and strategies, but in turn they 
were also affected by their activities, actions and strategies. Administrative and 
logistical dependencies were thus mutual.
Administrative and logistical dependencies were most evident in cases that spanned 
international boundaries, for example, involving joint venture-based foreign direct 
production capability investments, notably in the Asian car development project, but 
also in the fuel tank development project. This indicated that the more international or 
global an innovation project the more problematic it was to control the innovation 
process due to administrative dependencies. This finding concurs with Hakansson’s 
contention that administrative dependency may become more important due to 
increasing internationalisation (1987).128 However, the findings specifically identified 
that all the collaboration activities included in the conceptual structure, apart from 
exchanging human resources, were problematic to manage and control due to 
administrative and logistical dependencies.
The case studies revealed that administrative dependencies were often of a legal and 
commercial nature. None of the conceptualised forms of dependency appeared to fully 
capture these dependencies. One example of a ‘legal dependency’ concerned the 
problems which actors experienced in formalising contractual agreements. An example 
of what could be described as commercial dependency included different levels of 
commitment and priorities amongst inter-connected customer relationships. This type of 
dependency may be viewed as fundamental and was by no means surprising. 
Nevertheless it did not appear to have been fully incorporated into any of the forms of
128 Indeed H&kansson made this observation in 1987 since when the trend towards globalisation has truly 
surged (Dicken, 2003). As a tentative hypothesis, administrative dependency due to global industrial 
networks can thus be expected to be a highly relevant problem across industries.
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dependency that had been conceptualised. Cousins’ (2002) concept of ‘economic 
dependency’ may come closest to the concept of ‘commercial dependency’ proposed 
here. The conceptual lesson on this type of dependency is further discussed in section
8.7.1.
Administrative/logistical dependency effects on uniting
Across the case studies, the process of uniting was significantly inhibited by the practice 
of sub-supplier nomination, indicating an administrative dependency. Administrative 
dependency affected uniting in three of the four cases, but most strikingly in the case of 
the fuel tank development project where the choice of the most important suppliers of 
the focal company was practically dictated by the customer. Dictation had a series of 
associated negative effects on EuroPart’s ability to manage and control not only its 
immediate network situation but also its longer-term strategic direction.
The practice of customer intervention in sub-supplier selection was performed most 
directly in the case of the fuel tank development project. In the cases of the Asian car 
development project and the base station equipment development project, intervention 
was more indirect and subtle, as the customers attempted to influence sub-supplier 
selection, but in a less dictatorial, more collaborative manner. In the base station 
equipment development project, the customer of the focal firm required its direct 
suppliers, including the focal company, to unite with suppliers as specified on an 
approved suppliers list. In the case of the Asian car development project, the customer 
of the focal firm sought to exert its influence on sub-supplier selection through 
discussion with the focal company (AutoEngineer). Thus, the cases revealed different 
practices of customer intervention in sub-supplier nomination. At one end, the practice 
was dictatorial and essentially non-collaborative. At the other end, the practice was 
more collaborative, leaving more space for the supplier to decide with whom to unite.
Administrative/logistical dependency effects on timing
The process of timing only seemed to be affected by administrative dependencies in one 
case, the case of the Asian car development project. However, in this case it presented a 
significant constraint, resulting in late supplier involvement. The administrative 
dependency in the Asian car development project case resulted from problems in 
formally agreeing and arranging a joint venture agreement, which was fundamental to 
the initiation of the project. The joint venture agreement was part of a turnkey project,
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involving the construction of a plant for vehicle production in Asia. Hence, the 
administrative complexity in the case of the Asian car development project was high, 
albeit not an unlikely scenario as networks become increasingly global.
Administrative/logistical dependency effects on synchronising
Closely related to timing was synchronisation, which also was a key part of innovation 
project management. Only the case of the Asian car development project exhibited any 
apparent dependency effects on synchronising. Specifically, the administrative 
dependency, which originated from the customer’s joint venture formalisation process, 
inhibited AutoEngineer’s efforts to synchronise effectively with its suppliers.
Administrative/logistical dependency effects on mobilising
The process of mobilising appeared to be inhibited by administrative or logistical 
dependencies across all four cases. Mobilisation problems were related to customer 
intervention in commercial arrangements with sub-suppliers, such as in the case of the 
fuel tank development project, and intervention in joint venture arrangement difficulties, 
such as in the case of the Asian car development project. Such problems left many 
suppliers across the cases frustrated and disillusioned.
Another form of administrative dependency was evident in the two telecommunications 
cases. In those instances this concerned the level of resource allocation depending on 
the relative importance of the customer. In the case of the interception gateway 
development project there was a perceived lack of commitment due to the supplier 
having more important customer relationships. In the case of the base station 
development project this was illustrated by the supplier classification framework of the 
customer, which specified a higher level of mobilisation, for example in the form of 
extensive ‘frame agreements’ and risk and reward sharing agreements, with highly 
dependent suppliers.
Administrative/logistical dependency effects on communicating
The most strongly affected case of administrative dependency on communication 
seemed to be the fuel tank development project, which was circumvented by its key 
suppliers and customer in the communication of e.g. design changes, terms and 
conditions, and cost and margin information. One of EuroPart’s suppliers expressed its 
sympathy with EuroPart’s inability to control its communication within the network:
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This is where it probably in a way works against [EuroPart] in that there’s a very 
transparent pricing system. [The vehicle manufacturer] know exactly what price I ’m 
selling it to [EuroPart] at. Whereas I  guess if it’s a normal supplier down the road, if 
[EuroPart] can get a very good price for it, then that’s [EuroPart] ’s good purchasing. 
For the parts that we supply it’s the case that I  tell them what the price is and I  tell [the 
vehicle manufacturer] what the price is...
This quote indicated that the circumvention strongly affected Europart’s ability to 
conduct and control its activities. Even worse, the system of enforced cost transparency 
constrained EuroPart’s ability to make a viable profit. On the one hand, the vehicle 
assembler might have viewed the method as a cost efficient way to apply its purchasing 
leverage and, perhaps, perceived superior negotiation skills (Ellram and Billington, 
2001). On the other hand, the focal company might compensate for the presumed 
advantage of purchase leverage by having a superior knowledge of its own local 
suppliers with whom it has an established long-term relationship. This research did not 
attempt to measure the efficiency or effectiveness of either arrangement. This therefore 
constitutes an area of further research.
The joint venture problems in the Asian car development project had similar 
consequences to the problems experienced by EuroPart in the fuel tank development 
project. In this case the joint venture problems prevented AutoEngineer from receiving 
and thus providing complete and detailed information about critical project details.
Administrative/logistical dependency effects on problem solving
Administrative dependency related to perceived supplier problems in balancing
different customer projects and priorities. This was prevalent in the two cases of the
base station equipment development project and the Asian car development project. In
those two cases, the customer perceptions were that some suppliers were unable to
allocate sufficient resource and commitment to resolving problems within their project.
As discussed earlier, such dependency could be viewed as a form of ‘economic
dependency (Cousins, 2002).
Administrative Dependency Effects: Supportive or Interfering Intervention 
Intervention took different forms across the cases. In some cases OEMs intervened in
positive ways by assisting or supporting the focal companies in a collaborative fashion,
for example, in identifying suitable sub-suppliers. In the cases of the base station
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equipment development project and the Asian car development project, the nature of the 
intervention was largely characterised by mutual agreement and consensus between the 
focal companies and the OEM customers. The focal companies did not appear to be 
severely constrained in their actions, albeit inappropriate intervention was seen as 
frustrating, as it added no apparent value but plenty of obstruction. From the vehicle 
manufacturers perspective, of course, their intervention might have been regarded as 
essential to ensure that the time and effort they had invested in those indirect specified 
relationships would not be wasted (Humer, 1998).
Intervention could also take on a much more destructive, interfering (Lamming et al, 
2000b; Lamming 1996) or dictatorial form when viewed from the focal company’s 
perspective. In such cases power was exerted in a coercive rather than collaborative way 
(Frazier and Antia, 1995; Ford et al, 2003). In some cases, it became clear how one 
actor’s network intervention, seeking to enable an activity from its position, often 
became another actor’s constraint. The overall performance impact of such interference 
was difficult to establish. However, there were indications that customer interference 
created a variety of problems for the focal companies, most notably EuroPart. 
Evidently, interference prevented focal companies from pursuing their own strategies 
and controlling their own business offerings.
8.4.2. Path Dependency Effects
In addition to the administrative dependency effect in connection with sub-supplier 
intervention in the selection process, another form of dependency, namely path 
dependency, was also revealed. Path dependency was manifested either in the form of a 
poor record of accomplishment inhibiting future involvement, which was the case in the 
interception gateway project, or through the difficulties of submitting new suppliers to 
extensive qualification processes, in the case of the base station equipment development 
project:
I f  there is any deviation from that parts list then it would need to go back through the 
re-approval process, which costs thousands of pounds and time of the engineers. So 
once we have produced this product and it has been approved by TelePart and [its 
customer] with the range of components then that is set in stone and we can’t deviate 
from that particular range of components. There is a fixed number of alternative
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manufacturers that TelePart and [its customer] would accept. Operations Manager, 
TelePart Supplier
Path dependency effects on communication were observed in the two cases of the Asian 
car development project and the base station equipment development project. Path 
dependency was manifested through the records of accomplishment of suppliers and 
their ability to respect confidentiality; untrustworthy suppliers would be classified as 
‘non-preferred’. Less predictable was the path dependency example in the case of the 
Asian car development project where its poor past experiences with vehicle 
manufacturers led it to restrict the openness of its communication. Thus, the Asian car 
development project case appeared to constitute another example of path dependency in 
the shape of poor experience or performance. Unsurprisingly, the reverse effect of path 
dependency was also evident within this activity. In other words, positive past 
experience enabled communication.
Path dependency effects on problem solving were observed in the base station 
equipment development case where the change-averse attitude of some staff involved in 
problem solving reportedly constrained adoption of new ideas and solutions that would 
resolve problems.129 In the case of the Asian car development project, path dependency 
constrained the process of problem solving in two ways and at two different levels. Path 
dependency constrained problem solving at a dyadic level through the lack of history 
between the focal company and the key customer resulting in limited mutual 
understanding. The lack of history thus meant lack of path dependency. Hence, it may 
be problematic to describe as a path dependency effect, as it was more related to past 
dependence than path dependence (Araujo and Harrison, 2002).
Although path dependency was conceptualised as a network constraint it emerged that it 
simultaneously enabled several activities, including uniting, communicating and 
problem solving. For example, a positive record of accomplishment was an enabling 
factor in the ability of suppliers to become involved in new projects, indeed in some 
cases this was a precondition as this had generated trust and thus reduced the risk often 
associated with involving new unknown suppliers. This is consistent with recent 
research on technological innovation in industrial networks. The findings by Hakansson
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and Waluszewski, which were published in parallel with the writing up of this thesis, 
have shown that path dependence can facilitate technological development when 
solutions that are historically embedded in networks are confronted with new 
opportunities (2002). Thus, path dependence can contribute to technological 
development through alternative uses of existing knowledge, the ‘black-boxing* of 
some problems and allowing developers to focus their efforts on other, more restricted 
and soluble problems (Araujo and Harrison, 2002).
8.4.3. Technological Dependency Effects 
Technological dependency effect: timing
Technological dependency had important bearings on the management of timing, 
especially in relation to the problem of whether to produce technical specifications in- 
house or assign this responsibility to suppliers. NetCom had involved its supplier after 
the specification stage, but realised in hindsight that the supplier would have been 
technically more competent to produce the specification, or at least be involved in the 
specification process. TelePart was in much the same situation, but had not quite made 
the realisation that suppliers could add significant value to the specification process and 
thereby help to avoid later quality and cost problems. Both of these focal companies had 
internal design specification competencies, which had hitherto dissuaded them from 
allowing suppliers to assume the responsibility for the specification process. Still, they 
relied on their suppliers to respond to the specifications, although changes to the 
specifications would not be easy to implement. The lack of focal company competence 
trust in the suppliers’ abilities to produce design specifications, seemed to be one 
contingent factor that influenced this decision.
Technological dependency effect: uniting
The case of the fuel tank development project showed how a company can lack the full 
technical control over its own module design and manufacture due to extensive 
customer intervention, or administrative dependency, in choice of sub-supplier and 
hence technology. Uniting was therefore constrained by technological dependency 
effects in one case.
129 The extent to which this can be attributed to a ‘network effect’ may be weak. It has been included here 
because it related to a historical development within individuals as well as relationships.
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Technological dependency effect: synchronising
Long-term synchronisation in the form of strategic alignment was affected by 
technological dependency. In two cases, the base station equipment development project 
and the interception gateway development project, this related to either customers or 
suppliers being reluctant to share technology road maps with the focal firms. Such 
reluctance appeared to concern relationships in which the actor was relatively less 
important compared with other actors. Technological dependency at a higher network 
level also affected synchronisation. This was observed in the case of the interception 
gateway development project, as it needed to comply with and adapt to a complex set of 
third generation telecommunication standards.
Technological dependency effect: problem solving
In the case of the Asian car development project, the lack of technological path, given 
the level of technology newness to the focal company, meant that there were no 
established ways of resolving the technological challenges that transpired. Thus, this 
concurrent path and technological dependency appeared to constrain the problem 
solving process.
An implication of the findings on technological dependencies on different collaboration 
activities concerns the problem of core competencies. It was discussed in Chapter Three 
that a network perspective implies that core technologies and competencies become 
vested in relationships rather than within companies and that multi-technology 
corporations have distributed rather than distinctive core competencies (Granstrand et 
al, 1997). Competencies become network, or networking, competencies (Ritter, 1999). 
Technological dependency had important bearings on the problem of whether to 
produce specifications in-house or assign this responsibility to suppliers. The cases 
indicated that some companies were beginning to realise the potential benefits of 
involving the supplier in the specification stage, although often companies had seen the 
development of design specifications as an internal R&D core competence. However, 
the timing question regarding when to produce specifications in-house or allocate to the 
supplier (Wynstra, 1998; Handfield et al, 1999; Bonaccorsi and Lipparini, 1994) did not 
seem necessarily to be an either/or decision. Rather, some companies in the cases were 
reaching the point where they began to believe that the right decision would be for 
customer and supplier to jointly produce specifications. Conceptually and practically 
this has significant implications, because it means that the competence related to the
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development of technical specifications may increasingly become shared rather than 
existing within either party. It becomes a relationship-specific competence rather than 
an internal competence residing within companies. Using the concept of quasi-firm 
suggested by Blois (1972) the technical specification competence may be conceived of 
as belonging to the quasi-firm rather than either the customer or the supplier. The 
customer retains the overall control of the technical specification process, even though 
its dependency on key suppliers increases due to supplier-produced detail specifications 
(see also Karlsson et al, 1998). Figure 30 builds on the idea in Figure 13 regarding 
‘quasi teams’, to illustrate the implication of such a shift in design specification 
competence.130










Thus, the case studies have shown how the activities of uniting, timing, synchronising 
and problem solving were constrained by technological network dependency. The 
findings on technological dependencies have also indicated that some companies may 
be starting to realise the potential for joint capabilities e.g. in the production of design 
specifications. Ford and Saren (2001), Granstrand et al (1997), and Gadde and Jellbo 
(2002) have argued that as companies are increasingly outsourcing not only non-core 
technologies, but potentially also core technologies, technological dependency 
increases. The cases indicated that companies may be reluctant to lose internal design 
specification capabilities, thus giving away the control of the design specification 
process. The cases, however, pointed to a number of advantages of allowing suppliers to 
assume at least part of the control over the design specification process. Some 
companies appeared to be ready to make the leap towards joint design specifications, 
although not without trepidation due to their fears of losing control over what they 
perceived as a core competence.
130 The development towards joint design specification capabilities concurs with a black-box engineering 
process where the supplier develops and successively presents a set of different specifications based on
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8.5. Situations of Appropriate Network Co-ordination Strategies
A number of situational or contingent factors were investigated in the case studies. 
Some of these were explored as part of the interview guide structure, first of all 
Interview Guide One (Appendix B) and first parts of Interview Guides Two, Three and 
Four (respectively Appendices C, D, and E). As explained in sections 5.6.2 and 5.6.3, 
other situational factors emerged from the cases and were identified through a process 
of annotation, coding and categorisation (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Some of these 
were captured through analysis of the collaboration activities and network effects. For 
example, issues of power emanated from discussions of different forms of dependency 
(see Appendix G). Hence, although related to the a priori defined constructs, some 
situational factors simply emerged from the case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). Table 25 
provides an overview of the situational factors that were identified through this process 
of analysis.




Table 25. Key Contextual Factors Across the Four Case Studies
Innovation Recent material / 
process technology 







material applied first 
time in high-volume 
vehicle production: 






Part of major 
systemic shift from 
(2G) voice to (3G) 
data transmission: 
specific project is 
incremental 
innovation, as builds 





























Driven by legal 








FC customer (J- 
Car) has limited 
competence trust 









FC JV customer is 
partly global vehicle 
manufacturer, partly 
Asian JV partner: JV 
limited experience, 
relies on & trusts 
more experienced FC. 
FC trusts prototype 
suppliers (long-term 
relationships) but has 
limited experience 
with/trust in new 
Asian production 
suppliers.
FC customer (TM) 
lacks complete trust 
in FC’s ability to 
manage project but 
trusts its technological 
capabilities. FC trusts 
few of its suppliers, 
particularly in relation 
to technological 
capability.
FC trusts key 
supplier’s 
technological 
capabilities but not its 
ability to manage 
project. Different 






J-Car is powerful 
Japanese vehicle 
manufacturer: dual 







VM very powerful 
but JV limited power 
due to lack of 
experience in Asia, 
single-source strategy 




dependent on FC -  
limits customer 
power.
TM is global telecoms 
network provider. Its 
power reduced in 
particular project by 
TM single source 
strategy & TM’s large 
use of FC. FC has 60- 
70% of business with 
TM: FC highly 
dependent on TM but 
elements of mutual 
dependency limits 
TM power.
FC customers are 
national law 
enforcement agencies 
(LEAs) & network 
operators. FC 
powerful: several 
customers. FC uses 
one supplier of 
product/single source. 
Supplier powerful as 
only one of two 
international players.
Note: FC: Foca'! Company
It is clear that the four case studies, whilst they shared some common denominators,
differed widely in terms of situational characteristics. An apparent difference concerned
the nature of the focal companies. One of the cases had as its focal company an
assembler, NetCom, whereas in the three other cases the main roles of the focal
companies were as suppliers to assemblers, or ‘first tier suppliers’. As a differentiator,
however, it is imperfect. For example, AutoEngineer’s role was not only a ‘first tier’
supplier, as it frequently operated as a vehicle assembler in other projects. In the project
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studied, AutoEngineer would not have final assembly responsibility but its turnkey role 
not only included setting up a plant, but also managing, or convening (Lamming et al, 
2000b), the development of an industrial network, or at least part of it. Furthermore, as a 
situational factor the role of the focal companies may be an inappropriate differentiator, 
because it does not differentiate the cases but merely the focal perspective within each 
case.
A key situational factor related to the actual projects constituting each case study. The 
interception gateway project involved the development of a component technology that 
would form part of telecommunications networks. Hence, it would form part of a large 
and complex system: itself a technological network. This was in many ways comparable 
with the base station equipment development project. The Asian car development 
project concerned the development of a car, or in other words an end product, although 
the focal perspective was that of an engineering supplier, with a wide-spanning role. In 
comparison, the case of the fuel tank development project focused on the development 
of ‘parts’ for a relatively simple end product: a car.
Closely related to the nature of the projects of the four case studies, was the level of 
innovation involved. Despite the ambition to identify and focus on innovative projects, 
critical assessment of the projects revealed that only one of the projects, the Asian car 
development project, involved what could be described as radical innovation (Lundgren, 
1995). This was in the form of the application of a new to the industry material (Gobeli 
and Brown, 1987). Although radical, the innovation could hardly be described as 
discontinuous or disruptive (e.g. Linton, 2002; Kassicieh et al, 2002). The other three 
cases concerned innovations that could most accurately be described as incremental, 
even if one of them, the interception gateway project, was part of a major systemic 
innovation (Freeman, 1994; Teece and Chesbrough, 1996) moving from voice to data 
transmissions.
When abstracting from the pre-defined situational, or contingent, factors, a number of 
additional factors emerged as ‘causal powers’ (Easton, 1998; Sayer, 1984). Indeed, 
network co-ordination strategy patterns seemed to relate to a specific combination of 




The literature indicates that companies may often favour intervention if they are in a 
position of power and/or possess the capability to intervene (Harland et al, 2001). The 
explanation for the different levels of customer intervention in uniting across the cases 
may well lie in the relative dominance or power of the respective customers (Cox et al, 
2000). A common feature of the customers of the three focal companies, EuroPart, 
AutoEngineer, and TelePart, was that they all were, or were part of, major global 
OEMs. In the case of the Asian car development project the customer company 
consisted of a joint venture, involving a global vehicle manufacturer as one of the 
partners. However, the joint venture itself was not very powerful due to its limited 
experience in setting up a new plant, supply base, and developing an innovative new 
vehicle, all at the same time. Hence, the managerial and technical systems capabilities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992), or using the terminology of Ford and Saren (2001), the 
product, process and marketing technologies of AutoEngineer in this particular project 
were relatively superior to those of the joint venture in managing this complex project. 
These factors contributed to placing AutoEngineer in a position of power, and thus
1 “X  1influence, in relation to the joint venture customer. In the case of the base station 
equipment project, the customer ‘TM’ was an equally large global actor and its position 
was not compromised by any joint venture partners. It had significant power over the 
focal company, TelePart, not least because of its high dependence on TM. The 
dependence, however, was to some extent mutual as TM relied on TelePart as a single 
source for the development of the base station equipment. This was a common strategy 
by TM in its relationship with TelePart, which would usually, in other projects, be 
balanced with a dual source to avoid a high degree of dependency. In comparison, the 
powerful network position of EuroPart’s customer, J-Car, in the fuel tank development 
project was much more straightforward. J-Car pursued a deliberate dual sourcing 
strategy to enable it to shift supplier if required and dependency was much more 
unidirectional. J-Car exerted and thereby manifested its power through its intervention 
strategy, for example, in sub-supplier nomination. Its power was thus sovereign and 
utilitarian (Lukes, 1974). The case of the interception gateway project did not have any 
one powerful sovereign actor. The national law enforcement agencies naturally 
possessed some power given their regulatory position. The focal company NetCom, 
however, was also a large global and powerful actor. Its supplier in the case study was
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relatively small, but its strong duopolistic position in the market as only one of two 
international suppliers was a significant source of power. Power was thus more 
dispersed in the interception gateway development project compared with the other 
projects, particularly the fuel tank development project.
The relative significance of power seemed to be linked to different patterns of network 
co-ordination strategies and thus a key situational factor. The case in which network 
intervention was most evident was the case with the most obviously powerful customer 
relative to the focal company being subjected to intervention. In comparison, the other 
cases included more examples of what may have been implicit use of dissemination 
strategies, for example, in uniting and communicating.
The cases also illustrated the different workings of power when applied to network 
intervention. As identified by Frazier and Antia (1995) power may be applied either 
coercively or in a collaborative way. The intervention in the cases exemplified what 
could be interpreted as coercive power and it seemed that such power was particularly 
applied in relatively non-collaborative relationships e.g. in the relationships surrounding 
EuroPart in the fuel tank development case. The following quote illustrates the contrast 
between the power of the powerful vehicle manufacturer J-Car and suppliers and the 
amount of deference shown by suppliers in the face of powerful customers:
[The Japanese rubber suppliers] are not so flexible, we *re a long way away and even if 
my colleagues in Japan go to see them it’s them as J-Car Commerce Japan. I f  J-Car 
Japan are going to see them, then the flags will be out and everybody will be sweeping 
the streets and things. (J-Car Commerce)
The exertion of power in other cases seemed to be more collaborative. For example, 
although dealing with powerful customers in one sense, TelePart and AutoEngineer 
were still able to assume very proactive roles in the sub-supplier nomination process, or 
uniting. This is consistent with the suggestions by Ford et al (2003) that coercive power 
is mostly of relevance to low-involvement relationships.
131 Given the focus on developing a supply base in the car development case ‘supply technology’ might 
be a more accurate term than marketing technology.
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It is interesting to note that in concurrence with Ford et al (2003) the case studies 
featured power as a key explanatory factor despite the fact that the case studies 
concerned collaborative innovation projects. This supports the notion that collaboration 
by no means implies that power and indeed conflict become less important. As 
discussed in this section it would appear that the exertion of power through intervention 
strategies is linked to the level of collaboration within network relationships. This leads 
to the second apparent situational factor: competence trust in suppliers.
8.5.2. Competence Trust in Supplier
There were signs that the perceived relative competencies of the focal firms vis-a-vis 
the customers and suppliers affected the type of network co-ordination strategy that was 
favoured. The fuel tank development case, in which there was extensive customer 
intervention, was characterised by a lack of competence trust (Sako, 1992) in EuroPart. 
There were indications that the limited competence trust by J-Car related not only to 
EuroPart but also to European suppliers in general, although the limited and possibly 
biased statements on this by respondents means that this cannot been verified. It seems 
reasonable to assume, however, that J-Car had a higher level of competence trust in its 
domestic long-term suppliers in which much time and effort had been invested. 
Nevertheless, the explanation in that particular case may be that trust between different 
cultures may be difficult to establish (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Ford, 1980) and thus 
encourages the application of network intervention strategies. In comparison, there 
seemed to be relatively more competence trust in the other three case studies. In the 
Asian car development project, there appeared to be trust in the relationships between 
AutoEngineer and VM and AutoEngineer and its prototype suppliers. AutoEngineer did 
not trust many of its new production suppliers, however, and applied network 
intervention, by virtue of narrow product specifications, in the uniting with some sub­
suppliers. The different national cultures of Asian production suppliers may be an added 
factor in explaining the lack of competence trust, but also the immaturity of the 
relationships (Ford, ibid.). In the base station equipment case TelePart’s customer, TM, 
evidently lacked trust in TelePart’s ability to manage the project, or in other words its 
managerial systems capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Nevertheless, it did not appear 
to lack trust in its technological capabilities or product technology (Ford and Saren). 
This seemed to be a key factor in explaining the joint nature of the intervention that was 
conducted in the base station equipment case, for example, in uniting with the focal
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company’s sub-suppliers. The situation in the interception gateway project was similar 
in many ways, as the focal company trusted the technological capabilities of the key 
supplier, but had little competence trust in its ability to manage the project. Also in this 
case there was limited network intervention, and ‘implicit dissemination’, or delegation, 
and network access strategies seemed to be more prevalent. The cases therefore indicate 
that there is a possible link between the level of competence trust in suppliers and the 
form of network co-ordination strategy applied by network actors.
As identified in the literature review in Chapter Three trust has been described in a 
range of studies as an important mechanism, which can contribute, along with other 
relationship characteristics such as commitment (e.g. Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), to 
preventing the occurrence of opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Sako, 1992; Thorelli, 1986; 
Kumar, 1996). The role of trust is therefore well-established as a way of safeguarding 
against opportunistic behaviour. Thus, the perceived capability or competence of, and 
therefore trust in, the supplier to manage the process without intervention from the 
customer, seems to be another contingent factor; this is supported by a wide body of 
literature on trust.
8.5.3. Product Architecture
A further explanatory factor in explaining the different levels of customer intervention 
in sub-supplier nomination seemed to be the product architecture and thereby structure 
of the supply network (Harland, 1996; Gadde and Hakansson, 2001; Johnsen et al, 
2000). These two inter-linked factors may be prominent in explaining patterns of 
customer intervention. It was discussed in Chapter Three how companies are 
increasingly relying on external companies to develop, manage and supply technology, 
which often comes in bundles that form part of complex system offerings (Granstrand et 
al, 1997; Gadde and Jellbo, 2002). The findings support the recent suggestions that 
there is a trend towards large system suppliers assuming more responsibility on behalf 
of assemblers (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Doran, 2003). In Chapter Three the 
implication of such network restructuring change processes was discussed; one major 
implication is that individual actors become more dependent on other actors in order to 
perform their own activities and thus lose control over resources and technologies.
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Different forms of product architecture and supply network structure seemed to be key 
factors in explaining the different patterns of network co-ordination that were observed. 
The case with the most obvious network intervention was the fuel tank project. In this 
case the part (i.e. the fuel tank) and the end product in which it was to form a part (i.e. a 
car) were both characterised by a high level of modularity. Similarly, the Asian car 
development and the base station development projects featured examples of network 
intervention, although in a more collaborative style involving both the focal companies 
and their customers. In comparison, the interception gateway development project case 
was unique in its virtually complete lack of sub-supplier intervention. It emerged from 
discussions with respondents in the interception gateway project that the large 
proportion of software components in addition to the complex non-modular or integral 
product architecture rendered customer intervention in, for example, sub-supplier 
‘nomination’ obsolete. Sub-supplier ‘nomination’ would have been problematic because 
the integral product architecture implied a high level of component inter-dependency 
and thus a tight rather than a loose coupling between individual components (Sanchez 
and Mahoney, 1996; Ulrich, 1995). Thus the substitution of one supplier for another 
would have been highly problematic. This supports the notion of modular supply 
network architectures featuring multiple, interchangeable suppliers, standardised
interfaces, systems sourcing, and volatile geography (Gadde and Jellbo, 2001; Araujo,
1 1 02003). The inter-changeability of suppliers appears to be key to understanding 
network intervention; it is related to the characteristics of interactions between modules 
being well-defined (interfaces), which allows design change in one module without 
changes in other modules (decomposability) (Ullrich, 1995). Hence, network 
intervention strategies may only be feasible and practicable in modular product and 
network structures. Conversely, non-modular integral product and hence supply 
network structures do not appear to offer the flexibility required for network
133intervention.
132 It is important to bear in mind the difference between supply networks and wider industrial networks, 
as discussed in Chapter three. It is not suggested here that the wider industrial network structure is a result 
of product architectures.
133 It may be relevant to note that it has been observed that Japanese vehicle manufacturers have been 
relatively slow to adopt modular product strategies compared with some of their Western counterparts 
(Sako and Warburton, 1999).
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8.5.4. Product or Part Criticality
The lack of commercial necessity seemed to be another factor that contributed to the 
preclusion of attempts to intervene. The findings indicated that intervention requires 
availability of or investment in resource; hence if a product or part were dominated by 
cost considerations, the benefits of intervention would be unlikely to justify the costs. 
The Asian car project showed that the product or part criticality in terms of quality and 
technical performance was an added factor for companies considering whether to rely 
on an intervention or a dissemination strategy:
Fortunately, this product doesn ’t have very exacting performance requirements. Our 
strategy would have been very different i f  it was a luxury car or a high end o f  the 
market car. This is very much entry level so perform ance o f  seals and mechanisms and 
locks and latches isn ’t as demanding as it would have been i f  it were a European 
organisation. [Then] we w ould’ve had to go to level 2 and 3 and it would have cost VM 
a lot more and it would have taken a lot more time and a lot more resource from  [u s] or 
whoever. AutoEngineer Business Unit Director
As this quote indicates product or part criticality, products or parts involving a relatively 
‘high level’ of technical specification at the expense of cost, may favour network 
intervention to safeguard against potential critical problems, such as safety risks. As 
there is increasingly a need for innovating companies to control the nature of the parts 
and technologies that enter their offerings, and the processes used to develop and 
produce these, there is a significant incentive for intervention. Hence, the need to obtain 
a high level of control may not only be a regulatory but also an ethical and 
environmental requirement (Smart, 1992).
8.5.5. Synopsis o f Situational Factors
Table 26 summarises the situational, or contingent, factors that appear to influence the 
three potential strategies of the access strategy, dissemination strategy, and intervention 
strategy. The findings indicate that the application of the strategies may not be mutually 
exclusive. Rather, the indications are that they may co-exist within innovation projects.
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Table 26. Conditions of Network Co-ordination Strategies
Power Actor requires limited
network
power/influence
Actor requires some 
network power/influence
Actor requires high 




Actor has high level of 
competence trust in 
supplier
Actor has some 
competence trust in 
supplier
Actor has limited 




Integral or modular 
product/component 
architecture






Product or Part 
Criticality
Product/part uncritical Product/part critical Product/part critical
Thus, the findings from the thesis indicate that the network co-ordination strategies of 
dissemination (in explicit form) and intervention may be more likely to be conducted if 
the focal firm has a high degree of network power and influence, limited trust in the 
competencies of other actors, modular product architectures, and highly specified 
products or components. The indication from this inquiry is that such focal actors may 
seek to exert their control over the network by direct intervention or explicitly 
disseminating, for example, their design specifications and preferences; they may also 
seek to negotiate directly through such network co-ordination. If these factors are not 
present, the findings indicate that an access strategy of relying on other actors to control 
the innovation process may be more likely.
8.6. Situations of Network Constraints on Conduct of Collaboration 
Activities
The previous sections have revealed how different forms of dependency, including 
network intervention which may constitute a network constraint, appeared to affect 
collaboration activities. The final research question addresses the following issue: in 
which situations is the conduct of collaboration activities most likely to be constrained 
by the network?
The discussion of different types of dependency effects on collaboration activities 
highlighted how innovation projects, which spanned international boundaries, appeared 
to be susceptible to administrative and logistical dependencies. For example, the cases 
that involved joint venture-based foreign direct investments in production capabilities 
showed how it became more difficult for the focal companies to control the process as a 
result of administrative dependencies. Problems of finalising and formalising joint
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venture agreements constituted one such administrative constraint. As discussed earlier, 
this indicated that the more international or global an innovation project the more 
problematic it was to control the innovation process due to administrative dependencies. 
As this concurs with Hakansson’s finding on administrative dependency (1987), it 
seems that there is some evidence to suggest that the international and global dimension 
of innovation projects is one critical situational factor.
The link between network co-ordination and network constraints indicates that the 
factors, which appeared to influence whether companies would be in a position to adopt 
an intervention, a dissemination, or an access strategy, may also have a bearing on the 
situations in which the conduct of collaboration activities is most likely to be 
constrained by the network. Therefore, if a focal actor were interacting with other actors 
that possessed a high degree of network power and influence, limited trust in the 
competencies of other actors, modular product architectures, and highly specified 
products or components, the indication from the research is that such focal actors may 
have less control over their own activities during innovation projects. The case in which 
the focal firm, EuroPart, had to cope with those factors provided an illustration of how 
severe those constraints can be.
The other form of network constraint, risk of dissipation of knowledge to third parties,
was seen as a necessary evil across the cases and thus carefully managed. Unlike the
biotechnology and pharmaceutical cases in the exploratory mini-survey, all four in-
depth case studies involved innovations that occurred within rather weak appropriability
regimes (Teece, 1986; 1998). Some of the projects relied at least partly on protecting
new technology through patents, however, none of the innovations would be easy to
protect purely by legal mechanisms. Whereas several respondents across the cases
emphasised the importance of obtaining patents these would most likely be relatively
easy to ‘invent around’. The exception to this scenario might be the case of the
interception gateway project where the technological knowledge appeared to be of a
predominantly tacit nature and highly context specific (Peteraf, 1990; Winter, 1987);
hence they might be characterised by causal ambiguity (Barney, 1991). This may
explain why the technology supplier Securicom seemed confident that it would be very
problematic for competitors to replicate the technology. The limitation of the
intellectual property regimes governing the two sectors of the case studies elucidates the
motivations for actors in the Asian car development project to be so highly concerned
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about confidentiality, as once launched the car might simply be reverse-engineered and 
the nature of the material technology unveiled. In fact, the degree of competition in both 
the automotive and telecommunications industries is so high that it may be reasonable 
to assume that imitators would overcome many isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1987). 
This assumption would appear to be supported by the findings by Mansfield et al (1981) 
and Mansfield (1985) regarding the speed of imitation across industries. So it was not 
surprising that respondents tended to exhibit a great deal of awareness of the need to be 
vigilant in protecting sensitive knowledge -  an issue that also made it critical for the 
researcher to assure and respect confidentiality in a similar manner to other 
collaboration parties.
Within each case the level of trust in individual relationships was a key explanatory 
factor in the extent to which risk of dissipation of knowledge posed a problem. Trust 
was clearly regarded by respondents as a pre-requisite to collaboration. This observation 
is consistent with the findings of Sako (1992), who argued that goodwill and 
competence trust become more important than contractual trust as relationships grow 
over time. Nevertheless, most of the companies involved insisted on supporting 
intangible trust by tangible non-disclosure agreements. Such formal agreements, 
however, would only be undertaken with trusted parties, although different levels of 
trust (goodwill and competence) appeared to influence the level of collaboration. An 
example of this was TelePart’s inability to assume the status of ‘strategic partner’ with 
its major customer, which was partly because TelePart had not performed well enough 
to assume the ‘strategic partner’ status. To put it more succinctly, it had not gained 
sufficient competence trust with the customer.
Thus, the main contingent factors for administrative dependency effects correspond to 
the factors highlighted in Table 25. In addition, international innovation projects appear 
to be particularly prone to administrative dependency problems. The factors that appear 
to influence the risk of dissipation implied by networks are primarily goodwill trust and, 
in some cases, the existence of mechanisms for formalising the level of trust in 
relationships, such as non-disclosure agreements. In concurrence with the literature the 
findings support the proposition put forward by e.g. Sako (1992) that formal 
arrangements are rarely sufficient for establishing the trust required for preventing 




This section outlines some of the main lessons gained from the inquiry into the 
management of collaborative innovative in networks. It focuses on lessons regarding the 
conceptual structure, firstly considering network effects and secondly the set of 
collaboration activities.
8.7.1. Network Effects 
Network as enabler
The case studies examined two ways in which networks may enable activities: the 
access strategy, and network co-ordination strategies, the latter including dissemination 
and intervention. The concept of dissemination, as identified in the literature, implied 
that the customer explicitly instruct its suppliers to forward its policies, preferences, and 
protocols to sub-suppliers (Lamming et al, 2000b; Lamming 1996). However, the 
dissemination strategy rarely proved to be conducted as such. It more often took the 
form of an attitude of ‘leaving it to the suppliers’. When no attempts to co-ordinate 
activities were recorded it was interpreted as signifying that companies employed an 
implicit dissemination strategy. However, this could be problematic to interpret as a 
form of network co-ordination.
Another lesson from the case studies was that ‘dissemination’ was easier to relate to 
some activities, such as communicating, than others. For example, it was problematic to 
discuss ‘dissemination’ in the context of timing. ‘Delegation’ might have been a better, 
and perhaps a more accurate, characterisation. However, a more serious problem with 
the dissemination strategy was that in its implicit form it was hard to separate from what 
had been conceptualised as a network access strategy, as this effectively relied on a 
similar strategy of, implicit, delegation. It was discussed in section 8.1 that the 
understanding and indeed conceptualisation of this concept gradually evolved during 
the literature review and the empirical data collection. During this learning process the 
notion of an access ‘strategy’ became increasingly tentative. In many ways, it simply 
seemed to describe a basic characteristic of networks and the network function 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995), that is to connect actors through common network 
connections, and thereby provide a means of access. Nevertheless, this phenomenon did 
not appear to relate to all collaboration activities and was therefore included as part of 
the conceptual structure as it still seemed to impact on particular activities. Interesting
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examples of what could be interpreted as an access strategy also emerged, such as when 
a focal company consulted its customer about its views of a sub-supplier. More research 
may need to be conducted to further conceptualise such behaviour.
Network as constraint
‘Dependency’ and ‘risk of dissipation of knowledge to third parties’ constituted the two 
forms of network constraints that had been conceptualised. The case studies focused on 
three forms of dependency, namely administrative/logistical, technical/technological, 
and path dependency. Administrative/logistical dependency captured a range of 
dependency effects, including network intervention by ‘other’ actors, hence 
representing the logistical aspect. The case studies revealed that administrative 
dependencies were often of a legal and commercial nature, for example, in connection 
with the formalisation of contractual agreements. Such administrative dependencies 
were particularly evident in the cases featuring complex international joint ventures, 
which necessitated contractual agreements. As a sub-set of administrative/logistical 
dependency it may therefore be possible to distinguish between network intervention, 
legal and commercial dependencies; the latter may be equivalent to what Cousins terms 
‘economic dependency’ (2002). Technological dependencies were also evident across 
several cases; the concept of technological (rather than technical) dependency seemed to 
capture dependencies related not only to physical artefacts but also, and perhaps more 
significantly, intangible knowledge. Path dependencies were apparent across all cases; 
however, the main lesson on this form of dependency was its dual impact as an enabler 
as well as a constraint. Interestingly, the research by Hakansson and Waluszewski, 
2002), based on a case study of IKEA and its attempts to introduce green catalogue 
paper, found a similar dual role of path dependence. One lesson regarding path 
dependency in this thesis concerned the distinction between path dependency and past 
dependency: the former was reported in this research when there was an influence of 
history on activities; this may arguably be conceived of as past dependence rather than 
path dependence (Araujo and Harrison, 2002). Furthermore, the presence of a historical 
impact was recorded as a positive path dependency effect, although a negative history 
was construed as negative path dependency, whereas a positive history was construed as 
positive path dependency. This problem may constitute a limitation of the findings in 
relation to path dependence, although as a finding in itself it shows the complex dual 
role of path dependence as facilitator and constraint of innovation.
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The problem of risks of dissipation of knowledge to third parties through network inter­
connections was constructed as the other form of network constraint. This risk was seen 
as important across the cases and affected a number of activities, however, most 
respondents did not perceive it as a problem that could not be managed. Thus, unlike 
network dependency constraints the risk of dissipation of knowledge to third parties did 
not appear to be a problem that was regarded as hard to control.
8.7.2. Collaboration Activities 
Uniting
The concept of ‘uniting’ was constructed as an alternative to, for example, supplier or 
customer selection. It was deliberately named to reflect the interactive nature of 
industrial customer-supplier relationships. The findings from the cases suggest that 
although the process in many relationships was very customer-led it was also interactive 
as suppliers actively sought to become selected. Customer respondents often initially 
found it difficult to relate to the concept, as they perceived it as one of supplier 
assessment and selection, or ‘nomination*. However, once the meaning of the concept 
had been explained it was generally seen as a useful construct.
The main pitfall in relation to the concept of uniting is that the term ‘uniting’ to some 
people primarily would imply uniting of several actors and thus a network level 
concept. As a consequence there is a tautological risk of implying that ‘uniting of 
several network actors can be enabled by network co-ordination’. The logic of the 
conceptual framework is that uniting is a firm-specific relationship-orientated activity, 
which can be extended into the network by means of network enabling strategies, such 
as network co-ordination. On that assumption it is believed that the potential 
tautological problem is reduced.
Timing
The issue of timing was considered to include the problem of early, or more accurately 
timely, supplier involvement. The companies included in the cases generally seemed to 
realise the importance of early involvement, but many were struggling to actually 
implement the practice. Significantly, the notion of ‘early’ was often fundamentally a 




The findings from some of the cases, but most notably the base station equipment 
development project, indicated the limitations of adopting the individual development 
project as the unit of analysis, as suppliers (in that case TelePart) may have long term 
R&D involvement with their major customers. Such R&D involvement may concern 
technological development and innovation, which span several individual product 
development projects, or technology development programmes. Therefore, albeit a 
supplier may be involved relatively late in an individual product development project it 
may have longer term involvement in technology development programmes (Moller, 
2002), which gives it visibility of potential product applications prior to entering any 
specific project. Nevertheless such long-term involvement does not appear to offset the 
problems of lack of early involvement in specific product application projects. As an 
overall observation however, the issue of early supplier involvement is still difficult to 
capture without some understanding of extra-project activities. This may be an 
important lesson regarding unit of analysis and has also been discussed by Wynstra 
(1998).
Mobilising
The construct of mobilising covered motivational issues, including risk and reward 
sharing, and development of ‘ground rules’. Risk and reward sharing did appear to be a 
core element of mobilising, and as the following quote illustrates, sometimes viewed as 
a differentiator between different types of relationships:
....we don't use the word ‘p artn er' with [TelePart], they are a ‘strategic sub 
contractor'.... a t [TM ] we are quite strong on that differentiation.... A partner is 
someone who is actually sharing with us in terms o f  risk and rew ard so they really are 
very close to [TM ] ....[TelePart] are more ‘sub contractors' so it's a little bit one step  
removed. (TM)
The development of ground rules was generally recognised by respondents as being of 
equal importance, even if the notion of ‘ground rules’ sometimes had to be exemplified.
One problem with the concept was that although the aspects investigated as part of 
mobilising could all be related to mobilising in one way or another, mobilising was 
arguably an ‘umbrella’ for a set of sub-activities; it was difficult to capture these rather
308
Chapter Eight
divergent issues through one construct. A division into two activities might be one 
viable solution to this problem.
Communicating
Communicating was constructed as a two-way concept, encompassing informing as 
well as listening and absorbing information and knowledge. The case studies supported 
the need to view this as an interactive process; it is doubtful that informing would have 
generated the same insights.
Following the pilot case study, communicating was developed as an inclusive activity 
that included the exchange of knowledge in addition to information. It was decided to 
amalgamate two previously separate activities into one to avoid the overlap in 
discussions that had occurred during the pilot case. Nevertheless, the focus of 
discussions during interviews for the three subsequent case studies was largely on 
exchange of information and knowledge that can be categorised as predominantly 
explicit. Exchanges of knowledge of a more tacit nature were rarely captured. The 
inclusion of different forms of knowledge, including tacit (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995) and thus more critical aspects of knowledge is a challenge for future research.
Exchanging human resources
Overall, there was very limited evidence of activities that could be classified as ‘human 
resource exchange’. Partly this could be explained by the lack of familiarity of such 
activity amongst the respondents. However, the nature of the focal companies and the 
projects studied were both likely factors, which could explain the apparent lack of this 
activity. Certainly, the case of the fuel tank development project illustrated this point, as 
it was one of the joint venture partners (which had founded EuroPart) and its subsidiary 
in Japan that had been the main customer interface rather than the predominantly 
manufacturing-focused EuroPart subsidiary. Therefore, the choice of focal company, 
and in the fuel tank case a limited travel budget, may explain the apparent visibility of 
human resource exchange identified across the four case studies.
Synchronising
The operationalisation of the concept of synchronising included both short-term project
management synchronisation of, for example, milestones, and long-term strategic
alignment. This meant that the former was closely related to the issue of timing and
sometimes difficult to differentiate. Long-term strategic alignment was regarded as a
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core ingredient of highly collaborative relationships across several cases, for example, 
in the case of the relationship between TM and TelePart. As a long-term management 
problem, however, it did not relate specifically to individual projects. As a unit of 
analysis, a project therefore did not capture such long-term synchronisation and 
adaptation, requiring discussion of extra-project activity.
Problem Solving
Problem solving was included as an activity following the pilot case study. It 
subsequently also found support in the literature (e.g. Lamming, 1993; 1996; Womack 
et al, 1990; Naude and Buttle, 2000). The cases supported the suggestion in the 
literature that a joint approach to problem solving focusing on identification and 
elimination of causes, rather than symptoms of problems, is a more collaborative 
approach than one that is based upon the blaming of other parties when problems 
surface. The majority of respondents stated an intention to seek out root causes rather 
than apportion blame, although one has to question the universal reliability of such 
statements, as it may not be uncommon for people to believe in the concept but at the 
same time in reality to behave in an entirely different manner. In other words, there may 
be an element of post-rationalisation.
Overall, as discussed in Chapter 9, it may be useful for future research to build on the 
conceptual lessons from this inquiry and refine the conceptual structure accordingly. 
One possible development would be to attempt to conceptualise the set of collaboration 
activities at three different levels based on the framework shown in Figure 10 
(Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). This remains, however, an avenue of future research.
8.8. Conclusions
It has been discussed how different forms of network enabler and constraint appeared to 
influence collaboration activities. Table 27 presents an overview of the different forms 
of network effect on each of the seven collaboration activities.
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Table 27. Relative Importance of Network Effects on Collaboration Activities
Uniting Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mobilising No Yes Yes No
Synchronising No No Yes No
Communicating Yes Yes Yes Yes
Problem Solving No No Yes No
Exchanging Human 
Resources*
No No No Possibly
Timing No No Yes No
V ................................. /  1
: Limited empirical evidence
Table 27 shows that the findings of the thesis indicated that two activities in particular 
stood out as being most strongly affected by both positive enabling network effects and 
negative constraining network effects. These were uniting and communicating. Other 
activities appeared to be less strongly affected. Synchronising, problem solving and 
timing appeared to be affected by different forms of dependency, most notably 
administrative and technological dependencies, but not universally by all network 
effects. Exchanging human resources seemed to be neither enabled nor constrained in 
any significant way by any forms of network effects, except possibly risks of dissipation 
of knowledge. However, as will be discussed in Section 8.8.2, the evidence of this 
activity was very limited in the case studies, so this finding may be less reliable. Indeed 
the link between this activity and communicating may indicate that network effects 
could have impacted upon it.
The findings showed the extent to which specific collaboration activities might be 
affected by networks and in which ways such effects could manifest themselves. In 
particular, the findings provided early indications that two of the most critical 
collaboration activities, in which companies engaged when seeking to manage product 
innovation projects, more than any other activities seemed to be enabled as well as 
constrained by networks: uniting and communicating. Hence, whereas networks on the 
one hand provided the lifeline for the conduct of these two activities, the full 
management and control of these two activities was highly dependent on the network 
activities and strategies of other network actors. Although most other collaboration
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activities also appeared to be affected by networks, the effects seemed to be relatively 
less common. Figure 31 illustrates the main network effects on collaboration activities.
Figure 31. Main Network Effects on Collaboration Activities
Actors & Resources: 
Network Pool 
of Technologies











Turning the attention to the conceptualisation of the network effects, the analysis 
testified not only to the relative importance of some effects, but also to possible inter­
connections between enabling and constraining effects. Table 28 provides an overview 




May affect uniting, synchronising, timing, and 
problem solving
Administrative/Logistical Dependence:
May affect uniting, mobilising, timing, 
communicating. Possibly also synchronising and 
problem solving
Path Dependence:
May affect communicating and problem solving 
Risk of Dissipation of Knowledge:
Network Co-ordination Strategies: 
Intervention and Dissemination
May affect uniting, communicating, mobilising
Access Strategy:
May affect uniting, communicating, mobilising May affect uniting and communicating
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As Table 28 illustrates, the two forms of network constraints and enablers appeared to 
constitute related effects. As explained in Sections 3.4.2 and 4.3.2, the two columns of 
the table were not designed to accurately portray and conceptualise the mirror, negative 
and positive, sides of network effects. The conceptual structure did not seek to 
encapsulate the corresponding network enabling effects of the different forms of 
dependency effects and ‘risk of dissipation of knowledge’ and vice versa. Nevertheless, 
the findings unveiled that administrative/logistical dependence and network co­
ordination to a large extent represented two different sides of the same coin. This was 
also evident in their apparent impacts on collaboration activities, specifically those of 
uniting, communicating, and mobilising. The fact that administrative/logistical 
dependencies seemed to impact upon more activities than network co-ordination may be 
explained by the wider spectrum of effects captured by the former.
Similarly, the opposite network effects of ‘risk of dissipation of knowledge’ and 
‘network access strategy’ appeared to influence much the same activities, specifically 
uniting and communicating. This may be logically explained by the emergent 
realisation on behalf of the researcher that these two constructs both revolved around 
the problem of accessing networks. In other words, the bridges or conduits provided by 
inter-connected relationships may not only be used to enable activities, but also 
constituted a route to the loss of knowledge.
Overall, the findings revealed how one actor’s attempts to use the network as an enabler 
through the co-ordination strategies of dissemination and intervention was likely to 
present a constraint in the form of administrative dependency to other actors in the 
network. Companies try to manage within the network whilst at the same time coping 
with the attempts of other companies to manage within the very same network. The 
cases unveiled that the potentially destructive strategy, at least for some actors in the 
network, of intervention could also be applied in a more supportive and collaborative 
manner. The extent to which the intervention strategy was viable, however, was not 
merely a question of power and influence. The findings indicated that the factors of 
modularity of product and network architecture, and commercial and technological 
criticality also favoured intervention.
In addition to the conceptual lessons implied in this concluding section the final part of
the chapter addressed the main lessons from the empirical enquiry. This was divided
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into network effects and collaboration activities. The main lesson on positive network 
effects included the difficulties in distinguishing between the access strategy and 
network co-ordination strategies, particularly in relation to dissemination strategies 
being conducted in an implicit form as a ‘leave it to suppliers’ attitude. On negative 
network effects a set of different forms of administrative/logistical dependencies 
emerged: network intervention performed by other actors (logistical), and legal and 
commercial dependencies. Path dependency seemed to incorporate a dual effect as both 
an enabler and constraint of collaboration activities. Risks of dissipation of knowledge 
to third parties via network connections, although affecting a variety of activities, did 
not appear to be a problem that respondents viewed as problematic to control; it was 
generally managed by ensuring a high degree of trust in collaborative relationships.
Finally, a number of lessons were gained in relation to the collaboration activities. Most 
significantly, it was pointed out that uniting, although constructed as a firm-specific 
relationship-orientated activity, could be interpreted as a network-level activity. 
Mobilising emerged as an ‘umbrella’ construct, encompassing a variety of important 
sub-activities, which however emerged as being conceptually different; the development 
of ground rules and risk and reward sharing did not always appear to be logically inter­
linked. Both timing and synchronising emerged as activities that not only concerned 
individual product development projects but also spanned across individual projects into 
long-term technology programmes. This indicated the limitations of adopting projects as 
the main unit of analysis. Knowledge exchange, although designed to form part of 
communicating, was not adequately captured. The cause of this problem was likely to 
have been the lack of specific questions to tease out exchange of knowledge as opposed 
to information. The inclusion of different forms of knowledge, including for example 
explicit and tacit knowledge, is a challenge for future research. There was little 
evidence, or at least visibility, of human resource exchange activity, so limited 
empirical data on this activity could be collected. However, one reason for the lack of 
evidence might in some cases be the choice of focal firms and innovation projects. 
Finally, the danger of post-rationalisation by respondents in relation to problem solving 
was discussed, although no major conceptual lessons were identified.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND
LIMITATIONS
This chapter presents the overall conclusions from the thesis. It begins by drawing the 
main conclusions based upon the aim and objectives that were set out in Chapter One. 
Thereafter, the contributions and limitations of the thesis are discussed. A discussion of 
managerial implications follows and leads to an outline of future avenues of research. 
The chapter concludes with an epilogue.
9.1. Conclusions
The thesis set out to examine how innovating companies deploy the resources and 
technologies available within their network whilst at the same time coping with the 
problem of loss of control of knowledge and technologies. A set of more specific 
objectives was developed to address the overall aim. This section presents the 
conclusions on each of these objectives.
9.1.1. Objective 1:
• to identify a set o f activities that companies apply during technological innovation 
to draw upon individual dyadic relationships and gain access to resources and 
technologies available in the wider network
The first objective was addressed through a review of the literature combined with 
exploratory empirical investigation. The preliminary literature review revealed a variety 
of activities and resulted in an initial set of activities: - identifying/selecting, timing, 
mobilising, informing, synchronising, assigning human resources, and co-ordinating.
The initial set of activities was used for the exploratory mini-survey and refined 
following further literature review. It was discussed in Chapter Five how this was an 
abductive process of simultaneous literature search and empirical investigation, rather 
than a linear deductive process. Following this process, ‘identifying/selecting* was 
replaced with ‘uniting’ as the exploratory mini-survey, together with further literature 
review, indicated that actors in some cases were not simply identifying and selecting 
other actors in a rational fashion; in some cases they were at least as much subjected to 
being identified and selected. The IMP interaction model was instrumental in revising
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the collaboration activities and adopted as the major perspective in this thesis (e.g. 
Hakansson, 1982; Ford, 1990). The two activities of ‘informing’ and ‘assigning human 
resources’ were substituted with, respectively, ‘communicating’ and ‘exchanging 
human resources’ for the same reason. ‘Co-ordinating’ was removed after the 
exploratory mini-survey as it emerged as an element of all activities, namely that all 
activities are somehow co-ordinated within the network. It was instead included as part 
of the enabling ‘network effects’ and so became redundant as a separate activity.
The revised set of collaboration activities following the exploratory mini-survey and 
further literature review was: - uniting, mobilising, synchronising, communicating, 
exchanging knowledge, exchanging human resources and timing. This set of activities 
was based on an interaction perspective, which emerged as increasingly important for 
understanding how companies manage technological innovation in networks (e.g. 
Hakansson, 1987; Ford and Saren, 2001). The interaction perspective also made it 
realistic to assume that the same activities would apply for the management of upstream 
as well as downstream relationships. A company’s relationships with its suppliers and 
customers essentially concern the same forms of relationship, customer-supplier 
relationships, only viewed from different perspectives. The activities involved in the 
management of supplier relationships are thus logically similar to those involved in 
customer relationships.
A final iteration of the set of collaboration activities took place. The pilot case study, the 
first of the four in-depth case studies, included knowledge exchange as a separate 
activity from communicating. However, these two activities proved to be overlapping 
and thus difficult to distinguish as separate. Knowledge exchange was replaced with 
problem solving, which emerged as an important ingredient of collaborative innovation 
in the pilot case and subsequently also found support in the literature (e.g. Lamming, 
1996; Takeishi, 2001; Naude and Buttle, 2000).
It was recognised that some collaboration activities were more generic than others. 
Principally, timing and communicating were seen as underlying activities given that 
there may be timing and communication elements of all the other activities (see Figure 
15). For example, it can be argued that the reason why companies should wish to 
engage in exchanging human resources would be to facilitate communication.
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The review of different bodies of literature indicated that each of the collaboration 
activities is critical to the management of collaborative innovation (see Table 8). The 
empirical investigation in this thesis did not set out to prove or disprove the level of 
criticality of individual activities. The four in-depth case studies demonstrated that the 
final set of activities was useful for describing and understanding key processes of 
collaborative innovation management with specific respect to product development 
projects. Empirical analysis based around the set of activities revealed that each of the 
activities took place between customers and suppliers involved in product development 
projects, although the examples of one activity, ‘exchanging human resources’, were 
limited for a number of reasons. The lessons of the activities were discussed in Section 
8.7.2 and we return to these towards the end of this chapter when discussing the 
limitations of the study. Table 29 provides a brief definition of each activity:
Table 29. Collaboration Activity Set Revisited
Uniting The process o f  identifying actors, including selection  
criteria -  or being identified/selected
Mobilising The process o f  motivating actors to commit to project, 
including establishing ground rules and objectives and 
arranging sharing o f  risks and benefits
Synchronising The process o f  mutually adapting activities and 
resources, including development procedures; aligning 
objectives and technology roadmaps
Communicating The process o f  exchanging e.g. design ideas, concepts, 
technical specifications, policies, procedures and 
performance information
Problem Solving The process o f  resolving e.g. technical or 
manufacturing/supply problems
Exchanging Human Resources The process o f  allocating (on long-term mutual basis) 
staff to development projects e.g. resident design 
engineers
Timing The process o f  deciding the moment or stage o f  involving 
actors in the project
The activities shown in Table 29 represented different ways in which individual 
companies managed product innovation projects vis-a-vis other actors. They were thus 
firm-specific and relationship-orientated. The problem of how they might be extended 
into the wider network surrounding companies was the second objective of the thesis. 




• to examine how companies draw on networks when managing the identified set o f 
activities
The second objective of the thesis concerned how companies make use of networks 
when managing collaboration activities during technological innovation. This implied 
that it was about the positive implications of networks and thus involved generating 
insights into how the set of activities identified was managed beyond the dyadic 
relationship level. The second objective was initially investigated through the literature 
and subsequently empirically investigated through initially the exploratory mini-survey 
and then the four in-depth cases.
Drawing on the complementary perspectives of network theory, supply chain 
management and lean supply, two main ways in which companies may use networks to 
enable collaborative innovation activities were conceptualised. The first was described 
as an ‘access strategy’; this sought to capture the use of one relationship to gain access 
to other indirect relationships and was perceived as a predominantly informal use of 
networks, to some extent implying a ‘conceding’ style (see Ford et al, 2003). The 
second enabler was conceptualised in the form of two ‘network co-ordination 
strategies’: network intervention and network dissemination. They were formulated as 
means to capture attempts to co-ordinate or convene actors, resources and activities in 
the wider network and were seen as potentially more explicit, assertive and coercive 
attempts by companies that aim to capitalise on a wider part of the network in which 
they operate.
The empirical research indicated that companies often used the access strategy to enable 
two collaboration activities within networks: uniting and communication. The case 
studies showed how companies appeared to use the access strategy to enable uniting 
with network actors. The case of the fuel tank development project specifically 
demonstrated how one supplier to the focal company, EuroPart, had been assigned an 
access role by the end customer, a Japanese vehicle assembler. Similarly, companies 
used the access strategy to enable communicating within networks. This was most 
evident in the Asian car development project and the fuel tank development project, 
most notably in relation to obtaining design change information. The companies 
involved in the case studies did not appear to use the access strategy to enable the
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remaining collaboration activities. Whereas this should not be taken as an indication 
that the remaining activities were not conducted throughout the network, it implied that 
individual companies did not seem to take advantage of networks through what had 
been conceptualised in this thesis as an ‘access strategy’ to the same extent to enable 
those activities. This finding concurred with a number of related findings by other 
researchers (e.g. Hakansson and Eriksson, 1993; Bower, 1993) although the findings of 
this thesis pointed specifically to how this affected certain collaboration activities 
during product innovation activity. The lessons regarding the concept of the ‘access 
strategy’, however, were discussed; these will be further highlighted in section 9.3: 
Limitations.
There were several examples from across all four case studies of how companies sought 
to enable uniting and communicating by means of network co-ordination strategies. In 
the case of uniting, some of the focal companies, and more often their large customers, 
sought to intervene in sub-supplier selection. Similarly, companies in the cases sought 
to enable communicating through network co-ordination strategies e.g. by 
communicating design changes and terms and conditions, directly with indirect 
suppliers. Finally, there was evidence of companies using network co-ordination 
strategies to enable mobilising, for example, when companies endeavoured to drive 
delivery targets by liaising directly with sub-suppliers.
The findings indicated that network co-ordination strategies might be more likely to be 
conducted by focal firms if the following conditions were present: a) if the focal firm 
had a high degree of network power and influence; b) if the focal firm had limited trust 
in the competencies of other actors; c) if the product being developed had a modular 
product architectures; d) if the product or component being developed was critical e.g. 
in terms of safety requirements. If these factors were not present, the findings indicated 
that the access strategy of relying on other actors to manage the innovation process 
could be more likely. Some literature appeared to support this observation (e.g. Gadde 
and Jellbo, 2001; Araujo, 2003) but further empirical testing, however, is required to 




• to examine the extent to which networks pose a constraint on the conduct o f the 
identified set o f activities
The third objective concerned how networks might constrain the conduct of 
collaboration activities during technological innovation. Hence, it concerned the 
negative implications of networks. Like the second objective, the third objective was 
initially examined through the literature and subsequently empirically investigated 
through the exploratory mini-survey and then the four in-depth cases.
The literature revealed that innovation activities were constrained as a result of 
operating in networks. An interaction and network perspective implied that individual 
actors, or companies, have to cope with the behaviour and actions of other network 
actors. Such a view contrasted with the assumption present in many modem strategic 
management theories, including the resource-based view (e.g. Wemerfeldt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991), which stressed the importance of internal development and nurture of 
distinctive resources and competencies and the need to protect these from other 
organisations (e.g. Rumelt, 1987). In contrast, the network perspective assumed that 
resources, competencies and technologies are developed and deployed through networks 
(Ford et al, 2003). Companies are relying on external companies to develop, manage 
and supply technology, which increasingly comes in bundles that form part of complex 
system offerings (Granstrand et al, 1997; Gadde and Jellbo, 2002).
Two main forms of network constraint were discussed. The first concerned ‘dependency 
effects’: when companies collaborate with external companies they become dependent 
upon these. Five main forms of dependence were identified and discussed: - technical or 
technological, administrative or logistic, path, knowledge, and social dependencies. It 
was decided to focus on the first three of those, viewing knowledge dependency as an 
integral part of technological dependency. The second was conceptualised as ‘risk of 
dissipation of knowledge’: knowledge may dissipate through network inter-connections 
to, for example, competitors. As companies increasingly compete on unique knowledge 
and competencies such dissipation may present a serious risk.
The empirical findings demonstrated how the risk of dissipation of valuable knowledge 
to third parties constrained the activity of communicating. Other collaboration activities,
320
Chapter Nine
however, did not appear to be constrained by this risk. The cases revealed how the risk 
of dissipation of knowledge was often seen as real, but they also suggested that 
companies have begun to develop effective ways to either avoid or manage the problem. 
Many companies simply communicated on a ‘need to know basis’ with any actors not 
considered key collaboration allies. Indeed, a metaphorical ‘Chinese wall’ would often 
be established to segment information and knowledge between essential and non- 
essential relationships and thereby prevent knowledge leakage. The findings on this 
management problem concurred with much existing research, including e.g. Bower and 
Whittaker (1993), Sako (1992), Kale et al (2000) and Dyer and Nobeoka (2000). Like, 
for example, Dyer and Nobeoka’s (ibid.) research on Toyota’s encouragement of 
knowledge sharing within its network, the cases in this thesis indicated that the risk of 
dissipation of knowledge was seen as a necessary evil; it had to be managed through 
trust and knowledge segregation rather than purely formal contractual arrangements.
The empirical findings indicated that all activities except from human resource 
exchange (where the findings were limited) were constrained by different forms of 
dependency effect. This meant that as a result of network dependency constraints, the 
management of the set of collaboration activities was at least partly outside the control 
of individual focal actors; these were dependent on how other network actors conducted 
collaboration activities in their parts of the wider network.
The most striking finding was the duality of network effects: the concept of network co­
ordination was constructed as a network enabler, but emerged from the findings as a 
simultaneous network enabler and constraint, depending on the perspective. The most 
interesting example related to network intervention; the cases included several examples 
of how intervention conducted by one network actor affected the ability of focal 
companies to control their own collaboration activities. Therefore, intervention 
performed by one network actor constituted a form of administrative or logistical 
dependency on other network actors.
Path dependency was manifested either in the form of a poor record of accomplishment 
inhibiting future involvement or through the difficulties of submitting new suppliers to 
extensive qualification processes. Once suppliers had undergone qualification processes 
some customers were unwilling to unite with new suppliers. However, an emergent
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conceptual finding in relation to path dependency was that although it was 
conceptualised as a network constraint it, also, emerged as a simultaneous enabler and 
constraint of several activities; these included uniting, communicating and problem 
solving. For example, a positive record of accomplishment was an enabling factor in the 
ability of suppliers to become involved in new projects, indeed in some cases this was a 
precondition as this had generated trust and thus reduced the risk often associated with 
involving new unknown suppliers. This dual role of path dependency had recently also 
been discussed by Hakansson and Waluszewski (2002). Thus, path dependence was 
found to contribute positively to technological development.
Finally, the problem of technological dependency was investigated. The literature 
indicated that the problem of technological dependency was closely related to the 
question of how companies manage the make-or-buy (or develop-or-buy) decision. As 
companies are increasingly out-sourcing what they consider to be non-core activities 
and technologies, they are likely to become more dependent on technologies available 
through networks. From this perspective, several collaboration activities were 
constrained by technological dependency, including uniting, timing, synchronising and 
problem solving.
The final research question turned out to be closely related to the question concerning 
the appropriateness of network co-ordination strategies, as one network actor’s co­
ordination attempts turned out to present a problem of administrative or logistic 
dependency for other network actors. Therefore, in the cases in which network 
intervention strategies were applied extensively, such as the case of the fuel tank 
project, some network actors had to cope with interventions by other actors. Such 
intervention affected their ability to control collaboration activities within the networks. 
The factors that seemed to explain such network co-ordination patterns - power, 
competence trust, product architecture and product or part criticality - therefore also 
appeared to explain when activities were likely to be constrained as a result of 
administrative dependency. Furthermore, administrative and logistical dependencies 
were most evident in cases that spanned international boundaries, for example, 
involving joint venture-based foreign direct production capability investments. This was 
notably the case in the Asian car development project, but also in the fuel tank 
development project. This indicated that the more international or global an innovation
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project the more problematic it may be to control the innovation process due to 
administrative dependencies. This finding was consistent with Hakansson’s (1987) 
suggestion that administrative dependency may be becoming more important due to 
increasing internationalisation. The fact that administrative/logistical dependencies 
seemed to impact upon more activities than network co-ordination may be explained by 
the wider spectrum of effects captured by the former.
The main factors that appeared to influence the risk of dissipation implied by networks 
were primarily the level of goodwill trust (Sako, 1992). In concurrence with the 
literature (ibid.) the findings supported the proposition that formal arrangements are 
rarely sufficient for establishing the trust required for preventing leakage of knowledge 
through network connections.
9.2. Contributions
Overall, the contributions of this thesis revolve around the understanding of how 
networks affect technological innovation processes. Specifically, the contributions 
concern the paradox of how companies engaged in new product development projects, 
on the one hand use networks to their advantage, but on the other hand are constrained 
in their ability to control the innovation process.
One contribution is the set of collaboration activities. Previous scholars have sought to 
develop similar sets of activities for managing, for example, supplier (or purchasing) 
involvement in product development (e.g. Hakansson and Eriksson, 1993; Wynstra, 
1998). However, the set of activities developed in this thesis is arguably of a more 
interactive nature than previous efforts.
Perhaps more importantly, the thesis contributes to debate about the extent to which 
specific collaboration activities may be affected by networks and in which ways such 
effects may be manifested. In particular, the findings provide early indications that two 
of the most critical collaboration activities which companies engage in when seeking to 
manage product innovation projects - uniting and communicating - more than any other 
activities seem to be enabled as well as constrained by networks. Hence, whereas 
networks on the one hand provide the lifeline for the conduct of these two activities, the 
full management and control of these two activities is highly dependent on the network 
activities and strategies of other network actors. Although most other collaboration
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activities also appear to be affected by networks, the effects seem to be relatively less 
comprehensive.
The findings of the thesis indicate that two activities in particular stand out as being 
most strongly affected by both positive enabling network effects and negative 
constraining network effects. These are: - uniting and communication. Other activities 
appear to be less strongly affected. Synchronising, problem solving and timing only 
appear to be affected by different form of dependency, most notably administrative and 
technological dependencies. Exchanging human resources neither seem to be enabled 
nor constrained in any significant way by any forms of network effect, except possibly 
risks of dissipation of knowledge. However, as discussed in Section 8.8.2, the evidence 
of this activity is very limited in the case studies, so this finding may be less reliable.
The analysis also indicates possible inter-connections between enabling and 
constraining effects. Most importantly, administrative/logistical dependence and 
network co-ordination to a large extent represent two different sides of the same coin. 
The findings have revealed how one actor’s attempts to use the network as an enabler 
through the co-ordination strategies of dissemination and intervention is likely to 
present a constraint in the form of administrative dependency to other actors in the 
network. Companies have to try to effectively network and manage within the network 
whilst at the same time cope with the attempts of other companies to network and 
manage in the network. The cases have unveiled that the potentially destructive strategy, 
at least for some network actors, of intervention can also be applied in a more 
supportive and collaborative manner. The extent to which the intervention strategy is 
viable, however, is not merely a question of power and influence. The findings have 
indicated that the factors of modularity of product and network architecture, and 
commercial and technological criticality also favour intervention.
9.3. Limitations
The limitations of this study can be divided into those that concern conceptual and/or 
methodological issues and those that concern the actual findings.
One conceptual limitation concerns the focal firm network perspective adopted in this 
thesis. This perspective was chosen because of a number of advantages of such a
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perspective, such as the more immediate, short- and medium-term, managerial 
consequences of the focal firm network on the focal firm itself i.e. a conceptual reason, 
and the relative feasibility and practicability of researching non-focal firm networks i.e. 
a methodological reason. A focal firm network orientation, however, is inevitably 
limited in its ability to capture the wider consequences of networks. Ford et al (2003) 
argue that a focal firm network perspective ignores potential sources of solutions or 
pressures that the company faces long-term. The case of the Asian car development 
project is a case in point: the core material technology was brought in from outside the 
automotive industry, using boats and bathroom technology, so the focal company, 
AutoEngineer, would have considered as part of its network picture the suppliers of this 
technology that were on the border of, or outside, the focal firm network. Wider 
network analysis could have explored this part of the network, entering an entirely 
different industry. Another example would be the case of the fuel tank project, which 
particularly illustrated the problems of intervention strategies. However, this was the 
problem as predominantly seen from the focal company, EuroPart. The intervenor, the 
vehicle assembler, was not ignored but was interviewed and its picture of the network 
explored. However, this data collection primarily focused on its relationships with 
EuroPart and those relationships that had a more or less direct impact on EuroPart. 
Consequently, the full complexities and dynamics of the network were only partially 
uncovered. Whether or not, for example, network intervention was of benefit to the 
vehicle manufacturer, and potentially therefore to EuroPart and other suppliers in the 
long-term, remained unexamined.
Another conceptual limitation concerns the heart of the conceptual framework: the set 
of collaboration activities. Whilst it is believed that this set of activities reflects and 
captures how companies across industries may involve their suppliers and customers in 
product innovation projects, the activities remain generic. Therefore, there may be 
aspects of the activities that are of limited relevance in some industries and/or countries, 
or there may be essential elements of activities that are missing. It has neither been the 
purpose of this research to construct and refine a set of comprehensive activities that 
offers managerial guidance to companies, nor to investigate how the activities may vary 
across different circumstances. Instead, the activities have served as a substructure for 
investigating how networks may affect a set of activities, which is likely to be of
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generic relevance to companies that seek to collaborate within networks for the 
development of new products and technology.
Another limitation in relation to the conceptual structure pertains to the 
conceptualisation of network enablers. The findings provided important conceptual 
lessons on the usefulness and validity of the concepts of the ‘access strategy’, the 
‘dissemination strategy’, and the ‘intervention strategy’. One of the lessons from the 
cases was that the dissemination strategy often seemed to be practised implicitly as a 
‘leave it to the suppliers* approach. The evidence regarding this, however, was 
inconclusive. Furthermore, it made the concept problematic to distinguish from the 
access strategy. These conceptual problems thus present a limitation of the study.
The main limitation concerning network constraints pertains to the concept of path 
dependency. Path dependency was reported when there was an influence of history on 
activities, however as discussed earlier, this may arguably be conceived of as past 
dependence rather than path dependence. In other words, history matters but events 
(their sequence and temporal unfolding) may not necessarily follow a particular path or 
trajectory (Tilly, 1994; Araujo and Harrison, 2002). The interpretation of historical 
impacts as path dependency effects thus constitutes a limitation of the findings.
Furthermore, the limited investigation of performance effects of activities and network 
effects constitutes a methodological limitation. Performance questions were included as 
part of the interviews and the results were documented in Chapter Seven. However, 
these say little about actual effects on project outcomes. Furthermore, long-term extra­
project effects were not investigated. No post-project studies have been carried out, 
which could have attempted to measure long-term performance effects. It has already 
been argued, however, that the measurement of such effects would be highly 
problematic given the difficulty in identifying causality in networks (see Chapter Five).
Another methodological limitation concerns the problems of adopting the individual 
development project as the unit of analysis. For example, suppliers may have long-term 
R&D involvement with customers for the purpose of technological development. These 
are likely to span several individual product development projects. Therefore, albeit a 
supplier may be involved relatively late in an individual product development project it
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may have long-term involvement in technology development projects or programmes, 
which gives it visibility of potential product applications prior to entering any specific 
project. Hence, the issue of supplier involvement in product development is difficult to 
capture without some understanding of extra-project activities.
In terms of the actual findings of the inquiry, a limitation concerns the limited number of 
case studies that have been conducted. As explained in Chapter Five the choice of four 
case studies conducted across two industries was motivated by a wish to maintain 
external validity and analytic generalisation in particular. No one of the four cases stood 
out as being highly unique in any way, although each individual case featured particular 
themes. Therefore, the external validity provided by four cases constituted a first step 
towards replication and thus testing of the findings in different contingencies (Tsang and 
Kwan, 1999). Without further testing, however, the findings cannot in any way be 
generalised into other contingencies than those examined here. It is also recognised that 
one of the four cases, the interception gateway project, was limited in scope and scale as 
it only involved interviews with the focal company and its main supplier in the project. 
Furthermore, direct comparisons with the three other cases were problematic given the 
focal company’s network position. Unlike the three other focal companies in the other 
cases, NetCom was an assembler rather than a supplier to assemblers. The advantage of 
NetCom’s different position and thus perspective was that it offered a useful contrast to 
the three other cases and thus helped to understand and interpret the three ‘supplier- 
focused’ cases.
9.4. Managerial Implications
Thus far the thesis has avoided making normative statements concentrating instead on 
making analytical observations and conclusions. At this stage, however, it is appropriate 
to try to draw out some of the possible managerial implications of the inquiry.
9.4.1. Interactive Innovation
The first managerial implication is that innovation needs to be understood as something 
which is generated through interaction with a myriad of actors with different 
knowledge, capabilities and technologies, of which suppliers and customers are critical 
sources. Much research has pointed out that customers can provide critical information
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and feedback about market needs. Similarly, research has identified that suppliers have 
specialised capabilities and technologies allowing them, potentially, to contribute to 
improving the value of new offerings being developed and reducing cost and 
development lead-time. However, the notion of who is the customer and who is the 
supplier is often blurred: all actors are essentially suppliers and at the same time 
customers, serving the end market, be it a consumer or industrial market. As a 
consequence, it is not simply a question of whether or not a company should involve its 
suppliers and customers in product development. Instead, there is a need for companies 
to think about how they can interact with a host of other actors; this involves 
responding to the demands of other companies and requesting the involvement of other 
actors. The case studies included numerous examples of companies that on the one hand 
complained that their customers failed to involve them properly in product 
development, and on the other hand struggled to understand that the very same situation 
often applied in their own supplier relationships.
9.4.2. Appropriate Management o f Collaboration Activities
The set of collaboration activities constitutes different ways in which companies can 
interact with suppliers and customers. Although some activities may arguably be more 
appropriate in some circumstances than others, the set of activities can potentially be 
used as a reference list to check, for example, whether some aspects of collaboration are 
ignored or even managed in a non-collaborative way. Some form of balanced approach 
may be more likely to generate the desired results, ensuring consistency in the level of 
involvement of external parties and the right combination of ‘carrot and stick’. The 
process of activity mapping, using the framework provided in Figure 19 as a tool, might 
be useful to aid such analysis.
Although a managerial implication of this thesis is that interaction and collaboration are 
critical to managing innovation, it is not a question of either/or. It is unlikely that an 
undifferentiated approach to relationship management for innovation will be the way to 
reap the desired outcome. Relationships are heterogeneous and therefore need to be 
treated individually. A framework for classifying different relationships into common 
types and managing them accordingly may help companies to ensure the right parties 
are managed in the appropriate way. Therefore, the management of the set of 
collaboration activities needs to be geared to the particular characteristics of individual
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relationships. A number of established portfolio models exists for this purpose, 
including Clark (1989), Kamath and Liker (1994), and Wynstra and ten Pierick (1999).
9.4. S. Understanding the Conditions that Drive other Network Actors Towards 
Intervention
Another managerial implication of the research is that although there may be very good 
reasons for seeking to collaborate with suppliers and customers during technological 
innovation, companies may be unable to do so because they operate under network 
constraints. For example, the findings of the thesis indicate that a company may be 
unable to control its own management of collaboration activities because powerful 
customers, which do not have sufficient competence trust in its ability to manage the 
innovation processes within its own supplier relationships, are intervening in its choice 
of, and communication with, its key suppliers. The findings of the thesis also indicate 
that a company involved in the development of a critical product or part that has a 
modular product architecture may be more likely to be subjected to customer network 
intervention in uniting and communication activities. Conversely, in such situations 
companies may also wish to intervene themselves in, for example, sub-supplier 
decisions. Hence, the choices and actions, which individual network actors can take, 
may be limited in certain circumstances. Consequently they have to cope with the 
constraints imposed on them by other network actors.
9.4.4. Coping with Network Intervention
One way of coping with situations of excessive customer intervention may be for 
companies to establish a more viable network position. For example, they may be able 
to take more control of the system they offer to become full-systems suppliers. This 
could involve merging with or acquiring other actors in the network to enable 
companies to provide a full-system offering. For some companies an alternative may be 
to develop strategic relationships with other companies thus taking charge of their own 
destiny, but without having to make the capital investments which are difficult and risky 
for many companies. Finally, in extreme cases the development of new customer 




9.5. Future Avenues of Research
This thesis has not attempted to test any pre-defined propositions or hypotheses. It has 
explored and examined a number of issues of importance to companies involved in 
technological innovation. The implication of this purpose of the research is that a 
number of avenues of future research exist. The most important of these are discussed 
here.
The first avenue of future research would be to build on the conceptual lessons from this 
inquiry and refine the conceptual structure accordingly. For example, one idea is to 
conceptualise the set of collaboration activities at three different levels based on the 
framework shown in Figure 10 (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). The robustness of the 
refined structure could then be validated in a set of case studies.
Alternatively, or perhaps subsequently, the conceptual structure could be 
operationalised and used to formulate a number of propositions. Using a structured 
questionnaire, which could subsequently be used as an instrument to further validate 
and test the results on a wider set of contexts, quantitative analysis could confirm, 
disconfirm or refine the contingent factors that have emerged from this inquiry.
One option would be to identify the relevance of each collaboration activity along a 
time line, either project-specific or extending beyond individual projects. This would 
not only help to define the activities even more clearly, but also be a step in the 
direction towards a more managerially-orientated framework, in a similar manner to, for 
example, the framework offered by Dowlatshahi (1992) and Calvi (2003).
Finally, an important area of future research relates to the link between product 
modularization and supply network structures and strategies. Existing research has 
examined the trends towards modularization across a variety of industries, although 
predominantly automotive and computers (e.g. Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Langlois and 
Robertson, 1992; Doran 2003; Sako and Warburton, 1999). However, from a network 
perspective a number of critical questions remain to be answered, such as:




- How do modular product architecture strategies devised by OEMs impact on the 




Life is understood backwards but lived forwards - Soren Aabye Kierkegaard
And so is this thesis. Research is always a learning experience and the complexity of 
researching networks means that with the benefit of hindsight one sometimes wishes 
that one had done certain things differently. One of these would have been to refrain 
from trying to bridge two schools of thought: KISS! (Keep It Simple Stupid).
My attempt to position myself in two complementary but nevertheless in some ways 
distinctive schools of thought, IMP and ‘Supply’, over a period of six-seven years has 
been challenging and at times problematic. The work as a Research Officer within 
CRiSPS (and subsequently as lecturer in supply management), has revolved around 
emerging concepts such as supply networks, supply strategy, lean supply, and inter- 
organisational networking (Project ION). The ‘CRiSPS approach’ features an 
operations-based understanding of the management o f  customer-supplier relationships, 
supply chains and networks; CRiSPS projects often involve the development of 
methodologies and tools for managerial guidance and are therefore often normative in 
orientation. In comparison, the IMP approach is concerned with the development of a 
more comprehensive understanding of the complexities and implications of managing 
or coping in networks. The IMP group has developed a substantial amount of theory in 
this area and has thereby created the conceptual terminology and language used 
throughout this thesis.
The interaction between - and bridging of - those two research environments has 
resulted in a level of learning that would have been hard to gain otherwise. The most 
evident manifestation of this interaction was the conceptual framework: it was a direct 
result of combining an operations-based CRiSPS-orientated approach with an IMP 
model and approach. This ambition leaves two possibilities: researchers from both 
schools may disapprove of it, or at least one of the schools will be able to understand 




The discussions have revealed that the development of the thesis has, however, by no 
means been a smooth process; a researcher in the position of trying to bridge two 
approaches inevitably feels the scale of the problems of cross-functional working 
himself and learns to appreciate when respondents explain their cross-functional and 
cross-organisational problems. Therefore, even if the report documenting this thesis 
comes across as an ordered and linear process, this is a tremendous simplification of the 
reality -  like the innovation projects that were studied, the process was more often 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide Exploratory Mini-Survey
A ) C om pany background (G et an annual report beforehand to cover m ost o f  these)
• Could you tell me a bit about the background of the company?
* when was it founded?
* any major changes such as take-overs or mergers?
* who owns the company now?
• What is your (personal) role and responsibility in the company?
•  What is the total turnover world-wide (£)?
• How has that changed during the last 10 years?
• What is the number of employees world-wide?
• What are the major products of the company (in terms of profit, sales volume?)
• What are the core technologies of the company?
B) Identifying appropriate product developm ent project
•  Which product development project would you like to focus on?
• When was this product developed? - if  still being developed, when is it due to be launched?
•  Who initiated the development (the driver)?
• Is this product important to the company - why?
• Which product technologies are embedded in this product?
• Are you protective about the product and the underlying technology? - how?
* Is it proprietary?
C) Discussing the role o f  innovation in process and m arketing technologies in the NPD project
• Which process technologies were necessary to develop in this NPD project?
• At which stage were they developed?
• Did any process technologies actually enable the development of the product?
• Was it necessary to develop any marketing technologies? (e.g. distribution channels)
• If yes, at which stage?
D) M apping netw ork pool o f  technologies and identifying collaboration partner(s) (drawing) 
Upstream :
• Could you identify which suppliers were involved in the development?
• Who were the most important?
• What components do they supply? - any process technology e.g. tool suppliers?
• Are there any other reasons why they are important? (Do they for instance possess particular 
capabilities or technologies?)
• Do they supply any other customers?
• Who are their major suppliers?
• What components do they supply?
• Are there any other reasons why they are important?
• Any important 3rd parties?
• What is the status of the main parties? (e.g. ‘partners’)
Downstream :
• Could you identify which customers were key to the development?
• Who were the most important?
• How did they contribute to the development?
• Are they buying from any of your competitors?
• What was their status? (e.g. ‘partners’)
Others:
• Any other companies that were important to this development, such as complementary manufacturers 
in other industries, research institutions, design houses, consultants?
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•  What was their status? (e.g. ‘partners’ or’ strategic alliance’)
E) D iscussing collaboration activities
Identifying and Selecting:
• How did you identify the ‘key actors’ to be involved?
• Which criteria did you use to select them?
• Was the selection in any way hindered as a result o f any 3rd party relationships? (explain the meaning 
of ‘3rd party’ by referring to drawing)
• Did their 3rd party relationships enable their selection?
Timing:
•  At which point in the process did the ‘key actors’ become involved (concept development, basic 
design, detail engineering, orpilot-production/start-up)?134
•  Did any of these get involved at a later point as a result of their 3rd party relationships such as their 
suppliers, their other customers, or any other of their relationships?
•  Did the existence of any 3rd party relationships mean that you wanted to get any of these involved at 
an earlier point?
Mobilising:
• Which measures did you use to mobilise these ‘key actors’? - any risk/benefit sharing arrangements?
• Was it difficult to mobilise some of them because o f their 3rd party relationships?
• Did any 3rd party relationships actually enable their mobilisation?
Assigning:
• Did you assign any people, such as resident design engineers, to the project?
•  Was this constrained by 3rd party relationships?
• Which mechanisms did you apply to cope with the risk of people leaking information and knowledge 
to 3rd parties?
• Did 3rd party relationships actually enable this to happen?
Informing:
• How did you keep them informed them during the process? (e.g. communication of procedures and 
requirements, performance evaluation)
• Was the amount of information and knowledge being exchanged constrained by their 3rd party 
relationships?
• Which mechanisms did you use to cope with the risk of leakage of information and knowledge to 3rd 
parties?
• Did 3rd party relationships actually enable the process of information and knowledge sharing? 
Synchronising:
•  Did either you or they synchronise any procedures, processes, or systems?
• Was this process constrained by any 3rd parties?
• Did any 3rd party actually enable the synchronisation?
Co-ordinating:
•  To what extent did you co-ordinate the relationships?
* between 1st tier relationships?
* across tiers?
134 Use the term ‘partners’ or equivalent instead of ‘key actors’ if appropriate
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Appendix B: Interview Guide One: Interviews with Focal Firm: Context
1) Com pany background
- Could you tell me a bit about the company?
- What is your (personal) role and responsibility in the company?
- What are the major products of the company (in terms of profit, sales volume?)
- What are the core technologies of the company?
2) Identifying appropriate product developm ent project
- Do you have any ideas for a good product development project that we could focus on? -  This has to 
have been completed quite recently, involved some extent of collaboration with suppliers and 
customers, and involved the application of a new product or process technology.
Concept Product Planning/ Product/process Pilot-Production /
Development Basic Design engineering/ Ramp-Up
Detail Engineering
a) Screening Level of Collaboration:
- Were you able to choose your own suppliers?
- Were any suppliers involved in idea generation or concept development?
- Did you get involved at this stage with your customer or later?
- Was there any sharing of development costs between the main parties?
- Did the main parties provide full information to each other?
- Were any engineers specifically allocated to the project or exchanged?
- Was there any alignment of the main parties’ technology development plans?
- Did you seek to jointly identify the root cause of critical technical problems with suppliers and/or 
customers?
- Was this product developed in response to a particular customer request or problem? -What was 
their request/problem?
- How innovative is this new product -  Is it:__________
Revolutionary: 
transforming existing & 
new products
Normal: 
creating significant changes 
to existing & new products
Incremental: 
creating only minor changes to 
existing & new products
3) Identifying underlying technologies
- What are the key product technologies that have been applied in this product?
- Have you had to develop new process technologies in order to produce this new product or did they 
exist already?
- Have these technologies been applied in other products yet?
- In how many products is this technology to be applied over the next 5 years?
- How innovative are the underlying technologies -  Are they:
Revolutionary: 
transforming existing & 
new products
Normal: 
creating significant changes 
to existing & new products
Incremental: 
creating only minor changes to 
existing & new products
- Does a common industry standard exist for these technologies?
- Does any of your competitors possess similar technologies, or technologies that perform the same 
function?
3) Project Perform ance: Process
- What were the target development costs of the product?
- What were the actual development costs of the product?
- What was the target development time of the product?
- What was the actual development time of the product?
4) Project Perform ance: Output
- What was the target cost per unit o f the product?
- What was the actual cost per unit of the product?
- Has the development of the product resulted in any patents?
- Has the product, or the underlying technology, received any awards?
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- If yes, which award(s)?
- What were the forecast sales in units of these products for the 1st year?
- What were the actual sales of these products the 1st year/to date?
- What was the external defect rate of the product in the 1 st year/to date
- following launch i.e. percentage of units claimed to be defective, in PPM?
Overall, how successful do you think this project was, accorc ing to the criteria given below:
Very
satisfactory
Satisfactory Average Unsatisfactory Very
unsatisfactory
In financial terms
As a learning 
experience
Comments:
5. A ppropriability regim e
- Have you taken any particular steps to protect this product and the underlying technology? - why?
patents  copyrights  trademark  trade secret
- Have any competitors attempted to copy the product (or any of the technology)?
- Have they been successful?
- How important is the history of the company in the development of the product?
6) M apping industrial network and identifying collaboration partner(s) (drawing)
a) Upstream :
- Could you identify which suppliers were involved in the development?
- Who were you in most frequent contact with?
- What is the nature of the technology or components they supply?
- Are there any other reasons why they are important? (Do they for instance possess particular
capabilities or technologies?)
- Do they supply any other customers?
- Who are their major suppliers?
- What components do they supply?
- Are there any other reasons why they are important?
- Any important 3rd parties?
b) Downstream :
- Could you identify which customers were key to the development?
- Who were you in most frequent contact with?
- How did they contribute to the development?
- Are they buying from any of your competitors?
c) Others:
- Any other companies that were important to this development, such as competitors, 
complementary manufacturers in other industries, research institutions, consultants?
- What was their status? (e.g. joint venture or strategic alliance)
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Appendix C: Interview Guide Two: Interviews with Focal Firm: 
Collaboration Processes
1) Introduction
- Could you confirm if the map we drew the last time is accurate?
2) C ollaboration Processes 
a) Uniting
- How did you identify and choose the key suppliers to be involved in the project?
- Which criteria did you use to select these suppliers?
- How did the key customers get involved in the project? -  Who approached whom?
- Why did you chose these customers and not others? -  Was it your choice or theirs?
- To what extent did you end up with suppliers and customers you have worked with previously?
- Did you deliberately avoid any particular suppliers or customers?- Why?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect your choice?
- Did you in any way try to co-ordinate the choice of the wider pool of suppliers and customers to be 
involved in the project? Example?
b) Timing:
- At which stage in the process did the key suppliers become involved?
Concept Product Planning/ Product/process Pilot-Production /
Development Basic Design engineering/ Ramp-Up
Detail Engineering
- At which stage in the process did the key customers become involved?
Concept Product Planning/ Product/process Pilot-Production /
Development Basic Design engineering/ Ramp-Up
Detail Engineering
- Did you seek to delay the involvement o f any suppliers or customers? -  Why?
- Did you deliberately want to involve any suppliers or customers at an earlier stage? -  Why?
- To what extent did you seek to delay or advance the involvement of suppliers or customers you 
have worked with previously?
- Did you try to influence at what stage your suppliers were to involve their suppliers in the project? 
Example?
c) Mobilising:
- What were the arrangements for sharing o f development costs with both suppliers and customers?
- Were the ground rules established at the beginning of the project? -  Who took the initiative?
- Did you formulate the objectives at the beginning of the project? -  Were they shared?
- Did you experience any difficulties motivating the key suppliers and customers to fully commit to 
the project? - Why?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect the motivation of either 
suppliers or customers?
- To what extent was it easier or more difficult to motivate suppliers and customers you have 
worked with previously?
- Did you try to influence how your suppliers motivated their suppliers in the project? Example?
d) Communicating
- How were design ideas and concepts communicated with key customers?
- How were design ideas and concepts communicated with key suppliers?
- How did you communicate policies and procedures with suppliers during the process?
- How did you communicate policies and procedures with customers during the process?
- How was information concerning your performance as a supplier communicated with the 
customers?
- How did you communicate performance information with your suppliers?
- Did you hold back any of those types of information from suppliers or customers? -  Why?
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- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect the amount of 
information being communicated?
- In the cases where you had previous experiences with suppliers or customers, how did that affect 
the amount of information being communicated?
- Did you try to ensure that the wider pool of suppliers and customers received the same information 
as your direct suppliers?
- Did you do anything to try to encourage communication amongst individual direct and indirect 
suppliers and customers or did you leave that to them? Example?
e) Exchanging human resources
- Did the key suppliers allocate any staff e.g. resident design engineers to the development team?
- Did the key customers allocate any staff to the development team?
- To what extent did this happen with suppliers and customers you have worked with previously?
- Did you avoid allocating staff from any suppliers or customers? -  Why?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect the amount of staff 
being allocated?
- Did you allocate any staff from any indirect suppliers or customers involved in the project? 
Example?
j)  Synchronising:
- Did the key suppliers synchronise their development procedures to suit yours?
- To what extent did you seek to align your technology plans, or roadmaps, with key suppliers?
- Did the key customers synchronise their development procedures to suit yours?
- To what extent did you seek to align your technology plans, or roadmaps, with key customers?
- To what extent were the relevant adaptations already in place?
- Did you avoid synchronising with any suppliers or customers -  Why?
- Was it a problem to synchronise with suppliers or customers who are involved with other 
companies - Why?
- Did you synchronise with any indirect suppliers or customers involved in the project? Example?
g) Problem Solving:
- How did you resolve critical technical problems with key suppliers during the project?
Who or what had caused the problem?
- How did you resolve critical manufacturing or supply problems with key suppliers during the 
project?
- How did you resolve critical problems with key customers during the project?
- To what extent were these problems affected by your past experience with these companies?
- Was it a problem to agree on the root cause of problems with any suppliers or customers -  Why?
- Were problems sometimes caused by suppliers or customers being involved with other companies 
-Why?
- Did you involve any indirect suppliers or customers in the problem solving process? Example?
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3) Effect of collaboration activities on project perform ance
How do you think the way in which the collaboration activities were actually carried out in this project, 
affected a) project development cost, b) project development time, c) the eventual cost o f  the product, and




Project Project Eventual Eventual




+ - + “ +
Uniting:








Establishing ground rules and arrangements j 
for sharing of risks, benefits, and objectives
K ®  1 
1
Communicating with partners:
Exchanging e.g. ideas and concepts, policies, 
and performance information
Exchanging human resources with partners: 
Allocating e.g. resident design engineers to 
project
Synchronising with partners:





Resolving technical or supply problems
-r  1, M
... -....... .
Comments:
4) Improvement of collaboration activities
- Bearing the previous discussions about collaborating with a large group of parties for the development 
o f new products, what is your vision for how you could ideally involve other companies in the best 
possible way?
- If you were to achieve that, would that involve any change in the collaboration activities we have 
discussed today?
- What would be the problems o f realising these future changes?
- How would you cope with those problems?
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Appendix D: Interview Guide Three: Interviews with Key Suppliers
1) C om pany background
- What is your (personal) role and responsibility in the company?
- What is the total turnover world-wide (£)?
- What is the number of employees world-wide?
- What are the major products of the company (in terms of profit, sales volume?)
- What are the core technologies o f the company?
2) M apping netw ork pool o f  technologies and identifying collaboration partner(s) (draw ing)135
- Looking at this network map, do you agree that these are the most important parties involved in the 
development?
- From the perspective of your company, are any key players missing?
- What are their roles in this project?
- On supply side: Do they supply any other customers?
- On customer side: What are their other major suppliers?
- Any other companies that were important to this development, such as complementary manufacturers 
in other industries, research institutions or consultants?
3) C ollaboration Processes
a) Uniting
- How did you get involved in this project?
- How do you identify and choose which suppliers you wanted to involve in this project?
- Have you worked with these companies before?
- Did you deliberately avoid any suppliers? - Why?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect which suppliers you 
wanted to involve?
- Did you in any way try to co-ordinate the choice of the wider pool of suppliers to be involved in 
the project?
b) Timing:




















- Did you seek to delay or advance your involvement in the project? - Why?
- Did you seek to delay the involvement of any suppliers? -  Why?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect at what stage they were 
involved?
- To what extent did you seek to delay or advance the involvement of any suppliers you have 
worked with previously?
- Did you try to influence at what stage your suppliers were to involve their suppliers in the project?
c) Mobilising:
- What were the arrangements for sharing of development costs with [the focal firm]? Any such 
arrangements with any of your suppliers?
- Were the ground rules established at the beginning of the project? -  Who took the initiative? Any 
such arrangements with any of your suppliers?
135 This part as well as other parts o f the interview schedule which address issues specific to either 
upstream or downstream relationships, may only be answered by respondents in the appropriate positions 




- Did [the focal firm] formulate their objectives at the beginning o f the project? -  Did you share 
those?
- Did you experience any difficulties motivating your key suppliers to fully commit to the project? -  
Why?
- Did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships in any cases make it easier to motivate them?
- Was it easier or more difficult to motivate suppliers you have worked with previously?
- Did you try to influence how your suppliers motivated their suppliers in the project?
d) Communicating
- How were design ideas and concepts exchanged with [the focal firm] during the project?
- How were policies and procedures exchanged with [the focal firm]?
- How were design ideas and concepts exchanged with your suppliers?
- How were policies and procedures exchanged with your suppliers?
- How did [the focal firm] inform you about your performance during the project?
- How did you inform your suppliers of their performance during the project?
- Did you hold back any of those types o f information from suppliers? -  Why?
- Did you hold back any of those types of information from [the focal firm]? - Why?
- In the cases where you had previous experiences with your suppliers, how did that affect the 
amount o f information being communicated?
- How did the extent o f your previous experiences with [the focal firm] affect the amount of 
information being communicated between them and yourselves?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect the amount of 
information being communicated?
- Did you do anything to ensure that the wider pool o f suppliers received the same information as 
your direct suppliers?
- Did you do anything to try to encourage communication amongst individual direct and indirect 
suppliers or did you leave that to the suppliers?
e) Exchanging human resources
- Did you allocate any staff to the [focal firm] development team?
- Did this involve your suppliers?
- How did the extent of your previous experiences with [the focal firm] affect the amount of staff 
being allocated?
- To what extent did this happen with suppliers you have worked with previously?
Did you avoid allocating staff from or to any suppliers involved in this project? -  Why?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect the amount of staff 
being allocated?
- Did you allocate any staff from any indirect suppliers involved in the project?
f) Synchronising:
- Did you synchronise your development procedures to suit [the focal firm’s]?
- To what extent did you seek to align your technology plans, or roadmaps, with theirs?
- Did your key suppliers synchronise their development procedures to suit yours?
- Did any other key players align their technology plans, or roadmaps, with yours?
- To what extent were most of the relevant synchronisations already in place?
- Was it a problem to synchronise with suppliers who are involved with other companies? -  Why?
- Did you avoid synchronising with any suppliers or [the focal firm]? -  Why?
- Did you synchronise with any indirect suppliers involved in the project?
h) Problem Solving:
- How did you resolve critical technical problems with [the focal firm] during the project?
- Who or what had caused the problem?
- How did you resolve critical manufacturing or supply problems with [the focal firm] during the 
project?
How did you resolve critical problems with your suppliers customers during the project?
To what extent were these problems affected by your past experience with these companies?
Was it a problem to agree on the root cause of problems with suppliers or [the focal firm] -  Why? 
Were problems sometimes caused by suppliers or [the focal firm] being involved with other 
companies - Why?
Did you involve any indirect suppliers or customers in the problem solving process? Example?
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3) Effect o f collaboration activities on project performance
How do you think the way in which the collaboration activities were actually carried out in this project, 
affected a) project development cost, b) project development time, c) the eventual cost o f  the product, and




Project Project Eventual Eventual
Development Development Product Cost Product
Cost Time Value
+ - + - + + -
Uniting:
Identifying and selecting the partners
Timing:
Deciding at which stage in the project to 
involve partners
Mobilising partners:
Establishing ground rules and arrangements 
for sharing of risks, benefits, and objectives
Communicating with partners:
Exchanging e.g. ideas and concepts, policies, 
and performance information * | |g g g
Exchanging human resources with partners: 




Aligning systems, procedures, plans and 
roadmaps
Problem Solving:
Resolving technical or supply problems
Comments:
Improvement of use of collaboration activities
- Bearing the previous discussions about collaborating with a large group of parties for the development 
of new technology, what is your vision for how you could ideally involve other companies in the best 
possible way?
- If you were to achieve that, would that involve any change in the collaboration activities we have 
discussed today?
- What would be the problems of realising these future changes?
- How would you cope with those problems?
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Appendix E: Interview Guide Four: Interviews with Key Customers:
1) C om pany background
- What is your (personal) role and responsibility in the company?
- What is the total turnover world-wide (£)?
- What is the number of employees world-wide?
- What are the major products of the company (in terms of profit, sales volume?)
- What are the core technologies of the company?
2) M apping netw ork pool o f  technologies and identifying collaboration partner(s) (drawing)
- Looking at this network map, do you agree that these are the most important parties involved in the 
development?
- From the perspective of your company, are any key players missing?
- What are their roles in this project?
- On supply side: Do they supply any other customers?
- On customer side: What are their other major suppliers?
- Any other companies that were important to this development, such as complementary manufacturers 
in other industries, research institutions or consultants?
3) C ollaboration Processes
a) Uniting
- How did you get involved with [the focal firm] in this project?
- How did the other key players get involved?
- Had you worked together with any of these companies before?
- Did you deliberately avoid any companies? -  Why?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect which key players you 
wanted to involve?
- Did you in any way try to co-ordinate the choice of the wider pool of companies to be involved in 
the project?
b) Timing:
At which stage in the process did you get involved?
Concept Product Planning/ Product/process Pilot-Production /
Development Basic Design engineering/ Ramp-Up
Detail Engineering
- Did you seek to delay or advance your involvement in the project? -  Why?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect at what stage they 
were involved?
- To what extent did you seek to delay or advance the involvement o f any key players you have 
worked with previously?
- Did you try to influence at what stage any of the other key players, including [the focal firm] 
were to involve any of their contacts in the project?
c) Mobilising:
- What were the arrangements for sharing of development costs with [the focal firm]? Any such 
arrangements with any of the other key players?
- Were the ground rules established at the beginning of the project? -  Who took the initiative?
- Did [the focal firm] or any other key players formulate their objectives at the beginning of the 
project? -  Did you share those?
- Did you experience any difficulties motivating any of the other key players (including 
customers) to fully commit to the project? -  Why?
- Did such relationships in any cases make it easier to motivate other key players?
- Was it easier or more difficult to motivate companies you have worked with previously?




- How were design ideas and concepts exchanged with [the focal firm] during the project? Same 
way between you and other key players?
- How were policies and procedures exchanged with [the focal firm]? Same way between you and 
other key players?
- How did [the focal firm] inform you about your performance during the project?
- How did you communicate such information with other key players during the project?
- Did you hold back any of those types of information from other key players, including [the focal 
firm]? -  Why?
- In the cases where you had previous experiences with key players, including [the focal firm], how 
did that affect the amount of information being communicated?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect the amount of 
information being communicated?
- Did you do anything to ensure that the wider pool of companies received the same information as 
your direct contacts?
- Did you do anything to try to encourage communication amongst individual direct and indirect 
relationships or did you leave that to other companies?
e) Exchanging human resources
- Did you allocate any staff to the [focal firm] development team?
- Did this also involve any key contacts of yours?
- How did the extent of your previous experiences with [the focal firm] affect the amount of staff 
being allocated?
- Did you avoid allocating staff from or to any companies involved in this project? -Why?
- To what extent did your suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships affect the amount of staff 
being allocated?
- Did you assign any staff from any indirect relationships involved in the project?
J) Synchronising:
- Did [the focal firm] synchronise their development procedures to suit yours?
- To what extent did they seek to align their technology plans, or roadmaps, with yours?
- Did any other key players synchronise their development procedures to suit yours?
- Did any other key players align their technology plans, or roadmaps, with yours?
- To what extent were most of the relevant synchronisations already in place?
- as it a problem to synchronise with key players who are involved with other companies? -  Why?
- Did you avoid synchronising with any suppliers or [the focal firm]? -  Why?
- Did you synchronise with any indirect companies involved in the project?
h) Problem Solving:
- How did you resolve critical technical problems with [the focal firm] during the project?
- Who or what had caused the problem?
- How did you resolve critical manufacturing or supply problems with [the focal firm] during the 
project?
- To what extent were these problems affected by your past experience with [the focal firm]?
- Was it a problem to agree on the root cause o f problems with [the focal firm] -  Why?
- Were problems sometimes caused by [the focal firm] being involved with other companies - Why?
- Did you involve any indirect suppliers or customers in the problem solving process? Example?
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3) Effect of collaboration activities on project perform ance
How do you think the way in which the collaboration activities were actually carried out in this project, 
affected a) project development cost, b) project development time, c) the eventual cost o f  the product, and




Project Project Eventual Eventual
Development Development Product Cost Product
Cost Time Value
+ - + _ + +
f j tp  ‘if*; v'
Uniting:
Identifying and selecting the partners
. ,  ■ . - v
Timing:
Deciding at which stage in the project to 
involve partners




Establishing ground rules and arrangements 
for sharing of risks, benefits, and objectives
Communicating with partners:
Exchanging e.g. ideas and concepts, policies, 
and performance information . ’ . ‘ y -J
Exchanging human resources with partners: 
Allocating e.g. resident design engineers to 
project
:> ■’ - -^r .
&JgSfedgfj
Synchronising with partners:
Aligning systems, procedures, plans and 
roadmaps
Problem Solving:
Resolving technical or supply problems
L. , _ ........ ‘ .....  ' J
Comments:
Improvement of collaboration activities
- Bearing the previous discussions about collaborating with a large group of parties for the development 
o f new technology, what is your vision for how you could ideally involve other companies in the best 
possible way?
- If you were to achieve that, would that involve any change in the collaboration activities we have 
discussed today?
- What would be the problems of realising these future changes?
- How would you cope with those problems?
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Appendix F: Analysis and Interpretation of Intra-Company Perceptions of Collaboration Activities with Key Suppliers and
Customer: Fuel Tank Development Project
Project Engineering 
M anager
Commercial Co-ordinator Quality /Kaizen M anager M anufacturing M anager Purchasing M anager
Respondent's 
rote
Responsible for day-to-day running of 
project in focus, refers to Technical 
Manager.
Responsible for day-to-day running of J-Car 
UK interface.
Represents Kaizen department: acting as 
intermediate between manufacturing and 
project departments. Installs production 
facility and performs training function for 
manufacturing. Links mostly with tooling 
suppliers.
Uniting J-Car decided on plastic fuel tank, 
produced a specification and cost pack, and 
sent out for tender.
A Europart told by J-Car which key 
suppliers to use (nomination) - allowed 
to choose lesser value parts.
A Pricing set/negotiated by J-Car for key 
components: commercial problem 
a When choosing its suppliers Europart 
sends out quotations but has good idea 
of outcome due to past experience.
¥ Europart do not look for suppliers who 
will only supply parts to Europart - 
looking at proven track record.
Europart won tender after J-Car sent cost 
pack to 3 or 4 potential suppliers.
A Key component supplier nominated by J- 
Car. Europart only allowed to choose 
lesser value items.
A Lack of ability for Europart to set price due 
to nomination -  opens up for blaming.
Also lack of ability to choose preferred 
local suppliers.
A Avoided known problem suppliers.
A Ended up with many previous suppliers.
¥  Some key components carried over 
from other J-Car projects.
A Not personally involved in choice of 
materials suppliers, but points out 
importance of J-Car nominating key 
suppliers e.g. negotiating prices with key 
Europart suppliers. Compared with other 
customers J-Car takes more control.
A Europart uses existing EuroPart Partner 
long-term tooling suppliers; 
v Tooling suppliers become involved if 
they have sufficient spare capacity (and 
right price).
Europart became involved with J-Car 
through tendering process. Not personally 
involved in process, although provided 
information on supplier performance 
through managing operations.
*  J-Car nominated key suppliers.
Opportunity for Europart to present case 
for different supplier, but alternative 
must be substantially better than 
nominated source.
A Little latitude for Europart in choosing 
its key suppliers as these are nominated 
by J-Car. Only low value added 
suppliers chosen by Europart (where 
Europart seen as expert): chosen on 
quality, locality and price. J-MasterPart 
effectively part of J-Car: link to 3rd tier. 
Europart remote from Japanese 
suppliers.
A Did not avoid any particular suppliers or 
customers.
A Small proportion of child parts suppliers 
used before.
A Did not co-ordinate choice of wider pool 
of suppliers and customers: may 
nominate indirect suppliers.
Timing Key component supplier involved in 
parallel with Europart: at design/concept 
stage (prior to nomination).
A Europart did not deliberately delay 
involvement of any suppliers or 
customers: too risky to overlook anyone 
once project reached UK potential.
A List of preferred suppliers for project: 
these would have been at least aware.
Key component supplier would have joined 
very early in J-Car Japan's project.
* Europart does not try to influence at what 
stage its suppliers involve their suppliers in 
the project: provide time schedule for part 
requirements.
Tooling supplier became involved right 
from the start, especially the EuroPart 
Partner internal M&V.
A Limited attempt to influence tooling 
supplier's timing of involving their 
suppliers; performance monitoring may 
highlight potential problems
Key suppliers became involved through 
concept stage; J-Car involved Europart 
same stage i.e. from first initial approach: 
A Europart needed support/prices from 
supplier base in producing quote.
Nominated suppliers involved at design 
stage: managed in Japan.
Believes Europart was involved too late by 
J-Car, causing problems e.g. not being 
aware if design has been fixed.
A Europart suppliers involved asap. Did 
not try to influence when their suppliers 
were to involve their suppliers.
Mobilising Tooling and prototype costs incorporated 
into piece price or reimbursed by J-Car. 
Key milestones part of cost pack incl. 
requirements, market information etc. 
Ground rules established at nomination but 
do not believe it is ever formalised. 
Motivating of suppliers not normally a 
problem due to the volume, value and 
prestige of the business.
A Europart followed J-Car’s rules and 
objectives, setting targets accordingly.
Overall development costs usually 
incorporated into piece price. Europart rarely 
pay suppliers lump sum for development cost 
apart from tooling cost.
J-Car ultimately pays for tooling: claim back 
from J-Car.
No difficulties motivating key suppliers to 
commit to project as they want the business. 
Also good relationships help motivation.
A Would like to try to influence how 
Europart’s suppliers motivate their 
suppliers in project, but do not have 
resources.
Respondent has limited input into 
arrangements for sharing of development 
costs and ground rules (projects).
¥ Europart finances tooling, enabling it to 
use it elsewhere if necessary.
A J-C ar's master timing plan was broken 
down by Europart into own project 
timing plan, however, as suppliers 
follow J-C ar's plan and timings this 
creates problems for Europart 
operations.
A Lack of ownership of supply base, due 
to nomination, causes problems: 
Europart effectively receives a handling 
charge but no profit.
Development costs financed by J-Car . 
Some packaging costs shared with supplier. 
Europart formulated project objectives at 
beginning of project.
No real problems motivating most suppliers 
due to prestige and volume.
A J-MasterPart did not recognise Europart 
as customer: problem. Europart de­
motivated due to J-Car’s dual sourcing, 
sometimes favouring other supplier.
A Some suppliers motivated as they can 
see historical increase in business.
A Did not try to influence how indirect 
suppliers were motivated; difficult 
enough to involve 2nd tier: resource 
constraints.
Communicating All requests go to J-Car UK who do not Europart has supplier guidelines which are Europart communicates its environmental, Communicate supplier delivery J-Car ‘Are You Ready’ reviews. All
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always make own decisions: requests 
forwarded to Japan, R&D centre or HQ 
(Europart no direct involvement).
Supplier performance communicated 
through supplier development: delivery & 
quality.
A Europart issue supplier guidelines, terms 
and conditions when issuing 
orders/quotations: J-MasterPart’s 
conditions may ultimately apply due to 
close relationship with J-Car.
A Terms & conditions known from 
previous programmes.
A Communication with wider pool of 
suppliers responsibility of 2nd tier. 
Europart may intervene beyond 2nd tier 
if wanting to ensure suppliers are on 
critical path.
issued when issuing orders.
A Arguments over whose terms and
conditions to apply due to J-MasterPart's 
relationship with J-Car.
A Europart experienced difficulties in flow of 
information: may be circumvented. 
a  Europart would not communicate to 3rd 
tier.
health and safety policies to suppliers, as do 
J-Car with Europart: checks suppliers’ 
policies/capabilities by issuing 
questionnaire.
Suppliers receive performance ratings.
♦ Respondent unaware of information 
being withheld, believing it should be 
open e.g. enabling joint V A/value 
analysis (involving suppliers and J-Car) 
a  Respondent unaware of Europart 
communicating beyond direct suppliers 
unless there is a concern.
performance information: more forgiving 
during development, due to number of 
changes.
v Volume analysis (scheduling) 
information sent directly to indirect 
suppliers.
A Information on Europart's real operating 
performance withheld from suppliers 
and J-Car, to win business.
suppliers go through Europart’s supplier 
approval process, including supplier 
guidelines. Also quarterly review of all 
suppliers.
Europart struggles with time lack between 
J-Car UK and J-Car Japan.
♦ Would withhold information on 
individual supplier performance from 
other suppliers. During bidding 
information is more tight.
A Europart felt out of loop when design 
changes occurred, annoyed by late 
notices.
v Suppliers having relationships with 
Europart's competitors seen as informal 
way of obtaining information on 
competitors: not seen as problem.
Exchanging
knowledge
Design change information normally passes 
tlirough Europart’s commercial department 
to engineering and purchasing, then 
forwarded to suppliers.
J-Car makes specific requests rather than 
airing ideas for discussion.
♦ During design/concept stage Europart 
only given relevant information, J-Car 
avoiding to provide details of whole 
vehicle.
v J-Car UK may be unaware of changes, 
made by its R&D department in Japan, 
discussed with J-MasterPart: informal 
route of information for Europart.
Europart forwards J-Car’s drawings to 
suppliers but left J-MasterPart and J-Car to 
exchange design issues, such as drawings, 
between themselves without Europart 
becoming involved.
Respondent has visited suppliers to identify 
and root out processes which may cause 
potential problems. Suppliers seen as happy 
to listen to Europart's suggestions if useful. 
♦ Europart very careful not to provide 
J-Car with too much technical know­
how as they have very close relationship 
(internal?) with another supplier. J-Car 
very keen to receive copies of 
documents detailing Europart’s 
processes and technology. Recognises it 
is part of J-Car's learning culture: 
learning from range of suppliers/ 
assisting e.g. in simplifying designs. 
Works both ways
Knowledge on test equipment exchanged: 
Europart’s unique system: shared with J- 
Car but not suppliers.
♦ Suppliers’ and J-Car’s other 
relationships did not affect 
manufacturing but knowledge related to 
Europart's core technology was withheld 
when J-Car was over-interested.
A Previous experiences with suppliers and 
J-Car would not affect amount of 
engineering or market knowledge being 
exchanged by manufacturing.
Drawings issued to Europart from J-Car 
Japan to J-Car UK and forwarded to 
Europart and thence suppliers. Also 
technical and material specifications 
exchanged: seen as way of communicating 
end customer/consumer needs down supply 
chain.
♦ A Europart provide suppliers with all 





Europart had resident engineer (from its 
HQ) on J-Car Japan’s development team: 
informed of requirements and consulted on 
technical issues.
J-Car did not allocate staff to Europart’s 
team.
No exchange of resident engineers between 
Europart and 2nd tier: basic design would 
have been done within Europart.
J-Car did not allocate staff to Europart’s 
development team
Not aware of any residents for this project, 
although Europart has supply development 
engineer assigned to assist suppliers. One 
resident engineer was allocated for 1“ 
product application to J-Car Japan. Seen as 
important then as Europart was starting up. 
Main constraint is resource, needing 
sufficient internal people.
Not aware of any resident engineers. J-MasterPart allocated resident engineers to 
J-Car’s development team, not Europart’s: 
constructing drawings.
Not seen as necessary to allocate more staff 
due to Europart's limited involvement in J- 
Car’s design.
A No indirect suppliers or customers 
involved in project.
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Synchronising J-MasterPart set in its ways and a global Do not think key suppliers synchronised J-Car issued a timing programme: Europart Key suppliers synchronised phase builds Key suppliers do not always synchronise
player: adapts to J-Car rather than Europart: development procedures. synchronised all activities accordingly. and test builds procedures. development procedures- supposed to:
Europart can merely inform it of its + Relevant adaptations with suppliers already Not aware of any technology alignment. *  Relevant adaptations all in place: matter suppliers thus not always ready in time for
requirements. in place because of previous project of timing. production.
Europart would not align its technologies to experience, thus much more aware of their + Did not avoid synchronising with Suppliers all the way down the supply chain
any key suppliers, but sees technical systems, and any pitfalls that Europart had anyone. must align with J-Car, although possibly
collaboration with key supplier as experienced before. *  Suppliers involved with many large suppliers do not.
possibility. customers, managing several projects: Future technology development seen as
+ Experience from previous projects affects priorities and causes Europart to Europart HQ responsibility.
allowed Europart to look out for road fail to meet phasing. + Most physical adaptations in place from
blocks and pitfalls. + Suppliers responding to J-Car's demand, 
rather than Europart’s, means that 
suppliers end up with different standards 
and different performance objectives.
previous project.
+ Not seen as problem to synchronise with 
suppliers involved with other 
companies: Europart insist on having its 
systems adhered to or combine systems.
* Do not synchronise with indirect 
suppliers.
NB: Different codes/bullets indicate type o f network effect:
Network as constraint: Network dependencies including path, technological, and admin./logistical. 
♦: Network as constraint: loss of control: Dissipation of knowledge and technology to third parties 
v : Network as enabler: Network access strategy/networking 
*: Network as enabler: Intervention and dissemination/delegation strategies 
FC: Focal Company
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Appendix F Continued: Analysis and Interpretation of Inter-Company Perceptions of Collaboration Activities: Fuel Tank
Development Project___________ ____________________ ____________________ ______________________ ______________
J-Car UK JMasterPart TooIMaster EuroPart Partner J-Car Commerce
R esp o n d en t’s  
R ole
From New Model Parts Development, which 
introduce new products/parts with suppliers. 
Personal role to manage project from drawing to 
mass production, project managing quality and cost 
through development e.g. involving tooling 
modifications and trial builds.
A) Sales/Project Manager, J-Car Sales 
Department. Responsible for business 
development i.e. winning business with J-Car, 
including price negotiations, quality and 
delivery aspects; preparation of parts.
B) J-MasterPart OE Sales Executive. 
Respondents have limited knowledge of 
activities in Japanese HQ and R&D.
Operations/Works Director and Managing 
Director
MD: Overall responsibility for the two sides of 
the business i.e. blow moulding and injection 
moulding.
Programme Manager: leading the J-Car product line 
programme for mass production in the United States, 
UK and Brazil, incl. technical issues, financial issues 
etc..
Team Leader in sales department dedicated to UK tier 
one suppliers. Specialise in sourcing of foel tank and 
chassis parts.
Minimal design and development involvement
U niting J-Car Cost & Sourcing or R&D team choose 
suppliers (R&D chose EuroPart). Use formal 
performance monitoring system.
* EuroPart chosen due to existing supply in other 
regions i.e. a global supply contract and 
history/experience from 1 “ car application. 
Viewed as critical supplier (technical 
complexity/safety of foel tanks).
* Did not avoid anyone when choosing tank 
supplier.
¥ J-Car positive towards EuroPart's close links 
with J-Car R&D in Japan and reL with 
EuroPart US; EuroPart supplying other 
customers is positive: learn from mistakes with 
others & shows they are good suppliers.
* J-Car tried to co-ordinate wider pool of 
suppliers by specifying J-MasterPart and J-Car 
Commerce (due to history, ‘a safe pair of 
hands’, and global supply contract). Horizontal 
co-ordination with J-MasterPart and EuroPart 
only due to their particular problem.
J-MasterPart became involved in project as 
result of development in Japan. J-MasterPart 
UK subsequently sent off quotation etc.
* J-MasterPart Japan chose pump suppliers, 
sending out for tender or used existing 
suppliers.
* ‘A controlled situation’ i.e. J-MasterPart a 
controlled supplier of J-Car’s (however 
control does imply effect). Limited choice of 
suppliers as European suppliers quality 
standards are lower than those of Japanese 
counterparts, which made J-MasterPart a 
natural candidate.
Quality of material most important criterion for
TooIMaster.
* Relation with EuroPart as TooIMaster 
already worked for EuroPart Partner’s base 
in Yorkshire, have known EuroPart Sales 
Director for years (works for both EuroPart 
and EuroPart Partner). Competition after 
initial intro.
* TooIMaster uses preferred long-term 
suppliers and did not avoid anyone: good 
relationships built up over time; do not shop 
around very often, unless suppliers are not 
performing.
¥ Suppliers' or customers’ other relationships 
make no difference with regard to whom 
TooIMaster wishes to involve.
* No co-ordination of choice of wider pool of 
suppliers to be involved in project. 
TooIMaster’s choice where to source 
material.
¥ J-MasterPart and J-Car Commerce nominated by 
J-Car
* Suppliers’ or customers' other relationships not seen 
as relevant due to supplier specification (and thus 
effectively is).
+ J-Car specify 2nd tier suppliers: do not trust non- 
Japanese suppliers’ capabilities.: a fait accompli. J- 
Car provided drawing and list of child part suppliers, 
specifying key (Japanese) suppliers and offering JC 
as conduit.
* J-Car co-ordinate all the Japanese suppliers by 
controlling complex parts, ‘free-issued’ to J-Rubber 1 
or J-Rubber 2; they assemble and sell on - ‘keeping it 
in the family’ i.e. controlling as many costs as 
possible within J-Car Group.
* JC would have avoided J-Rubber 2 if choice, viewed 
as ‘pain in the neck’. UK companies last priority: 
inflexible delivery.
Timing Fuel tank design was virtually completed between 
JapComp and J-Car J-Car Japan before EuroPart 
was even nominated. EuroPart basically copied 
that design but with own spec. EuroPart Partner 
involved before EuroPart (with J-Car J-Car Japan), 
making the drawings.
+ J-Car did not delay or advance timing, EuroPart 
got involved as soon as drawings were set. 
EuroPart had finished tooling before smaller 
suppliers were even nominated. J-Car UK 
received drawings same time as other suppliers; 
suppliers collaborating with J-Car Japan in 
Japan; involved even earlier.
* J-Car UK made sure, as part of QAV, that 
suppliers’ suppliers are involved and checked.
Car was released first in Japan i.e. design was 
already completed in Japan. J-MasterPart Japan 
became involved during concept development, 
J-MasterPart UK during detail engineering/pilot 
production/start-up.
+ Some cross-ownership between Toyota and 
J-MasterPart (historical link), but respondent 
does not believe that explains closeness of 
link.
* Did not deliberately delay or advance J- 
MasterPart’s involvement in project.
¥ No effects of suppliers’ or customers’ other 
relationships on timing.
* Did not try to influence at what stage 
suppliers were to involve their suppliers in 
the project: all based on customer’s 
schedule, cascading information, only 
influence is to convey requirements.
TooIMaster became involved, by EuroPart, at 
very early stage for tooling, at concept 
development.
TooIMaster involved its suppliers at tool design 
stage, much later on, when specification was 
ready, at detail engineering.
+ Did not seek to delay involvement of 
suppliers: TooIMaster responds immediately 
to any EuroPart demands and involve 
suppliers the minute TooIMaster is ready to 
begin sourcing materials.
+ J-Car may visit TooIM aster directly to 
help e.g. for leverage when buying.
¥ Suppliers’ or customers’ other 
relationships did not affect at what stage 
they became involved, 
a Did not try to influence when their 
suppliers were to involve their suppliers: 
their problem.
Respondent believes EuroPart Partner and J- 
M aster Part became involved at same time, although 
suspects J-MasterPart became involved earlier as they 
were more closely involved in project.
* JC became involved at ‘D1 Design Stage’ i.e. shortly 
after drawings were issued to Euro Part/knew which 
parts to use. Knew from previous project that parts 
would take long to source from Japan and thus urged 
early involvement.
* JC’s suppliers became involved from the very start 
(before JC) having already been nominated by J-Car 
Japan to supply domestically. They are specialists in 
their field and their parts will thus be designed in 
close collaboration with J-Car.
* JC did not try to influence at what stage those two 
Japanese suppliers involved their suppliers - would 
not supply chain manage it thus far as a general rule.
M obilis ing Respondent unsure of split for sharing of 
development costs, but believe mostly at 
EuroPart’s expense, including testing. Suppliers’ 
development work shows their capability. J-Car 
UK may order some prototypes (and pay).
Ground rules established in terms of general 
purchasing agreements, establishing 
responsibilities etc.. EuroPart had one already. Not 
seen as formal contract as such.
Suppliers have to show action plan at beginning 
including costs, aims and targets, quality, delivery, 
performance, milestone events being monitored
No development costs being exchanged with 
EuroPart, but already delivered for Japan 
product line. All commercial discussions with J- 
Car, including tooling costs.
Ground rules were established after being 
selected, at a 3-way meeting with J-Car UK, J- 
MasterPart and EuroPart, on J-MasterPart’s 
initiative. All objectives fairly well understood, 
having been disseminated from J-Car.
* No difficulties motivating key suppliers to 
folly commit to project but can be a problem 
motivating tool makers. Re. relationship
EuroPart financed tooling. If EuroPart wanted 
modifications TooIMaster re-quote. No other 
development costs.
Can be discussions/arguments re. tooling 
design, although decisions remain with EuroPart 
and J-Car; TooIMaster only make suggestions, 
realising that changes may affect whether parts 
have to be re-tested. ToolMaster’s 
responsibilities established during standard 
quotation process.
Different situation with TooIMaster suppliers 
who supply raw material: no costs to share.
Development costs, prototype tooling costs, 
engineering costs etc. were quoted and agreed with J- 
Car. J-Car could thus have gone to another supplier 
for production, but EuroPart Partner quoted for that 
also and secured the business: costs for production 
tools, blow mould machines etc. included into mass 
production quote.
Ground rules have been quite clear in terms of who 
should be responsible for what.
Objectives also clearly defined with J-Car about 
EuroPart Partner’s responsibilities and their 
expectations and specifications.
Believes J-Car Japan financed all development costs via 
piece price i.e. ultimately J-Car pay. Not aware of 
arrangement with two Japanese suppliers 
JC rely on J-Car Japan to project manage but equally rely 
on itself and EuroPart to project manage J-Car project 
management i.e. mutual project management.
* Motivation problems with one Japanese supplier 
being inflexible due to lack of clout but EuroPart 
would be worse off on their own with this supplier, 
as J-Car is important customer for this supplier.
* Ground rules established at beginning of project in 
terms of EuroPart/JC lessons from previous project
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through QAV.
* Only motivation problem was issue with J- 
M aster Part and EuroPart - J-MasterPart had 
own agreement with J-Car Japan: seen as 
unusual situation.
* EuroPart dedicated much effort to project, 
possibly because of little other business at the 
time and received much support from EuroPart 
Partner US and Europe.
* Co-ordination only in terms of making sure 
EuroPart’s suppliers were involved.
between J-MasterPart and EuroPart, J- 
MasterPart do not see EuroPart as their 
customer but simply as a delivery point. J- 
MasterPart view J-Car as customer: seek to 
fulfil J-Car’s requirements not EuroPart's. 
But all three parties have to agree issues e.g. 
quality problems.
¥ Suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships 
did not make it easier to motivate them. 
However, J-MasterPart initially not 
motivated to supply its direct (supply) 
relationship i.e. EuroPart, focusing on its 
relationship with J-Car.
EuroPart formulated their objectives at the 
beginning of the project in terms of delivery 
dates and annual requirements: TooIMaster act 
accordingly.
* * Experienced no difficulties motivating 
key suppliers to folly commit to project - 
mist be committed.: not network effect
¥ Suppliers’ or customers’ other relationships 
did not affect motivation.
* TooIMaster and its suppliers are self­
motivated. Motivation not seen as an issue. 
TooIMaster supplier relationships very 
close: at the end of a telephone. Steel tooling 
and plastics suppliers much bigger than 
TooIMaster.
* Did not try to influence how suppliers 
motivated their suppliers in the project: do 
not even know who they are.
Motivation: good relation with J-Car (Japan) and no 
real problems from a development point of view.
were carried over - being aware of everyone’s 
parameters.
*. Responsibilities communicated with Japanese
supplier by JC’s office in Japan, informing of annual 
requirements: JC have learnt from experience that 
suppliers need monthly/yearly requirements, planned 
ramp up and start of production, asap.
* Both easier and more difficult to motive suppliers JC 
had worked with previously. Two Japanese suppliers 
were much more supportive for 2*1 application than 
1*. EuroPart had met them in Japan for 1* 
application and gained respect consequently.
4> Did not try to influence how JC suppliers motivated 
their suppliers: if problems had occurred JC would 
have consulted J-Car rather than directly contacting 
suppliers in Japan.
C om m unicating Design ideas and concepts communicated via 
EuroPart Partner design engineer working in Japan 
with J-Car Japan. Info, did not always go directly 
to EuroPart but would go through J-Car UK. 
Action/project plan communicated to suppliers at 
start of project; suppliers monitored through QAV. 
Also informal visits for checking parts, discussing 
problems. Milestone events increasingly frequently 
towards end.
♦ * No info, withheld by J-Car UK particularly 
because tank was already established in Japan 
and US developments were 3 months ahead, 
thus knew EuroPart was to be involved and 
needed all info, possible.
* J-Car UK would try to encourage EuroPart to 
pass on info, but neither formally nor following 
up. Had close links with two key suppliers.
a Not seen to be in J-Car UK’s interest to
encourage communication amongst suppliers of 
different parts/horizontally.
All design details come from J-Car. J- 
MasterPart received pump drawings from J-Car. 
J-MasterPart received a supplier report from 
EuroPart, focusing on delivery performance. 
Policies and procedures were exchanged at three 
3-way meetings where e.g. delivery issues were 
discussed. Some tension at the start. Following 
those meetings relationship between EuroPart 
and J-MasterPart has been quite good. J- 
MasterPart try to support EuroPart as much as 
possible.
♦ Design details were held back from EuroPart 
because they were not seen as part of the 
process and fears that they might use 
information to develop own pump.
* J-MasterPart has limited experience with 
European suppliers so no effect on amount 
of information being communicated.
Involved in exchange of drawings with 
EuroPart. Interact with EuroPart if design 
features need altered; not exchanged with 
ToolMaster’s suppliers, as they only supply raw 
material: only receive spec, forwarded from 
EuroPart.
Policies and procedures exchanged with 
EuroPart through their supplier manual and 
ToolMaster’s terms and conditions; same 
procedure with TooIMaster suppliers. 
TooIMaster did not receive formal performance 
info, during the project (did during production) 
but if delivery date not met TooIMaster would 
receive a letter. Timing plan issued every week 
by TooIMaster to keep EuroPart informed of 
progress but EuroPart do not usually monitor 
progress.
♦ No secrets, including ‘strategic knowledge’, 
from suppliers or customers: nothing to 
withhold in any way i.e. TooIMaster 
communicate as much as possible with 
EuroPart and suppliers.
♦ * Some customers have tried to ask for cost 
breakdowns i.e. open book costing but have 
little idea of part costs so TooIMaster could 
tell them any price.
a Did not seek to communicate with wider 
pool of suppliers.
EuroPart Partner's design engineers had design 
review meetings with J-Car designers and foel tank 
engineers, over period of 2 - 3 weeks. CAD 
engineering done by EuroPart Partner in Europe 
working directly with J-Car. App. three monthly 
meetings in Japan but always dyadic.
EuroPart Partner had very limited communication 
with J-Car UK. EuroPart Partner’s regional plants e.g. 
EuroPart communicated with J-Car’s regional plants 
e.g. J-Car UK. Clear separation between the two 
situations i.e. EuroPart Partner had few problems with 
e.g. J-MasterPart, this was a manufacturing rather 
than development issue. Focal point of discussion was 
always J-Car who were leading all these activities; 
EuroPart Partner hardly met J-MasterPart during 
development.
EuroPart Partner received very limited supplier 
performance feedback during the project, other than 
informally at meetings, less than in other projects but 
no major problems. Had app. monthly programme 
status reports and test status reports.
* No team meetings involving wider group of 
suppliers, but this happens now in other 
programmes.
Few design ideas and concepts exchanged with EuroPart, 
communication between JC and EuroPart/JC and J-Car 
UK tended to be of supply nature.
JC normally communicated with Japanese suppliers 
through their Japanese HQ, these often knew of design 
changes before information reached EuroPart and JC. 
Cost system very transparent between JC and J-Car 
Japan - J-Car negotiated JC’s EuroPart price/margin. 
Policies and procedures exchanged with EuroPart by JC 
referring to the deal with J-Car, incl. price, delivery 
agreements etc.
Performance feed-back informal, although ‘are you 
ready?’ sheets in place.
* * Did not withhold information on performance, 
design ideas and concepts and polities from suppliers 
and would not withhold any info, from EuroPart or J- 
Car.
* JC’s relationship with J-Car affected communication 
as EuroPart was circumvented. EuroPart tried to 
implement formal performance feed-back in previous 
project but realised the uniqueness and slowness of 
supply and communication route.
* Experience from previous project enabled extent of 
info, sharing, understanding each other’s 
requirements better e.g. relating to continuous 
replenishment requests from Japan - an initial 
learning curve.
¥ JC forwarded questions from EuroPart to J-Car UK 
to seek extra information e.g. from R&D which 
EuroPart would not always be able to receive.




Much tank development performed in Japan 
between JapComp and J-Car R&D (J-Car Japan): 
JapComp designer made original drawing for J-Car 
Japan which the EuroPart designer subsequently 
used as basis, using EuroPart’s slightly different 
technology.
End customer/consumer demand info, not relevant 
as they would not be interested in this type of 
component, main issue is regulation/ safety and 
functionality.
* Development experiences from EuroPart US 
carried over.
* J-Car learn from EuroPart’s mistakes with 
other customers and also share facilities (with 
Other VM: blow moulder).
Does not know about exchange of other 
technical engineering or consumer/end customer 
demand knowledge with EuroPart as this 
concerns J-MasterPart Japan.
Knowledge exchange primarily concerns 
manufacturing of tool as more skill is attached 
to it, which is why EuroPart use TooIMaster. 
Tool manufacture process is ToolMaster’s 
business; EuroPart do not need to know that, 
although may if they want.
Tooling knowledge not discussed with 
TooIMaster suppliers.
Only customer need or demand knowledge 
concerns delivery, spec, and quality 
requirements: from EuroPart not J-Car.
♦ No engineering or market knowledge 
withheld from suppliers, but only receive 
spec for its part, do not see actual, specific, 
foel tank. Believe everyone would benefit 
from more insight re. production of part, but
JC do not become involved in exchanging technical 
engineering knowledge apart from forwarding. JC did 
not know much about end customer need or demand 
knowledge same with JC’s suppliers.
♦ JC now dealing with other customer, competitor of 
EuroPart, for next tech. application. This new 
customer is UK part of the Japanese foel tank 
supplier, but UK factory has only recently expanded 
into foel tanks. Respondent believes EuroPart were 
probably used as information was shared widely for 
this project which has made this tech. common in 
Japan.
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Believes there were two EuroPart Partner resident 
engineers in Japan making drawings with J-Car 
Japan. J-Car UK not involved in design so little 
relevance of resident design engineers with J-Car 
UK.
4 J-Car UK occasionally allocate people to sort 
out production problems at suppliers.
No staff allocated by J-MasterPart to EuroPart’s 
development team but engineers on site in J-Car 
Japan (J-MasterPart Japan).
Little knowledge of this activity.
No staff allocated by TooIMaster to EuroPart 
development team, but TooIMaster is small 
company and works as a team; everybody is 
involved, particularly management.
Only human resource link with suppliers is via 
sales/technical reps.
In previous project TooIMaster agreed to allow 
designer to work within TooIMaster for some 
time, jointly designing the part. Viewed as way 
to get superior part and costs down.
EuroPart Partner sales and marketing office 
(including engineers) in Japan, close to J-Car, would 
visit J-Car for meetings, acting as interface to 
EuroPart Partner, Europe. No J-Car development 
team existed: core knowledge and experience in 
Europe. Believes it is different now. Seen as very 
important due to distance but often a cost issue and 
depends on nature of relationship. J-Car asked for 
resident designers in Japan but EuroPart Partner 
preferred to keep main expertise in Bonn.
JC staff not allocated to EuroPart’s development team. A 
couple of people within JC manage the relationships.
JC Japan allocate to J-Car’s base.
Synchron ising EuroPart and J-Car UK synchronised project 
management plans.
Alignment of tech. plans: believes everyone will 
end up going in same direction due to legislation. 
EuroPart may revert to steel technology due to 
waste disposal problems with plastic: legal 
judgement pending. Everyone tries to follow best 
weight and cost reduction, regulation etc., 
whatever works out is way everyone will tend to 
go. Tech. used with other customers may be 
offered to J-Car and if it works they might use it 
(not for fuel tanks).
* Most synchronisations already in place from 
previous project. Problems with l9 car project, 
resulted in QAV system being implemented.
* Problems to synchronise with large suppliers 
unwilling to change own systems, which J-Car 
has to accept. J-MasterPart also slightly 
unwilling e.g. to translate their plans from 
Japanese. J-Car a very important customer to 
EuroPart (30-40%) so no excuses.
Delivery but not development procedures were 
synchronised.
Future technology plans of EuroPart and J- 
MasterPart fairly separate.
Other key players may align their technology 
plans with J-MasterPart’s but J-MasterPart UK 
not involved.
J-MasterPart Japan would align to J-Car Japan.
TooIMaster synchronise with EuroPart, not vice 
versa, basically do what they are told (follow 
EuroPart's timing plan), because EuroPart is 
customer. Same with TooIMaster suppliers.
No key players aligned technology plans with 
TooIMaster.
4 Most relevant synchronisations already in 
place: quality manuals and procedures were 
laid down already.
* Not a problem to synchronise with suppliers 
involved with other companies
* Did not avoid synchronising with any 
suppliers or EuroPart.
No alignment or synchronisation of technology 
development plans. Global requirements based on 
legal and safety requirements and European 
guidelines: all auto manufacturers know future 
requirements. Vehicle manufacturers will ask 
suppliers how they intend to manage requirements 
and their technology approach. EuroPart Partner has 
own technology strategy: this is used for convincing 
customers of products’ ability to meet requirements, 
confidence levels etc.
4 Overall programme management performed by J- 
Car: EuroPart Partner responsible for own system 
delivery, co-ordinate most suppliers re. timings 
etc. (although not J-MasterPart) i.e. cascading. J- 
MasterPart effectively separately programme 
managed.
* No approach from J-Car telling EuroPart Partner 
how to change technology.
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Appendix F Continued: Analysis Matrix Used for Intra-Case/Intra-Company Analysis: Base Station Equipment Project
Group Quality Manager Programmes Director Programme Manager Sales Manager
Respondent's 
role
Chair global quality forum Roles in customer/market 
quality, system quality, MPI & IS09000, suppliers.
Overall programme/project responsibility. Act as focal point for communication between FC and 
customer. Project planning responsibility. Took over 
from previous programme manager after initial concept 
phases.
Main site interface with key customers. 
Commercial responsibility. Liase with ECM and
FC.
Uniting 3 part approval (vendor assessment) process for suppliers, 
depending on type of supplier (suppliers of design critical 
parts production capability assessed). Production supplier 
decision Purchasing & cost led.
Internal suppliers involved per default for prototyping.
A Used existing suppliers
♦ FC changed supplier in the past when 
discovering it was supplying competitor -  depends on 
individual supplier’s degree of confidentiality 
(exceptional). Do not want competitors to see FC 
prototypes exposed at suppliers.
A TM specify some FC suppliers (approved list) -  
if FC wish to use supplier not on list it must undergo a 
qualification process.
v  FC consulted TM re. its assessment of one of its 
suppliers.
* Some specification of sub-suppliers (within 
TM’s spec./approval list).
A FC suggested to TM in the past that it unite FC 
and cabinet supplier to co-ordinate design, but has not 
happened. Similar ideas with FC suppliers but not 
materialised (concept stage involvement would be 
required).
Production suppliers only just becoming 
involved. FC do not have an approved suppliers 
list, always investigating new sources.
♦  A Components must be TM approved. 
TM may recommend certain suppliers not be 
used due to bad experience.
A FC specify materials but not suppliers.
♦ A  Some suppliers avoided due to past 
performance, including confidentiality 
problems. Can be a problem that suppliers’ 
facilities are not kept separate.
Prototyping for machining conducted by dedicated 
facility: automatic choice. Other prototype suppliers 
judged mainly on quality performance (supplier 
inspection report).
FC received RFQ from TM and submitted a bid: formal 
process.
A TM issues guidelines 
a  Majority existing suppliers: gives mutual
understanding of needs and requirements: expensive 
to switch supplier 
A No problems in connection with suppliers 
having other customers: only issue is available 
capacity
A Limited specification by FC of sub-suppliers
Global roles o f FC staff: aim to co-ordinate / 
allocate business across sites.
A Very close personal ties between FC 
Europe and TM partly because it used to be part of 
TM. FC Europe staff always interfacing with TM, 
exploring new business.
A FC encourages its suppliers not to do 
business with ADC i.e. FC’s main competitor, as it 
would compromise its IPR.
Timing FC involved with TM at detail design. All FC suppliers 
involved at detail design or later. Designs relatively fixed 
at that stage. Some suppliers not involved as early as 
respondent would like, but tooling (cost) constraints.
A Concerned that if suppliers were to decide on 
production process they would do so according to own 
process tech. rather than optimum, standardised benchmark 
geared to suit other source: reason for delaying their 
involvement till spec, is set.
A Experience influences timing if problems are 
foreseen (advance).
A No influence of sub-suppliers’ timing
Production suppliers involved after prototyping, 
after testing to ensure TM is happy with product 
Awareness that this is late.
FC’s suppliers involved after initial concept definition. 
FC does not have full visibility of TM internal 
specification process/limited FC involvement in 
developing spec, in this project/late (post-spec.) 
involvement with TM.
a  a a v  Limited network effect on timing due to 
limited involvement o f suppliers in design and 
development. No attempts to co-ordinate suppliers 
and no constraints.
A Very close personal ties between FC 
Europe and TM partly because it used to be part of 
TM. Hence involved prior to RFQ. FC UK 
involved after initial prototyping/specification.
Mobilising FC absorb own development costs with TM. FC/TM may 
jointly purchase suppliers’ tools, but respondents does not 
perceive risks are jointly shared with TM.
Ground rules set out in terms and conditions, quality 
documents (incl. workmanship and quality control 
standards). Recent, controversial, change o f reject parts 
policy: suppliers now charged automatically. Suppliers 
generally not difficult to motivate.
A Easier to motivate historical suppliers 
A FC tries to influence sub-suppliers mobilisation e.g. 
re. delivery targets, contacting some directly (sometimes 
incl. TM). May also include problem solving.
Some mobilisation problems occasionally 
internally due to project clashes but team is well- 
motivated.
Limited awareness of sharing of development costs but 
FC do not charge TM for pure engineering costs. 
Expensive tooling costs of suppliers passed on to TM 
(part o f contract).
Believes FC-TM ground rules, procedures etc. are 
understood fairly well.
Suppliers motivated by volume/value of potential 
business. FC use ‘exit’ strategy to mobilise suppliers 
e.g. threatening to use alternative source if problems of 
meeting time scales.
A Easier to mobilise existing suppliers due to 
existing relationship and understanding.
FC product portfolio approach (conscious?) to 
balancing development costs and rewards: no 
agreed margins with TM.
Formalised TM document contained contact 
names, toles, output, milestones etc. - mutually 
agreed with FC. IPR mutual agreements with TM.
A Long term relationship with TM provides 
motivation
v  Perception that risks are being pushed 
upstream.
Communicating Extensive communication of specifications, incl. ratings of 
components, failure analysis, technical and risk analysis
Much communication but not entirely 
transparent with suppliers (re. nature of project)
Much communication with TM through conferences and 
emails. Extensive communication of policies.
FC’s cost/margin information almost transparent to 
TM.
373
etc.. FC provides performance info, to TM.
♦ Little quality info, is withheld from suppliers but 
communication on need-to-know basis with TM and 
suppliers. Suppliers not always able to identify which 
project info, is for (confidentiality).
+ Historical suppliers may receive more informal 
information
♦ * FC has conducted limited supplier satisfaction 
survey, obtaining feed-back on FC-supplier relationship 
(discussion of supplier newsletter but dropped).
* FC encouraged communication between 2 
suppliers.
* Joint FC/TM supplier development activity to 
share ideas (seen as useful).
and TM (re. problems). Many weekly conference 
calls but a perception of too little face-to-face 
communication. TM perception that FC is poor 
at communicating, withholding information re. 
problems, but respondent does not think 
communication is so bad.
specifications etc.. High degree of formalisation e.g. 
minuting of meetings and decisions, performance 
measurement etc..
♦ Fairly ‘open book’ communication with TM, 
but only relevant information: aware that TM has 
asked FC to be more open with problems.
+ Respondent works across projects so not 
100% dedicated to this project: believe TM 
understand.
* No attempts to co-ordinate communication 
with FC’s suppliers
Believes internal and external communication is an 
FC problem.
+ FC accused by TM o f withholding 
information when problems occurred, delaying 
messages not to lose face .
Problem
Solving
FC suppliers generally seen as good at and willing to 
resolve problems but less good at preventing them. 
Occasional TM supplier development activity focused on 
problem solving, involving also FC key suppliers.
+ Perceptions of FC developed over time of being too 
re-active have influenced suppliers and TM’s perception of 
FC, some rather badly).
*  No problems agreeing root causes with suppliers 
on technical issues, more difficult on soft issues.
* Some customers have expressed concerns about 
FC being too dependent on TM and thus not giving other 
customers the same attention.
* Sub-supplies may be involved in solving hard 
problems
FC not very open with TM about project 
obstacles: prefer to keep details of minor 
problems to itself but aware TM disagrees. On­
going supplier development activities.
FC experienced many re-design/specification problems 
which were discussed openly with TM. FC does not 
have full visibility of TM internal specification 
process/limited FC involvement in developing spec, in 
this project/late (post-spec.) involvement with TM.
FC suppliers not involved in process.
+ No path dependency 
+ Fairly ‘open book’ problem solving process with 
TM: aware that TM has asked FC to be more open 
with problems.
ECM may liase directly with FC Europe when 
problems escalate due to its close relationship with 
TM.
+ FC accused by TM o f withholding 
information when problems occurred, delaying 





No HR exchange on this project, but used to have some 
with TM.
No HR exchange, may be confidentiality 
concerns and also concerns about effect on 
productivity.
No HR exchange on this project. No actual HR exchange. Exceptionally happens 
when problems. TM residents in earlier projects, 
building up understanding of FC.
Synchronising FC prefer to work with suppliers with degree of process 
tech. flexibility to be able to meet FC’s standards.
Much efforts allocated to communicating and aligning 
technology roadmaps and quality development plans with 
TM. More piece meal with suppliers (did presentation 4 
years ago but not since).
+ Most synchronisation in place 
+ Few network constraints on synchronising: past 
concerns about small group of suppliers being used by too 
many telecoms companies
FC produces own project plan for TM. Project plans synchronised with suppliers. Respondents 
believes TM has full visibility o f FC’s road maps. 
Perception that TM is very concerned about risks of 
adopting and developing new filter technology, so need 
not to be too innovative.
Difficult to know future technological direction of TM: 
many different perceptions within FC.
Overall Gantt chart shared with TM 
Regular meetings at which FC technology road 
maps are presented to TM. TM in turn presents 
market trends.
♦ TM careful not to divulge individual 
suppliers’ road maps, protecting IPR.
+ FC keeps procedures generic to avoid too 
many customer-specific procedures.
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Appendix F Continued: Analysis and Interpretation of Inter-Company Perceptions of Collaboration Activities with Key
Suppliers and Customer: Base Station Equipment Project___________ __________________________________________








Project Manager, based in TM Networks Operations Manager, with company for 5 years 
having worked closely with FC as engineer.
Ops. Dir.: responsible for all manufacturing, 
engineering and quality.
Project Engineer: works up front with FC engineers 
on project implementation
TP Plating a profit centre within FC i.e. ‘semi- 
external supplier’. Respondent reports to FC GM. 
Based within FC. App 60 employees in TP Plating.
Uniting TM Networks UK assumed control of project due to lack 
o f capacity in Europe. Subsequently FC UK took over 
from FC Europe. ECM became involved to assist with 
sourcing, although TM Europe still influenced global 
sourcing decisions. FC Europe originally given general 
specification and invited to quote.
+ History important as it provides price, delivery and 
design credibility. Sub-suppliers approval process 
conducted over time/mid 1990s. Way to avoid having 
dual source.
+ ♦ Some suppliers are non-preferred due to past 
performance/experience. May have been too careless 
about sensitive information sharing with TM 
competitors.
* TM specifies in contracts that it is allowed to check 
sub-suppliers: must be TM approved but are not 
directly specified by TM.
Limited formal selection process of ECM suppliers- 
development/prototype orders are placed when parts 
are required.
4k ECM’s key suppliers are FC-specified. 
Specifications disseminated from TM. FC 
involved in discussions with TM to compile list of 
approved suppliers.
4k ECM has long-term relationships with its a core 
team of suppliers and FC: costly to change 
suppliers once they have gone through approval 
process
FC’s process is a formal selection process: 
AluComp responds to RFQ, delay in receiving 
message whether business is won. Limited design 
work until order is secured.
4k AluComp chooses suppliers based on list of 
approved suppliers. New more competitive 
suppliers may occasionally be introduced.
4k FC may influence AluComp’s choice of tooling 
suppliers, insisting on lowest cost supplier.
TP Plating involved per default due to internal 
status, provided it has the capacity.
Timing FC UK became involved during initial prototyping, FC 
Europe just after concept phase/pre-specification. FC 
became involved later than a ‘partner’ would have been 
(concept development).
«  FC has power to decide on timing of its 
suppliers/no TM influence.
ECM became involved 2 months after initial concept, 
during detail engineering. ECM has asked to be 
involved earlier to influence design specification.
AluComp quotes but is not involved till after 
prototyping. Late involvement creates problems 
e.g. cost, quality and meeting deadlines. Tooling 
becomes expensive due to unnecessary 
modifications.
TP Plating involved at prototype stage but neither 
takes part in developing concept nor specification. 
Seen by respondent as too late as creates 
manufacturing problems that becomes difficult to 
resolve.
4k The lack of experience o f early supplier 
involvement within FC prevents it from 
implementing it.
Mobilising Less risk and reward sharing with FC compared with TM 
partners where frame agreements exist. Partners receive a 
higher margin to cover development costs, FC less but in a 
grey area receiving a good margin to cover some costs. AF 
perception that FC is unwilling to develop new innovative 
technology to avoid risks/cost, TM having to pull 
design/technology developments: AF disappointed.
TM perception of FC engineers being de-motivated as its 
management has signed up for difficult deadlines putting 
pressure on engineers. Managers always keen to show TM 
it is important customer, listen to improvement suggestions 
etc..
*  Many contracts exist between TM and FC which set 
precedent for new projects.
4k TM influences new strategic sub-contractors sub- 
suppliers mobilisation but not anymore with FC.
Some costs and margins of ECM suppliers negotiated 
by FC (free-issued).
A prototype agreement exists between ECM and FC 
which specifies support for development work. (incl. 
costs and margins).
Ground rules very invisible to ECM.
The high dependency o f ECM on FC business serves 
as motivator but can be frustrating when lack of 
visibility.
ECM seeks to mobilise its suppliers and sub-suppliers 
(when through distributor) by informing of plans etc., 
sometimes bringing in FC or TM to ‘add weight’, 
v ? Contract sees a split of business in two (dual 
source) which serves to mobilise ECM as FC can 
switch.
¥ Long term nature of relationship helps to mobilise 
ECM
FC pays for tooling and products. No long-term 
agreements (other than T&C) /no guaranteed 
minimum volumes (risk and rewards measures). 
AluComp used to get to see Gantt chart with 
responsibilities etc.
FC drives AluComp very hard -  bullying. Seen as 
de-motivating as indicates low respect. Also the 
uneven project management is de-motivating.
4k AluComp has policy o f not being over­
dependent on any customers: motivated for all 
customers.
4k Problems with FC disseminate to AluComp’s 
suppliers: have to work hard to mobilise these.
As internal profit centre situation is different: TP 
Plating charge for its work but FC bears cost when 
subsequent problems.
Rules not entirely clear at beginning. Emerged 
during introduction and design process.
Motivation is given.
+ Some rules were different on this project, in 
terms of expected quality being higher.
Communicating TM wants very open communication e.g. open book Orders and specifications are disseminated from FC Large amount of drawings with little project FC’s information normally on need-to-know basis
375
costing with key suppliers and partners who can retain 
confidentiality: FC one such trusted supplier.
TM can issue guidelines for technology performance but 
would prefer to let FC decide, however, TM has had to 
specify too much to FC/pull design process.
TM performs vendor assessment and audits, 
communicating problems. FC also seen as very re-active 
on relationship development: subject of TM discussions. 
*  ♦ Some suppliers are non-preferred due to past 
performance/experience. May have been too careless 
about sensitive information, using this to own 
advantage with TM competitors.
to ECM and thence its suppliers.
Visibility of FC activity and technology is very low
within ECM.
No performance information received from FC re.
development work but some for on-going production.
*  Aware that FC often struggles to obtain forecasts 
from TM: problem disseminates.
+ Low visibility is a historic issue
* ECM has attended supplier seminars at FC for 
learning new manufacturing techniques etc. (no 
such ECM organised activities)
information sent by FC to AluComp. Very limited 
product information from FC incl.. forecasts. 
Information often delayed.
Performance feedback is rare from FC.
AluComp communicates very openly with its 
tooling suppliers, incl. plans.
♦ Perception of very high confidentiality
awareness in FC to maintain competitive edge: 
information always retained and AluComp not 
allowed to use FC products for promotional 
purposes.
but as semi-internal respondent is able to obtain 
information informally through personal 
relationships. Also part o f FC senior management 
so is aware o f more strategic/policy information 
than other suppliers, although limited project 
progress information.
Communication of performance requirements not 
very clear; limited performance feedback: mostly 
when problems (informal).




TM performs vendor assessment and audits, 
communicating problems, having identified important 
programme management, and risk (incl. for technology 
performance) problems within FC. Have had reviews to 
discuss and resort/supplier development.
FC’s suppliers have not been involved to a great extent so 
far in the project so have not been involved yet in problem 
solving.
Problem solving process focused on identifying root 
causes, however, FC often quick to assume that 
problem lies in ECM internal processes.
Problems (normally design related) apparently 
mutually resolved between AluComp and FC: FC 
often sends in personnel.
Informal brainstorming-type problem solving 
process: often FC’s starting point is to blame TP 
Plating.





TM has key suppliers’/partners’ engineers working 
alongside its own in house.
ECM very local to FC so has not been deemed 
necessary to allocate staff -  never been requested.
No HR integration between FC and AluComp. 
Relationship not close enough/very limited design 
involvement. Has never been requested.
More close integration with AluComp suppliers 
(tooling).
HR integration is fairly strong due to semi-intemal 
status -  adjacent premises.
Synchronising TM shares technology strategy details with key 
partners/suppliers and FC has been involved in technology 
development programmes. FC has been conducting 
presentation of its road maps for future technology at TM, 
trying to align with TM. TM shares general for what 
affects FC but not TM product strategy. FC shares more 
technology strategy details with its partners however.
♦ *  TM concerned that FC has relationships with its 
competitors so restricts its ability to become partner. 
TM’s preference is max. 30-50 % TM business for 
strategic sub-contractors, more for partners where 
frame agreements are in place to prevent dependency 
problems/for mutual support.
+ TM prefers to let FC develop its project plan to avoid 
FC paying lip service to TM deadlines: past on bad past 
experience.
ECM has little visibility of FC activities and plans -  
frustrating due to high dependency.
ECM has run a training school with internal and FC 
staff concerning quality management etc., in attempt 
to adapt to FC
AluComp is asked to produce its own project plan 
but does not get to see FC’s overall plan, although 
it knows it exists: seen as a one-way street.
Very limited strategic alignment, no technology 
roadmap exchange.
AluComp provides rolling plans to its suppliers and 
its suppliers synchronise with these.
♦ Perception of very high confidentiality 
awareness in FC to maintain competitive edge: 
information always retained and AluComp not 
allowed to use FC products for promotional 
purposes.
*  Systems and procedures aligned with QS9000 
requirements rather than specifically FC 
(industry wide)
Many short-term requirements rather than long­
term view, although as part of FC senior 
management respondent is more involved in 
strategic planning than other suppliers.
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Appendix F Continued: Analysis and Interpretation of Intra-Company Perceptions of Collaboration Activities with Key
Suppliers and Customer: Asian Car Development Project____________ __________________________________________
Business Unit Director Manufacturing Manager Technical Manager/Leader Project Manager/Leader
Respondent's 
role
Overall programme responsibility To manage project from prototype to production/ramp 
up.
Manage technical aspects of project, incl. interface 
with prototype suppliers. Also managed 
manufacturing till project reached production 
phase. Link to VM R&D.
Responsible for interface with client/VM: link 
between manufacturing and technical side. Key 
role in setting up commercial arrangements.
Uniting Re. production suppliers: AE conducted structured vendor 
selection process but several parties ‘vetoed’ process: 
eventually largely unstructured and somewhat political.
Re. prototype suppliers: only two and existing suppliers to 
either AE or sister company. Similar process of. uniting of 
VM with AE.
A Established relationship with one prototype supplier 
(Prototype Supplier 1) -  easy decision.
*  JV’s suppliers existing, often on-site, suppliers to the 
Asian company (no formal assessment); AE no history 
with these even if it had previously been involved with 
their Western JV partners
A Would have avoided many suppliers not seen 
technically competent or geographically unsuitable. 
Ultimate choice was not AE’s but Asian manufacturer 
(in JV). VM largely trusting AE to decide.
♦ Some suppliers deemed unsuitable because of their 
existing relationships with VM’s competitors: concern 
re. loss of knowledge o f technology to competitor
v Other prototype supplier (Prototype Supplier 2) a 
current supplier to AE Motor Sport sister company. 
a  AE wanted to specify sub-suppliers, especially for 
safety-critical parts. Would normally specify more -  
less here due to low cost nature of vehicle/market. 
Specified parts through tight design specification and 
thus limited no. of suppliers able to meet requirements.
Re. production suppliers: AE attempted to conduct a 
formal structured vendor selection process on behalf 
of VM but Asian party changed the selection 
somewhat due to largely political reasons. Re. uniting 
with the customer VM approached AE.
* Most of the AE manufacturing team is from an 
OEM background and therefore well connected 
with technically competent suppliers. But ended 
up with very few existing suppliers due to lack of 
VM’s infrastructure in Asia thus no list of 
preferred suppliers.
+ One prototype supplier chosen due to existing 
relationship with AE 
a  VM (USA) and AE had worked extensively 
together previously, particularly in niche 
market/new technology.
*  VM Purchasing intervened late in project and 
specified certain key suppliers.
*  Did not avoid any suppliers: sought global 
suppliers with presence in Asia
a  VM did not seek to dictate selection process, but 
would discuss with AE (limited guidance from 
VM)
A AE tried to make recommendations, although 
changed by VM; developed a 
framework/specification but sub-contracting 
decisions mainly left to suppliers. AE avoided 
specifying actual sub-suppliers as it could later get 
blamed for having imposed choice.
A  Prototype suppliers primarily chosen because 
AE, or people on project, have worked with 
them before. Trust they can do the work, way to 
reduce risk: investigated alternatives but 
decided on low-risk option 
A  ♦ Sticking to existing suppliers provides a way 
of avoiding risky/non-trust-worthy suppliers 
A AE asked prototype suppliers to dual source due 
to time scale and scale o f project, and to use 
their existing suppliers (specified): spreading 
risk.
a  Prototype suppliers’ key material suppliers were 
jointly specified by VM R&D and AE
A Having decided to enter the Asian market, VM 
allocated project to Far East subsidiary. AE had 
historical relationship with Holden through 
racing, AE owning Holden Special Vehicles.
A AE would like production suppliers to have 
long-term preferred suppliers in place, 
v VM used Holden as conduit to AE: a European 
partner.
Timing Production suppliers became involved after prototyping 
(incl. Crash testing): seen as late.
*  Prototype suppliers were involved from the start (their 
job) but limited opportunities for their particular 
capabilities due to nature of vehicle (i.e. simple). 
a  AE did not try to influence timing of sub-suppliers. 
Barriers were: distance and capability level (incl. 
language) of upstream positioned suppliers. Hence used 
largely standard parts instead of customised.
Suppliers asked to tender after AE had produced 
specifications: vendor selection process 6 months 
later where AE made final decisions and sent letters 
of intent to chosen suppliers.
Prototype suppliers became involved during concept 
development, immediately after AE 
A AE did not seek to delay involvement of any 
suppliers: wanted them involved asap. But they 
were still involved very late due to problems 
arranging the JV 
a  Did not try to influence timing of sub-suppliers’ 
involvement
Prototype suppliers involved from day one: 
involved in detail design and feasibility study. 
AE involved from day one with VM.
A AE encouraged prototype suppliers’ 
involvement with their key suppliers
Production suppliers involved late 
A This was due to JV arrangement taking time to 
be completed.
AE involved 6 months before VM started to 
allocate a project team itself.
A This was because VM never really believed 
project would go beyond concept development. 
ADC involved during concept development, 
producing a (non-engineered) show car.
Mobilising Development costs part of agreement: fixed price contract, 
including prototyping, tooling etc. Production suppliers 
generally charged for prototype parts but managed by VM. 
Ground rules constantly changing, including programme 
strategy and contractual agreement. People involved have 
changed several times (on customer side). AE has 
remained stable however.
Limited risk and benefit sharing: both production and 
prototype suppliers have been paid for a set scope of 
work only, incl. AE: payment plan agreed based on 3- 
month targets.
A Respondent believes ground rules and overall 
VM management of the project has been poor, not 
least due to problems of arranging JV.
Risk was limited as only innovation was in the high 
volume application of the material: material itself 
known.
Prototype suppliers take limited risk as they are 
paid for what they do; knew they would not be 
involved in production, although early on that was 
less clear so acted as carrot for some suppliers.
Original contract with VM did not include all 
aspects of vehicle engineering as project relied on 
suitable donor vehicle being in existence. This 
additional task had to be undertaken by AE.
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Tried hard to formulate objectives throughout programme; 
developed programme management plan together with rep. 
from VM, trying to allocate responsibilities, but VM 
effectively refused to agree it. VM very reluctant to play 
by any ground rules, particularly roles and responsibilities. 
AE experienced difficulties motivating prototype suppliers 
due to amount o f changes -  particularly no. of engine (and 
subsequent re-engineering) changes. Made it difficult also 
to motivate people internally.
A Mobilisation problem not least caused by difficulties in 
setting up the JV, adding delays, information 
constraints etc.
A Did not try to influence motivation of sub-suppliers due 
to high degree of carry-over in design and parts.
VM’s objectives in terms of vehicle concept was 
clear, but logistics and infrastructure unclear 
AE’s suppliers motivated due to scope of project 
(volume + new market) but many concerns re. 
cultural problems, payment and shipping concerns. 
A AE did not try to influence motivation of sub­
suppliers
Ground rules spelled out for prototype suppliers in 
their purchase orders.
Communicating With VM, design ideas and concepts were communicated 
through manager placed on site within AE. VM reluctant 
to commit to any policies and procedures: limited 
communication. Only anecdotal communication on 
performance from VM. AE report weekly on programme 
performance. VM unwilling to listen to AE.
Two prototype suppliers closely involved in design 
reviews etc. and on site frequently. Received both formal 
and informal feedback.
Production suppliers had limited communication due to 
their late involvement: limited influence on design. Also, 
language barrier as these are SMEs.
♦ Did not withhold any technical information. Asked by 
VM to keep some aspects confidential with JV partners. 
General policy has been ‘open book’ within key 
relationships, but high degree of confidentiality out- 
with. Believes VM would have kept more details 
confidential, but AE wanted it to be open.
JV arrangement problems constrained AE receiving 
knowledge re. manufacture.
♦  No problem sharing info, with prototype suppliers.
Very limited discussion with production suppliers re. 
manufacturing methods, materials etc..
v Encouraged communication between two prototype 
suppliers but could not do the same with production 
suppliers, e.g., inform them at forums, due to set up.
With VM, communication of design ideas and 
concepts took place via styling reviews/clinics: AE 
producing concepts to be reviewed by VM.
Suppliers had limited involvement in styling and 
concept development: high degree of confidentiality 
out-with VM-AE. But Asian production suppliers 
very keen to leam as they are not used to innovating 
vehicles.
Supplier selection was communicated via meetings 
with VM (when suppliers presenting/tendering).
Very frequent conference calls with VM and much 
electronic communication + meetings: extensive 
communication. Language and cultural barrier 
♦ High degree of confidentiality surrounded project: 
suppliers informed on need to know basis and 
confidentiality agreements. Core technology is 
very closely guarded: only AE and VM R&D 
know the details.
A AE only communicated with direct suppliers: sub­
suppliers no need to know/AE rely on direct 
suppliers to disseminate information
Much communication with VM evolved around 
review meetings. A range of electronic and non­
electronic/face-to-face means of communication 
used. AE has facility for electronic design reviews: 
cross-functional and cross-company. Meetings take 
place where emphasis of work is.
AE received little documentation, work procedures 
etc. from VM; asked AE to propose this. 
Performance communication with suppliers fairly 
rudimentary; no open book negotiation with 
prototype suppliers.
♦ No information withheld from prototype
suppliers but informed on a need to know basis. 
Only companies that absolutely must know are 
informed: limits dissipation of knowledge e.g. if 
people leave company 
A Two prototype suppliers automatically on team 
email circulation list, being informed about 
decisions, questions, issues.
A V VM’s failed attempt to use its strategic 
alliance with Other European VM to allow AE 
to use engine, gearbox and suspension from 
their partner in Asia, meant that AE had limited 
information. AE then communicated direct with 
Other European VM who provided much 
knowledge.
♦ AE not overly concerned about losing
knowledge in this project as the sensitive part is 
VM IPR, not AE’s.
v AE had discussions with Other Japanese VM 
and Other European VM in its search for 
suitable donor vehicles, both companies being 
VM alliance partners in the Far East.
Problem
Solving
A normal process where everybody gets together to 
identify root causes of problems. With VM, technical 
problem solving was AE’s responsibility: would use the 
VM resident for guidance. VM often reluctant to listen to 
AE’s advice re. potential problems. Few problems with 
suppliers. Prototype suppliers offered AE advice when 
problems occurred.
A Many problems occurred due to high frequency of 
engineering changes.
A Problems agreeing root causes of problems with VM 
R&D as they are researchers with limited interest in 
production.
A Many problems caused by inexperience o f working 
with the Asian.
AE however has a very structured approach to 
problem solving seen as more holistic and non­
blaming based; operates a central database collecting 
all problems encountered: meetings with suppliers to 
resolve problems. VM seen as having a unstructured 
approach to problem solving.
AE sees the problem solving as its responsibility but 
will involve VM if necessary.
A Problem solving process not dependent on past 
experience, but many problems arose because 
project contained so many unknown factors hence 
difficult to identify root causes: no benchmarks.
A very structured and cross-functional process 
within AE, involving suppliers if necessary. Design 
problems resolved at weekly design review held in 
virtual reality centre. Problems are identified, 
tracked in electronic system, and person allocated 
to resort problem. AE closely involved in problem 
solving in Asia, helping to prepare for production.
A Root causes jointly agreed: a no-blame culture.
Exchanging
h u m /in
With VM, design ideas and concepts were communicated 
through VM vehicle integration manager placed on site
AE’s Manufacturing Group team of 10 engineers 
constantly travels between AE in the UK and VM
Much interaction and exchange of engineers and 




within AE -  as keeper of the faith/concept.
Two prototype suppliers closely involved and on site app. 
two days a week but not as guest engineers. More closely 
involved than other AE projects.
AE people often in Asia but only visiting. Not seen as 
critical due to simplicity of engineering task for production 
suppliers (but complex supply task).
(Asia): office at the customer’s site.
‘Heavy’ support from many direct production 
suppliers, sending over people for e.g. 1-2 month e.g. 
for training at AE. Also involved Asian part of the 
JV/customer.
Also AE resident engineer in Asia.
Respondent believes HR exchange was quite 
extensive.
♦ + AE did not avoid allocating staff from anyone
VM had engineer based at AE full time and AE has 
engineers based at prototype supplier to review 
progress and assist. Two designers from ADC 
worked at AE’s for 6 months to understand design 
processes. People from AIC at AE and both 
prototype suppliers during prototyping, to leam.
But no reps. From prototype suppliers based at AE.
* Project areas are restricted access: key project 
personnel entry only
*  Exchange of people not a regular process for 
AE
* 2 engineers from suppliers to prototype 
suppliers on site helping out
Synchronising AE not interested in aligning its technologies with other 
companies, other than trying to liase with VM R&D 
departments.
Respondent very disappointed by lack of synchronisation 
with VM who would/will not share e.g. programme timing 
with production suppliers. Reason:
♦ VM very concerned about lack o f ability in Asia to 
maintain secret: concerned that knowledge of materials 
(the key tech.) will dissipate to competitors via 
suppliers
*  Mutual synchronising difficult due to late involvement 
of all JV partners and production suppliers. AE asked 
them to synchronise if they could/would
+ Not a problem to synchronise with companies being 
involved with other companies as that is a cornerstone 
of the organisation: to be flexible and adapt.
Overall project plan developed jointly by VM and 
AE: suppliers asked to fall in line with that.
The project leads/precedes the development of the 
technology i.e. the application 
+ Adaptations not in place from previous interaction 
as project has so many different/new elements
Some synchronisation by prototype suppliers but 
relatively limited as their involvement was ‘grey 
box’. Other suppliers black box and thus needed to 
synchronise more closely.
AE has recently announced a strategic liaison with 
other engineering company, seeking to jointly 
develop new technology: a new role for AE
AE try to keep its systems and language generic, 
e.g. limiting jargon, so that they are more easily 
transferable across customer relationships (+).
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Appendix F Continued: Analysis and Interpretation of Inter-Company Perceptions of Collaboration Activities with Key
Suppliers and Customer: Asian Car P r o j e c t    ___________________________
VM Prototype Supplier 1 Prototype Supplier 2
Respondent's 
role
Director Product and manufacturing. Overall technical responsibility, 




Works Director: manages customer relationships: sales and technical 
role.
Uniting No competitive bidding process.
♦ Confidentiality a major issue in project due to level of new 
technology: VM assessed which other companies potential 
suppliers worked with; some concerns re. particular suppliers.
* VM discussed supplier choices with AE and tried to encourage 
use o f certain suppliers but no requirement/specifications: 
mutual decision
Joined meeting with other prototype supplier to quote for job.
A Involved through having worked on past projects, building up 
reputation. Have also worked with most of the suppliers before 
A Did not avoid any suppliers
A Did not try to co-ordinate any suppliers: limited choice due to tech. 
spec.
a  Became involved through previous project: was invited to quote.
Had not worked with most of he suppliers before.
A ¥  VM specified materials as this was part of the key technology 
from their R&D department. Some specified through AE. Did not 
avoid any suppliers.
A Did not attempt to co-ordinate suppliers
Timing AE became involved in programme to complete the final feasibility 
study i.e. immediately after concept development. VM R&D had 
been working on basic technology for maybe 4-5 years before then. 
a  VM did not try to influence at what stage AE was to involve 
its suppliers, but the programme timing plan made this clear.
Prototype Supplier 1 became involved for concept development/detailed 
design: took part in final CAD design process and produced first prototype 
prototype. Less of an issue/collaboration with Prototype Supplier 1 ’s 
suppliers as these simply produce according to spec. Pressure on timing due 
to tight time scale: no network effects.
Became involved simultaneously with Prototype Supplier 1: concept 
development/basis design. Suppliers became involved once Prototype 
Supplier 2 had secured the order i.e. a gap: equipment suppliers first, 
then material suppliers. No network effects.
Mobilising Respondent tried to work hard on establishing ground rules and roles 
and responsibilities. He joined project later so re-opened the original 
contract to clarify issues. Level of specification was relatively high 
hence some uncertainty/flexibility built into programme 
management.
a  Did not try to delegate roles and responsibility at detailed 
level: individuals left to identify how to progress themselves. 
But encouraged suppliers to ensure the goals were clear (not 
dictating)
A Only effect on motivation was need to feel each other 
out/getting to know each other.
Limited relevance of risk/cost sharing as Prototype Supplier 1 simply 
receives payment upon completion of job.
AE outlined ground rules in RFQ/terms and conditions. Prototype Supplier 1 
responded to those. No motivation problems: no network effects.
Limited relevance of risk/cost sharing as Prototype Supplier 2 simply 
receives payment upon completion o f job. However, Prototype Supplier 
2 put in more wotk to complete the job than was quoted in the 
expectation that it would be involved also in production (for tooling). 
Did not happen so disappointed.
No motivation problems of Prototype Supplier 2 or suppliers as 
expectation was to obtain part in production (some, incl. Prototype 
Supplier 2, were informed they would have a part in production but did 
not accomplish it -  suspected VM decision to source from Asia). 
Limited ground rules in place.
A Prototype Supplier 2 did not attempt to influence how its 
supplies mobilised their suppliers
Communicating Communication very open amongst main parties, language and 
cultural problems with Asian parties. High degree of electronic 
communication in this project. Performance feed-back on continuous 
basis
♦  A VM insisted that AE obtain confidentiality agreements 
from its suppliers (even providing the forms).
♦ Asian parties would withhold information -  cultural trait. VM 
has only withheld information concerning key material 
technology details: high degree of transparency otherwise 
(incl. cost details).
A Open sharing of information a new way of working for AE: 
initial trust problems between VM and AE due to past 
problems between engineering suppliers and VMs. 
Respondent made effort to build up trust from beginning.
A  Tried to encourage communication amongst 2 prototype 
suppliers and their links with JV as they had a special role
Meetings and electronic CAD data transfer. No official performance feed­
back from AE and to Prototype Supplier 1 ’s suppliers.
♦ Communication restricted out-with parties having signed 
confidentiality agreements. Other suppliers do not even know who 
end/indirect customers are.
♦ Confidentiality specified by AE but standard practice.
Much communication via email and meetings. Terms and conditions on 
RFQ. No formal performance assessments.
♦ Suppliers not informed about who end customer/VM is
(confidentiality agreements in place, but communication with 
main partners very open, although suspected that AE had with­
held knowledge of Prototype Supplier 2 not to become involved 
in production to maintain carrot.
A No effect o f history on communication
Problem
Solving
Problem solving a two-way process between VM and AE: a 
partnership. Respondent worked hard to ensure no blaming to place: 
development of trust.
A Process initially inhibited by lack of existing relationship 
between VM and AE: lack o f mutual understanding.
A Process inhibited by AE being used to working in a different 
way: keeping things internally rather than involving external 
partner in process.
Various design faults or failures. A two way process: ultimately AE’s 
responsibility but Prototype Supplier 1 tries to produce to meet the spec. 
a  Problem solving ability grows with experience 
a  Process may be hindered by individuals working across different 
projects hence being difficult to contact.
Some problems with lead times from suppliers: Prototype Supplier 2 
would chase deliveries or seek out alternatives. Meetings to discuss 
design/manufacture problems with AE. Focus on cause of problem 
rather than blame.
A No effect of history on problem solving process.






VM and Eltra residents at AE during early part of project; 4-5 AE 
residents in Asia (initially resisted): improved communication. Much 
travelling of people between UK and Asia for long visits. 
a  (minor * : for AE) VM strongly encouraged residents in Asia 
but did not make it a requirement 
A Reason for need for residents: AE’s lack of experience in 
working overseas
AE had office at Prototype Supplier 1 for project. 
a  ¥ Extensive HR exchange of Asian party sending over people for 
training
AE engineers had office at Prototype Supplier 2 (one manufacturing 
engineer full time) to learn as much as possible about the 
manufacturing process: unique situation. No other exchange.
A Not affected by history of relationship: purely due to nature of 
job.
Synchronising Overall programme management/timing plan mutually agreed 
amongst VM and AE -  input also from e.g. prototype suppliers: a 
combination of VM and AE method of vehicle development.
No explicit discussion of alignment of long-term technology strategy 
plans between AE and VM.
A Project team not required to use existing VM processes: 
freedom to choose suitable processes
Prototype Supplier 1 had to synchronise by adapting to AE’s project plan
(timings).
No alignment of technology plans: works project by project.
A (Previous experience with customers helps to assess whether timings 
are realistic)
a  Only problem for Prototype Supplier 1 may be the small quantity it is 
able to order as large suppliers of e.g. steel may have far more 
important customers
Prototype Supplier 2 supplied a timing plan, Gantt chart: AE had some 
input into timings but project was very process driven: set timings. No 
consideration of long term alignment of technology development plans.
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Appendix F Continued: Analysis and Interpretation of Intra-and Inter-Company Perceptions of Collaboration Activities with
Key Suppliers and Customer: Interception Gateway Project________________________ _________________________________
Supply Chain Manager, NetCom (UK) Project Manager, NetCom (US) Sales & Marketing Director, Securicom
Respondent's 
role
Product management responsibility. Joined FC at start of project. Customer account responsibility. Limited involvement in supplier 
relationships.
Uniting 2 main suppliers in the (niche) market invited to tender: identified
through market analysis.
Compliance with standards and global presence critical.
*  Securicom was natural choice as already supplying for 2G (existing 
contract): natural evolution and hence reduced development costs.
*  One supplier not invited to tender due to lack of global presence. 
Suppliers' other customer relationships not a problem: offerings have 
to comply with different customer technologies/complementarity.
* No attempts to specify sub-suppliers/no approved parts list: seen as 
Securicom’s responsibility and FC does not have the 
influence/leverage in this market. Also little hardware to specify.
Securicom underwent FC’s vendor management process, including 
formal supplier selection and evaluation.
4k ¥ Existing relationship worked against Securicom, as experience had 
not been entirely satisfactory for FC. But the 2 suppliers evaluated 
were both previous suppliers to FC hence enabled both to be pre­
selected.
4k No other network constraints
4k No FC attempts to specify sub-suppliers.
Interactive process: FC considered whether to develop in-house but 
during discussions with Securicom FC decided to sub-contract and invite 
to tender. Securicom underwent a formal tender, competed with another 
company, and won contract.
+ History of relationship with FC was important as this gave FC the 
confidence that Securicom could deliver as promised.
*  Minor effect of existing nature of relationship with FC on 
Securicom’s decision to bid for contract 
4k 4k ¥ No attempts by FC to specify or approve Securicom’s 
suppliers, although FC once suggested an alternative supplier 
unknown to Securicom. Complex software product architecture 
restricts usefulness of this.
Timing Specification internally produced by FC. Securicom became involved 
after specification: time implication (negative). FC has culture of 
producing specs, in-house.
4k No network constraints on timing 
4k No attempts to influence timing
Timing considered early (given that Securicom’s offering is seen as 
standard). Securicom did not have input to specification but was invited 
to quote immediately afterwards. Timing seen as standard within FC.
+ No path dependency effect on timing 
4k Sub-supplier timing left to Securicom
FC developed specification in-house and Securicom prepared document 
in response proposing adjustments: Securicom involved after spec.
Mobilising Formal contract between FC and Securicom: FC owns IPR: not shared. 
Securicom receives payment upon completion o f contract. 
Responsibilities set out for specific objectives through programme plan 
(Gantt charts): shared with Securicom but have been subject to debate. 
*  No initial problems motivating Securicom but during final project 
stage its priority seemed to shift to generate business with other 
customers.
No sharing of costs: Securicom paid for job quoted: ‘blanket cost’. 
Milestones were mutually agreed, including responsibilities. FC 
experienced no problems inducing Securicom to commit although 
meeting commitments were a problem.
Fixed contract establishes costs, terms & conditions (incl. ground rules 
etc.). Overspending becomes Securicom’s problem.
Respondent had problems persuading his own company to commit to 
contract as they were unsure o f the future potential of the project.
4k Industry/FC standards for projects: Securicom aware from past 
involvement.
4k Indications that other more important customer relationships may 
influence motivation to commit to project: respondent reluctant to 
admit this influenced Securicom’s commitment to FC
Communicating Initial design information communicated through RFQ and Securicom’s 
proposal. Weekly meetings to review progress.
4k Policy and procedure information in place from existing contract 
♦ No information withheld from Securicom: NDAs, but less relevant for 
this relationship. FC trust suppliers to respect confidentiality.
4k FC does not attempt to influence Securicom’s supplier 
communication
Mixture of formal written documents and oral presentations and 
meetings. Formal project performance feedback exchanged once: both 
directions from parties’ quality departments.
+ Securicom perceived as hesitant to share information openly. FC 
seen as much more open. Respondent believes Securicom re­
allocated resources to other projects 
4k Believes deliverables were very clearly defined in this project, based 
on lessons from previous projects where deliverables were unclear 
4k ¥ No communication with Securicom’s suppliers.
Extensive communication between technical FC and Securicom staff: 
much is email or conference call-based due to geographical distance. 
Vendor assessment information exchanged. No open book negotiation. 
Cultural differences affect timing and directness of communication.
♦ Does not believe any significant information was withheld, 
except occasional schedule information. NDA and trust with FC 
means 3rd party relationships do not affect extent of communication. 
Tacit nature o f knowledge makes it difficult to transfer anyway.
Problem
Solving
FC process focused on identifying root causes: resolved through 
communication but escalation proved necessary in some instances. 
Problem to get Securicom to recognise existence of problem and agree 
on cause of problem. Securicom tried to resolve problems internally itself 
and did not inform FC of problems till very late.
Many problems for Securicom meeting milestones and delivery dates. 
Also problems during testing re. product functionality: Securicom made 
required changes to resolve problems. Seen as unwilling to customise 
product.
Problems meeting delivery targets. Problems resolved through escalation 
process and reaching eventual agreement. Focus on solving problems 
rather than blaming.




Securicom engineers have worked on site in FC on project -  not as 
extensive as on other FC projects: days or weeks (as project is not 
regarded as key within FC).
Only HR exchange were Securicom engineers on site for testing (weeks): 
less than on other projects due to limited development work required
Securicom staff on site at FC during installation and testing: a few weeks 
at a time.
¥ ¥  ♦ 4k No network effects: NDAs and trust ensure confidentiality
Synchronising FC and Securicom both very industry standards-driven: need to align 
developments with general industry developments and standards.
4k Programme plan (Gantt charts) shared with Securicom but have been 
subject to debate. Also wish to align Securicom road map with FC but 
Securicom claims it has no road maps: source of frustration within FC
FC insisted that Securicom had to agree to using FC processes, rather 
than its own. Securicom used to provide road maps but has not shown 
these recently despite FC requests. FC provides Securicom with 
projected sales info.
+ Insistence on using FC processes based on previous bad experience
Timings, deadlines, milestones etc. synchronised. Securicom seeks to 
satisfy FC’s needs, also watching FC’s long-term development.
4k Respondent occasionally needs to persuade his internal management 
o f FC’s importance and the need to synchronise with its systems that 
may be different from those o f other customers.
382
Appendix G Part A: Analysis Matrices Used for Inter-Case Analysis: Network as Constraint on Collaboration Activities
Base Station Equipm ent Project Interception Gateway Project Asian C ar Project Fuel T ank Project
Uniting:
Dependency effects
• Administrative dependency: indirect sub- 
supplier specification through customer 
parts approval list
• Path dependency: established suppliers on 
approval list- costly qualification process 
to add new suppliers to list.
• Path dependency: 2G collaboration 
history partly constrained FC’s choice of 
key supplier
• 2G collaboration history partly enabled 
FC’s choice of key supplier
• Administrative dependency through 
limited ‘consensus-focused’ intervention 
in supplier selection by customer
• Positive path dependency: History with 
prototype suppliers: involved per default 
to reduce risk.
• Administrative dependency through 
customer intervention in sub-supplier 
specification
• Path dependency: FC suppliers need track 
record to become selected i.e. 





Approval list excluded suppliers 
failing to respect confidentiality
• No apparent effects • Some suppliers deliberately avoided due 
inter-connected customer-supplier 
relationships and associated fears of risk 
of loss o f knowledge to competitors
• No apparent effects
Timing:
Dependency effects
• Path dependency: lack o f experience of 
early supplier involvement prevents 
practice
• Close historical link between customer 
Europe and FC Europe enabled early 
involvement (positive path dependency)
•  Technological dependency: FC produced 
specification in-house due to internal 
competence (afterwards recognised 
supplier’s specification competence is 
stronger)
• Late involvement of several parties due to 
JV set up problems, notably production 
suppliers: administrative dependency
• No apparent effects but previous
experience had shown importance o f early 






No apparent effects •  No apparent effects •  No apparent effects •  No apparent effects
M obilising: 
Dependency effects
• Logistical dependency: customer frame 
agreements with highly dependent 
suppliers
• FC problems transfer across relationships 
and cause chain of mobilisation problems
• Past involvement enabled supplier 
motivation (positive path dependency)
• Logistical/administrative dependency: key 
supplier struggling to commit resources 
due to other customers
• Frequency of changes in JV set up & 
ground rules: administrative dependency 
+frequent engine (and related) changes: 
technological dependency: caused 
frustration/mobilisation problems for FC
• Administrative dependency: through 
Customer intervention in sub-supplier 






No apparent effects • No apparent effects •  No apparent effects •  No apparent effects
Com municating: 
Dependency effects
• Path dependency: suppliers failing to 
respect confidentiality non-preferred. But 
historical suppliers receive more 
information (positive)
• No apparent effects • FC experience with other vehicle 
manufacturers restricted communication 
with customer (path dependence).
• Weak customer alliance relations and JV 
problems constrained extent of 
communication: knowledge, technical, 
and admin dependencies.
• Administrative/technological dependency: 
FC circumvented in sub-supplier- 
Customer communication re. design 
changes, terms & conditions, and 
cost/margin
• Positive path dependency: previous 






•  Information re. project problems withheld 
from customer: FC confidentiality culture
•  No confidentiality concerns: managed 
through NDAs and trust.
•  Confidentiality concerns restricted 
communication: need-to-know basis 
(open within select relationships).
•  Key supplier withheld design information 






• No apparent effects • No apparent effects •  Few network effects: only FC’s lack of 
experience in HR exchange affected its 
willingness to allocate residents to project 
(lack of path dependency).








•  Possibly no HR exchange due to 
confidentiality concerns
•  No confidentiality concerns: managed 
through NDAs and trust.




• Customer reluctant to share road maps 
with FC: partly due to FC having other 
customer relationships: administrative and 
technological dependency
• Positive path dependency: only example 
related to synchronisations being in place 
from previous projects
• Key supplier reluctant to share road maps 
with FC: possibly due to different 
customer requirements: administrative 
and technological dependency
• Technological dependency: need to 
comply with 3G standards.
• Delay in JV arrangement caused late 
synchronisation with production 
suppliers: admin dependency
• FC coping with different customer 
systems: administrative dependency
• No effect of history on synchronising, 
although history mi enabler in judging 
realism of project plans e.g. milestones 
(positive path dependency).
• Administrative/technological dependency: 
FC lacked control over its own module 
design and manufacturing due to 
Customer intervention in choice of sub- 
supplier and technology






•  No apparent effects •  No apparent effects •  Customer unwillingness to synchronise 
with production suppliers (confidentiality 
concems/risk of loss of knowledge)





•  Path dependency: people being change 
averse
• Perceived administrative dependency 
problem: FC being too dependent on 
customer
• No apparent effects • Lack of history/existing relationship betwee 
And customer: no initial mutual understanding
• Lack of technological path complicated rooi 
Analysis
• Technological dependency: problems agreei 
Of technical problems with customer R&D
• Administrative dependency: balancing diffe 
Projects
• Similar to communicating: FC









•  No apparent effects •  No apparent effects •  No apparent effects •  Examples of perceived loss of technology 
from FC to Customer dual source
136 Knowledge exchange was replaced with problem solving after EuroPart case. EuroPart data in this row refers to knowledge exchange.
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Appendix G Part B: Analysis Matrices Used For Inter-Case Analysis: Network as Enabler of Collaboration Activities
Base Station Equipment Project Interception Gateway Project Asian Car Project Fuel Tank Project
Uniting:
Network as conduit
FC consulted customer re. its 
assessment of FC suppliers
No examples/cases FC involved through customer subsidiary in Far 
East
One supplier acting as a sourcing function to 
Japanese 3rd tier suppliers
Uniting:
Network co-ordination
Indirect (parts) specification by FC in 
conjunction with TM
No attempt by FC to specify sub­
suppliers
FC asked prototype suppliers to dual source to 
limit risk
Indirect FC supplier specification for safety 




No examples/cases No examples/cases No examples/cases No examples/cases
Timing:
Network co-ordination
No examples/cases No attempt by FC to influence timing 
of sub-suppliers
Limited attempts by FC/customer to influence 
timing of sub-supplier involvement




FC dual sourcing mobilised supplier 
performance




FC negotiating with indirect suppliers 
FC drove sub-supplier delivery targets 
in conjunction with customer
No examples/cases Customer encouraged suppliers to ensure clarity 
of goals
Few significant effects: no attempts by FC to 
influence mobilisation of sub-suppliers
Communicating: 
Network as conduit
No examples/cases No examples/cases FC networked with customer’s alliance partners 
without customer’s assistance, seeking technical 
information and solutions.
Networking is way to obtain informal 
information e.g. re. launch delays
Communicating: 
Network co-ordination
Two FC suppliers asked to communicate 
to resolve delivery problem









No examples/cases No examples/cases HR exchange across two supply chains prototype
and production suppliers
Prototype sub-suppliers offered assistance at FC




No examples/cases No examples/cases No examples/cases No examples/cases
Synchronising:
Network co-ordination
No examples/cases No examples/cases No examples/cases No examples/cases
Problem Solvingl37: 
Network as conduit
No examples/cases No examples/cases No examples/cases Networking is way to obtain informal 
information e.g. re. design changes 




Few effects: involvement of FC sub­
supplier in resolving complex problems
No examples/cases Few effects: assembly of ‘indirect’ actors to 
resolve problems
No examples/cases
137 Knowledge exchange was replaced with problem solving after EuroPart case. EuroPart data in this row refers to knowledge exchange.
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Appendix H: Respondents Involved in the Four Case Studies




Respondents Focal Firm Interviews: Focal Firm Interviews: Focal Firm Interviews: Focal Firm Interviews:
General Manager (main contact) Business Unit Director (main Global Programmes Director Supply Chain Manager (main
Production Manager (Project contact): interviewed twice (main contact) contact): interviewed 3 times
Engineer during fuel tank project) Managing Director Programme Director Project Manager
Project Engineering Manager Manufacturing Director Programme Manager
Commercial Co-ordinator Manufacturing Manager Programme Administrator External Interviews:
Quality Manager Technical Manager Engineering Director - Securicom (supplier): Sales &





External Interviews: Asian-VM JV (customer):
EP-JV1: Programme Manager Director Product and External Interviews:
J-Car (customer): New Product Manufacturing TM (customer): Project
Engineer Prototype supplier 1: Manager
J-Car Commerce (supplier): Sales Engineering Manager + Project ECM (supplier): Operations
Team Leader Engineer Manager
J-MasterPart (supplier): Sales Prototype supplier 2: Works AluComp (supplier):
Manager + Sales Executive Director Operations Director,
ToolMaster (supplier): Works Engineering Manager & Project
Director + Managing Director Engineer
TP Plating (supplier): 
Operations Manager
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